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Yale  Studies  in  Political  Science,  9 
David  Home,  Editor 


Published  under  the  direction 

of  the  Department  of  Political  Science 


Jayan  and 

jidjacent 

%egwns 

1931 


CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

The  Rise  of  the  Japanese  Military 

By  TAKEHIKO  YOSHIHASHI 

New  Haven  and  London,  Yale  University  Press,  1963 


Copyright  ©  1963  by  Yale  University. 

Designed  by  Crimilda  Pontes, 

set  in  Times  Roman  type, 

and  printed  in  the  United  States  of  America  by 

The  Carl  Purington  Rollins  Printing-Office 

of  the  Yale  University  Press. 

All  rights  reserved.  This  book  may  not  be 

reproduced,  in  whole  or  in  part,  in  any  form 

(except  by  reviewers  for  the  public  press), 

without  written  permission  from  the  publishers. 

Library  of  Congress  catalog  card  number:  63-17025 


TO  MY  FATHER  AND  MOTHER 


PREFACE 


Japan  was  confronted  in  the  early  nineteen  thirties  with  twp 
crucial  problems.  Her  economy  had  been  in  a  state  of  chronic 
malaise  for  three  years  when  the  world-wide  depression  engulfed 
the  nation  and  threatened  disaster.  In  China  and  Manchuria, 
because  of  the  intense  antiforeign  sentiment  which  the  "rights 
recovery"  movement  aroused,  Japan  was  being  prevailed  upon 
to  relinquish  rights  and  privileges  which  in  the  course  of  decades 
she  had  come  to  assume  were  rightfully  hers.  The  growing  feel- 
ing that  the  government  was  impotent  to  cope  with  the  crises  at 
home  and  abroad,  reinforced  by  rumors  of  corruption  in  high 
places,  discredited  the  Diet  and  political  parties — that  is  to  say, 
the  civilian  government — rather  convincingly  in  the  eyes  of  the 
people. 

Hardly  a  more  opportune  time  could  have  presented  itself  for 
self-styled  patriots — ultranationalists,  expansionists,  activists,  and 
young  officers — to  step  forward  with  a  dynamic  plan  of  expan- 
sion. Politically,  economically,  and  socially  Japan  was  in  ferment 
and  ripe  for  momentous  change.1  On  the  night  of  September  18, 
1931,  a  handful  of  officers  of  the  Kwantung  Army,  seizing  the 
moment,  engineered  the  Mukden  Incident  by  setting  off  a  bomb 

1.  John  W.  Burton  in  Peace  Theory:  Preconditions  of  Disarmament 
(New  York,  1962),  pp.  8-11,  22-23,  attributes  Japan's  aggressive  behavior 
in  the  thirties  to  her  economic  hardship,  which  in  turn  was  caused  by  trade 
restrictions  imposed  on  her  by  Western  nations;  also  see  Robert  A.  Scala- 
pino,  Democracy  and  the  Party  Movement  in  Prewar  Japan  (Berkeley, 
1953),  pp. 233-34. 

vii 


viii  PREFACE 

on  a  rail  just  outside  the  city  of  Mukden.  The  Kwantung  Army 
immediately  went  into  action  and  by  the  following  morning  was 
in  full  control  of  the  city.  Its  subsequent  unbridled  military  cam- 
paign into  the  plains  of  northern  Manchuria,  which  precipitated 
the  Manchurian  crisis,  seriously  threatened  world  peace. 

Equally  momentous  but  less  appreciated  were  the  domestic 
repercussions  of  the  Incident.  In  its  wake  the  Army  extremists 
made  an  unsuccessful  attempt  at  another  coup  d'etat,  the  October 
Plot — a  successor  to  the  abortive  March  Plot  of  seven  months 
earlier.  The  succession  of  crises  at  home  and  abroad  strengthened 
the  influence  of  the  military  in  national  affairs  at  the  expense  of 
the  civilian  government. 

Aside  from  these  critical  events,  the  Japanese  military  were 
materially  assisted  in  their  rise  to  power  by  civilian  ideologists: 
Kita  Ikki,  Okawa  Shumei,  and  a  rabid  expansionist,  Mori  Kaku. 
The  first  two  shared  in  common  the  conviction  that  the  military 
leadership  was  absolutely  essential  to  the  success  of  any  program 
for  national  reconstruction.  The  politician,  Mori,  unwilling  to 
relinquish  civilian  control  of  the  government  and  hand  it  over 
entirely  to  the  military,  nevertheless  hoped  to  obtain  Army  back- 
ing in  order  to  institute  a  new  political  order. 

In  short,  it  was  the  crisis  of  the  early  thirties  that  brought  the 
army's  influence  to  the  fore  of  Japan's  politics  and,  once  secure 
in  power,  the  army  saw  to  it  that  the  atmosphere  of  crisis  con- 
tinued. Yet  it  was  patently  a  question  of  time  before  Japan  would 
come  face  to  face  with  a  concert  of  superior  powers  which  could 
not  allow  her  to  continue  expanding  at  the  expense  of  her  neigh- 
bors. When  this  critical  moment  arrived,  the  Japanese  military 
dared  not  back  down  lest  they  suffer  loss  of  prestige  in  the  eyes 
of  their  own  people.  Therein  lies  the  root  of  the  greatest  tragedy 
ever  to  befall  the  nation. 

The  present  study  relies  heavily  upon  the  dossiers  of  the  Tokyo 
War  Crimes  Trials.  Equally  significant  have  been  certain  diaries, 
memoirs,  and  autobiographies  published  in  Japan  since  1950 — 
for  example,  works  by  Wakatsuki,  Shidehara,  Shigemitsu,  Ugaki, 


• 


PREFACE  ix 

Okada,  and  Harada,  all  of  whom  figured  prominently  in  the  poli- 
tics of  the  period.  In  many  instances  the  data  c6ntained  in  these 
more  recent  sources  have  made  it  possible  for  me  to  fill  in  gaps 
and  reconstruct  the  development  by  key  incidents  in  a  new  light. 

It  was  inevitable  that  in  the  process  the  roles  and  responsibili- 
ties of  a  number  of  individuals  and  groups  should  be  re-evaluated, 
in  particular  Mori  Kaku,  a  man  comparatively  little  known  in 
the  West,  who  paved  the  way  for  the  armed  occupation  of  Man- 
churia and  the  eventual  collapse  of  party  government  in  Japan. 
Attention  has  also  been  paid  to  developments  in  the  early  stages 
when  the  Japanese  army  was  beginning  to  act  independently  of 
the  civilian  government,  a  phase  especially  relevant  to  a  study 
of  military-civilian  relationships  and  a  topic  of  great  interest  at 
the  present  time.  I  should  mention  that  the  present  work  was  un- 
dertaken without  the  benefit  of  literature  emanating  from  Chinese 
sources  or  a  visit  to  Japan.  Hence  I  would  be  the  first  to  admit  its 
limitations.  However,  it  is  my  modest  hope  that  the  story  I  have 
developed  here  will  help  especially  those  who  cannot  read  Jap- 
anese to  understand  the  crises  Japan  faced  in  the  early  thirties  and 
their  effect  on  the  course  of  world  history  in  the  decade  that  fol- 
lowed. 

The  Hepburn  system  of  romanization  has  been  used  to  tran- 
scribe Japanese  words  and  the  Wade-Giles  system  of  romaniza- 
tion for  Chinese  words.  However,  the  transcription  of  Chinese 
geographical  names  follows  the  spelling  in  the  Chinese  Postal 
Atlas.  In  citing  oriental  names,  family  names  are  generally  given 
first,  except  when  the  individuals  are  better  known  by  their 
Western  given  names. 

The  present  publication  is  an  outgrowth  of  a  doctoral  disser- 
tation presented  to  Yale  University;  I  am  indebted  in  one  way 
or  another  to  each  member  of  the  graduate  faculty  at  Yale  with 
whom  I  studied  international  relations.  The  over-all  discipline  I 
received  from  them  provided  a  framework  within  which  the  com- 
plex relationships  between  two  oriental  nations  could  be  worked 
out. 


x  PREFACE 

I  would,  however,  like  to  take  this  occasion  to  acknowledge 
my  particular  gratitude  to  Arnold  Wolfers,  now  with  The  Johns 
Hopkins  University;  and  to  Walter  R.  Sharp,  Samuel  Flagg 
Bemis,  Hajo  Holborn,  and  Frederick  C.  Barghoorn,  all  of  Yale. 
The  idea  of  making  a  study  of  the  rise  of  the  Japanese  military 
in  conjunction  with  the  invasion  of  Manchuria  came  to  me 
while  I  was  taking  a  course  in  the  government  and  politics  of 
Eastern  Asia  given  by  David  N.  Rowe.  I  am  deeply  grateful  for 
the  wise  counsel  I  received  from  him  in  the  course  of  completing 
my  thesis.  Were  it  not  for  unflagging  encouragement  and  moral 
support  from  Chitoshi  Yanaga  throughout  these  years,  I  would 
probably  never  have  reached  the  point  of  undertaking  the  present 
study.  Few  students  have  owed  so  much  to  their  teacher  for 
patient  guidance,  thoughtful  suggestions,  and  generous  assistance. 

I  owe  a  great  deal  also  to  Warren  Tsuneishi  of  the  Yale  Uni- 
versity Library  staff  for  innumerable  suggestions  and  the  unstint- 
ing help  he  provided  to  materially  improve  my  manuscript. 
Osamu  Shimizu,  Andrew  Kuroda,  Katsuyo  L.  Takeshita,  Shojo 
Honda,  and  Hisao  Matsumoto  have  been  most  helpful  at  the 
Library  of  Congress,  where  I  spent  many  hours.  I  have  received 
encouragement  from  Dean  Ernest  S.  Griffith  and  William  C. 
Cromwell  of  the  School  of  International  Service  of  the  American 
University.  I  am  deeply  grateful  to  David  Home  and  Marian 
Neal  Ash  of  the  Yale  University  Press  for  their  moral  support 
and  the  hours  of  time  and  effort  they  have  put  in  to  edit  my  manu- 
script with  thought  and  care.  Finally,  I  would  like  to  thank  my 
wife,  Chiyo,  for  her  attention  to  details  and  quiet  patience  in 
retyping  the  drafts  many  times  between  her  household  chores 
and  regular  working  hours  at  a  busy  office. 

T.  Y. 
Washington,  D.  C. 
February  1963 


CONTENTS 


Preface  vii 

List  of  Maps  xiii 

Short  Titles  xv 

1.  The  Mukden  Incident,  i  1 

On  the  Scene  1 

In  Tokyo  6 

2.  Portents  of  Crisis  11 

Resignation  of  the  Wakatsuki  Cabinet  1 1 

Tanaka's  Private  Diplomacy  with  Chang  Tso-lin  14 

The  Other  Arm  of  Tanaka's  China  Policy  1 6 

The  Second  Eastern  Regions  Conference  21 

The  Dairen  Conferences  26 

The  Tsinan  Incident  33 
The  Attempt  on  Chang's  Troops  at  Shanhaikwan 

and  Other  Plots  36 

Assassination  of  Chang  Tso-lin  41 

The  Aftermath  51 

Tanaka  Resigns  57 

3.  Tensions  Within  Japan  61 

Dissension  over  the  London  Naval  Agreement  61 

After  the  Conference  80 

The  March  Plot  83 

The  Cherry  Society  95 

Sources  of  Military  Provocation  102 

Agrarian  Impoverishment  and  the  Young  Officers  1 07 


CONTENTS 


4.  Mounting  Crisis  in  Japanese-Chinese  Relations        119 

Minister  Saburi's  "Suicide"  119 

China's  Positive  Diplomacy  121 

Railroad  Negotiations  124 

Other  Irritants  127 

5.  The  Actors  132 

Accomplices  in  Tokyo  132 

Itagaki  Seishiro  134 

Ishihara  Kanji  137 

The  Wanpaoshan  Incident  143 

The  Death  of  Nakamura  Shintaro  144 

6.  The  Mukden  Incident,  ii  151 

The  Night  of  September  18  159 

Crossing  the  Yalu  170 

Sidelights  at  Nanking  and  Tokyo  185 

The  Bombardment  of  Chinchow  190 

The  October  Plot  194 

Further  Military  Operations  on  the  Continent  206 

7.  Collapse  of  the  Wakatsuki  Cabinet  219 

8.  Prelude  to  Tragedy  230 
Chronology  241 
Glossary  245 
Bibliography  249 
Index  261 


MAPS 


Japan  and  Adjacent  Regions,  1931  Frontispiece 

Chart  of  the  Mukden  Incident  5 

Yamamoto-Chang  Agreements  on  Five  Railroads,  1927-1928      15 
The  Site  of  the  Bombing  of  Chang  Tso-lin's  Train  47 


SHORT  TITLES 


Aoki,  The  Pacific  War — Aoki  Tokuzo,  Taiheiyo  Senso  Zenshi 

(History  of  Events  Leading  to  the  Pacific  War),  1,  Tokyo, 

1953 
Asahi,  Taiheiyo — Asahi  Shinbun-sha,  Taiheiyo  Senso  e  no  Michi 

(The  Road  to  the  Pacific  War),  1,  2,  Tokyo,  1962 
Hanaya,    Himerareta    Showashi — Hanaya    Tadashi,    "Manshu 

Jihen  wa  Koshite  Keikaku  Sareta"  (This  is  how  the  Man- 

churian  Incident  was  Planned),  Himerareta  Showashi,  Sup- 
plement to  Chisei,  December  1956 
Harada  Diary — Harada  Kumao,  Saionji-ko  to  Seikyoku  (Prince 

Saionji  and  Political  Developments),  1 ,  2,  Tokyo,  1950 
Hirano,  Manshu — Hirano  Reiji,  Manshu  no  lnbosha  (A  Con- 
spirator in  Manchuria),  Tokyo,  1959 
IMTFE — International  Military  Tribunal  for  the  Far  East 

International  Prosecution  Section  Document,  Tokyo,  1949 

Judgment,  Tokyo,  1948 

Proceedings,  Tokyo,  1948 
Iwabuchi,   Military   Cliques — Iwabuchi   Tatsuo,    Gunbatsu   no 

Keifu  (The  Lineage  of  Military  Cliques),  Tokyo,  1948 
Kinoshita,  Japanese  Fascism — Kinoshita  Hanji,  Nihon  Fashi- 

zumu-shi  (History  of  Japanese  Fascism),  1,  Tokyo,  1949 
Kiyozawa,  May  15,  1932  Incident — Kiyozawa  Retsu,  "Go-ichi- 

go  Jiken  no  Shakaiteki  Konkyo"  (Social  Origin  of  the  May 

15,  1932  Incident),  Kaizo,  15  1933 
Lytton  Report — League   of  Nations,  Appeal  by   the   Chinese 

Government:    Report    by    the    Commission    of    Enquiry, 

Geneva,  1932 
Maruyama,  Contemporary  Politics — Maruyama  Masao,  Gendai 

Seiji  no  Shiso  to  Kodo  (Thoughts  and  Actions  Underlying 

Contemporary  Politics),  /,  Tokyo,  1958 


xvi  SHORT  TITLES 

Morishima,  Conspiracy — Morishima  Morito,  Inbo,  Ansatsu, 
Gunto  (Conspiracy,  Assassination,  and  the  Sword),  Tokyo, 
1950 

Okada  Memoirs — Okada  Keisuke,  Okada  Keisuke  Kaikoroku 
(Okada  Memoirs),  Tokyo,  1950 

Shidehara  Kijuro — Shidehara  Heiwa  Zaidan,  Shidehara  Kijuro, 
Tokyo,  1955 

Shidehara  Memoirs — Shidehara  Kijuro,  Gaiko  Gojunen  (Fifty 
Years  of  Diplomacy),  Tokyo,  1951 

Shigemitsu  Memoirs — Shigemitsu  Mamoru,  Gaiko  Kaisoroku 
(A  Diplomatic  Memoir),  Tokyo,  1953 

Suzuki,  Himerareta  Showashi — Suzuki  Teiichi,  "Hokubatsu  to 
Sho:  Tanaka  Mitsuyaku"  (The  Northern  Expedition  and 
Chiang  Kai-shek:  Tanaka's  Secret  Agreement),  Himerareta 
Showashi,  Supplement  to  Chisei,  December  1956 

Tanaka  Giichi  Denki — Takakura  Tetsuichi,  ed.,  Tanaka  Giichi 
Denki  (The  Biography  of  Tanaka  Giichi),  Tokyo,  1960 

Toyoshima,  Himerareta  Showashi — Toyoshima  Fusataro,  "Cho- 
sengun  Ekkyo  Shingeki  su"  (Japan's  Korea  Army  Crosses 
the  Border  and  Advances),  Himerareta  Showashi,  Supple- 
ment to  Chisei,  December  1956 

Ugaki  Diary — Ugaki  Kazushige,  Ugaki  Nikki  (Ugaki  Diary), 
Tokyo,  1954 

Ugaki  Memoirs — Ugaki  Kazushige,  Shorai  Seidan  (Refreshing 
Discourse  at  Shorai  Villa:  A  Memoir),  Tokyo,  1951 

Usui,  Himerareta  Showashi — Usui  Katsumi,  "Cho  Sakurin  Baku- 
shi  no  Shinso"  (The  Truth  Regarding  the  Assassination  by 
Bombing  of  Chang  Tso-lin),  Himerareta  Showashi,  Supple- 
ment to  Chisei,  December  1956 

Uyehara  Checklist — Cecil  H.  Uyehara,  comp.,  Checklist  of  Ar- 
chives in  the  Japanese  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Tokyo, 
Japan,  1868-1945,  Washington,  1954 

Wakatsuki  Memoirs — Wakatsuki  Reijiro,  Kofuan  Kaikoroku 
(Memoirs  of  Kofuan  [Wakatsuki's  pseudonym]),  Tokyo, 
1950 

Yamada,  National  Income — Yamada  Yuzo,  Nihon  Kokumin 
Shotoku  Suikei  Shiryo  (Statistical  Estimates  of  Japan's  Na- 
tional Income),  Tokyo,  1951 


CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 
The  Rise  of  the  Japanese  Military 


1. 

THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  I 


On  the  Scene 

The  date  was  September  19,  1931.  The  residents  of  Mukden 
were  puzzled  by  the  unaccustomed  sight  of  Japanese  sentries 
standing  guard  at  street  intersections  that  Saturday  morning.  To 
be  sure,  they  had  heard  the  loud  booming  of  guns  the  preceding 
night,  but  only  the  overly  cautious  had  taken  special  note  of 
them.  Training  maneuvers  by  the  Japanese  railway  guards1  had 
been  going  on  nightly  for  almost  a  week,  and  the  residents  had 
become  accustomed  to  the  clatter  of  machine-gun  fire.  Hardly 
a  soul  knew  that  on  the  night  before  an  actual  skirmish  between 
Chinese  and  Japanese  troops  had  taken  place;  still  less  did  any- 
one suspect  that  the  skirmish  was  swiftly  developing  into  an 
occupation  of  Manchuria  by  the  Kwantung  Army  of  Imperial 
Japan. 

1.  These  so-called  railway  guards  were  detailed  to  protect  a  zone  ex- 
tending the  length  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  and  wider  than  the 
tracks  by  a  few  yards,  as  well  as  some  fifteen  municipalities  known  as 
Japanese  railway  towns,  situated  on  the  railroad  from  Dairen  to  Chang- 
chun and  from  Antung  to  Mukden.  For  locations,  functions,  and  legal 
status  of  the  guards  see  below,  pp.  130-31. 

From  December  1929,  when  the  Nationalist  flag  was  unfurled  in  Man- 
churia, to  the  outbreak  of  the  Mukden  Incident  in  September  1931,  the 
Three  Eastern  Provinces — Liaoning,  Kirin,  and  Heilungkiang — were  nom- 
inally under  the  Nanking  government,  but  Chang  Hsueh-liang,  a  local 
warlord,  held  de  facto  control.  Nevertheless,  Chang  had  to  defer  to  the 
Japanese  in  a  number  of  important  matters  because  of  the  extensive  rights 
which  Japan  had  acquired  in  these  provinces.  These  included  the  leasehold 

1 


2  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

According  to  the  Japanese  version,2  on  the  night  of  September 
18  a  small  guard  detachment  under  First  Lieutenant  Kawamoto 
Suemori  was  patrolling  the  tracks  of  the  South  Manchuria  Rail- 
way just  to  the  north  of  Mukden  when  a  loud  explosion  was 
heard.  The  detachment  about-faced  and  marched,  at  double  time, 
approximately  two  hundred  yards  to  the  north.  There,  where 
the  ends  of  two  rails  were  joined,  they  picked  up  a  fragment  of 
rail  and  two  pieces  of  wood  from  a  railroad  tie.3  The  official 
Japanese  report  said  that  "the  end  of  each  rail  had  been  cleanly 
severed,  creating  a  gap  in  the  line  of  thirty-one  inches."4  At  this 
point  the  patrol  was  fired  upon  from  the  fields  to  the  east  of  the 
track.  The  Japanese  troops,  quickly  deploying  and  returning  fire, 
pursued  the  attackers,  only  to  encounter  more  fire  from  a  con- 
tingent estimated  at  about  three  to  four  hundred  men.  Fearing 
encirclement,  Lieutenant  Kawamoto  sought  reinforcement  from 


on  the  Kwantung  Province  and  railroad,  mining,  and  commercial  rights. 
However,  there  was  a  great  deal  of  controversy  over  the  rights  Japan  in- 
sisted she  had  acquired  in  Manchuria  and  Inner  Mongolia  under  Article 
Four  of  the  Twenty-One  Demands.  Chinese  authorities  were  determined 
not  to  honor  the  terms  of  this  article,  which  Japan  had  extracted  from 
China  under  exceptional  circumstances  in  1915.  Any  concession  to  the 
Japanese  demand  would  have  meant  flying  in  the  face  of  the  strong 
"rights  recovery"  movement  flourishing  in  China  at  the  time.  Although 
the  Japanese  repeatedly  protested  to  Chang  Hsueh-liang,  he  avoided  direct 
negotiations  with  them  and  discreetly  referred  them  to  Nanking  as  the 
duly  constituted  government  of  China.  This  diversionary  tactic,  as  subse- 
quent events  bore  out,  taxed  the  patience  of  the  Japanese  government  and 
especially  of  the  direct  actionists  of  the  Kwangtung  Army. 

2  League  of  Nations,  Appeal  by  the  Chinese  Government:  Report  by 
the  Commission  of  Enquiry  (Geneva,  1932),  pp.  67-69  (hereafter  re- 
ferred to  as  the  Lytton  Report). 

3.  These  three  objects  constituted  the  entire  evidence  of  the  explosion. 
They  were  held  in  the  custody  of  Kwantung  Army  headquarters.  Mori 
Shozo,  Senpu  Nijunen  (Twenty  Turbulent  Years)  (Tokyo,  1955),  p.  53. 

4.  Lytton  Report,  pp.  67-68.  In  a  written  report  which  Minami  Jiro, 
the  -Minister  of  War,  brought  to  the  extraordinary  meeting  of  the  cabinet 
on  the  morning  of  September  21,  it  was  stated  that  Chinese  soldiers  in- 
vaded the  railway  zone  and  attempted  to  destroy  the  track.  Shidehara 
Kijuro,  Gaiko  Gojunen  (Fifty  Years  of  Diplomacy)  (Tokyo,  1951),  p. 
172  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Shidehara  Memoirs). 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  I  3 

the  Third  Company,  which  was  engaged  in  night  maneuvers 
some  1,500  yards  to  the  north. 

It  was  about  this  time  that  the  men  heard  the  roar  of  an  ap- 
proaching train  from  Changchun.  Fearful  of  a  derailment,  the 
Japanese  patrol  broke  off  the  engagement  and  tried  to  stop  the 
train  by  placing  detonators  on  the  rails.  Unheeded,  the  express 
sped  by  at  full  speed.  In  cautiously  phrased  language,  the 
Japanese  report  later  observed  that  "when  the  express  reached 
the  site  of  explosion,  it  was  seen  to  sway  and  incline  to  one  side; 
but  it  recovered  and  passed  on  without  stopping."  It  was  reliably 
reported  on  the  night  of  the  explosion  that  the  train  had  arrived 
at  Mukden  on  schedule  at  10:30  p.m.,  and  by  calculating  back- 
ward Lieutenant  Kawamoto  concluded  that  the  explosion  had 
occurred  at  about  10  p.m. 

The  Third  Company  under  Captain  Kawashima  Tadashi  ar- 
rived on  the  scene  at  about  10:50  p.m.  Meanwhile,  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Shimamoto  Masaichi  at  battalion  headquarters  in  Muk- 
den had  ordered  the  First  and  Fourth  Companies  to  rush  to  the 
aid  of  the  forces  already  on  the  scene  and  had  sent  a  hurried  call 
to  the  Second  Company  at  Fushun,  about  twenty-five  miles  due 
east. 

Shortly  after  midnight  the  company  from  Mukden  arrived  at 
the  scene  of  the  skirmish,  increasing  the  strength  of  the  Japanese 
troops  to  approximately  500  men,  an  insignificant  force  when 
compared  to  the  estimated  10,000  Chinese  soldiers  quartered  at 
the  North  Barracks  in  Mukden.  Nevertheless,  Shimamoto  or- 
dered an  attack  on  the  barracks,  believing,  as  he  later  recalled, 
that  offense  was  the  best  defense. 

When  the  Japanese  troops  reached  the  North  Barracks,  about 
250  yards  from  the  railroad  tracks,  the  area  was  "aglitter  with 
electric  lights."5  The  Third  Company  spearheaded  the  attack  by 
breaching  the  left  wing  of  the  west  wall.  The  First  Company  at- 
tacked the  right  wing  and  the  Fourth  Company  the  center  portion 
of  the  same  wall.  At  5  a.m.,  after  two  cannon  shells  had  demol- 

5.  Lytton  Report.  For  a  more  graphic  record  of  the  engagement  at  the 
North  Barracks,  see  Map  1. 


4  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

ished  the  gate  to  the  south  wall,  a  detachment  under  Lieutenant 
Noda  poured  through  the  gap.  Although  the  Chinese  soldiers 
resisted  fiercely,  in  the  face  of  Noda's  flanking  attack  they  yielded 
ground;  by  6  o'clock  the  North  Barracks  was  completely  in  Japa- 
nese hands,  and  the  defenders  were  retreating  via  the  east  gate 
northeastward  toward  the  village  of  Erhtaitze. 

The  Chinese  maintained  that  the  Japanese  attack  on  the  North 
Barracks  was  unjustified.6  According  to  a  report  by  an  officer 
named  Liu,  a  train  of  three  or  four  coaches  without  the  usual 
type  of  locomotive  stopped  to  the  northwest  of  the  barracks  at 
9  p.m.  At  10  there  was  a  loud  explosion  followed  by  rifle  fire.  At 
10:30  the  roar  of  distant  artillery  was  heard  coming  from  the 
southwest  and  northwest.  A  general  attack  on  the  southwest  cor- 
ner of  the  barracks  came  at  about  1 1 ,  and  the  Japanese  effected 
an  entry  into  the  compound  half  an  hour  later. 

By  midnight  live  shells  were  bursting  within  the  barracks.  The 
main  body  of  Chinese  troops  evacuated  the  grounds,  building  by 
building,  without  offering  resistance.  The  only  exception  was  the 
620th  Regiment,  whose  path  of  retreat  was  cut  off  at  the  eastern 
exit  by  the  Japanese  troops.  It  was  here,  according  to  the  Chinese 
account,  that  their  heaviest  casualties  were  sustained. 

In  Mukden  at  10:30  p.m.  Colonel  Hirata  Yukihiro  heard  from 
Colonel  Shimamoto  of  the  bombing  incident  and  of  the  latter's 
intention  to  rush  to  the  site  with  reinforcements.  At  1 1 :  30  Colo- 
nel Hirata  led  his  troops  in  an  attack  on  the  walled  city  in  Muk- 
den, capturing  it  by  3:40  the  following  morning.  He  encountered 
resistance  only  from  the  Chinese  police,  of  whom  seventy-five 
were  slain.  The  staff  of  the  Second  Division  and  a  part  of  the 
Sixteenth  Regiment  arrived  shortly  after  5  a.m.  from  Liaoyang, 
and  the  arsenal  and  airfield  located  to  the  east  of  the  walled  city 
were  captured  at  7:30.  The  East  Barracks  three  to  four  miles 
northeast  of  the  city  was  occupied  by  1  p.m.  Thus  within  fifteen 
hours  all  important  military  installations  in  and  about  Mukden 
were  completely  in  the  hands  of  the  Japanese  army. 

During  the  same  night  Chinese  troops  at  Antung,  Yingkow, 

6.  Ibid.,  pp.  69-70. 


3rd  Co. 

(Capt.  KawasWma) 


ij    Chart  of  the  Vdukden  incident 

ti  .      .  . 

Showing  principal  happenings  and  actions 
during  the  night  of  September  1819, 1931 


Strength  of  forces 

Chinese:  8m-I0m  1. 

Japanese:    5-600     ' 


Replica  of  Map  No.  6,  Lytton  Report. 


6  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Liaoyang,  and  other  smaller  towns  were  overcome  and  disarmed 
without  resistance.  The  attack  on  Changchun,  the  northern  ter- 
minus of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway,  began  on  the  night  of 
September  18  and  the  city  was  occupied  by  3  p.m.  the  following 
day.  Kirin,  approximately  seventy  miles  to  the  east,  was  captured 
on  the  21st  without  a  shot. 

The  League  of  Nations'  Lytton  Commission,  sent  to  investi- 
gate the  Japanese  irruption  in  Manchuria,  made  these  observa- 
tions: First,  on  the  night  of  September  18-19  the  Japanese,  by 
their  own  admission,  executed  "with  swiftness  and  precision"  a 
plan  that  had  been  laid  out  in  advance  of  the  incident.  Secondly, 
there  was  no  proof  that  the  Chinese  had  plans  to  attack  the 
Japanese  troops  or  molest  the  persons  or  property  of  Japa- 
nese nationals.  Instead,  it  was  the  Chinese  who  were  taken 
by  surprise.  The  Japanese  themselves  corroborated  this  fact  by 
stating  that  the  barracks  area  was  "aglitter  with  electric  lights." 
Thirdly,  the  damage  done  to  the  rails  by  the  explosion  on  the 
night  of  September  18  was  minimal — the  southbound  express 
from  Changchun  passed  over  the  affected  portion  of  the  railroad 
without  mishap  and  arrived  in  Mukden  on  time.  Fourthly,  the 
military  actions  by  the  Japanese  troops  on  the  night  of  September 
18  could  therefore  not  be  regarded  as  acts  of  legitimate  self- 
defense. 

The  Commission  made  the  reservation  that  "it  does  not  ex- 
clude the  hypothesis  that  the  officers  on  the  spot  may  have 
thought  they  were  acting  in  self-defense,"7  and  the  evidence 
seems  to  show  that  this  was  indeed  the  case.8 

In  Tokyo 

The  first  news  of  the  hostilities  at  Liutiaohu1  reached  the  Jap- 
anese Ministry  of  War  in  Tokyo  at  2  a.m.,  September  19.  At 
10:30  a.m.  the  cabinet  met  in  extraordinary  session,  and  Pre- 

7.  Ibid.,  p.  71. 

8.  See  below,  pp.   159-64. 

1.  The  precise  location  at  which  the  bombing  of  the  railroad  took  place. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  I  7 

mier  Wakatsuki  Reijiro  asked  General  Minami  Jiro,  the  Minis- 
ter of  War: 

Did  the  incident  break  out  because  the  Chinese  troops 
destroyed  the  rail  and  opened  fire  on  the  Japanese 
guards?  Was  it  truthfully  an  act  of  legitimate  self- 
defense?  If,  on  the  contrary,  it  turns  out  to  be  an  act  of 
conspiracy  by  the  Japanese  army,  what  do  you  propose 
to  do  about  our  nation's  standing  in  the  world?  .  .  . 
Whatever  may  have  caused  the  incident,  I  will  imme- 
diately instruct  the  commanding  officer  of  the  Kwan- 
tung  Army  not  to  enlarge  the  theater  of  conflict  nor 
to  bombard  and  occupy  government  buildings  and  for- 
tifications.2 

Though  reportedly  caught  off  guard,  Foreign  Minister  Shide- 
hara  Kijuro  entertained  no  illusions  about  the  real  objectives  of 
the  extremists  of  the  Kwantung  Army3  and  immediately  recog- 
nized the  gravity  of  the  situation. 

A  top-secret  telegram  from  Hayashi,  the  Consul  General  at 
Mukden,  the  same  morning  confirmed  Shidehara's  misgivings: 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  there  were  several  requests 
from  the  Chinese  side  to  settle  the  incident  amicably, 
I  telephoned  Staff  Officer  Itagaki.  I  explained  to  him 
that  Japan  and  China  had  not  yet  formally  declared 
the  existence  of  a  state  of  war.  Moreover,  the  Chinese 
stated  that  they  would  adhere  strictly  to  the  principle 

2.  Harada  Kumao,  Saionji-ko  to  Seikyoku  (Prince  Saionji  and  Political 
Developments),  2  (Tokyo,  1950),  62  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Harada 
Diary).  Author's  translation. 

3.  The  group  included  Colonel  Itagaki  Seishiro,  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Ishihara  Kanji,  Major  Hanaya  Tadashi,  Captain  Imada  Juntaro,  and  a  few 
others.  "I  had  a  series  of  forewarnings  prior  to  the  sudden  outbreak  of  the 
Liutiaohu  Incident,"  wrote  Shidehara  in  his  memoirs,  citing  a  succession 
of  presaging  events.  Shidehara  Memoirs,  p.  170.  For  a  detailed  treatment 
of  the  point  see  below,  pp.  152-54. 


8  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

of  non-resistance.  They  also  stressed  the  importance 
of  not  aggravating  the  situation  at  this  juncture  and 
of  seeking  a  settlement  through  diplomatic  channels. 
Itagaki  replied  that  the  prestige  of  the  Japanese  nation 
and  army  was  at  stake.  Efforts  would  be  made  to  pro- 
tect foreign  residents,  but  the  Chinese  army  would  have 
to  be  dealt  with,  since  it  was  they  who  opened  the 
attack  first.  As  Itagaki  showed  no  sign  of  heeding  my 
advice,  all  I  could  do  was  to  repeat  the  same  message 
over  and  over  to  him.4 

At  the  emergency  cabinet  meeting  Shidehara  insisted,  over  the 
War  Minister's  objections,  that  the  scope  of  military  operations 
be  kept  to  a  minimum  as  long  as  possible.  Minami  had  good 
reason  to  object  since  he  was  confronted  with  a  serious  tactical 
problem.  In  his  own  words: 

Since  the  army  strongly  advocated  sending  reinforce- 
ments for  operational  reasons,  it  took  some  time  before 
its  argument  could  be  overcome  and  the  cabinet  could 
decide  on  a  non-aggressive  policy.  The  army's  greatest 
concern  was  whether  or  not  the  small  Kwantung  Army, 
in  the  presence  of  250,000  Chinese  troops,  could  pro- 
tect 200,000  Japanese  and  1,000,000  Korean  residents 

4.  International  Military  Tribunal  for  the  Far  East,  Proceedings 
(Tokyo,  1948),  pp.  15,734-35  (hereafter  referred  to  as  IMTFE,  Pro- 
ceedings). It  is  a  moot  question  whether  Shidehara  read  this  telegram 
before  he  attended  the  cabinet  meeting  at  10:30  the  same  morning. 
Shidehara's  account  is  further  corroborated  by  the  following  passage  in 
a  memoir  by  a  consular  official  stationed  in  Mukden:  "During  the  night 
of  September  18-19,  Dr.  Chao  Chin-po,  the  supreme  advisor  of  the  Three 
Eastern  Provinces,  pleaded  repeatedly  on  the  telephone,  'The  Chinese  side 
will  adhere  to  nonresistance;  will  the  Japanese  forces  cease  attack  immedi- 
ately.' After  each  call  from  Dr.  Chao,  the  Consul  General  or  myself  [a 
Consul]  transmitted  the  message  to  Itagaki,  but  without  any  response." 
Morishima  Morito,  Inbo,  Ansatsu,  Gunto  (Conspiracy,  Assassination,  and 
the  Sword)  (Tokyo,  1950),  p.  53  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Morishima, 
Conspiracy).  Author's  translation. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  I  9 

and  the  long  railway  lines.  If  the  Massacre  of  Niko- 
laevsk  of  1920  had  been  repeated,  the  army  would 
have  been  charged  with  dereliction  of  duty.5 

Shidehara  finally  extracted  from  Minami  assurances  that  "the 
events  would  not  be  permitted  to  expand  beyond  the  present 
point."  At  12:20  p.m.  the  Prime  Minister  announced  to  press 
reporters  the  cabinet's  decision  to  adhere  to  nonaggression.  The 
Minister  of  War  transmitted  the  decision  to  General  Honjo  Shi- 
geru,  Commander  of  the  Kwantung  Army.6  Later  the  same 
afternoon  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  General  Kanaya  Hanzo, 
sent  an  identical  instruction  of  General  Honjo.  The  latter  action, 
however,  was  made  in  the  name  of  the  supreme  command,  there- 
by bringing  all  subsequent  military  operations  in  Manchuria 
technically  under  the  command  of  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff. 

Immediately  after  the  cabinet  meeting  the  Minister  of  War, 
the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  and  General  Muto  Nobuyoshi, 
Inspector  General  of  Education — the  so-called  Big  Three  of  the 
army — met  to  deliberate  on  a  future  course  of  action.  Curiously, 
their  decision  contradicted  that  which  the  cabinet  had  reached 
only  a  short  time  before.  After  the  meeting,  Minami  told  press 
reporters  that  the  Army  need  not  consult  the  cabinet  about 
measures  to  be  taken  with  respect  to  exigencies  which  may  arise 
in  the  future,  but  will  leave  the  matter  to  the  discretion  of  the 
commanding  officer  of  the  Kwantung  Army.7 

This  decision  was  tantamount  to  giving  the  Kwantung  Army 
free  rein  to  occupy  the  remainder  of  Manchuria  at  top  speed. 
For,  after  the  Mukden  Incident,  Honjo,  the  Commanding  Gen- 
eral, and  Miyake  Mitsuharu,  his  Chief  of  Staff,  were  virtually 

5.  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  pp.  19,780-81. 

6.  One  writer  states  that  Minami's  directive  went  so  far  as  to  prescribe 
a  status  quo  ante  bellum — that  the  Japanese  army  withdraw  to  its  original 
stations  within  the  railway  zone.  Matsumura  Hidesugu,  Miyakezaka 
(Tokyo,  1952),  p.  41. 

7.  Tatsuji  Takeuchi,  War  and  Diplomacy  in  the  Japanese  Empire  (New 
York,  1935),  p.  351. 


10  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

powerless  to  check  the  expansionist  ambitions  of  their  extremist 
subordinates,  who  planned  and  executed  simultaneous  attacks 
on  strategic  cities  in  South  Manchuria,  occupying  them  in  short 
order.  Once  the  deed  was  accomplished,  Honjo  could  hardly  pull 
back  his  army  in  retreat.  Increasingly,  Honjo  and  his  chief  of 
staff  came  to  be  treated  as  puppets,  dancing  to  the  expansionist 
tune  played  by  their  ostensible  subordinates.8 

8.  Morishima,  Conspiracy,  p.  63.  Harada  Diary,  2,  77. 


2. 

PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS 


Resignation  of  the  Wakatsuki  Cabinet 

It  is  clear  today  that  the  Mukden  Incident  could  not  have  erupted 
at  a  more  inopportune  time  for  the  government  in  Tokyo.  Beset 
by  economic  difficulties  and  lacking  in  positive  leadership,  its 
power  was  at  a  low  ebb,  and  it  could  hardly  afford  a  further 
weakening  of  its  authority.  Yet  this  was  precisely  what  happened 
when  the  Kwantung  Army  continued  to  expand  in  Manchuria 
in  defiance  of  a  contrary  policy  laid  down  by  the  cabinet. 

How  did  Wakatsuki's  government  come  to  be  caught  in  such 
a  predicament?  For  the  answer  we  must  turn  back  to  the  latter 
half  of  the  twenties  and  trace  Japan's  prior  attempts  to  expand 
her  sphere  of  influence  in  the  mainland  of  Asia,  studying  this 
expansion  within  the  context  of  her  internal  difficulties.1 

Wakatsuki  was  no  stranger  to  troubles  from  extremist  quarters. 
In  the  spring  of  1927,  fully  two  and  a  half  years  before  the  Wall 
Street  crash,  Japan  was  confronted  with  a  domestic  financial 

1.  In  the  words  of  a  perceptive  scholar  of  Japan's  recent  history:  "Jap- 
anese expansion  on  the  Asiatic  continent  and  in  the  Pacific  has  so  held  the 
interest  of  most  Western  writers  that  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  the 
internal  struggle  within  Japan.  Yet  the  key  to  the  expansionism  lies  in 
these  struggles.  It  is  only  by  careful  study  and  analysis  of  Japan's  internal 
history  that  the  events  abroad  may  be  understood."  R.  J.  Wald,  "The 
Young  Officers  Movement  in  Japan,  ca.  1925-37:  Ideology  and  Action" 
(Unpublished  doctoral  dissertation,  University  of  California  at  Berkeley, 
1949). 

11 


12  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

crisis.  Thirty-five  banks,  including  the  Bank  of  Taiwan,  one  of 
the  largest  in  Japan,  closed  their  doors.  At  this  juncture  the  ultra- 
nationalists  and  expansionists — proponents  of  the  so-called 
"positive  policy"  and  avowed  foes  of  Foreign  Minister  Shide- 
hara's  conciliatory  policy  toward  China2 — capitalized  on  the 
bank  crisis  to  administer  the  finishing  blow  to  Wakatsuki's  first 
government. 

The  crisis  developed  in  March  1927  when  the  Bank  of  Japan 
notified  the  Bank  of  Formosa  that  it  could  no  longer  honor  the 
notes  of  the  Suzuki  Company  which  the  Bank  of  Formosa  was 
unloading  in  large  quantities.  In  desperation,  the  Bank  of  For- 
mosa turned  for  help  to  Kataoka  Kenkichi,  Minister  of  Finance. 
Since  the  government  could  not  very  well  let  down  a  bank  with 
semiofficial  status,  it  sought  to  advance  a  loan  of  200  million  yen 
by  means  of  an  emergency  imperial  ordinance.  Such  an  ordi- 
nance, however,  had  to  be  approved  by  the  Privy  Council  before 
it  could  take  effect,  and  Ito  Miyoji,  as  chairman  of  the  Reviewing 
Committee  of  the  Council,  used  his  influence  to  block  it.  Con- 
fronted with  the  failure  of  one  of  Japan's  important  banking 
institutions  and  the  ensuing  chaos  in  domestic  finance,  the 
Wakatsuki  government  was  left  with  no  choice  but  to  resign. 

The  stormy  petrels  of  the  positive  school  had  been  incensed 
because  Shidehara's  diplomacy  was  cued  to  Anglo-American 
leadership  in  the  post-World  War  I  period  and  was  conducted 
within  the  framework  of  the  League  of  Nations  and  the  Wash- 
ington Conference.  It  sought  to  reach  international  agreement  by 
means  of  negotiation  and  persuasion  rather  than  direct  action. 
This  meant  that  the  Shidehara  school  treated  Manchuria  as  an 
integral  part  of  Chinese  territory.  As  demonstrated  during  the 
Nanking  Incident  of  March  1927,  it  did  not  take  the  position  that 

2.  Vociferous  members  of  this  group  included  Ito  Miyoji  and  Hiranuma 
Kiichiro  of  the  Privy  Council,  and  Mori  Kaku  and  Yamamoto  Jotaro 
of  the  Seiyukai.  Mori,  in  particular,  worked  closely  with  the  extremists  in 
the  army,  but  it  was  Ito  who  was  largely  instrumental  in  bringing  about 
the  collapse  of  the  Wakatsuki  government. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  13 

the  Japanese  residents  in  China  were  entitled  to  special  protection 
by  Japan's  military  forces. 

The  ultranationalists  and  the  expansionists  denounced  the 
Minseito  party  for  Shidehara's  weak  China  policy.  Not  only  was 
the  policy  criticized  as  weak  and  unrealistic,  it  was  scorned  as 
downright  unpatriotic.  The  extremists  of  the  Seiyukai  party  joined 
the  chorus  of  opposition  and  criticized  Shidehara  for  having  gone 
too  far  in  observing  the  rights  of  China  and  of  the  nations  of  the 
West  to  the  detriment  of  Japan's  vital  interests. 

While  the  overriding  task  of  the  succeeding  cabinet,  headed  by 
Baron  Tanaka  Giichi,  should  have  been  to  create  a  semblance  of 
order  in  domestic  finance  as  quickly  as  possible,  it  made  its  debut 
on  April  20,  1927,  as  a  matter  of  political  expediency,  with  a 
new  look  on  the  diplomatic  front — a  positive  or  get-tough  policy 
in  China.  In  the  words  of  Admiral  Yamamoto  Gonbei,  "China 
was  Tanaka's  only  talking  point  in  politics."3 

Determined  to  effect  a  demarche  in  China  policy  when  he  was 
named  Premier,  Tanaka  also  assumed  the  post  of  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs.  According  to  General  Suzuki  Teiichi,4  "In  those 
days  Premier  Tanaka  used  to  turn  to  younger  men  and  complain 
about  the  weak  diplomacy  which  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
was  conducting  under  Wakatsuki.  He  said  that  he  would  person- 
ally assume  the  post  of  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  with  the 

3.  Baba  Tsunego,  Gendai  Jinbutsu  Hydron  (Character  Sketches  of 
Contemporary  Figures)  (Tokyo,  1930),  p.  42.  Author's  translation. 

4.  Suzuki  was  a  close  friend  of  Mori  Kaku,  Tanaka's  chief  lieutenant. 
Suzuki  and  Mori  first  met  in  Hankow  in  the  spring  of  1926  when  the  latter 
visited  the  Wuhan  government  with  Matsuoka  Yosuke  and  Yamamoto 
Jotaro.  From  April  1941  to  July  1 9^-4  Suzuki  held  the  important  .cabinet 
post  of  president  of  the  Cabinet  Planning  Board  under  the  second  and 
third  Konoe  governments  and  under  the  Tdjd  government.  He  received  a 
life  sentence  from  the  Tokyo  War  Crimes  Tribunal  in  November  1948. 
See  Suzuki  Teiichi,  "Hokubatsu  to  Sho:  Tanaka  Mitsuyaku"  (The  North- 
ern Expedition  and  Chiang  Kai-shek:  Tanaka's  Secret  Agreement),  in 
Himerareta  Showashi  (Hidden  History  of  the  Showa  Era),  Supplement  to 
Chisei  (December  1956),  p.  24  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Suzuki,  Himera- 
reta Showashi). 


14  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

aid  of  a  resolute  and  capable  man  thoroughly  overhaul  and  re- 
build the  ministry."5 

Tanaka's  Private  Diplomacy  with  Chang  Tso-lin 

Tanaka's  articulate  concern  for  an  immediate  solution  of  Chinese 
problems  stemmed  in  large  measure  from  his  belief  that  he  could 
thereby  forestall  the  activities  of  extremists  clamoring  for  a  hard 
policy  toward  China.  In  the  latter  part  of  April  1927,  shortly 
after  he  became  Premier,  he  summoned  Colonel  Machino  Take- 
ma,  an  advisor  to  Marshal  Chang  Tso-lin  (independent  ruler  of 
Manchuria)  for  well  over  a  decade,1  and  confided  his  plan  to 
steal  a  march  on  these  elements:  "The  real  reason  for  my  as- 
suming the  premiership  at  this  time  is  to  settle  the  Chinese  prob- 
lems— that  is  to  say,  the  outstanding  issues  pertaining  to 
Manchuria.  Manchuria  is  Japan's  lifeline.  If  we  should  allow 
the  Manchurian  issues  to  keep  on  drifting,  they  would  give  rise 
to  such  a  controversy  at  home  that  eventually  the  situation  would 
get  out  of  hand.  This  would  lead  to  a  war.  That  I  want  to  avoid."2 
Tanaka  then  asked  Machino  to  undertake  preliminary  nego- 

5.  Yamaura  Kanichi,  Mori  Kaku  (Tokyo,  1940),  p.  580. 

1.  There  were  in  Manchuria,  among  old  China  hands  from  Japan,  cer- 
tain army  officers  of  active  or  reserve  status,  like  Lieutenant  General 
Matsui  Nanao,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Machino  Takema,  Major  Giga 
Nobuya,  and  Colonel  Doihara  Kenji,  who  enjoyed  access  to  the  Marshal. 
Although  nominally  his  advisers,  they  were  in  fact  observers  for  the 
Japanese  army.  They  also  acted  as  go-betweens  for  Japanese  business 
interests,  such  as  the  Okura  combine,  which  sought  concessions  in  Man- 
churia. On  the  other  hand,  inasmuch  as  these  Japanese  officers  had  to  deal 
directly  with  Chang  Tso-lin,  they  were  more  sympathetic  about  his  prob- 
lems and,  at  the  same  time,  were  more  aware  of  the  growing  hostile  senti- 
ment of  the  resident  Chinese  in  Manchuria  toward  the  Japanese.  These 
sentiments,  however,  were  not  shared  by  the  staff  officers  of  the  Kwantung 
Army  who  were  advocates  of  military  action  out  of  sheer  exasperation. 
Included  in  this  group  were  Major  General  Saito  Tsune,  the  Chief  of  Staff, 
Colonels  Komoto  Daisaku  and  Itagaki  Seishiro,  and  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Ishihara  Kanji.  They  were  critical  of  these  so-called  advisers  because  the 
latter  were  generally  exploiting  their  connection  with  the  Marshal  to  pro- 
mote the  interests  of  some  specific  business  group  rather  than  to  enhance 
the  over-all  prestige  and  influence  of  Japan  in  Manchuria. 

2.  The  quotations  and  the  facts  cited  are  based  on  an  article  by  Shin- 


yarnanwto- Chang  Agreements  on3^e%dlroads 


II II II   South  Manchuria  Railway  Co. 
+H+  Existing  Railroads 

National  Boundaries 

Five  Proposed  Lines 

(1)  Tunhwa  to  Tuynen 

(2)  Changchun  to  Taiai 

(3)  Kirin  to  Wuchang 

(4)  Taonan  to  Solun 

(5)  Yenki  to  Hailin 


S 


1927-1928 


Heiho  V 


16  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

tiations  for  railroad  loans  to  be  made  to  Chang  Tso-lin.  His 
proposal  was  that  Japan  should  finance  the  construction  or  the  de- 
velopment of  five  railways  between  Tunhwa  and  Tumen,  Chang- 
chun and  Talai,  Kirin  and  Wuchang,  Taonan  and  Solun,  and 
Yenki  and  Hailin.  In  addition,  Tanaka  instructed  Machino  to 
inform  the  Marshal  of  Japan's  willingness  to  finance  the  outright 
purchase  of  Russia's  share  in  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  and 
the  Changchun-Harbin  Railway  in  order  that  the  two  railways 
might  be  operated  jointly  under  Sino-Japanese  partnership. 
Tanaka  continued,  "If  these  plans  can  be  carried  out,  I  can  main- 
tain order  at  home  and  we  shall  probably  get  by  without  a  war."3 
That  same  night  Tanaka  summoned  Yamamoto  Jotaro  and, 
following  Machino's  advice,  asked  him  to  assume  the  presidency 
of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Company,  which  the  latter  did 
in  July  of  the  same  year.  Tanaka  repeated  to  Yamamoto  his  pro- 
posals for  the  railroad  loans  to  be  made  to  Chang  Tso-lin.4  The 
two  parted  company  with  a  firm  understanding  that  the  matter  of 
railroad  negotiations  was  to  be  kept  a  strict  secret  among  the 
three  men.  Machino  returned  to  Peking  and  began  to  negotiate 
vigorously  with  Chang  Tso-lin. 

The  Other  Arm  of  Tanaka 's  China  Policy 

Meanwhile,  for  his  right-hand  man  Tanaka  appointed  Mori  Kaku 
to  the  post  of  Parliamentary  Vice  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
By  this  time  Mori  had  already  made  a  name  for  himself  among 


myo  Takeo,  "Showa  Seiji  Hisshi — Cho  Sakurin  Bakusatsu"  (Secret  History 
of  the  Showa  Era — The  Bombing  of  Chang  Tso-lin),  Child  Koron  (April 
1954),  pp.  190-201.  Author's  translation. 

3.  Ibid.,  Asahi  Shinbun-sha,  Taiheiyo  Senso  e  no  Michi  (The  Road  to 
the  Pacific  War)  1  (Tokyo,  1962),  294-97,  Supplement,  pp.  2-3  (hereafter 
interests,  such  as  the  Okura  combine  which  sought  concessions  in  Man- 
referred  to  as  Asahi,  Taiheiyo).  See  Peter  S.  H.  Tang,  Russian  and  Soviet 
Policy  in  Manchuria  and  Outer  Mongolia,  1911-1931,  (Durham,  1959), 
pp.  35-51,  208-234  for  the  origin  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  and 
the  undeclared  Sino-Soviet  war  which  was  waged  in  1929  over  the  question 
of  its  control. 

4.  For  the  details  of  the  Yamamoto-Chang  railroad  negotiations  see 
Takakura  Tetsuichi,  ed.,  Tanaka  Giichi  Denki  (The  Biography  of  Tanaka 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  17 

his  colleagues  as  a  fighter.  His  original  ambition  had  been  to  re- 
orient Japan's  China  policy  by  first  bringing  Japan's  domestic 
politics  under  his  control;  to  accomplish  this  he  had  aspired  to 
the  post  of  Parliamentary  Vice  Minister  of  Home  Affairs  but 
had  been  thwarted  in  achieving  this  goal  by  a  fellow  member  of 
the  party. 

Upon  assuming  his  post  in  the  Foreign  Office,  Mori  summoned 
the  ranking  officers  of  the  ministry  and  told  them  bluntly  that  he 
intended  to  get  tough  with  China.  They  were  dumfounded.  Here- 
tofore, the  post  of  Parliamentary  Vice  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  unlike  that  of  Permanent  Vice  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  had  been  strictly  a  political  office  of  minor  importance: 
the  Parliamentary  Vice  Minister  neither  had  access  to  classified 
materials  nor  was  expected  to  take  part  in  important  decision- 
making conferences.1  But  Mori,  as  soon  became  evident,  was  in 
fact  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

About  the  time  Tanaka  was  forming  his  cabinet,  a  two- 
pronged  drive  launched  the  previous  summer  by  the  Nationalist- 
Communist  armies  from  Canton  against  the  northern  warlords 
was  well  under  way.2  Japanese  expansionists  both  in  and  out  of 
the  Seiyukai  had  viewed  this  advance  with  alarm,  since  the  suc- 
cess of  the  Northern  Expedition  could  very  well  hasten  the  unifi- 
cation of  China  under  the  aegis  of  either  the  Nationalists  or  the 


Giichi)  2  (Tokyo,  1960),  678-88  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Tanaka  Giichi 
Denki). 

1.  See  Ishii  Itaro,  Gaikokan  no  Isshd  (Life  Story  of  a  Diplomat) 
(Tokyo,  1950),  pp.  140^41,  for  Mori's  overbearing  conduct  as  Parliamen- 
tary Vice  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  When  Premier  Tanaka  assumed 
concurrently  the  post  of  Foreign  Minister  he  told  Debuchi,  Permanent 
Vice  Minister  of  foreign  Affairs,  "Don't  discuss  important  matters  with 
Mori.  Whether  they  concern  the  work  [of  the  Foreign  Office]  or  its  fiscal 
policy,  go  right  ahead  and  do  as  you  think  best."  Tanaka  Giichi  Denki,  2, 
643-44,  based  on  account  given  by  Debuchi  Katsuji.  Author's  translation. 

2.  For  accounts  of  the  Nationalist  expedition  against  the  northern  war- 
lords and  the  ensuing  intraparty  struggle  between  the  Wuhan  and  the 
Nanking  regimes,  see  H.  F.  MacNair,  China  in  Revolution  (Chicago, 
1931),  pp.  61-64,  108-26;  Paul  M.  A.  Linebarger,  Government  in  Repub- 
lican China  (New  York,  1938),  pp.  54-55,  105-07;  Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku, 
pp.  606-07. 


18  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Communists  with  the  resultant  diminishing  of  Japan's  influence 
there  and  eventually  in  Manchuria.3  Therefore,  when  Foreign 
Minister  Shidehara  had  refrained  from  joining  forces  with  the 
Western  powers  in  retaliating  against  antiforeign  outrages  in  the 
Nanking  Incident  of  March  24,  the  Seiyukai,  then  the  out-party, 
had  joined  the  opposition  chorus  in  a  scathing  attack  on  the 
Minseito's  timidity  in  China. 

Meanwhile  the  Fengtien  (Mukden)  Armies  of  Chang  Tso-lin, 
which  had  pulled  back  to  the  vicinity  of  Peking  after  their  defeat 
by  the  Nationalist  forces  on  the  banks  of  the  Yangtze  River,  re- 
grouped and  began  a  new  advance.  In  March  they  crossed  the 
Yellow  River  and  drove  southward  through  the  province  of 
Honan. 

In  the  latter  part  of  April,  Wuhan  troops  under  Tang  Shen- 
chih  marched  northward  from  Hankow  to  engage  the  Fengtien 
Armies.  At  the  scene  of  impending  clash  between  the  two  armies 
Feng  Yu-hsiang,  in  league  with  Yen  Hsi-shan,  thrust  his  recon- 
stituted Northwest  Army  from  Shensi  into  the  plains  of  Honan. 

In  the  ensuing  encounters  between  the  Fengtien  and  the 
Wuhan  forces  near  Chumatien  from  May  21  to  28,  heavy  losses 
were  sustained  by  both  sides.  Chang  Tso-lin  was  again  forced 
to  retreat  toward  Peking.  Now  Feng  wedged  his  army  between 

3.  Cf.  Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku,  pp.  530,  534-39,  regarding  a  three-week 
trip  made  by  Mori,  Yamamoto  Jotaro,  and  Matsuoka  Yosuke,  all  three 
prominent  party  members  of  the  Seiyukai,  to  visit  Michael  Borodin, 
Eugene  Chen,  and  other  notables  of  the  Wuhan  government  in  late  Febru- 
ary and  early  March  of  1927.  Upon  his  return  to  Tokyo,  Mori  delivered 
an  extremely  pessimistic  speech  at  a  luncheon  given  by  a  businessmen's 
club,  the  Kojunsha,  on  April  1  predicting  that  enterprises  in  China  would 
suffer  as  a  result  of  the  upsurge  of  nationalistic  sentiment  and  the  pene- 
tration of  Soviet  influence.  Mori  and  his  group  were  not,  however,  the 
first  Japanese  emissaries  to  visit  the  Wuhan  government.  Suzuki  Teiichi,  a 
Japanese  army  officer,  had  been  earlier  dispatched  by  General  Ugaki 
Kazushige,  Minister  of  War  in  Wakatsuki's  cabinet,  in  December  1926 
to  Hankow,  where  he  saw  Borodin  and  later  was  to  encounter  Mori. 
Suzuki  then  proceeded  to  Kiukiang,  met  Chiang  Kai-shek,  and  finally  re- 
turned to  Tokyo  in  May  1927  to  report  his  findings  to  Premier  Tanaka. 
Suzuki,  Himerareta  Showashi,  pp.  23-24. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  19 

the  two  weakened  forces  and,  after  taking  Chenchow,  established 
himself  in  Kaifeng.  Yen  Hsi-shan,  whose  alignment  had  been 
somewhat  in  doubt  till  then,  openly  sided  with  Chiang  Kai-shek. 

Thus  in  late  May  1927  the  situation  was  fluid,  and  the  fate 
of  North  China  and  ultimately  of  Manchuria  seemed  to  hang  in 
the  balance.  In  view  of  the  impending  battle  between  the  oppos- 
ing forces,  Mori  argued  that  the  Tanaka  government  must  send 
troops  to  Shantung  to  protect  the  life  and  property  of  Japanese 
residents  if  the  Seiyukai  were  to  keep  face. 

Initially,  opposition  to  the  expedition  was  voiced  from  within 
the  government,  especially  the  army,  lest  it  precipitate  an  un- 
toward incident.4  Tanaka  was  himself  reluctant  and  suggested 
that  a  mere  token  force  of  two  battalions  be  sent  from  Tientsin  to 
Tsingtao.  Mori  persisted,  however,  and  singlehandedly  turned 
the  cabinet  decision  in  favor  of  the  expedition. 

Saito,  the  Consul  General  at  Tsinan,  pleaded  most  urgently 
against  the  sending  of  troops,  which  he  felt  would  do  more  harm 
than  good.  He  pointed  out  that  the  cabinet  decision  to  dispatch 
an  expeditionary  force  was  based  on  erroneous  information  given 
by  General  Shirakawa  Yoshinori,  Minister  of  War.  Despite 
Saito's  last-minute  telegram,  some  2,200  Japanese  troops  from 
Manchuria  landed  at  Tsingtao  on  May  30. 

From  Peking,  Chang  Tso-lin  protested  that  "Japan's  action 
not  only  departs  from  [accepted  practices  in  the]  comity  of  na- 
tions but  violates  China's  sovereignty,  arousing  the  enmity  of  the 
Chinese  people.  Her  actions  only  aggravate  the  situation."5  The 
Nanking  government  followed  with  a  protest  of  similar  purport. 

It  is  appalling  to  realize  that  this  was  a  one-man  venture. 
Mori's  persistence  can  be  gathered  from  his  defiant  tone:  "If 
Tanaka  will  not  assent  to  sending  the  expeditionary  force,  I'll 
make  him  resign  from  the  presidency  of  the  Seiyukai."6  Because 

4.  Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku,  p.  608.  Asahi,  Taiheiyo,  1,  288-89. 

5.  Ibid.,  p.  609.  Author's  translation. 

6.  Ibid.  The  following  episode  is  indicative  of  the  peculiarly  vulnerable 
position  of  Tanaka  in  relation  to  Mori.  According  to  Matsuoka  Shunzo, 
Mori's  fellow  member  of  the  Seiyukai,  "On  the  day  Yokota  Sennosuke 


20  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

of  Mori's  close  ties  with  the  army,  he  is  said  to  have  brought 
pressure  to  bear  upon  the  members  of  the  General  Staff  as  well, 
for  it  was  reported  that  Major  General  Araki  Sadao,  Chief  of 
the  Division  of  Strategy,  and  his  subordinates,  Obata  Toshio 
and  Suzuki  Teiichi,  carried  out  the  mobilization  order  with 
utmost  reluctance.7 

Though  Tanaka,  despite  misgivings,  gave  in  to  Mori  in  send- 
ing troops  to  Shantung,  the  Premier  sought  in  other  ways  to  pre- 
serve Chang  Tso-lin  as  a  pro-Japanese  ally  in  Manchuria.  Once 
again,  for  example,  he  resorted  to  private  diplomacy  by  dispatch- 
ing General  Yamanashi  Hanzo  to  Peking  in  the  summer  of  1927 
to  visit  the  Marshal.8  Yamanashi  pleaded  with  Chang  Tso-lin  to 
pull  back  to  Mukden  and  secure  his  position  there  behind  the 
assured  support  of  the  Japanese  army.  Tanaka  hoped  that,  if 
Marshal  Chang  were  to  give  up  Peking  without  a  struggle,  the 
Nationalists  would  be  satisfied  with  the  attainment  of  their  pri- 
mary goal — the  seizure  of  Peking — and  there  would  be  less  likeli- 


[the  incumbent  president  of  the  Seiyukai]  died.  Mori,  Kasuga  Toshibumi, 
and  I  happened  to  meet  at  Yokota's  residence.  Tanaka  was  also  there;  so 
we  walked  over  to  his  side  to  tell  him  that  since  Yokota  was  dead,  we 
were  switching  our  support  to  him  and  made  a  toast  to  that  effect.  Then 
Mori  and  Kasuga  turned  to  Tanaka  and  said,  'Hereafter  we  want  you  to 
listen  to  whatever  we  have  to  say.'  Tanaka  assented.  Mori  then  turned  to 
me  and  said  in  a  defiant  tone,  'You  are  Tanaka's  subordinate,  but  I  am  no 
pliant  servant  of  Tanaka.  He  is  the  one  who  is  going  to  take  orders  from 
me.'  "  Ibid.,  p.  494.  Author's  translation.  For  a  perceptive  description  of 
Tanaka  as  a  politician,  see  Scalapino,  Democracy  and  the  Party  Move- 
ment in  Prewar  Japan,  p.  232. 

7.  Yamaura  Kanichi,  "Bosho  Mori  Kaku"  (Mori  Kaku,  The  Arch- 
Schemer),  Filun  Jinbutsu  Tokuhon  (Review  of  the  Men  of  the  Hour), 
Supplement  to  Bungei  Shunju,  33,  no.  12  (1955),  64. 

8.  Although  Shigemitsu  Mamoru  in  his  Showa  no  Doran  (Political 
Disturbances  of  the  Showa  Period,  /  (Tokyo,  1952),  34,  indicates  that 
Premier  Tanaka  was  responsible  for  General  Yamanashi's  mission  to  Pe- 
king, Suzuki  in  Himerareta  Showashi,  p.  24,  states  that  he  sent  Yamanashi 
to  Chang  Tso-lin  in  Peking.  While  one  can  only  wonder  how  a  lieutenant 
colonel  could  have  ordered  a  full  general  on  assignment,  there  is  a  hint 
that  Suzuki  may  well  have  been  the  originator  of  the  idea. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  21 

hood  of  their  pushing  on  into  Manchuria  to  fill  the  vacuum  left 
by  the  defeat  of  Marshal  Chang's  army. 

Chang,  however,  was  extremely  reluctant  to  abandon  Peking, 
largely  because  it  symbolized  prestige.  He  retorted  defiantly  that 
it  was  he  who  was  waging  Japan's  war  against  the  Communist 
hordes,  even  to  the  extent  of  advancing  against  them.  Therefore 
he  was  frankly  puzzled  as  to  why  Japan  should  ask  him  to  pull 
his  punches;  in  his  eyes  this  was  tantamount  to  siding  with  the 
Nationalists,  who  had  fallen  under  Communist  influence.  To  this, 
General  Yamanashi  had  no  ready  answer,  and  he  returned  to 
Tokyo  to  report  on  Chang's  obdurate  attitude. 

The  Second  Eastern  Regions  Conference1 

While  the  Chinese  people  were  still  smarting  from  the  incursion 
of  the  Japanese  expeditionary  forces  into  Shantung,  Mori  set 
afoot  even  more  aggressive  moves  with  respect  to  Manchuria 
by  persuading  Tanaka  to  summon  a  second  Eastern  Regions  Con- 
ference. The  Premier  was  unenthusiastic  from  the  outset,  for  he 
had  his  own  secret  plans.2 

Unlike  the  first  Eastern  Regions  Conference  summoned  by 
Premier  Hara  Kei  as  a  consultative  body,  the  second  assembly 
of  ranking  diplomatic  officials  and  military  officers  from  China, 
Manchuria,  and  the  Kwantung  Territory  met  primarily  to  be 
informed  about  and  agree  to  the  Seiyukai's  reinvigorated  China 
policy  and  the  means  to  implement  it.  Suzuki  Teiichi  tells  what 

1.  Premier  Hara  Kei  convened  the  first  Eastern  Regions  Conference  in 
May  1921.  It  was  a  consultative  conference  in  which  ranking  officials, 
civil  and  military,  reported  to  Tokyo  from  their  overseas  posts  on  the 
Asiatic  continent  to  participate  in  the  formulation  of  Japan's  over-all 
policy  in  China  and  Manchuria. 

2.  See  above,  pp.  14-16.  Although  Ugaki  fails  to  give  reasons  for 
Tanaka's  lukewarm  attitude  toward  summoning  the  Eastern  Regions  Con- 
ference, see  Ugaki  Kazushige,  Shdrai  Seidan  (Refreshing  Discourse  at 
Shorai  Villa:  A  Memoir)  (Tokyo,  1951),  p.  316  (hereafter  referred  to  as 
Ugaki  Memoirs). 


22  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Mori  Kaku,  this  slight  but  energetic  expansionist,  was  trying 
to  do:3 

About  the  time  of  the  second  Eastern  Regions  Con- 
ference, when  I  was  with  the  General  Staff,  I  met  Mori 
at  his  request.  His  main  argument  was  that  the  Chi- 
nese problem  would  not  be  solved  unless  the  politicians 
and  the  military  united.  Mori's  idea  underlying  the 
Eastern  Regions  Conference  was  that  Japan  would 
take  upon  herself  the  task  of  maintaining  peace  and 
order  in  Manchuria.  I  replied  that  I  went  along  with 
him  but  that  I  would  like  to  add  some  observations 
of  my  own.  Mori  asked  me  to  put  them  into  writing. 

In  summary  my  views  were  that  since  the  resump- 
tion of  Sino-Russian  relations  in  1924,  Russia  had 
openly  engaged  in  spreading  communism  in  China. 
I  was  convinced  by  1927  that  this  could  not  go  on. 
Unless  Japan  waged  war,  she  would  find  it  difficult  to 
solve  her  continental  problems.4  Thinking  that  at 
least  the  military  ought  to  be  prepared  for  such  a  con- 
tingency, I  took  the  matter  up  with  the  younger  officers 
of  the  General  Staff  and  the  Ministry  of  War.  In  this 
group  were  Isihara  Kanji  and  Komoto  Daisaku.5 

My  object  was  to  unify  their  ideas  with  respect  to 
Japan's  course  on  the  continent.  The  consensus  was  to 
cut  Manchuria  off  from  China  proper  and  bring  it 
under    Japan's    political    control.    This    meant    that 

3.  Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku,  pp.  599-601.  Author's  translation. 

4.  In  the  original  text  there  is  an  expurgated  portion,  represented  by 
four  blank  spaces,  as  follows:  "ippen  ()()()()  na  kere  ba  tairiku 
mondai  no  kaiketsu  wa  konnan  da."  It  seems  highly  plausible  that  the 
four  letters  omitted  were  (sen)  (so)  (o)  (shi),  i.e.  to  wage  war.  Yamaura, 
Mori  Kaku,  p.  599. 

5.  Colonel  Komoto  was  later  responsible  for  the  death  of  Marshal 
Chang  Tso-lin  in  1928.  Soon  afterward  he  was  retired  from  active  status 
but  remained  in  Manchuria  and  maintained  close  contact  with  the  expan- 
sionist elements  of  the  Kwantung  Army.  Ishihara  was  the  guiding  mind 
behind  the  plot  to  engineer  the  Mukden  Incident  on  September  18,  1931. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  23 

Japan's  whole  policy — domestic,  foreign,  and  military 
— must  be  directed  toward  the  attainment  of  this  single 
objective. 

We  knew  that  the  execution  of  the  plan  called  for 
circumspection  and  finesse,  since  it  was  obvious  that 
no  minister  in  Tanaka's  cabinet  would  support  such 
a  plan.  I  then  went  to  see  Mori.  He  suggested  that  we 
see  Yoshida  Shigeru,  the  Consul  General  of  Mukden, 
who  happened  to  be  in  Tokyo  at  the  time.  Yoshida 
thought  that,  since  the  United  States  would  be  the 
difficulty,  Saito  Hiroshi6  would  be  the  man  to  consult. 
It  was,  therefore,  Saito  who  took  my  draft  and  re- 
vised it  into  a  more  presentable  form. 

It  soon  became  apparent  that  the  undisguised  object  of  the 
second  Eastern  Regions  Conference,  which  took  place  from  June 
27  to  July  7,  1927,  was  to  hammer  out  a  course  of  action  pre- 
cisely as  outlined  by  Suzuki — viz.,  Japanese  seizure  of  Man- 
churia. 

It  is  true  that  various  other  problems  were  dealt  with.  A  fund 
was  appropriated  to  assist  Japanese  residents  in  the  Yangtze 
Valley,  where  they  were  suffering  from  the  effects  of  the  anti- 
Japanese  campaign.  There  was  some  discussion  of  the  large 
unsecured  loans  made  to  China.  Mori  subjected  to  searching  scru- 
tiny the  role  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Company  had  played 
in  the  past,  blaming  the  rapid  deterioration  of  Japan's  influence  in 
Manchuria  on  the  fact  that  the  company  had  failed  to  perform 
its  role  as  the  vanguard  of  Japanese  imperialism  in  Manchuria 
and  Mongolia.  He  made  a  five-point  proposal  that  would  have 
stripped  the  company  of  two  of  its  essential  functions — its  right 
to  develop  the  natural  resources  of  Manchuria  and  Inner  Mon- 
golia and  its  authority  to  administer  the  areas  immediately  ad- 
joining the  railway  zone.  That  portion  of  the  proposal  was  not 
accepted.7 

6.  Japan's  Ambassador  to  the  United  States. 

7.  See  below,  pp.  29-31. 


24  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

At  this  point  there  is  a  large  gap  in  the  records  of  the  con- 
ference, and  one  may  surmise  that  Mori  ordered  the  portion  of 
the  proceedings  dealing  with  his  drastic  proposals  for  Man- 
churia and  Mongolia  stricken  from  the  records.8  But  from  other 
sources  we  can  piece  together  a  fairly  coherent  picture  of  what 
these  proposals  embodied. 

A  clue  lies  in  the  eight-point  program  that  Premier  Tanaka 
announced  on  the  final  day  of  the  conference.  China  took  a  grave 
view  of  these  disquieting  statements  because  they  departed  radi- 
cally from  Shidehara's  policies.  The  most  significant  were  5,  6, 
7,  and  8: 

5.  It  is  clear  that  lawless  elements  in  China  will 
from  time  to  time  disrupt  the  peace,  causing  unfor- 
tunate international  incidents.  It  is  expected  that  the 
Chinese  regime  and  the  awakened  people  will  sur- 
press  these  rebellious  elements  and  restore  peace  and 
order.  However,  Japan  will  have  no  choice  other 
than  resort  to  measures  of  self-defense  should  Japan's 
rights  and  interests  or  the  life  and  property  of  the  Jap- 
anese residents  be  jeopardized. 

Moreover,  in  order  to  impress  on  the  Chinese  the 
nature  of  Japan's  rights,  Japan  must  act  against  those 
elements  who  wantonly  instigate  anti-Japanese  cam- 
paigns and  the  boycott  of  Japanese  goods  by  spread- 
ing false  rumors. 

6.  Since  Manchuria  and  Mongolia  and  particularly 
the  Three  Eastern  Provinces  [Heilungkiang,  Kirin,  and 
Liaoning]  affect  in  the  gravest  way  Japan's  existence 
as  a  nation,  Japan  feels  responsible  for  the  main- 
tenance of  peace  and  the  economic  development  of 
these  areas. 

7.  Japan  must  count  on  the  efforts  of  the  people 

8.  For  details  of  the  conference  see  Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku,  pp.  575-601; 
also  under  "Toho  Kaigi"  in  "Papers  Recovered  from  the  Estate  of  the  Late 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  25 

of  these  three  provinces  for  the  maintenance  of  peace 
and  order  there.  She  will  support  any  regirfie  deemed 
capable  of  fostering  political  stability,  which  would 
also  respect  Japan's  special  interests. 

8.  Should  the  spreading  of  the  civil  war  into  Man- 
churia and  Mongolia  jeopardize  Japan's  special  rights 
and  privileges,  Japan  must  be  ready  to  deal  swiftly  with 
any  faction  threatening  her  rights  so  that  these  regions 
may  be  maintained  as  safe  and  suitable  areas  for  de- 
velopment by  local  and  foreign  residents.9 

Mori  appears  to  have  had  four  main  points.  First,  the  Tanaka 
government  would  not  hesitate  to  send  troops  into  China  proper, 
Manchuria,  or  Inner  Mongolia  to  protect  the  rights,  interests, 
life,  and  property  of  the  Japanese  residents  or  to  quell  anti-Jap- 
anese activities.  He  was  saying  that  Japan  was  ready  to  intervene 
by  force  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  China  when  she  thought  such 
a  move  was  warranted.  Secondly,  since  Manchuria  and  Inner 
Mongolia  were  of  utmost  importance  to  Japan's  security,  she 
would  insist  that  peace  and  order  be  maintained  in  these  regions. 
Thirdly,  Japan  would  back  a  regime  indigenous  to  the  Three 
Eastern  Provinces  if  it  would  respect  Japan's  special  interests. 
Fourthly,  Japan  was  ready  to  isolate  Manchuria  and  Inner  Mon- 
golia from  China  proper  and  set  up  a  puppet  regime  if  the  Na- 
tionalists should  alter  the  special  status  of  these  regions. 

There  is  a  clue  to  the  momentous  import  of  Mori's  proposals 
in  an  exchange  between  Premier  Tanaka  and  Lieutenant  General 
Muto  Nobuyoshi,  commanding  officer  of  the  Kwantung  Army, 
on  the  first  day  of  the  conference.  General  Muto  said  to  Tanaka, 


Matsumoto  Tadao,  Parliamentary  Vice  Minister,"  designated  as  PVM  41 
in  Cecil  H.  Uyehara,  comp.,  Checklist  of  Archives  in  the  Japanese  Min- 
istry of  Foreign  Affairs,  Tokyo,  Japan,  1868-1945  (Washington,  1954), 
p.  109  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Uyehara  Checklist;  Tanaka  Giichi  Denki, 
2,  644-62;  and  Asahi,  Taiheiyo,  1,  289-91. 

9.  Modified  from  Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku,  pp.  592-93.  Author's  trans- 
lation. 


26  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

"Although  this  is  not  a  pleasant  prospect,  Japan  must  be  pre- 
pared to  face  a  world  war  if  such  a  drastic  program  is  to  be  car- 
ried out.  To  begin  with,  America  will  not  tolerate  it.  If  America 
will  not  acquiesce,  neither  will  England  nor  the  rest  of  the  powers. 
Are  you  prepared  to  cope  with  America  and  the  eventuality  of 
a  world  war?"  Tanaka  replied,  "I  am  prepared  to  face  the  con- 
sequences." Muto  repeated,  "You  are  sure  you  will  not  waver 
later  on,  are  you?"  "I  am  all  set  to  face  the  worst."  Muto  said, 
"If  the  Government  is  so  determined,  I  have  nothing  else  to  add. 
We  shall  wait  for  the  order  to  come  and  simply  carry  it  out." 
Thereafter,  Muto  did  not  utter  a  word  throughout  the  whole 
conference.10 

The  Dairen  Conferences1 

The  landing  of  the  second  contingent2  of  Japanese  forces  in 
Shantung  in  July,  following  closely  on  the  heels  of  the  Eastern 
Regions  Conference,  aroused  the  ire  of  the  Chinese  people.  This 

10.  Ibid.,  pp.  636-37.  Author's  translation. 

1.  A  collective  designation  for  the  series  of  meetings,  held  as  a  sequel 
to  the  Eastern  Regions  Conference,  between  Mori  and  Japanese  officials 
in  Manchuria  and  the  Kwantung  Territory.  The  meetings  were  held  on 
successive  days  in  Mukden,  Dairen,  and  Port  Arthur,  August  13-15,  1927. 
One  author  alleges  that  the  so-called  Tanaka  Memorial  drew  upon  the 
decisions  rumored  to  have  been  reached  at  the  Dairen  Conferences.  Cf. 
Ozawa  Eiichi,  Takai  Hiroshi,  and  Oda  Yasumasa,  Shiryo  Nihonshi  (A 
Source  History  of  Japan)  (Tokyo,  1958),  p.  346.  On  the  other  hand, 
Chinese  delegates  to  the  League  attributed  to  Tanaka  the  authorship  of 
an  alleged  confidential  memorial  to  the  throne  of  July  25,  1927.  Japan 
has  denied  the  attribution  (and  at  the  same  time  has  never  quite  succeeded 
in  proving  that  it  was  a  forgery),  but  her  military  actions  in  Manchuria, 
Inner  Mongolia,  and  China  after  1931  offer  striking  parallels  to  the  pro- 
posals made  in  the  memorial.  However,  J.  W.  Ballantine  in  the  Tokyo 
Trials  declared  he  found  no  evidence  to  substantiate  the  Chinese  charges. 
For  further  details  see  Samuel  F.  Bemis,  A  Diplomatic  History  of  the 
United  States  (New  York,  1951),  p.  809,  n.  1;  also  Morishima,  Con- 
spiracy, pp.  7-8;  Shigemitsu,  Showa  no  Doran,  1,  33.  Shigemitsu  and 
Morishima,  as  members  of  the  Foreign  Office,  made  an  exhaustive  inves- 
tigation to  discover  the  true  author  of  the  alleged  memorial.  Both  men 
deny  its  authenticity. 

2.  After  Chiang  Kai-shek's  troops  successfully  occupied  the  southern 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  27 

move,  it  seemed  evident,  was  an  implementation  of  Tanaka's 
"positive"  policy.  In  China  itself  the  boycotting  of  Japanese  goods 
quickly  gathered  momentum8  and  in  Manchuria  a  similar  move- 
ment gained  headway.4  Irate  Japanese  residents  of  Manchuria 
countered  by  calling  a  mass  meeting  and  demanding  resolute 
action  by  their  home  government.  They  sent  representatives  to 
Tokyo  to  arouse  and  enlist  support  both  in  and  out  of  the  gov- 
ernment.5 

In  Mukden,  meanwhile,  Consul  General  Yoshida  was  pushing 
negotiations  with  the  Chinese  authorities  in  accordance  with  the 
decision  reached  at  the  Eastern  Regions  Conference;  but  little 
could  be  expected  in  such  a  hostile  atmosphere.  Simultaneously, 
Japan's  Minister  to  China,  Yoshizawa  Kenkichi,  was  negotiating 
with  Chang  Tso-lin  in  Peking.  He  was  embarrassed  when  he 
was  told  by  the  wily  Yang  Yu-ting  (a  powerful  political  figure 
in  the  Mukden  government  and  second  only  to  the  Marshal) 
of  the  talks  already  in  progress  between  Chang  Tso-lin  and 


part  of  Shantung  Province  in  early  July  1927,  former  subordinates  of 
Chou  Hsien-jen  in  Kiaochow  shifted  their  allegiance  to  the  Nationalists, 
thereby  cutting  off  railway  connections  between  Tsinan  and  Tsingtao.  This 
isolated  some  2,000  Japanese  residents  in  Tsinan,  a  potential  war  zone. 
Tanaka  then  obtained  imperial  sanction  on  July  6  to  move  inland  to 
Tsinan  Japanese  troops  stationed  in  Tsingtao,  after  which  he  rushed  the 
Eighth  Brigade  in  Dairen  to  Tsingtao  as  replacements.  In  late  August, 
however,  Tanaka  ordered  the  evacuation  of  Japanese  troops  from  Tsinan, 
because  the  Northern  Expedition  had  come  to  a  halt  after  Chiang's  re- 
linquishment of  his  military  command  to  facilitate  rapprochement  be- 
tween the  Nanking  and  Wuhan  regimes. 

3.  The  Central  Headquarters  of  the  Nationalist  party  (Wuhan),  in  a 
circular  telegram  of  June  8,  1927,  publicized  its  decision  to  boycott  Jap- 
anese goods.  The  Shanghai  League  of  Economic  Boycott  against  Japan 
passed  a  resolution  on  July  2  calling  for  cessation  of  transactions  with 
Japanese  banks. 

4.  During  the  month  of  August  1927  there  were  many  displays  of  anti- 
Japanese  sentiment  throughout  Manchuria.  The  Mukden  Chamber  of 
Commerce  at  its  general  meeting  on  August  7  ordered  a  boycott  of  Jap- 
anese goods.  On  August  16  the  first  anti-Japanese  mass  meeting  was  held 
in  Mukden. 

5.  Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku,  p.  601.  Free  translation  by  author. 


28  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Yamamoto  Jotaro,6  president  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway 
Company.  Yoshizawa  sent  a  scorching  telegram  to  Tanaka,  not 
knowing  that  Yamamoto  had  earlier  received  secret  instructions 
from  Tanaka. 

Mori  had  been  waiting  impatiently  in  Tokyo,  hoping  to  re- 
ceive word  of  progress  in  the  talks  being  held  in  Mukden  and 
Peking  between  Chinese  and  Japanese  officials.  When  a  month 
passed  without  tangible  result,  he  hastened  to  the  continent  to 
learn  firsthand  the  sources  of  the  difficulties.  There  he  held  a 
series  of  conferences  with  staff  members  of  the  Peking  legation 
and  the  Consulate  General  of  Mukden  and  with  executives  of  the 
South  Manchuria  Railway   Company. 

That  Tanaka  was  only  a  skeptical  bystander  to  Mori's  latest 
move  is  evident  in  a  statement  Tanaka  made  to  press  reporters 
on  August  17,  1927:  "Although  I  am  told  that  the  follow-up 
conference  to  the  Eastern  Regions  Conference  in  Tokyo  is  cur- 
rently convening  in  Dairen,  I  say  that  deciding  on  a  rigid  course 
of  action  vis-a-vis  a  nation  such  as  China  whose  domestic  situa- 
tion is  constantly  in  a  state  of  flux  is  simply  not  feasible.  Our 
government  is  taking  the  position  that  we  negotiate  with  Chang 
Tso-lin  so  long  as  he  prevails  in  the  north  and  likewise  with 
Chiang  Kai-shek  so  long  as  he  is  in  control  of  the  south."7 

Mori  proposed  that  ineffective  approaches  to  the  solution  of 
Manchurian  problems  be  discarded  and  new  lines  of  attack  de- 
vised. Spheres  of  operation  were  to  be  staked  out  more  distinctly, 
so  that  each  team  comprehended  the  task  it  was  to  perform.  The 
South  Manchuria  Railway  Company  would  continue  to  handle 
railroad  problems  while  Yoshida,  as  the  Consul  General  at  Muk- 
den, would  deal  with  local  issues  in  Manchuria.  Negotiations 
covering  outstanding  questions  on  Manchuria  and  Inner  Mon- 
golia were  to  be  conducted  in  Peking  between  Chang  Tso-lin  and 
Yoshizawa. 

These  so-called  outstanding  questions  pertained  to  the  rights 

6.  See  above,  pp.  14-16. 

7.  Author's  free  translation  from  Tanaka  Giichi  Denki,  2,  740. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  29 

and  privileges  Japan  claimed  to  have  acquired  in  Manchuria  and 
Inner  Mongolia  under  Group  II  of  the  Twenty-one  Demands 
of  May  25,  1 9 1 5 . s  Yoshizawa's  proposed  broad  agenda  touched 
upon  the  following  points. 

1.  The  extension  of  the  leases  of  Port  Arthur, 
Dairen,  South  Manchuria  Railway,  and  Antung-Muk- 
den  Railway  to  ninety-nine  years 

2.  The  right  of  Japanese  nationals  to  lease  land  for 
commercial,  manufacturing,  and  agricultural  enter- 
prises, and  to  reside  and  travel 

3.  The  right  of  Japanese  nationals  to  undertake  joint 
enterprises  with  Chinese  nationals 

4.  Suitable  localities  in  eastern  Inner  Mongolia  to 
be  opened  to  foreigners  for  trade  and  residence 

5.  The  right  to  prospect  and  extract  mineral  re- 
sources 

6.  The  prior  right  of  Japanese  nationals  to  invest 
in  railroad  building  in  South  Manchuria  and  eastern 
Inner  Mongolia 

7.  Prior  right  of  Japanese  nationals  to  be  em- 
ployed as  advisers  or  instructors  in  political,  financial, 
military,  and  police  matters 

8.  Speedy  revision  of  the  Kirin-Changchun  Railway 
Loan  Agreement 

The  Chinese  government  had  consistently  questioned  the  va- 
lidity of  these  agreements,  since  it  had  been  forced  to  conclude 
them  under  duress.  That  the  United  States  frowned  upon  the 
treaties,  and  the  world  in  general  disapproved  of  Japan's  action, 
strengthened  China's  moral  position  and  made  her  all  the  more 
reluctant  to  continue  them.  Moreover,  Japan  was  flying  in  the 
face  of  the  rights  recovery  movement  of  the  late  twenties,  where- 

8.  Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku,  pp.  588-90,  602.  H.  F.  MacNair  and  Donald 
F.  Lach,  Modern  Far  Eastern  International  Relations  (New  York,  1950), 
p.  184. 


30  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

by  China  sought  wholesale  abrogation  of  the  rights  the  powers 
had  extracted  from  her  by  means  of  unequal  treaties.9 

Of  particular  significance  was  the  temper  of  the  Dairen  Con- 
ferences. The  consensus  among  the  participants  was  that  the 
time  had  come  for  Japan  to  apply  coercive  measures.  The  im- 
patient went  so  far  as  to  demand  immediate  occupation  of  Man- 
churia, foreshadowing  the  abortive  attempt  made  less  than  a 
year  later,  in  May  1928. 10  But  what  seemed  like  a  well-coordi- 
nated two-pronged  drive  on  the  Chinese  at  Peking  and  Mukden 
met  rebuffs  from  unexpected  quarters. 

When  Yamamoto  Jotaro  learned  at  the  Dairen  Conferences 
of  the  drastic  measures  Mori  was  proposing,  he  rushed  back  to 
Tokyo  to  report  to  Tanaka  on  the  progress  he  was  making  in 
negotiating  directly  with  Chang  Tso-lin.  Yamamoto  then  invited 
to  his  residence  Mori  and  other  key  figures  of  the  Foreign  Office, 
including  Debuchi  Katsuji,  Vice  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
Kimura  Eiichi,  Chief  of  the  Asia  Bureau,  and  Uehara  Etsujiro, 
parliamentary  councilor,  and  informed  them  of  the  private,  nego- 
tiation in  which  he  was  engaged  with  Chang  Tso-lin  in  Peking. 
Yamamoto  pleaded  that  the  decisions  reached  at  the  Dairen 
Conferences  would  only  undo  favorable  concessions  he  had  ex- 
tracted from  the  Marshal  on  five  railroads,  of  which  Chang  had 
already  formally  approved  two.11  Although  indignant,  Mori, 
Yoshizawa,  and  the  staff  of  the  Foreign  Office  had  to  drop  their 
plans.  The  incident  again  pointed  up  Tanaka's  ineptness  in  for- 
mulating a  well-coordinated  China  policy,  as  well  as  the  exces- 
sive influence  which  Mori  was  attempting  to  exert  over  Tanaka's 
foreign  policy. 

Upon  returning  to  Mukden,  Yoshida  promptly  changed  tack. 
Assuming  that  it  was  within  the  competency  of  the  officials  on  the 
spot  to  implement  the  policies  decided  at  the  Eastern  Regions 
and  Dairen  Conferences,  he  threatened  to  abrogate  the  Pact  of 

9.  For  additional  information  see  Foreign  Relations  (Washington, 
1915),  pp.  197-204;  and  MacNair  and  Lach,  Modern  Far  Eastern  Interna- 
tional Relations,  pp.  183-97. 

10.  See  below,  pp.  37—40. 

11.  See  Morishima,  Conspiracy,  p.  13.  Asahi,  Taiheiyo,  1,  457  n. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  31 

1909,  which  enabled  the  Peking-Mukden  railroad  to  cross  the 
rails  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Company  and  reach 
Chang's  arsenal  within  Mukden's  city  walls.  An  arsenal  deprived 
of  its  spur  tracks  would  have  materially  weakened  Chang's  hand. 

This  time  Yoshida  encountered  opposition  from  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Kwantung  Army:  he  was  bluntly  told  that  it  was 
premature  to  apply  extreme  measures.  Since  no  diplomatic  move 
could  hope  to  attain  its  objective  in  Manchuria  without  the  back- 
ing of  the  Kwantung  Army,  he  had  no  way  out  but  to  feign  ill- 
ness and  withdraw  to  Tokyo.  Reportedly  the  rebuff  was  intended 
purely  as  a  personal  affront  to  Yoshida,  whose  caustic  tongue 
had  incurred  the  ill  feelings  of  highly  placed  officials  in  Port 
Arthur. 

Having  narrowly  prevented  Mori  from  performing  what  he 
called  a  "surgical  operation"  on  Manchuria,  Yamamoto  and 
Machino  had  all  the  more  reason  for  continuing  their  negotia- 
tions in  Peking  with  renewed  vigor.  They  sensed  that  time  was 
running  out.  Only  after  a  concentrated  effort  was  Machino  suc- 
cessful in  overcoming  the  Marshal's  initial  reluctance  and  paving 
the  way  for  the  final  stage  of  the  negotiations.  In  November, 
Yamamoto  visited  Peking  and  at  last  obtained  the  formal  ap- 
proval of  Chang  Tso-lin  and  Yang  Yu-ting  on  two  of  the  rail- 
ways. Machino  returned  to  Tokyo  the  same  month  to  report  to 
Tanaka  on  the  progress  of  the  negotiations.  In  February  1928 
Chang  and  Yamamoto  concluded  an  agreement,  which  they 
decided  to  announce  formally  in  July. 

As  part  of  the  pact,  parcels  of  land  were  to  be  attached  to 
each  railway  zone.  In  addition  to  financing  the  development  of 
the  railroads,  under  the  nominal  designation  of  rent  Japan  agreed 
to  pay  a  total  of  ten  million  yen  in  two  installments.  The  first  five 
million  was  to  be  paid  in  July  when  the  agreement  was  an- 
nounced and  the  balance  when  construction  was  actually  begun. 
However,  on  the  initiative  of  Machino  the  date  of  the  initial  pay- 
ment was  advanced,  and  a  draft  for  five  million  yen  was  paid  in 
February  1928. 

Why  did  Marshal  Chang  accede,  though  reluctantly,  to  a 


32  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

portion  of  the  Japanese  demands?  There  is  no  question  that  the 
Marshal  was  in  critical  need  of  up-to-date  arms  for  his  troops. 
In  November  1927  it  was  only  a  question  of  time  before  the 
Nationalist  Army  resumed  its  northward  march.  Chiang  Kai- 
shek  was  homeward  bound  from  Japan  to  take  over  military 
command.12  In  the  severe  fighting  around  Chumatien  in  May 
1927  Marshal  Chang  had  had  a  foretaste  of  the  superiority  of 
disciplined  and  well-equipped  Nationalist  troops.  Thus  Japan 
was  obliged  to  advance  the  date  of  the  initial  payment  if  the 
Marshal  were  to  block  the  Nationalist  troops  from  surging  into 
Manchuria. 

Also  working  in  favor  of  Japan's  railroad  designs  in  Man- 
churia were  Marshal  Chang's  suspicion  and  dislike  of  the  Rus- 
sians and  his  preoccupation  with  eliminating  Soviet  influence  in 
Manchuria — attitudes  that  resulted  from  the  Karakhan-Koo 
Agreement  of  May  1924,  whereby  the  Soviets  succeeded  in  re- 
storing the  old  Tsarist  rights  over  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway.13 
Chang  Tso-lin,  as  independent  ruler  of  Manchuria,  flatly  refused 
to  recognize  this  agreement.  Later  the  same  year,  however,  when 
the  Soviets  threatened  his  rear  by  massing  their  troops  along  the 
northern  borders  during  his  crucial  struggle  with  Wu  Pei-fu, 
Chang  Tso-lin  had  to  accede.  On  September  20,  1924,  the  Mar- 
shal concluded  a  special  convention  with  Ambassador  Leo 
Karakhan  in  Mukden  confirming  the  Karakhan-Koo  Agreement, 
although  with  some  modifications. 

At  the  time,  the  Marshal  demanded  and  secured  from  the 
Soviets  as  quid  pro  quo  an  arms  understanding  and  assurance 
that  they  would  not  molest  his  rear  during  the  Shanhaikwan  bat- 
tle against  Wu  Pei-fu  in  October  1924.  The  understanding  was 
not  made  effective  until  the  following  spring,  when  the  Marshal 
was  in  need  of  fresh  arms  to  liquidate  the  enemy  positions 
around  Peking.  Then,  however,  his  effort  to  obtain  arms  from 

12.  See  below,  p.  33. 

13.  See  MacNair  and  Lach,  Modern  Far  Eastern  International  Rela- 
tions, pp.  264-66;  also  Putnam  Weale  (Bertram  Lenox  Simpson),  Why 
China  Sees  Red  (New  York,  1925),  pp.  92-93. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  33 

the  Soviets  met  with  an  open  rebuff.  He  was  so  enraged  that  he 
hastily  sanctioned  the  construction  by  Japan  of  the  Taonanfu- 
Tsitsihar  Railway,  which,  by  intersecting  the  Chinese  Eastern 
Railway,  would  have  driven  a  wedge  into  the  Russian  sphere  in 
Manchuria.  The  tension  between  the  Marshal  and  the  Soviets 
continued  to  mount;  in  early  1926  Chang  ordered  the  arrest  of 
M.  Ivanov-Rinov,  the  director-general  of  the  Chinese  Eastern 
Railway,  though  he  was  later  released.  Thus  there  was  historical 
reason  to  presume  that  Chang's  railway  concessions  to  Japan 
may  in  part  have  stemmed  from  the  Marshal's  desire  to  check 
the  penetration  of  Soviet  political  and  economic  influence  into 
Manchuria. 

The  Tsinan  Incident 

In  September  1927,  Japanese  troops  were  evacuated  from  Shan- 
tung. Only  eight  months  later,  in  May  1928,  Tanaka's  cabinet 
was  again  saddled  with  the  responsibility  of  safeguarding  Japa- 
nese residents  in  that  area.  In  mid-March  Chiang  Kai-shek,  now 
fully  restored  to  power  and  in  league  with  Feng  Yu-hsiang  and 
Yen  Hsi-shan,1  had  resumed  a  general  offensive  against  Chang 
Tso-lin  and  the  remnants  of  the  northern  warlords.  By  mid- April 
a  combined  force  of  some  quarter  of  a  million  troops  was  de- 
ployed in  a  semicircle  ready  to  converge  on  Tsinan.  Residing  in 
and  about  the  city  were  2,000  Japanese;  an  additional  17,000 
lived  along  the  Shantung  railway  or  in  the  city  of  Tsingtao.2 

Details  of  the  second  Japanese  expedition  and  the  unfortunate 
collision  with  the  Nationalist  forces  that  ensued  has  been  ade- 

1.  In  the  previous  summer  the  Northern  Expedition  came  to  a  stop 
when,  in  order  to  make  possible  the  rapprochement  between  the  Nanking 
and  Wuhan  governments,  Chiang  went  into  voluntary  exile  and  visited 
Japan.  It  was  during  his  sojourn  there  that  he  held  a  conversation  with 
Tanaka  and  Mori  at  Hakone.  In  this  interlude  the  Wuhan  government 
purged  itself  of  communist  elements. 

2.  Japanese  residents  in  Shantung  and  Hopeh  were  distributed  as  fol- 
lows: Tsinan,  2,233;  Tientsin,  6,746;  Peking,  1,586;  Tsingtao,  13,621. 
Figures  are  derived  from  Tanaka  Ciichi  Denki,  2,  621. 


34  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

quately  dealt  with  in  a  number  of  well-known  works.3  Our  pri- 
mary concern  is  to  understand  the  circumstance  which  prompted 
the  Tanaka  government  to  send  the  second  expeditionary  force 
to  Shantung  despite  the  unpopularity  of  the  first. 

This  time  also  there  was  bitter  opposition  from  both  houses 
of  the  Diet,  and  Tanaka  and  the  army  were  opposed  to  sending 
troops.  Moreover,  Tanaka  was  reluctant  to  go  back  on  the  un- 
derstanding he  had  reached  with  Chiang  the  previous  October 
at  Hakone.  He  had  agreed  that  Japan  would  recognize  the  Na- 
tionalist revolution  and  the  unified  China  which  emerged  as  a 
result  of  it,  one  proviso  being  that  the  party  dissociate  itself 
from  its  Communist  elements.  Chiang,  in  return,  recognized 
Japan's  rights  and  vested  interests  in  Manchuria.4 

Mori  also  had  participated  in  the  Hakone  conversations,  but 
he  now  insisted  that  troops  be  sent  to  the  trouble  spot  again.  He 
argued  that  the  Seiyukai  must  live  up  to  the  public  statement  it 
had  made  at  the  time  of  the  first  expedition,  when  the  Japanese 
troops  were  evacuated — that  in  the  future  it  would  be  under 
obligation  to  send  troops  to  China  whenever  a  disturbance 
threatened  the  life  or  property  of  Japanese  residents  there.5  One 

3.  Takeuchi,  War  and  Diplomacy  in  the  Japanese  Empire,  pp.  248-61. 
Chitoshi  Yanaga,  Japan  since  Perry  (New  York,  1949),  pp.  455-56. 
MacNair  and  Lach,  Modern  Far  Eastern  International  Relations,  p.  307. 
MacNair,  China  in  Revolution,  pp.  130-34.  The  Incident  was  triggered  by 
the  firing  of  a  gun  by  Japan's  Special  Service  Agent  as  Chinese  and  Jap- 
anese troops  confronted  each  other  in  Tsinan.  Nezu  Masashi,  Dai  Nihon 
Teikoku  no  Hdkai  (Collapse  of  Imperial  Japan)  /  (Tokyo,  1961),  91. 

4.  For  the  mutual  understanding  achieved  at  Hakone  see  Yamaura, 
Mori  Kaku,  pp.  614-15;  Shigemitsu,  Showa  no  Doran,  1,  34-35;  Suzuki, 
Himerareta  Showashi,  pp.  24-25,  Tanaka  Giichi  Denki,  2,  741-47.  One 
writer  contends  that  it  was  not  Tanaka  but  Lieutenant  General  Matsui 
Iwane  who  met  Chiang  Kai-shek  at  Hakone  to  pave  the  way  for  a  subse- 
quent meeting  between  Chiang  and  Tanaka  at  the  latter's  residence  in 
Tokyo  on  November  5,  1927.  This  writer  states  that  Tanaka's  appointment 
book  does  not  mention  the  date  or  place  of  the  alleged  meeting,  nor  does 
it  even  place  Tanaka  at  Hakone  during  October.  Cf.  Tanaka  Giichi  Denki, 
2,  741,  828-29.  However,  the  question  is  not  where  these  two  men  met 
but  whether  they  actually  reached  a  firm  understanding.  Mr.  Takakura, 
the  editor  of  Tanaka  Giichi  Denki,  does  not  clarify  this  point. 

5.  Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku,  pp.  610-11. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  35 

author  believes  it  was  a  part  of  Mori's  vote-getting  tactics.6  Mori 
contended  that,  although  the  Nationalist  troops  might  not  require 
attention,  there  was  the  possibility  that  the  retreating  army  of 
Chang  Tso-lin  might  molest  Japanese  residents. 

After  the  sharp  Sino-Japanese  clash  of  arms  at  Tsinan,  it 
took  almost  a  year  of  painstaking  negotiation  between  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  two  governments  before  the  incident  was 
amicably  settled.  However,  the  resentment  of  the  Chinese  people 
did  not  subside  so  easily;  it  persisted  for  years  and  plagued  the 
relations  between  the  two  countries. 

It  is  essential  to  point  out  that  Shigemitsu  Mamoru,  Japan's 
principal  negotiator,  encountered  difficulties  on  two  fronts.  The 
inflexible  attitude  of  Mori  gave  him  as  much  as,  or  even  more 
trouble  than,  the  demands  made  by  the  Chinese  representatives. 
Seldom  does  one  come  across  passages  like  the  following  from 
Shigemitsu's  diplomatic  memoirs,  which  portray  Mori's  inten- 
tions toward  China  in  such  startling  fashion: 

It  was  decided  that  I  should  proceed  to  Shanghai 
to  find  a  way  out  of  the  present  impasse  in  the  Japa- 
nese-Chinese negotiations.  On  February  18  [1929] 
the  leading  officials  of  the  Foreign  Office  met  to  delib- 
erate over  the  instructions  which  were  to  guide  my 
negotiations.  Present  at  the  meeting  were  Yoshida 
Shigeru,  Vice  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs;  Mori  Kaku, 
Parliamentary  Vice  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs; 
Uehara  Etsujiro,  a  Parliamentary  Councilor;  Arita 
Hachiro,  Chief  of  the  Asia  Bureau;  and  myself. 

What  I  recall  vividly  to  this  day  was  Mori's  atti- 
tude. Since  Tanaka  held  the  portfolio  of  Foreign  Min- 
ister concurrently  with  the  premiership,  Mori  took  the 
attitude  that  he  was  to  run  the  Foreign  Office.  More- 
over, with  respect  to  China,  Mori  entertained  ideas 
which  were  at  variance  with  all  others.  That  day  Mori 

6.  See  Ito  Masanori,  Gunbatsu  Koboshi  (The  History  of  the  Rise  and 
Fall  of  the  Military),  2  (Tokyo,  1958),  133-34. 


36  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

said  to  me  in  an  overbearing  tone  of  voice,  "To  begin 
with,  it's  all  wrong  to  try  to  reach  a  settlement  over  an 
incident  like  the  one  at  Tsinan.  We  have  gotten  our- 
selves into  troubles  like  today's  because  Yoshizawa 
[Minister  to  China]  tried  to  reach  a  settlement.  You 
must  be  prepared  to  make  little  of  turning  places  like 
Shanghai  into  shambles.  When  you  go  to  Shanghai 
this  time,  you  must  bear  in  mind  not  to  be  lulled  into 
a  conciliatory  attitude.  Negotiations  of  this  sort  must 
be  dashed  to  pieces." 

Yoshida  and  Arita  listened  in  amazement.  Mori  was 
babbling  beyond  the  bounds  of  reason.  Since  I  was 
warned  beforehand  by  Tani  Masayuki  of  Mori's  dis- 
quieting attitude,  I  managed  to  gloss  over  the  situa- 
tion by  replying,  "Your  point  of  view  is  well  taken." 
Mori's  idea  was  diametrically  opposite  to  the  briefing 
I  had  received  from  Premier  Tanaka,  who  had  given 
me  instructions  in  his  capacity  as  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs.  It  seemed  as  if  Mori  was  already  in  league 
with  the  extremists  of  the  army  and  was  itching  to 
create  disorder  in  China  in  order  that  they  might  capi- 
talize on  the  confusion  to  extend  Japan's  influence 
there.7 

The  Attempt  on  Chang's  Troops  at  Shanhaikwan 
and  Other  Plots 

After  the  Sino-Japanese  clash  at  Tsinan,  the  Nationalist  troops 
bypassed  the  city  and  resumed  their  northward  march  toward 
Peking.  In  the  face  of  the  advance  of  the  better  disciplined  Na- 
tionalists, Marshal  Chang's  forces  beat  a  hasty  retreat  across 
the  northern  plains  toward  the  capital  city,  and  by  the  middle 
of  May  1928  its  fall  appeared  imminent. 

At  this  critical  juncture  Yamamoto  Jotaro,  president  of  the 

7.  Shigemitsu  Mamoru,  Gaiko  Kaisoroku  (A  Diplomatic  Memoir) 
(Tokyo,  1953),  pp.  65-66  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Shigemitsu  Memoirs). 
Author's  translation. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  37 

South  Manchuria  Railway  Company,  again  arrived  in  Peking 
to  press  Chang  Tso-lin  to  sign  the  particulars"  of  the  railway 
agreements  to  which  Chang  had  grudgingly  assented  the  pre- 
vious fall.1  In  this  exigency,  Yamamoto  finally  extracted  from 
the  Marshal  approval  for  Japan  to  engage  in  further  develop- 
ment and  construction  of  railroads  between  Kirin  and  Kainei 
and  between  Changchun  and  Dairen. 

Concurrently,  however,  an  even  bitterer  pill  was  being  pre- 
scribed for  Marshal  Chang  in  Tokyo.  As  a  result  of  the  cabinet 
meeting  of  May  16,  a  decision  was  reached  to  issue  warnings  to 
both  Chang  Tso-lin  and  the  government  in  Nanking,  declaring 
that  the  Japanese  government  would  take  appropriate  and  effec- 
tive measures  to  maintain  peace  and  order  in  Manchuria  in  the 
event  that  hostilities  reached  the  Peking- Tientsin  area  and 
threatened  the  peace  of  Manchuria.2 

It  was  close  to  midnight  on  May  18  when  Yoshizawa  Kenki- 
chi,  Japanese  Minister  to  China,  called  on  Marshal  Chang  to 
deliver  this  warning  and  elaborate  its  purport.  The  gist  of  Yoshi- 
zawa's  advice  was  that  Chang  should  withdraw  into  Manchuria 
before  he  was  defeated  by  the  Nationalists;  otherwise  the  Kwan- 
tung  Army  would  block  the  passage  of  both  Chang's  retreating 
troops  and  the  pursuing  Nationalist  forces  at  Shanhaikwan  and 
disarm  them.  This  was  in  fact  an  ultimatum.  Chang,  visibly  per- 
turbed, is  said  to  have  retorted,  "Even  if  I  have  to  give  up  my 
life,  I  do  not  want  Feng  Yu-hsiang  in  Peking."3 

As  a  preliminary  to  armed  intervention  in  China,  Japan's 
Kwantung  Army  on  May  1 8  shifted  its  headquarters  from  Port 
Arthur  to  Mukden.4  At  this  point,  at  the  instigation  of  C.  T. 
Wang  of  the  Nanking  government,  Washington  sent  a  reminder 

1.  The  account  of  Chang  Tso-lin's  last  days  in  Peking  are  drawn  from 
Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku,  pp.  631-32,  and  Usui  Katsumi,  "Cho  Sakurin 
Bakushi  no  Shinso"  (The  Truth  Regarding  the  Assassination  by  Bombing 
of  Chang  Tso-lin),  Himerareta  Shdwashi,  pp.  28-29  (hereafter  referred  to 
as  Usui,  Himerareta  Shdwashi). 

2.  This  is  referred  to  as  the  "Notification  of  May  18th,"  Himerareta 
Shdwashi,  p.  29.  Author's  translation. 

3.  Ibid. 

4.  Tanaka  Giichi  Denki,  2,  943-44. 


38  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

to  Tokyo  cautioning  the  Japanese  government  to  apprise  the 
United  States  in  advance  if  it  intended  to  take  any  action  in  Man- 
churia. 

Beginning  on  May  20,  another  Eastern  Regions  Conference, 
meeting  in  emergency  sessions,  spent  five  days  in  fruitless 
debates.  Those  who  had  been  given  to  bluffing  at  the  second  con- 
ference, in  the  preceeding  summer,  were  unnerved  by  the  sur- 
prise thrust  from  Washington.  Confusion  reigned  over  the 
question  of  how  to  answer  it.  Mori,  who  as  usual  was  the  chair- 
man, insisted  that  no  choice  remained  but  to  proceed  according 
to  the  predetermined  plan. 

General  Araki,  recalling  the  hectic  days,  said,  "Everyone  had 
different  ideas;  no  one  agreed;  we  were  just  going  around  in 
circles  wasting  precious  time.  If  they  were  going  to  waver  at  this 
late  stage  of  the  game,  why  did  those  men  assent  to  the  propo- 
sals when  they  were  first  presented  at  the  Eastern  Regions  Con- 
ference?"5 

Meanwhile,  the  Kwantung  Army,  poised  for  instant  action  in 
Manchuria,  was  becoming  more  and  more  impatient  and  began 
harassing  Tokyo  with  queries.  The  acute  sense  of  frustration 
coupled  with  an  awareness  of  imminent  action  is  recorded  by 
Major  General  Saito  Tsune,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Kwantung 
Army.  The  following  are  excerpts  from  his  diary: 

Mukden,  May  21: 

On  the  assumption  that  the  Imperial  Order  [to 
mobilize]  decreed  at  9  a.m.  in  Tokyo  would  become 
effective  at  12  noon  here,  I  advised  my  subordinates 
to  that  effect  and  at  12  summoned  them.  But  the 
orders  did  not  come  through.  I  am  beginning  to  think 
that  in  all  likelihood  the  plans  of  the  Army  Com- 
mand have  been  disrupted  by  some  plot.  .  .  . 

Waited  all  night  but  the  orders  never  arrived.  The 

5.  Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku,  p.  634.  Author's  translation. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  39 

Kwantung  Army,  bursting  with  spirit,  is  piqued  by  the 
government's  indecision. 

Mukden,  May  22: 

At  10  a.m.  moved  Command  Headquarters  to  the 
top  of  the  Totaku  Building.  At  3:47  p.m.  the  Com- 
mander in  Chief  [Lieutenant  General  Muraoka 
Chotaro]  arrived  [from  Port  Arthur]  on  schedule  and 
immediately  occupied  the  temporary  headquarters. 
...  I  sense  a  growing  warlike  mood  spreading  about 
us. 

Mukden,  May  23: 

A  Colonel  Tashiro,  Chief  of  the  China  Section  of 
the  General  Staff  Office,  arrived  from  Tokyo  to  brief 
us  on  the  government's  position.  According  to  him, 
Chang  Tso-lin  is  not  to  be  pressed  to  relinquish  his 
status  .  .  .  although  the  manifest  policy  of  the  govern- 
ment is  that  both  the  Northern  and  the  Southern 
Armies  are  to  be  disarmed  alike;  in  practice,  however, 
the  Commanding  General  of  the  Kwantung  Army  is 
authorized  to  use  discretion  and  treat  the  Northern 
Army  more  leniently. 

The  Kwantung  Army  in  Mukden,  expecting  mobili- 
zation orders  at  any  moment,  is  in  a  state  of  animated 
suspense.  Feeling  of  antagonism  toward  the  indecisive 
Tokyo  government  is  daily  mounting.  Even  Peking  is 
buzzing  with  rumors  of  the  Kwantung  Army's  pending 
expedition  to  Chinchow  and  the  forcible  seizure  of  the 
Peking-Mukden  Railway." 

On  May  25,  Mori  forced  a  decision  in  Tokyo  to  carry  out  his 
predetermined  plan.  The  decision  was  taken  to  Premier  Tanaka, 
then  at  his  villa  near  Kamakura,  for  final  approval.  That  evening, 

6.  Usui,  Himerareta  Showashi,  p.  32.  Author's  translation. 


40  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

as  he  strolled  along  the  beach  accompanied  by  two  men — Arita 
Hachiro  of  the  Foreign  Office  and  General  Abe  Nobuyuki,  who 
had  conveyed  the  decision  made  earlier  in  the  day  in  Tokyo — 
Tanaka  made  up  his  mind.  Mori's  plan  had  to  be  brought  to  a 
halt.  There  was  to  be  no  occupation  of  Manchuria.7 

General  Abe  and  Arita  were  back  in  Tokyo  the  following 
morning.  Mori  was  first  dumfounded  and  then  indignant.  His 
main  concern  now  became  how  to  placate  activists  within  the 
ranks  of  the  Kwantung  Army,  who  had  been  fretting  for  action. 
But  he  did  not  quite  succeed;  within  ten  days  Marshal  Chang 
Tso-lin  was  to  meet  an  untimely  death  at  the  hands  of  a  certain 
highly  placed  officer  of  that  same  army.8 

Although  the  Kwantung  Army  was  bent  on  taking  Manchuria, 
Tanaka  was  not  ready  to  risk  a  war  with  the  United  States.  His 
sudden  abandonment  of  Mori's  so-called  predetermined  plan 
marked  the  parting  of  ways  for  the  two  men.  A  handful  of  activ- 
ists within  the  Kwantung  Army,  however,  did  not  give  up  easily; 
and  it  sought  to  do  by  indirection  what  Tanaka  had  directly  pro- 
hibited by  his  refusal  to  sanction  the  Mori  plan.  This  plot,  as 
described  by  Admiral  Okada  Keisuke  in  his  memoirs,  involved 
the  imposition  of  a  barrier  to  the  northward  retreat  of  Chang 
Tso-lin's  troops,  so  that  the  Kwantung  Army  could  move  easily 
into  the  ensuing  vacuum.  The  plot  was  to  be  sprung  when  and  if 
Chang  Tso-lin  were  defeated  in  the  northern  plains  of  China  by 
the  Nationalist  Army  and  had  to  withdraw  to  Manchuria.  At  a 
preliminary  meeting  between  the  representatives  of  the  army, 
navy,  and  Foreign  Office,  an  army  representative  proposed  block- 
ing Chang  Tso-lin's  retreat  by  landing  a  division  at  Shanhaikwan, 
after  which  the  Kwantung  Army  would  have  an  easy  task  in 
occupying  Manchuria. 

7.  About  this  time  at  a  cabinet  meeting,  General  Shirakawa  Yoshinori, 
Minister  of  War,  also  undertook  to  persuade  Tanaka  that  action  be  taken 
to  retire  Chang  Tso-lin  from  public  life,  but  Tanaka  steadfastly  refused  to 
accede  to  Shirakawa's  proposal.  Shidehara  Heiwa  Zaidan,  Shidehara 
Kijuro  (Tokyo,  1955),  p.  361  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Shidehara  Kijuro). 

8.  See  below,  pp.  45-51. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  41 

Rear  Admiral  Yonai  Mitsumasa,  who  represented  the  Office 
of  Naval  Operations  at  the  preliminary  meeting,  flatly  refused 
to  be  a  party  to  such  a  proposal  and  returned  to  report  what  was 
afoot  to  Admiral  Suzuki  Kantaro,  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 
In  turn,  Admiral  Suzuki  asked  Admiral  Okada,  who  was  then  the 
Minister  of  the  Navy,  to  shelve  such  a  proposal  if  the  army  in- 
troduced it  at  a  cabinet  meeting. 

As  anticipated,  the  very  next  day  the  army  brought  up  the  plan 
at  the  cabinet  meeting,  and,  when  it  looked  as  if  the  proposal 
might  go  through  unopposed,  Okada  pointed  out  that  send- 
ing an  expeditionary  force  to  the  Peking-Tientsin  area  consti- 
tuted a  violation  of  a  time-honored  treaty9  and  that  Japan  must 
be  prepared  to  go  to  war  against  America  and  England  if  she 
chose  to  violate  it.  In  astonishment  Premier  Tanaka  naively  re- 
marked, "So  there  is  such  a  treaty?  Well,  then  the  whole  venture 
will  have  to  be  called  off."10 

It  should  be  noted  that,  about  the  same  time  the  army  was 
proposing  in  Tokyo  that  Chang's  retreating  troops  be  blocked 
at  Shanhaikwan,  the  Kwantung  Army  was  on  the  verge  of  ad- 
vancing on  Chinchow  of  its  own  accord.  This  action  was  halted 
only  at  the  last  minute  by  an  imperial  edict.11 

Assassination  of  Chang  Tso-lin1 

We  now  direct  our  attention  to  Mukden,  the  new  focal  point  of 
crisis  in  view  of  the  imminent  return  of  Chang  Tso-lin  to  his 
former  seat  of  power.  By  late  May,  Chang's  retreating  troops 
were  swarming  into  the  walled  city  at  five  to  ten  thousand  a  day. 

9.  Admiral  Okada  was  probably  referring  to  the  Nine-Power  Pact, 
although  he  does  not  so  specify. 

10.  Okada  Keisuke,  Okada  Keisuke  Kaikoroku  (Okada  Memoirs) 
(Tokyo,  1950),  pp.  34-35  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Okada  Memoirs). 

11.  Morishima,  Conspiracy,  p.  20. 

1.  I  am  indebted  to  Hirano  Reiji's  Manslul  no  Inbdsha  (A  Conspirator 
in  Manchuria)  (Tokyo,  1959),  pp.  75-91  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Hirano, 
Manshil),  for  the  general  sequence  and  development  of  the  narrative  in 
this  chapter.  For  passages  freely  rendered  into  English  from  the  pages 


42  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Adding  to  the  existing  confusion  was  the  influx  of  50,000  fresh 
men  from  the  northern  province  of  Heilungkiang  under  the 
command  of  General  Wu  Chun-sheng.  This  state  of  affairs  only 
contributed  to  the  heightening  of  the  sense  of  insecurity  among 
the  Japanese  residents,  who  were  already  harassed  by  the  mount- 
ing incidence  of  unfriendly  acts  toward  them.  In  some  cases  it 
was  the  Japanese  adventurers  themselves  who  tried  to  incite 
mobs  into  touching  off  anti-Japanese  incidents  to  give  the  Japa- 
nese army  in  the  area  a  pretext  to  go  into  action.  The  fact  was 
that  the  Kwantung  Army,  with  a  view  to  moving  south  toward 
Shanhaikwan  to  intercept  Chang's  army,  had  requested  and  had 
been  provided  with  a  mixed  brigade  from  Korea  to  protect  Jap- 
anese residents  in  Mukden  during  its  absence  from  that  city. 

It  was  during  this  explosive  situation  that  a  coded  cable  from 
Tokyo  Headquarters — representing  Premier  Tanaka's  veto  of 
Mori's  desperate  move — reached  the  temporary  headquarters 
of  the  Kwantung  Army  early  on  May  26,  ordering  the  army  to 
"suspend  completely  previously  decided  plan  [of  action]."2  The 
staff  officers  were  crestfallen.  According  to  Hirano,  "Colonel 


above,  acknowledgments  are  made  in  the  foregoing  footnotes.  Other 
pertinent  sources  for  the  story  in  this  chapter  are  Tanaka  Giichi  Denki, 
2,  947-51;  Usui,  Himerareta  Showashi;  pp.  26-38;  ltd,  Gunbatsu  Koboshi, 
2,  136-39;  Mori,  Senpu  Nijiinen,  pp.  11-18;  Machino  Takema,  "Cho 
Sakurin  Bakushi  no  Zengo"  (Events  Preceding  and  Following  Chang 
Tso-lin's  Death  from  Bombing),  Chuo  Koron  (September  1949),  pp.  72- 
80;  and  Komoto  Daisaku,  "Watakushi  ga  Cho  Sakurin  o  Koroshita"  (I 
killed  Chang  Tso-lin),  Bungei  Shunju  (December  1954),  pp.  194-201. 
There  are  indications  that  Hirano's  account  has  drawn  upon  the  facts 
contained  in  Colonel  Komoto's  own  article.  In  his  writings,  Komoto  ex- 
presses resentment  toward  the  ineptness  of  Japanese  military  advisers 
attached  to  Chang  Tso-lin.  Since  the  facts  of  the  secret  Chang- Yamamoto 
railroad  negotiations  were  then  known  to  the  Kwantung  Army  and  the 
members  of  the  Foreign  Office,  it  is  hardly  conceivable  that  Komoto  was 
unaware  of  them.  Years  later  Machino  speculated  that  Komoto  and  his 
fellow  conspirators  may  have  decided  to  dispose  of  Chang  Tso-lin  before 
the  railway  agreements  were  announced  in  July,  lest  their  thunder  be 
stolen.  See  Shinmyo,  "Showa  Seiji  Hisshi — Cho  Sakurin  Bakusatsu," 
Chuo  Koron  (April  1954),  p.  196. 

2.  "Kitei  hoshin  zenmenteki  ni  chiishi  seyo,"  Hirano,  Manshu,  p.  75. 
Author's  free  translation. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  43 

Komoto  clutched  the  telegram  in  his  hand  and  bit  his  lip.  .  .  . 
Commander  Muraoka  [Chotaro]  and  Chief  of  Staff  Saito  [Tsune] 
hardly  spoke  the  rest  of  the  day.  Even  normally  voluble  Ishihara 
and  easy-going  Itagaki  were  silent."3 

Komoto  decided  to  go  to  Tokyo  to  confront  Mori,  determined 
to  find  out  for  himself  why  the  original  plan4  to  disarm  Chang 
Tso-lin's  retreating  troops  had  been  abandoned.  He  was  also 
intent  on  calling  on  Army  Headquarters  to  seek  some  means 
whereby  the  heavy  flow  of  Chang  Tso-lin's  troops  into  Mukden 
could  be  prevented.  Failing  this,  he  wanted  assurance  that  Head- 
quarters would  send  substantial  reinforcements,  so  that  the  com- 
bat strength  of  the  Kwantung  Army  would  reach  some  semblance 
of  parity  with  that  of  Chang  Tso-lin's  force.  Komoto  confided  his 
plans  to  Araki  Goro,  major  general  in  command  of  Chang 
Hsueh-liang's  bodyguard,  and  asked  if  Araki  could  maintain 
order  for  a  month  until  he  returned  from  Tokyo.  Araki  assured 
him  that  his  Chinese  troops  were  just  as  reliable  as  the  Japanese 
regulars.5 

On  the  following  day,  May  27,  Komoto  revealed  his  plans 
to  Colonel  Itagaki  Seishiro  and  to  Lieutenant  Colonel  Ishihara 
Kanji,  subordinate  members  of  his  staff.  The  two  readily  agreed 
to  Komoto's  plans.  Since  it  was  Itagaki  and  Ishihara  who  later 
engineered  the  Mukden  Incident,  the  meeting  of  minds  at  this 
stage  is  a  matter  of  extreme  significance.  It  would  seem  that 
Itagaki  and  Ishihara  were  responsible  for  keeping  alive  the  idea 
of  bringing  Manchuria  and  Mongolia  under  the  direct  control 
of  the  Kwantung  Army — an  idea  that  fired  the  imagination  of 
the  men  at  least  three  years  prior  to  the  Mukden  Incident.6  How- 

3.  Ibid.  Author's  free  translation. 

4.  Colonel  Komoto  was  quite  aware  of  Mori's  original  plans,  since  he 
had  attended  the  Eastern  Regions  Conference  held  in  Tokyo  from  June  27 
to  July  7,  1927,  as  an  aide  to  General  Muto.  At  the  conference,  Komoto 
had  sided  with  Mori,  asserting  emphatically  that  Japan's  problems  in 
Manchuria  "could  no  longer  be  solved  by  feeble  diplomatic  protests." 
Hirano,  p.  71. 

5.  Ibid.,  p.  77. 

6.  It  is  possible  that  if  Colonel  Komoto  had  remained  on  active  duty 


44  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

ever,  Muraoka  Chotaro,  the  commanding  general,  while  not 
opposed  to  Komoto's  trip,  counseled  postponement  because  the 
situation  in  Mukden  just  then  was  fluid  and  critical. 

Meanwhile,  in  North  China,  in  order  to  meet  the  three- 
pronged  drive  launched  by  the  Nationalists,  Chang  Tso-lin 
marched  his  troops  southward.  The  result  was  that  some  200,000 
men  confronted  each  other  on  fronts  extending  over  100  miles 
in  what  had  every  appearance  of  being  a  decisive  encounter. 

The  Northern  Army  initiated  a  general  offensive  on  the  27th 
but  was  soon  forced  to  retreat  in  the  face  of  a  determined 
counteroffensive  by  the  superior  southern  armies.  On  the  30th 
the  Northern  Army  withdrew  northward  beyond  the  line  of  the 
Liuli  River  and  thereafter  deliberately  avoided  any  decisive  en- 
counter; Chang  Tso-lin  was  determined  to  keep  his  army  intact. 
On  June  2  in  somewhat  of  an  anticlimax,  Chang  Tso-lin,  by 
means  of  a  circulating  telegram,  let  it  be  known  that  he  intended 
to  withdraw  his  forces  into  Manchuria,  thereby  sparing  the  resi- 
dents in  and  about  Peking  from  the  ravages  of  war. 


after  the  death  of  Chang  Tso-lin,  he  could  have  been  the  principal  archi- 
tect of  the  Mukden  Incident.  There  was  a  meeting  of  minds  among  K6- 
moto,  Itagaki,  and  Ishihara,  and  the  three  often  dined  together  at  Japanese 
restaurants  in  Dairen  to  discuss  their  secret  plans  on  how  to  effect  Japan's 
colonial  policy  in  Manchuria.  Hirano,  p.  66. 

Hirano  relates  the  following  incident,  which  reveals  Komoto's  obsession 
with  the  idea  of  continental  expansion:  "One  day  Komoto  baited  General 
Muto  about  staging  an  insurrection.  Muto  said,  'That  is  not  a  light  matter; 
just  what  do  you  have  in  mind?'  KSmoto  replied,  'My  proposition  is  to 
blast  the  Yalu  River  Bridge  and  so  enable  the  Kwantung  Army  to  become 
independent  of  the  central  authority.  Subsequently  we  shall  establish  a 
small  independent  state  separate  from  Japan  and  China.  In  the  face  of  this 
fait  accompli  our  actions  would  not  be  censurable  by  the  government  in 
Tokyo,  nor  would  the  United  States  and  England  be  in  a  position  to  lodge 
complaints  with  Japan.  After  that  it  would  be  up  to  the  newly  founded 
nation  to  make  the  best  of  the  situation.  Too,  we  shall  be  able  to  head  off 
the  spread  of  communism,  which  is  in  the  process  of  subverting  China  and 
eventually  Japan.'  Komoto  stared  intently  at  General  Muto's  face  but  the 
General  dared  not  utter  a  word."  Since  Hirano  attributes  a  liberal  amount 
of  Komoto's  thinking  to  Ishihara's  ideas,  it  may  be  said  that  the  notion  of 
engineering  the  Manchurian  Incident  and  eventually  establishing  a  puppet 
state  was  already  envisaged  by  Komoto,  Itagaki,  and  Ishihara  about  1928. 
Hirano,  Manshu,  pp.  67-68.  Author's  free  translation. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  45 

The  admission  of  defeat  by  Chang  Tso-lin  was  taken  as  a 
signal  for  instant  action  by  the  anti-Chang  elements  in  the 
Kwantung  Army.  In  Mukden  one  day  Komoto  unexpectedly 
caught  sight  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Takeshita  Yoshiharu,  a  mili- 
tary attache  from  Harbin,  emerging  from  Muraoka's  office.7 
Komoto,  somewhat  puzzled,  sensed  that  something  was  afoot 
behind  his  back  because  issuance  of  travel  orders  for  military 
attaches  was  normally  part  of  his  duties.  He  bade  Takeshita  to 
come  into  his  office. 

There  Komoto,  by  deftly  alternating  cajolery  and  browbeat- 
ing, forced  Takeshita  to  divulge  the  fact  that  he  was  under  orders 
from  General  Muraoka  to  proceed  to  Peking,  engage  an  assassin, 
and  dispose  of  Marshal  Chang  Tso-lin.  Komoto  convinced  Take- 
shita that  Peking  was  not  the  proper  place  for  such  a  bold  under- 
taking, since  it  would  be  directly  under  the  watchful  eyes  of  the 
world.  Takeshita  was  reluctantly  prevailed  upon  to  transfer  his 
assignment  to  Komoto.  Takeshita  was  then  entrusted  with  the 
task  of  proceeding  to  Peking  and  identifying  from  there  the  train 
the  Marshal  would  board.  Finally,  Komoto  cautioned  Takeshita 
to  keep  their  understanding  a  secret  from  Itagaki  and  Ishihara 
and,  of  course,  from  General  Muraoka. 

There  followed  a  period  of  intense  activity.  Komoto  sum- 
moned First  Lieutenant  Kanda  Yasunosuke,  commanding  a 
company  attached  to  the  20th  Engineers  Regiment,  and  ordered 
him  to  study  the  terrain  around  the  railroad  bridge  over  the 
Chuliu  River  near  Mukden.  He  reported  back  that  the  area  was 
under  such  tight  guard  that  even  reconnoitering  posed  a  prob- 
lem. 

Komoto  then  suggested  an  alternative  site  near  Huangkutun, 
where  the  tracks  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  passed  over 
the  Peking-Mukden  Railway.  This  time  Lieutenant  Kanda  re- 
turned with  a  more  heartening  report  stating  that  only  Japanese 
railway  guards  patrolled  the  area  and  that  Chinese  guards  were 

7.  The  story  of  the  encounter  between  Komoto  and  Takeshita  is  taken 
from  Hirano,  pp.  79-81. 


46  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

not  posted  there.  Thereupon,  Komoto  gave  Kanda  detailed 
instructions. 

Along  about  this  time  an  officer  commanding  the  Independ- 
ent Railroad  Guard,  a  Major  Tomiya,8  was  also  determined  on 
a  certain  course  of  action  to  be  taken  in  view  of  the  imminent  re- 
turn of  Marshal  Chang  to  Mukden.  As  Lieutenant  Kanda  began 
to  frequent  the  zone  patrolled  by  the  railway  guards,  he  was 
spotted  by  Tomiya,  who  recognized  the  guiding  mind  of  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Komoto  at  work  behind  Kanda's  clandestine 
activities. 

Major  Tomiya  thereupon  went  to  Lieutenant  Colonel  Komoto 
and  reminded  him  that  he  was  intruding  upon  his  area  of  re- 
sponsibility. Komoto  declared  in  veiled  language  that  on  the 
crucial  day  the  responsibility  of  patrolling  the  site  of  the  railroad 
overpass  would  no  longer  rest  with  Tomiya  because  Komoto 
would  see  to  it  that  the  area  was  placed  under  the  joint  patrol  of 
the  Kwantung  Army  and  the  troops  of  Chang  Tso-lin.  There- 
fore, were  an  accident  to  occur  at  the  site,  Komoto  insisted  that 
he  and  he  alone  would  be  held  accountable  for  having  allowed 
the  Chinese  to  share  in  the  patrol  duties.  Tomiya,  realizing  the 
futility  of  resisting  Komoto,  consented  to  cast  his  lot  with 
Komoto's  plot.  Thereupon  the  two  confided  to  each  other  the 
details  of  their  plans. 

Komoto  entrusted  the  execution  of  the  plot  entirely  to  Tomiya 
and  turned  over  to  him  the  necessary  funds.  The  following  day 
Tomiya  and  Lieutenant  Kanda  began  the  task  of  installing  the 
explosives.  A  handful  of  enlisted  men  from  the  engineer  corps 
transported  cement  bags  packed  with  explosives  to  the  site  of 
the  railway  overpass.  Lieutenant  Sugano,  a  demolition  expert, 
deftly  installed  the  detonator,  and  the  explosives  were  ready  to 
be  triggered  at  any  time. 

To  camouflage  the  crime,  Komoto  engaged  Adachi  Takamori, 

8.  The  encounter  between  Komoto  and  Tomiya  follows  the  account  in 
Hirano,  pp.  83-85.  For  Tomiya's  version  of  this  conspiracy  see  Morishima, 
Conspiracy,  p.  23. 


The  Site  of  the  'bombing  ofChanq  Jso-Uris  Train 


JUNE    4,192, 


rf> 


fb 


"*kl. 


V 


Compound  within 

the  old  city  nat 

of  Mukden 


Note:  The  approximate  location  from  which  Major  Tomiya  detonated  the 
bomb  is  based  on  a  diagram  in  Ozaki,  Rikugun  o  Ugokashita  Hitobito,  p. 
107.  For  a  variant  version,  see  Asahi,  Taiheiyo,  1,  307,  where  the  location 
of  the  lever  to  actuate  the  bomb  appears  on  the  Commercial  District  side 
of  the  tracks  approximately  200  yards  from  the  point  at  which  the  Peking- 
Mukden  Railway  goes  under  the  tracks  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway. 


:■} 


48  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

an  adventurer,  to  line  up  three  henchmen  of  Liu  Tsai-ming9  to 
be  used  as  decoys.  The  three  men  were  told  to  come  to  the  sentry 
box  on  a  designated  day  to  get  their  instructions. 

In  the  meantime,  at  Peking,  working  closely  with  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Takeshita,  Captain  Tanaka  Ryukichi  kept  close  check 
on  the  schedule  and  composition  of  trains  departing  for  Mukden. 
Just  to  make  sure,  these  trains  were  spotted  again  by  observers 
detailed  at  key  points  such  as  Shanhaikwan  and  Chinchow  along 
the  Peking-Mukden  Railway.10  From  about  June  1  Komoto  and 
his  fellow  conspirators  waited  daily  for  the  all-important  signal. 

While  these  men  were  biding  their  time,  Marshal  Chang's 
security  guard  had  reason  to  be  apprehensive  of  the  security 
of  the  railway  overpass  at  Huangkutun.  First  Lieutenant  Chin 
of  the  gendarmes  called  upon  Major  Mitani,  a  squad  leader  of 
the  Japanese  gendarmery  in  Mukden,  and  sought  the  latter's 
permission  to  post  Chinese  sentries  in  the  vicinity  of  the  over- 
pass and  the  embankments.  Initially  Mitani  rejected  Chin's  pro- 
posal, but  in  the  end  the  two  agreed  to  share  the  responsibility — 
that  is  to  say,  the  Japanese  would  assume  the  responsibility  of 
guarding  the  overpass  while  the  Chinese  would  do  likewise  with 
the  area  beneath.11 

9.  Liu  Tsai-ming  was  an  underling  of  Kuo  Sung-ling,  who  was  executed 
for  leading  an  insurrection  against  Chang  Tso-lin  in  1925.  See  Hirano, 
p.  86.  Komoto  detailed  Captain  Ozaki  Yoshiharu  with  his  detachment  to 
stand  by  at  a  point  beyond  the  railroad  crossing  (see  Map  3).  Had  the 
bombs  failed,  it  was  so  devised  that  the  train  would  be  derailed  at  this 
point  and  Ozaki  was  to  direct  his  detachment  to  rush  into  the  train  and 
attack  the  Marshal.  Ozaki  Yoshiharu,  Rikugun  o  Ugokashita  Hitobito 
(Figures  Who  Wielded  Influence  in  the  Army)  (Odawara,  1960),  pp. 
105-110. 

10.  Usui,  Himerareta  Showashi,  p.  35. 

11.  Ibid.,  pp.  35-36.  There  are  indications  that  Marshal  Chang  was 
informed  by  his  agent  in  Tokyo  of  the  plot  to  bomb  his  train.  When  he 
discussed  this  report  with  Colonel  Machino,  the  latter  assured  the  Marshal 
that  he  would  personally  accompany  him,  thereby  implying  that  the  report 
was  groundless.  A.  Vespa,  Secret  Agent  of  Japan:  A  Handbook  to  Japan- 
ese Imperialism  (London,  1938),  p.  16. 

Apparently,  Komoto  also  had  his  moments  of  doubt.  After  he  received 
the  signal  that  the  Marshal's  train  had  left  Peking,  Komoto  called  on 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  49 

The  heavily  guarded  train  bearing  the  Marshal  left  Peking  at 
1:15  a.m.  on  June  4.  Accompanying  him  as  members  of  his 
cortege  were  General  Wu  Chun-sheng,  Colonel  Machino,  Major 
Giga,  and  Chang  Ying-huai,  the  director  general  of  transporta- 
tion. Machino  got  off  the  train  at  Tientsin  with  Premier  P'an 
Han  to  proceed  to  Techou,  where  the  two  were  to  meet  Chang 
Tsung-ch'ang,  the  leftist  military  leader  of  Shantung.  The  latter 
had  indicated  to  the  Marshal  that  he  would,  on  his  own,  try  to 
hold  off  the  Southern  Army.12  Nevertheless,  it  is  only  natural 
that  Machino's  action  aroused  the  suspicion  that  he  knew  in 
advance  of  the  plot  to  assassinate  the  Marshal.  But  if,  let  us  say, 
someone  had  tipped  him  off  at  the  last  minute,  it  is  inconceivable 
that  Machino  would  have  knowingly  allowed  Chang  Tso-lin  to 
go  to  his  death.  This  would  have  meant  the  complete  negation 
of  the  railroad  negotiations  over  which  he  had  labored  for 
months.  Moreover,  as  stated  earlier,  Machino  and  Giga  were 
at  odds  with  Komoto,  Itagaki,  and  Ishihara;  thus,  there  was 
every  reason  for  Komoto  and  his  group  to  keep  their  plot  con- 
cealed from  Machino  and  Giga. 

On  the  morning  of  the  4th,  Shenyang  Station  and  the  adjoin- 
ing compound  were  surrounded  with  a  heavy  cordon  of  military 
guards.  At  5:20  a.m.  the  air  suddenly  became  tense  upon  receipt 
of  the  report  that  the  Marshal's  train  had  just  passed  Huang- 
kutun. 

Aboard  the  train  a  game  of  mah-jongg  had  just  broken  up. 
Chang  Ying-huai,  Wu  Chun-sheng,  and  Major  Giga  hurriedly 
returned  to  their  quarters  toward  the  rear  of  the  train.  The 
Marshal  was  alone,  still  seated  at  the  mah-jongg  table,  when 
with  a  thunderous  roar  his  car  blew  up.  He  was  struck  in  the 


Captain  Ozaki  and  asked  if  the  venture  ought  not  be  called  off.  Komoto 
was  apprehensive  lest  the  plot  be  exposed  because  the  bombing  might  have 
to  take  place  in  daylight.  Ozaki  objected.  Subsequently,  he  regretted  doing 
so,  for  had  he  concurred  with  Komoto  history  might  have  followed  a 
different  course.  Ozaki,  Rikugun  o  Ugokashita  Hitobito,  p.  39. 

12.  Machino,  "Cho  Sakurin  Bakushi  no  Zengo,"  Chud  Koron  (April 
1949),  p.  79. 


50  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

nose  by  a  fragment  of  steel  apparently  just  as  he  was  about  to 
duck  under  the  table.  He  lay  unconscious.1 3 

A  press  officer  rushed  through  the  wreckage  to  the  Marshal's 
side  and  directed  soldiers  standing  in  a  state  of  confusion  to 
carry  the  Marshal  into  a  nearby  linen  factory,  whence  he  was 
surreptitiously  transported  by  truck  to  a  hospital  within  the  city 
walls  of  Mukden,  where  he  died. 

For  several  weeks  Tsang  Shih-yi,  commandant  in  charge  of 
maintenance  of  public  peace  in  Mukden,  cleverly  concealed 
Chang  Tso-lin's  death  by  fabricating  stories  about  his  progress 
toward  recovery.  But  the  truth  eventually  came  out.  Of  the  three 
henchmen  engaged  by  Adachi  Takamori,  two  were  bayoneted  by 
Japanese  guards,  but  the  third  escaped  to  report  the  whole  inci- 
dent to  Chang  Hsueh-liang,  the  Marshal's  son.14 

Premier  Tanaka  was  utterly  dismayed.  General  Ugaki 
Kazushige,  who  happened  to  be  visiting  Tanaka  when  he  re- 
ceived the  telegram,  reported  that  Tanaka  sighed,  "What  fools! 
They  [the  Kwantung  Army]  behave  like  children.  They  have  no 
idea  what  the  parent  has  to  go  through."15 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Colonel  Komoto's  plan  went  beyond  the 
mere  removal  of  Chang.  In  the  wake  of  Chang's  death,  Komoto 
ordered  Captain  Ozaki,  his  subordinate,  to  demand  that  Head- 
quarters mobilize  the  Kwantung  Army  and  engage  Chang's 
troops.  The  proposal  was  rejected  by  Lieutenant  General  Saito 
Tsune,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army.16  Komoto  had  hoped  that 
during  the  ensuing  confusion  the  Army  could  set  up  a  new  politi- 
cal order  in  Manchuria. 

After  the  bombing  of  Chang's  train,  acts  of  terrorism — among 
them  the  bombing  of  meeting  halls  of  Japanese  residents  in 
Mukden — were  perpetrated  by  agents  of  the  Kwantung  Army. 

13.  Based  on  Hirano,  p.  89.  For  a  somewhat  different  version  cf.  Paul 
S.  Dull,  "The  Assassination  of  Chang  Tso-lin,"  Far  Eastern  Quarterly,  11 
(1952),  456. 

14.  Morishima,  Conspiracy,  pp.  21-22. 

15.  Ugaki  Memoirs,  p.  317. 

16.  Ito  Gunbatsu  Koboshi,2,  137-38. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  51 

Subsequently,  the  Army  prodded  the  Consulate  General  with 
repeated  telephone  calls  asking  whether  the  consular  police  force 
alone  could  afford  adequate  protection  for  the  residents.  By  dis- 
creetly declining  the  Army's  offer  to  mobilize,  the  Consulate 
General  narrowly  averted  an  incident  at  Mukden  at  this  earlier 
date.  In  1931,  however,  the  Army  did  not  bother  to  consult 
the  Consulate  General.  It  went  into  action  without  heeding  the 
Consulate  General's  repeated  pleas  to  cease  fire.17 

The  Aftermath 

There  was  a  lapse  of  several  weeks  following  the  death  of  the 
Marshal  before  his  son,  Chang  Hsueh-liang,  cautiously  made 
his  way  back  to  Mukden  from  his  hideout  in  Chinchow  to  face 
a  highly  fluid  political  situation  in  the  Three  Eastern  Provinces. 
The  question  of  who  was  to  step  into  the  Marshal's  shoes  was  yet 
to  be  settled.  Informed  sources  guessed  that  Yang  Yu-ting,  the 
Old  Marshal's  Chief  of  Staff,  or  Chang  Tso-hsiang,  the  provincial 
governor  of  Kirin,  was  just  as  likely  to  succeed  the  Marshal  as  his 
own  son. 

Premier  Tanaka's  formula  for  ameliorating  the  crisis  was  to 
install  Chang  Hsueh-liang  as  nominal  ruler  under  the  tutelage 
of  Yang  Yu-ting.  There  were  others,  like  Yamamoto,  president 
of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Company,  Hayashi,  Consul 
General  of  Mukden,  and  Colonel  Machino,  military  adviser  to 
the  late  Marshal,  who  supported  Tanaka's  proposal.1 

A  smaller  but  no  less  influential  group  of  individuals,  among 
them  General  Muraoka,  Commanding  General  of  the  Kwan- 
tung  Army,  and  Matsuoka  Yosuke,  vice  president  of  the  South 
Manchuria  Railway  Company,  however,  were  bitterly  opposed 
to  Yang  Yu-ting's  assuming  any  role  in  the  new  regime.  A  third 
faction,  including  the  Okura  interests  and  General  Matsui  Nanao, 
another  military  adviser  to  the  late  Marshal,  favored  grooming 

17.  Morishima,  Conspiracy,  p.  24.  Asahi,  Taiheiyo,  1 ,  309. 
1.   Tanaka  Giichi  Denki,  2,  958-59;  Hirano,  Manshu,  p.  91;  Morishima, 
Conspiracy,  pp.  30-31. 


52  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Yang  Yu-ting  for  the  role  of  future  ruler  of  the  Three  Eastern 
Provinces.  Thus,  to  summarize  briefly,  the  consensus  in  the 
Kwantung  Army  and  among  the  higher  circles  in  the  Japanese 
government  was  to  name  Chang  Hsueh-liang  as  the  ruler  of 
Manchuria;  the  precise  status  of  Yang  Yu-ting  remained  the 
center  of  heated  controversy. 

As  for  Chang  Hsueh-liang  himself,  he  was  forced  to  turn  to 
the  Japanese  early  in  the  summer  of  1928,  despite  his  deep- 
seated  aversion  toward  and  mistrust  of  them,  because  they 
offered  the  only  way  to  safety  in  the  face  of  the  southern  armies 
and  opposition  within  Manchuria  itself.-  He  was  careful  not  to 
offend  the  Japanese,  lest  some  of  the  extremists  in  the  Kwantung 
Army  decide  to  take  matters  into  their  own  hands;  at  the  same 
time  he  was  spared  from  becoming  a  complete  tool  of  the  Jap- 
anese because  they  themselves  were  split  into  factions,  each 
group  bitterly  determined  to  be  the  sole  sponsor  of  the  Young 
Marshal. 

While  Chang  Hsueh-liang  held  the  Japanese  at  bay  and  at 
the  same  time  deftly  utilized  Japan's  military  presence  to  main- 
tain his  position  in  Manchuria,  he  had  to  contend  with  a  third 
force — namely  the  South — whose  alignment  with  his  adversaries 
in  Manchuria  could  upset  the  uneasy  equilibrium.  Thus  the 
Young  Marshal  was  fully  aware  that  Yang  Yu-ting  or  Chang 
Tso-hsiang  might  negotiate  a  compromise  with  the  Nanking 
government  behind  his  back.  Were  this  to  happen,  Kirin  Province 
for  certain,  and  perhaps  Heilungkiang  too,  would  have  sided 
with  the  Nationalists,  leaving  Chang  Hsueh-liang  a  puppet 
clutched  in  the  arms  of  the  Kwantung  Army.  This  was  an  end  he 
sought  to  avoid  at  all  cost,  since  he  well  knew  that  his  political 

2.  In  describing  the  sequence  of  events  and  the  actions  of  Chang  Hsueh- 
liang  immediately  after  the  death  of  Chang  Tso-lin,  the  author  is  indebted 
to  an  exceedingly  perceptive  article  by  Akira  Iriye  on  the  complex  inter- 
play of  forces  which  culminated  in  the  final  raising  of  the  Nationalist  flag 
in  Manchuria  on  December  29,  1928.  See  "Chang  Hsueh-liang  and  the 
Japanese,"  Journal  of  Asian  Studies,  20  (1960),  33-43;  also  Asahi, 
Taiheiyo,  1,  311-17. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  53 

future  would  be  doomed  once  he  was  cast  in  the  role  of  a  collab- 
orator. 

Nevertheless,  Chang  Hsueh-liang  dared  not  openly  seek  rap- 
prochement with  the  South,  for  several  reasons.  First,  the  Seven- 
teen-Member  Peace  Preservation  Committee,  of  which  he  was  a 
member,  was  sharply  divided  between  those  who  were  for  cast- 
ing their  lot  with  the  Nationalists  at  an  early  date  and  those  who 
were  opposed  on  the  ground  that  the  time  was  not  yet  ripe;  the 
latter  felt  that,  rather  than  toss  precaution  to  the  winds,  efforts 
should  be  made  to  get  along  with  the  Japanese,  at  least  until  such 
time  as  the  political  status  of  the  Three  Eastern  Provinces  could 
be  clarified.  Chang  Hsueh-liang's  tactics  of  temporizing  indicate 
that  until  about  the  middle  of  July  he  sided  with  the  latter  group; 
at  least  his  actions  had  the  practical  result  of  maintaining  the 
status  quo. 

For  even  were  Chang  Hsueh-liang  to  side  with  the  former 
faction  and  respond  to  the  overtures  made  from  the  South,  it 
would  gain  him  little,  since  at  this  time  the  authority  of  the 
Nanking  government  was  still  confined  to  the  lower  reaches  of 
the  Yangtze  River  and  to  the  regions  just  north  of  it.  Moreover, 
the  militarists  who  had  rallied  around  the  Nanking  government 
in  support  of  the  Northern  Expedition  were  far  from  being  in 
accord  on  the  future  status  of  the  Three  Eastern  Provinces. 

In  the  meantime,  however,  it  became  increasingly  evident  to 
Chang  Hsueh-liang  that  public  sentiment  in  the  Three  Eastern 
Provinces  was  steadily  growing  in  favor  of  union  with  the  South. 
By  the  middle  of  July  he  had  to  admit  to  Hayashi,  the  Japanese 
Consul  General  at  Mukden,  that  he  was  powerless  to  resist  it.3 
Also,  Chang  saw  an  opportunity  to  strike  a  political  bargain 
with  Chiang  Kai-shek.  Thus,  on  the  understanding  that  Jehol 
would  be  incorporated  as  a  fourth  province  in  Manchuria  and 
that  the  Nationalist  government  would  not  intervene  in  its  in- 
ternal affairs,  the  Nanking  and  Mukden  governments  agreed  that 
the  Nationalist  flag  should  be  raised  in  Manchuria  about  July  22. 

3.  Ibid.,  p.  36. 


54  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Meanwhile,  earlier  in  July,  Hayashi  had  received  a  lengthy 
telegram  from  Premier  Tanaka  declaring  that,  although  Japan 
could  view  with  equanimity  the  hoisting  of  the  Nationalist  flag 
in  Manchuria,  she  could  not  remain  passive  if  branches  of  the 
Kuomintang  were  established  in  the  Three  Eastern  Provinces, 
since  it  would  then  be  well-nigh  impossible  to  forestall  the  flow 
of  the  political  influence  of  the  South  into  Manchuria.4 

Thus,  despite  repeated  prodding  from  Premier  Tanaka  and 
Mori  Kaku  that  Hayashi  start  negotiating  with  the  Young 
Marshal  on  matters  of  railroad  construction  which  Yamamoto 
and  the  Old  Marshal  had  agreed  to  in  Peking,  and  on  Japan's 
commercial  rights  in  Manchuria,  Hayashi  discreetly  delayed, 
waiting  for  better  days,  and  concentrated  on  winning  Chang  to 
the  side  of  Japan.5  Hayashi  directed  his  efforts  entirely  to  dis- 
suading the  Young  Marshal  from  reaching  an  accord  with  the 
South. 

It  is  not  entirely  inconceivable  that  in  these  informal  talks  be- 
tween Hayashi  and  Chang  during  the  earlier  weeks  of  July, 
Hayashi  may  have  hinted  at  worse  things  in  store  if  Chang  were 
overly  hasty  about  reaching  an  agreement  with  the  Nanking 
government.  However,  when  on  July  19  the  Nationalist  govern- 
ment notified  the  Japanese  government  of  the  abrogation  of  the 
existing  Sino-Japanese  commercial  treaty,  Hayashi  on  the  same 
day  formally  warned  Chang  Hsueh-liang  against  raising  the  Na- 
tionalist flag  in  Manchuria.  Thus  we  note  that  on  July  21  the 
Young  Marshal  informed  Hayashi  that  efforts  in  this  direction 
would  be  abandoned  for  the  time  being,  and  at  the  same  time 
he  wired  the  Nanking  government:  "It  is  regrettable  that,  be- 
cause of  Japanese  intervention,  negotiation  toward  reaching  an 
accord  has  fallen  into  abeyance.  However,  there  has  been  no 
change  in  my  own  attitude  toward  seeking  eventual  peaceful 
unification  of  China."6  This  was  probably  not  the  only  reason. 

4.  Tanaka  Giichi  Denki,  2,  960-62. 

5.  Morishima,  Conspiracy,  p.  36. 

6.  Tanaka  Giichi  Denki,  2,  962.  Author's  translation.  On  October  19, 
1928,  at  Keio  University  in  Tokyo,  Shidehara  delivered  a  lecture  on  the 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  55 

The  Seventeen-Member  Peace  Preservation  Committee  was  still 
sharply  divided  between  those  who  advocated  immediate  agree- 
ment with  the  Nationalists  and  those  who  advocated  gradualism, 
Thus,  the  Young  Marshal  probably  deemed  it  wiser  to  temporize 
for  the  time  being  until  the  emergent  political  development  in 
the  Three  Eastern  Provinces  became  more  settled.  Although  the 
Peace  Preservation  Committee  at  its  meeting  on  August  10  de- 
cided to  postpone  talks  with  the  Nationalists  for  a  period  of 
three  months,  by  the  middle  of  the  same  month  the  Young 
Marshal  was  again  engaged  in  negotiations  with  Chiang  Kai-shek 
and  other  key  members  of  the  Kuomintang  government. 

On  the  other  hand  several  developments  forced  the  Tanaka 
government  to  revert  to  a  more  conciliatory  attitude  toward  the 
regimes  in  Mukden  and  Nanking.  The  formal  warning  which 
Consul  General  Hayashi  had  delivered  to  the  Young  Marshal 
on  July  7  only  heightened  anti-Japanese  sentiment  throughout 
China  and  added  impetus  to  the  economic  boycott.  Elsewhere 
it  excited  the  suspicions  of  the  Western  powers,  thereby  weaken- 
ing the  Seiyukai's  position  because  of  the  criticism  to  which  it 
was  subjected  by  the  opposition  party.  Moreover,  on  October  8 
Tanaka  learned  with  certainty  that  Japanese  army  officers  were 
responsible  for  the  death  of  Chang  Tso-lin,  placing  Japan,  at 
least  in  Tanaka's  own  thinking,  in  a  morally  indefensible  posi- 
tion.7 Inevitably  his  government  was  forced  to  modify  its  de- 
mands on  China,  abandon  the  positive  approach  adopted  by 
Mori  Kaku  at  the  Eastern  Regions  Conference,  and  retreat  to 


"Essentials  of  Japanese  Diplomacy  and  its  Guiding  Principles."  In  his 
talk,  he  took  to  task  the  Tanaka  government's  inept  meddling  in  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  China.  Shidehara  reproached  the  government  and  said 
that  Japan's  interference  in  the  rapprochement  between  the  Nanking  and 
the  Mukden  regimes  for  a  mere  three  months  accomplished  nothing  in  the 
interest  of  Japan.  Moreover,  it  was  an  unwarranted  assumption  that  Japan 
should  take  it  upon  herself  to  safeguard  both  the  local  and  foreign  resi- 
dents in  Manchuria,  a  territory  which  was  without  question  a  part  of 
China.  Shidehara  Kijilro,  pp.  372-74. 

7.  Ibid.,  pp.  964-65.  Also  see  p.   1030  for  a  description  of  the  agony 
that  Tanaka  suffered. 


56  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

a  policy  much  closer  to  that  of  the  opposition  party  under  Shide- 
hara — the  protection  of  Japan's  treaty  rights  and  interests.  In 
this  process,  too,  the  site  of  negotiations  on  matters  of  Japanese 
rights  with  the  Chinese  authorities  tended  more  and  more  to 
be  moved  away  from  Mukden,  where  it  was  under  the  watchful 
eyes  of  the  Kwantung  Army,  to  Nanking,  where  Minister  Yoshi- 
zawa  was  in  residence. 

By  the  fall  of  1928  the  adherents  of  early  recognition  of  the 
Nanking  regime  were  definitely  in  the  ascendant,  and  Chang 
Hsueh-liang  could  no  longer  postpone  the  crucial  decision.  The 
Kuomintang,  moreover,  had  appointed  him  a  member  of  the 
State  Council  at  Nanking,  and  he  was  assured  that  the  key 
officials  of  the  Three  Eastern  Provinces  would  be  appointed  by 
the  Mukden  regime.  These  developments,  together  with  a  com- 
promise on  the  composition  of  the  political  council  of  Jehol, 
laid  the  setting  for  the  rapprochement  between  the  Nanking  gov- 
ernment and  the  Mukden  regime.  On  December  29  the  blue 
and  white  revolutionary  flag  of  the  Nationalist  government  was 
raised  throughout  the  Manchurian  provinces. 

This  time  the  Tanaka  government  did  not  panic,  for  it  was 
reconciled  to  accepting  the  inevitable.  Nevertheless,  it  could  not 
escape  the  criticism  that  the  incident  represented  a  new  low  in 
Japanese  prestige  in  China.  In  retrospect,  it  can  be  stated  that 
Japan  had  only  her  inept  officers  like  Komoto  and  his  fellow 
plotters  to  blame.  Naively  these  activists  believed  that  the  re- 
moval of  Chang-Tso-lin  would  miraculously  bring  about  an 
improvement  in  the  over-all  situation  in  Manchuria,  to  the 
benefit  of  Japan.8 

Moreover,  a  factor  which  probably  contributed  just  as  much 
to  the  fiasco  was  the  mistaken  notion  shared  by  the  members  of 
the  staff  of  the  Kwantung  Army  that  orphaned  and  inexperienced 
Chang  Hsueh-liang  could  be  readily  won  over  and  made  into 

8.  See  Hanaya  Tadashi,  "Manshu  Jihen  wa  Koshite  Keikaku  Sareta" 
(This  is  how  the  Manchurian  Incident  was  Planned),  Himerareta  Sho- 
washi,  p.  42  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Hanaya,  Himerareta  Showashi). 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  57 

a  pliant  servant  of  Japan.9  As  matters  turned  out,  the  officers 
and  dignitaries  from  Japan  who  called  on  Chang  Hsueh-liang 
were  led  astray  by  his  suave  manners,  grossly  underrating  his 
firm  determination  not  to  give  in  to  Japanese  demands.10 

Finally,  some  key  officials  in  the  Tanaka  government — Mori 
Kaku  in  particular11 — and  the  majority  of  the  Japanese  military 
simply  refused  to  face  up  to  the  realities  of  the  rights  recovery 
movement,  which  was  sweeping  the  whole  of  China  in  the  wake 
of  Nationalist  victory  in  the  South.  The  overriding  political  fact 
of  the  day  was  that  no  Chinese  leader  could  hope  to  remain  in 
power  by  defying  this  fiery  expression  of  national  sentiment 
even  if  it  meant  losing  the  support  of  the  Kwantung  Army  or 
arousing  the  enmity  of  the  Japanese  people. 

Tanaka  Resigns1 

Shirakawa,  Minister  of  War,  at  first  refused  to  believe  that 
Japanese  officers  were  responsible  for  the  death  of  Marshal 
Chang,  but  in  view  of  persistent  rumors  he  sent  Mine,  command- 

9.  As  a  means  of  paving  the  way  for  Japan's  dominance  over  Man- 
churia and  Inner  Mongolia,  Komoto  advocated  the  removal  of  Chang 
Tso-lin.  Once  this  was  accomplished  it  would  be  easy  to  win  over  the 
"inexperienced"  Chang  Hsueh-liang.  See  Mori,  Senpu  Nijilnen,  pp.  13-14; 
Tanaka  Giichi  Denki,  2,  956-57. 

10.  For  a  rather  impressionistic  yet  perceptive  thumbnail  sketch  of 
Chang  Hsueh-liang  see  Morishima,  Conspiracy,  pp.  27-29.  The  author 
emphatically  refutes  the  thesis  that  Chang  Hsueh-liang's  rapprochement 
with  the  Nanking  government  was  motivated  solely  by  the  desire  to  safe- 
guard his  status.  Chang  was  sympathetic  to  the  objectives  of  the  Nation- 
alist party  and  possessed  a  genuine  desire  to  back  the  drive  against  foreign 
domination  of  China  under  the  rights  recovery  movement. 

11.  See  Nashimoto  Yuhei,  Chugoku  no  naka  no  Nihonjin  (Japanese  in 
China),  1  (Tokyo,  1958),  pp.  56-57.  Matsuoka  Yosuke,  vice  president 
of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Company,  bitterly  poured  out  his  invec- 
tives against  Mori  Kaku  for  his  ill-starred  Tsinan  military  venture,  Ma- 
tsuoka accused  Mori  of  being  a  "cancerous  growth"  in  the  Japanese  gov- 
ernment and  denounced  him  for  being  overeager  to  bring  fame  to  himself. 

1.  For  the  dilemma  in  which  Tanaka  was  caught  see  Paul  S.  Dull,  "The 
Assassination  of  Chang  Tso-lin,"  Far  Eastern  Quarterly,  11  (1952),  457- 
63. 


58  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

ing  general  of  the  gendarmery,  as  an  undercover  investigator  to 
Mukden.  It  was  only  after  Shirakawa  had  read  Mine's  full  findings 
that  he  was  convinced  that  a  Japanese  officer  was  implicated; 
he  reported  the  fact  to  Premier  Tanaka  on  October  8.  By  this 
time  some  four  months  had  elapsed  since  the  crime  had  been 
committed,  and  Tanaka  was  compelled  to  take  the  position  that 
the  offenders  should  be  brought  to  trial  and  punished. 

There  is  little  doubt  that  Tanaka  was  prompted  by  Prince 
Saionji,  who  summoned  the  Premier  and  advised  him  to  be  firm,2 
saying  that  the  truth  would  come  out  no  matter  how  hard  the 
government  of  Japan  tried  to  conceal  it.  If  it  became  plain  that 
the  guilty  party  was  a  Japanese  military  man,  he  must  be  pun- 
ished without  delay.  Only  by  so  doing  could  the  government  up- 
hold discipline  within  the  ranks  of  the  military  and  her  status 
of  honor  and  respect  among  the  nations  of  the  world.  In  the  long 
run  this  too  would  enable  the  Chinese  to  maintain  friendly  feel- 
ings toward  Japan.  Also  it  would  reflect  favorably  upon  the  mili- 
tary background  of  the  Premier  and  the  prestige  of  the  Seiyukai 
party.  When  Tanaka  vacillated  by  saying  that  he  would  look 
into  the  matter  after  the  coronation,3  Saionji  urged  him  at  least 
to  report  the  incident  to  the  Emperor  right  away. 

But  this  was  quite  contrary  to  the  opinion  held  by  executive 
members  of  the  Seiyukai.  They  took  the  position  that  under  no 
circumstances  should  the  culprit  be  punished,  because  this  would 
be  an  open  admission  of  Japan's  guilt.  After  all,  the  crime  was 
committed  by  members  of  the  Emperor's  own  troops.  How 
could  the  Emperor,  in  name  the  Commander  in  Chief,  main- 
tain face  in  the  presence  of  foreign  diplomats?  They  thought 
that  Prince  Saionji  was  wholly  in  the  wrong,  and  presently  there 
developed  a  strong  movement  to  whitewash  the  whole  incident. 

In  the  face  of  strong  opposition  from  within  his  party,  Tanaka 
was  extremely  reluctant  to  take  resolute  action;  but  in  the  end 
he  was  prevailed  upon,  by  Saionji's  repeated  urging,  to  report  the 

2.  Harada  Diary,  1 ,  3-4.  Okada  Memoirs,  p.  38. 

3.  Held  in  Kyoto,  November  10,  1928. 


PORTENTS  OF  CRISIS  59 

incident  to  the  Emperor.  At  an  audience,  Tanaka  stated  that  it 
appeared  likely  that  the  offending  party  was  a  Japanese  army 
officer  and  that  he  should  be  brought  to  trial  before  a  military 
tribunal.  The  Emperor  responded  tersely,  "Military  discipline 
must  be  maintained  with  rigor."4  Tanaka  pledged  that  His 
Majesty's  wishes  would  be  carried  out. 

But  Tanaka  discovered  that  it  was  well-nigh  impossible  to 
hold  a  trial  by  court-martial.  Not  only  were  ranking  army  officers 
violently  opposed  to  it,  but  objections  were  voiced  even  from 
the  members  of  his  own  cabinet.  The  Seiyukai  was  exerting 
utmost  pressure  on  Tanaka  to  prevent  him  from  conducting  a 
trial.5 

For  instance  on  October  23,  at  the  second  meeting  of  the 
"Special  Committee  to  Investigate  the  Death  of  Chang  Tso-lin," 
6ba,  an  administrative  official  of  the  Kwantung  Territorial  Gov- 
ernment, testified  that  Ito  Kenjiro  and  Staff  Officer  Komoto  were 
the  principal  offenders.  The  meeting  was  thrown  into  such  a 
turmoil  that  Mori  suspended  it  for  the  day.6  Even  more  alarming 
was  the  growing  resentment  of  the  general  populace  against 
holding  the  trial.  Tension  reached  a  point  so  critical  that  some 
feared  outbreaks  of  violence. 

Tanaka  was  left  with  no  choice  but  to  bow  to  public  senti- 
ment and  accept  the  formula  suggested  by  the  Minister  of  War, 
who  proposed  that  the  offenders  be  punished  by  administrative 
action.  General  Muraoka  and  Colonel  Komoto  were  now 
charged  with  dereliction  of  duty,  the  specific  charge  being  failure 
to  post  railroad  guards  at  a  zone  requiring  protection.  By  dispos- 
ing of  the  case  in  this  way,  General  Muraoka  would  not  even  be 
suspected  of  being  implicated  in  the  plot;  it  would  be  believed 
that  he  was  being  punished  solely  because  of  his  position  as 
Commanding  General  of  the  Kwantung  Army. 

4.  Harada  Diary,  1 ,  5.  Author's  translation. 

5.  For  Tanaka's  earnest  efforts  to  court-martial  Colonel  Komoto  and 
his  losing  battle  against  overwhelming  odds,  see  Shinmyo,  Child  Kdron, 
(April  1954),  pp.  197-99. 

6.  Kurihara  Ken,  Tenno  (The  Emperor)  (Tokyo,  1955),  p.  42. 


60  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

The  Emperor  was  displeased  when  Tanaka  reported  to  the 
throne  the  change  in  the  mode  of  bringing  the  offenders  to  ac- 
count. No  sooner  did  Tanaka  finish  reading  the  memorial  than 
the  Emperor  charged,  "You  are  contradicting  what  you  said 
the  last  time."  Mortified,  Tanaka  replied,  "I  shall  further  explain 
the  various  matters  to  Your  Majesty."  "There  is  no  need  for 
further  explanation,"  the  Emperor  retorted,  and  retired  into  the 
inner  chamber.  Later  Tanaka  sought  another  audience,  but  the 
Grand  Chamberlain,  Suzuki  Kantaro,  said  apologetically,  "I  shall 
convey  your  wishes  to  His  Majesty,  but  I  am  afraid  that  it  will 
be  useless."7 

Tanaka  returned  to  his  office  crestfallen,  firmly  resolved  to 
resign.  Although  some  members  of  the  Seiyukai  objected,  this 
time  he  stuck  to  his  decision.  Shortly  thereafter  he  died  of  heart 
failure.  There  were  rumors  that  he  had  committed  suicide,  but 
this  was  not  true.8 

A  new  cabinet  was  formed  under  Premier  Hamaguchi  of  the 
Minseito  party,  and  Shidehara  returned  as  Foreign  Minister. 

Though  Tanaka  passed  from  the  scene  quietly,  his  indecisive 
handling  of  the  death  of  Marshal  Chang  reaped  the  whirlwind,9 
marking  as  it  did  the  beginning  of  the  army's  domination  of 
Japan.  The  army  had  already  defied  the  Premier  and  had  even 
dared  to  ignore  the  imperial  will. 

7.  See  Okada  Memoirs,  pp.  40-41.  Author's  translation.  Years  later  the 
Emperor  reportedly  expressed  misgivings  about  having  been  too  harsh  with 
Tanaka  (Kurihara,  Tenno,  p.  46). 

8.  For  details  of  Tanaka's  dying  hours  see  Tanaka  Giichi  Denki,  2, 
1052-53. 

9.  Koizumi  Sakutaro,  Tanaka's  contemporary,  once  observed,  "Tanaka 
has  taken  over  the  government  but  has  not  accomplished  a  thing  that  he 
set  out  to  do.  Instead,  he  has  been  made  to  do  everything  he  has  not 
wanted  to  do"  Baba,  Gendai  Jinbutsu  Hydron,  p.  183.  Author's  translation. 


3. 

TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN 


Dissension  over  the  London  Naval  Agreement 

In  January  1930,  delegations  representing  Great  Britain,  the 
United  States,  Japan,  France,  and  Italy  met  in  London  to  nego- 
tiate an  agreement  governing  the  specifications  and  total  tonnage 
of  cruisers  (of  10,000  tons  and  less),  destroyers,  and  submarines. 
Although  the  five  powers  had  reached  an  agreement  on  capital 
ships  and  aircraft  carriers  at  the  Washington  Conference  in 
1922,  subsequent  efforts  at  Geneva  in  1927  to  reach  an  accord 
on  various  auxiliary  ships  had  failed,  owing  to  Anglo-American 
differences. 

As  1929  drew  to  a  close,  these  two  nations  were  willing  to 
try  again  with  Japan,  Italy,  and  France  also  participating.  Be- 
cause of  the  acute  financial  depression  gripping  these  countries, 
each  had  good  reason  to  try  to  head  off  a  possible  armament 
race  in  the  auxiliary  class. 

The  London  Naval  Conference  has  already  been  studied  in 

great  detail  by  a  number  of  scholars,1  and  here  we  shall  recount 

1.  The  fullest  account  is  to  be  found  in  E.  L.  Woodward  and  Rohan 
Butler,  eds.,  Documents  on  British  Foreign  Policy,  1919-39,  Second 
Series,  1  (London,  1930).  Also  see  Vol.  1  of  Foreign  Relations  (Wash- 
ington, 1930).  For  the  controversy  which  raged  within  the  Japanese  gov- 
ernment over  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  see  the  detailed  treatment  by 
Takeuchi,  War  and  Diplomacy  in  the  Japanese  Empire,  pp.  283-336;  and 
Aoki  Tokuzo,  Taiheiyo  Senso  Zenshi  (History  of  Events  Leading  to  the 
Pacific  War),  1  (Tokyo,  1953),  3-101  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Aoki,  The 
Pacific  War).  The  author  is  greatly  indebted  to  this  work  in  recounting 
the  events  up  to  April  2,  1930. 

61 


62  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

only  salient  facts  relating  to  protests  which  the  Japanese  Naval 
General  Staff  lodged  against  the  deliberate  actions  of  their  own 
government.2  This  account  should  show  in  sharp  relief  the  grow- 
ing split  in  Japan's  ruling  circles  during  a  period  of  declining  Jap- 
anese influence  in  China.  We  shall  examine  in  particular  the 
growing  dissatisfaction  of  the  Japanese  military  and  the  ultra- 
nationalists  with  the  Minseito  government,  particularly  Shidehara, 
because  of  its  insistence  on  conducting  its  foreign  relations  in 
accordance  with  anticipated  responses  from  the  leading  powers 
of  the  West. 

The  very  fact  that  the  government  was  able  to  prevail  over  the 
forces  of  reaction  in  the  Privy  Council  only  by  threatening  to 
invoke  the  authority  of  the  Emperor  so  incensed  reactionary 
elements  that,  in  the  words  of  one  observer,  "The  sentiment 
evoked  and  the  resentment  stirred  up  in  connection  with  the  Lon- 
don Naval  Treaty  were  echoed  and  re-echoed  in  subsequent 
years  by  arousing  public  opinion  against  the  political  parties, 
politicians,  and  liberals."3 

In  the  late  summer  of  1929,  Japanese  Naval  Officers,  and 
especially  members  of  the  "fleet  clique,"4  viewed  any  naval 
limitation  conference  with  grave  misgivings.  Still  rankling  in  their 
hearts  was  the  memory  of  the  Washington  Naval  Conference, 
particularly  the  unpopular  settlement  forced  on  Japan  with  re- 
spect to  the  capital  ship  ratio  of  5:5:3.  Inferiority  in  capital 

2.  Perhaps  the  most  significant  Japanese  work  on  the  London  Naval 
Conference  is  virtually  the  entire  first  volume  of  Harada  Diary.  See  also 
the  memoirs  of  Wakatsuki  Reijiro,  Japan's  Chief  Delegate  to  the  Confer- 
ence, entitled  Kofuan  Kaikoroku  (Memoirs  of  Kofuan  [Wakatsuki's  pseu- 
donym] hereafter  referred  to  as  Wakatsuki  Memoirs)  (Tokyo,  1950), 
pp.  332-66;  Shidehara  Memoirs,  pp.  120-45;  Okada  Memoirs,  pp.  42-74; 
Shidehara  Kijuro,  pp.  403-26;  Yatsugi  Kazuo,  Showa  Jinbutsu  Hiroku 
(Inside  Stories  of  Personalities  of  the  Showa  Era)  (Tokyo,  1954),  pp. 
63-99;  and  Uyehara  Checklist,  pp.  205-06. 

3.  Yanaga,  Japan  since  Perry,  p.  466. 

4.  Generally  speaking,  this  group  consisted  of  younger  naval  officers 
who  espoused  the  cause  of  Japan's  expansion  while  decrying  the  treaties 
which  fettered  Japan's  freedom  of  action  in  the  Far  East.  The  so-called 
"shore  clique"  was  comprised  mostly  of  the  old  guards  of  the  navy  who 
believed  in  Japan's  abiding  by  treaty  obligations. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  63 

ships  vis-a-vis  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  had  thus 
become  Japan's  lot.  Admiral  Kato  Kanji,  Chief  of  the  Naval 
General  Staff,  was  speaking  not  only  for  himself  when  he  brushed 
aside  an  offer  to  represent  Japan  as  one  of  the  delegates  to  the 
London  Conference  by  saying  that  his  job  was  to  wage  war,  not 
to  take  part  in  a  conference  to  end  wars.5 

The  Japanese  Admiralty  was  quite  aware  of  the  difficult  nature 
of  the  forthcoming  negotiations  and  therefore  undertook  to  be 
prepared  well  in  advance  of  the  opening  of  the  conference.  Early 
in  October  a  preparatory  committee  of  experts  met  to  examine 
and  discuss  technical  questions  pertaining  to  arms  reduction. 
Thus,  by  October  7,  the  same  day  on  which  the  Japanese  Em- 
bassy in  London  received  from  the  British  government  the  invi- 
tation to  the  Naval  Limitation  Conference,  the  Japanese 
Admiralty  sent  one  of  its  vice  admirals  to  Prince  Saionji,  the  last 
of  the  surviving  Elder  Statesmen,  to  explain  and  secure  his  under- 
standing and  support  of  the  Admiralty's  position. 

The  position  from  which  the  Admiralty  was  firmly  resolved 
that  it  would  not  retreat  was  spelled  out  in  the  so-called  "three 
fundamental  claims,"  which  were  regarded  as  being  "adequate 
for  defensive,  but  not  for  offensive  purposes."  First  of  the  desid- 
erata was  that  Japan  would  be  allowed  to  possess  in  the  class 
of  10,000-ton  cruisers  mounting  eight-inch  guns  an  aggregate 
tonnage  equivalent  to  70  per  cent  of  that  of  either  the  United 
States  or  Great  Britain,  whichever  had  the  greater  tonnage.  Sec- 
ondly, Japan  would  be  permitted  to  retain  intact  her  then-current 
tonnage,  79,000  tons,  of  undersea  craft.  Thirdly,  the  aggregate 
tonnage  of  auxiliary  ships,  excepting  the  10,000-ton  class 
cruisers  and  undersea  craft  already  mentioned,  should  be  70  per 
cent  of  that  of  the  United  States  or  Great  Britain. 

The  London  Naval  Conference  opened  on  January  21,  1931. 
For  the  first  six  weeks,  negotiations  centered  around  proposals 
submitted  by  Japan;  but  progress  was  slow  as  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  voiced  various  exceptions.  Finally,  as  a  matter 
of  expediency,  it  was  proposed  and  accepted  that  Senator  David 

5.  Mori,  Senpii  Nijilnen,  p.  21. 


64  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

A.  Reed  and  Matsudaira  Tsuneo,  Japanese  Ambassador  to  Eng- 
land, should  enter  into  private  conversations.  From  these  talks 
emerged  a  compromise  proposal.  Actually,  Matsudaira  con- 
ducted his  negotiations  with  Reed  without  benefit  of  Japanese 
naval  experts  and  without  consulting  Admiral  Takarabe,  Minis- 
ter of  the  Navy  and  a  member  of  the  delegation.6  Nevertheless, 
Takarabe  initialed  the  draft  proposal,  which  was  wired  to  Tokyo 
for  instructions.  A  convincingly  clear  explanation  is  still  wanting 
as  to  why  Takarabe  did  not  refuse  to  initial  this  document  be- 
cause it  was  obvious  both  to  him  and  to  Wakatsuki  that  the  terms 
embodied  in  the  proposal  would  not  be  acceptable  to  naval  lead- 
ers in  Tokyo.  One  can  only  surmise  that  after  protracted  nego- 
tiations they  did  not  wish  to  bear  the  onus  of  responsibility  for 
contributing  to  the  collapse  of  the  conference. 

The  gist  of  the  Matsudaira-Reed  compromise  was  that  Japan's 
tonnage  in  auxiliary  ships  of  all  classes  was  to  be  69.75  per  cent 
of  that  of  the  United  States  or  of  Great  Britain.  In  aggregate 
tonnage  this  would  have  been  short  of  Japan's  proposal  by  1,290 
tons,  a  difference  of  seemingly  minor  importance.  However,  the 
draft  proposal  contained  an  additional  provision  restricting 
Japan's  cruisers  in  the  10,000-ton  class  mounting  eight-inch  guns 
to  60  per  cent  of  that  of  the  United  States  or  Great  Britain.  With 
respect  to  undersea  craft,  the  proposal  stipulated  that  the  three 
powers  would  maintain  parity  at  52,700  tons.  This  would  have 
meant  a  reduction  by  one-third  of  the  tonnage  which  Japan  then 
possessed  in  this  class  of  ships.  Were  she  to  assume  that  the  re- 
placement age  of  these  ships  would  be  agreed  upon  at  thirteen 
years,  she  would  not  be  able  to  build  a  single  undersea  craft  until 
1936.  She  feared  that  during  this  period  existing  facilities  and  the 
technical  skill  required  to  build  these  highly  specialized  craft 
would  fall  into  obsolescence. 

Another  source  of  disappointment  to  Japan  was  her  inability 

6.  Takeuchi,  War  and  Diplomacy  in  the  Japanese  Empire,  p.  293. 
According  to  Wakatsuki,  Takarabe  and  the  naval  officers  objected  strenu- 
ously and  declared  that  they  would  submit  a  protest  to  the  home  govern- 
ment. Yatsugi,  Showa  Jinbutsu  Hiroku,  p.  88. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  65 

to  come  to  terms  with  the  United  States  on  retaining  excessive 
tonnage  in  undersea  craft  by  accepting  a  reduction  in  other  forms 
of  auxiliary  ships.  Although  Japan  had  hoped  that  this  difference 
could  be  made  up  by  reducing  the  tonnage  of  her  light  cruisers 
and  destroyers,  the  draft  proposal  called  on  Japan  to  reduce  her 
over-all  tonnage  in  the  10,000-ton  cruiser  class.7 

Despite  the  fact  that  Wakatsuki,  the  Chief  Delegate,  had  grave 
misgivings  concerning  the  reception  of  the  draft  proposal  by  the 
navy — it  obviously  represented  a  distinct  departure  from  the 
three  fundamental  claims — he  transmitted  it  to  his  home  govern- 
ment, stating  that  it  was  beyond  his  power  to  extract  any  further 
concessions  from  the  United  States.  In  Tokyo  the  Foreign  Office 
advocated  immediate  acceptance  of  the  draft  proposal  in  the 
interest  of  promoting  more  stable  and  friendly  relationships  with 
the  other  nations.  The  navy,  however,  was  disturbed  and  highly 
resentful.  Admiral  Kato,  Chief  of  the  Naval  General  Staff  and 
Vice  Admiral  Suetsugu  Nobumasa,  Kato's  immediate  subordi- 
nate, vigorously  opposed  the  proposal.  Siding  with  the  two  ad- 
mirals were  a  number  of  young  naval  officers,  retired  military 
officers,  and  many  civilians  representing  right-wing  elements. 

During  the  critical  weeks  that  followed,  the  tactics  employed 
by  the  Office  of  the  Naval  General  Staff  lacked  decisiveness. 
Actions  taken  by  Kato  and  Suetsugu  can  at  best  be  characterized 
as  ineffectual  holding  operations.  On  March  17  Suetsugu  indi- 
cated his  opposition  to  the  draft  proposal  by  publishing  it  in  the 
press.  Again  on  the  22nd  he  was  about  to  release  his  views  to  the 
press  when  he  was  restrained  from  doing  so.  Nevertheless,  several 
Tokyo  papers  did  manage  to  report  on  the  suppressed  news. 
Meanwhile,  on  the  19th,  Admiral  Kato  called  on  Premier  Hama- 
guchi  Osayuki  and  emphasized  that  the  navy  would  not  give 
ground  unless  an  agreement  could  be  reached  on  effective  security 
measures,  in  which  case  the  three  fundamental  claims  could  be 
modified. 

On  the  22nd,  the  leaders  of  the  navy  met  in  order  to  prepare 

7.  Aoki,  The  Pacific  War,  1,  8. 


66  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

a  strongly  united  front  since  it  had  become  apparent  that  Hama- 
guchi  was  unwilling  to  take  any  stand  that  might  jeopardize  the 
success  of  the  London  Conference.  The  consensus  of  the  naval 
leaders  was  that  the  draft  proposal  was  unacceptable  because  it 
did  not  reflect  the  strategic  requirements  of  the  Japanese  navy 
as  determined  by  professional  naval  personnel;  moreover,  it  was 
suggested  that  a  compromise,  such  as  the  Matsudaira-Reed  pro- 
posal, should  be  resorted  to  only  as  a  last  measure.  Representa- 
tions were  made  by  the  naval  leaders  that  the  Premier  should 
clarify  to  this  group  the  government's  thinking  as  soon  as  it  had 
drawn  up  its  instructions.  Finally,  the  group  drew  up  its  own  set 
of  proposals  to  be  incorporated  into  the  instructions  to  be  sent 
to  London.  The  so-called  naval  proposals,  for  reasons  unknown, 
ended  in  a  conciliatory  tone  by  conceding  that,  even  were  their 
proposals  to  be  rejected,  the  navy  would  abide  by  the  decision 
of  the  government. 

The  three  desiderata  outlined  above  were  drawn  up  in  a 
memo  and,  after  review  by  the  Board  of  Admirals  of  the  Navy 
and  the  Supreme  War  Council,  were  presented  to  Foreign  Minis- 
ter Shidehara  and  Premier  Hamaguchi  on  the  25th.  Despite  these 
actions,  the  naval  men  remained  ill  at  ease  and  on  the  27th  sent 
two  admirals,  Okada  and  Kato,  to  see  the  Premier  and  again  to 
make  representations.  Hamaguchi  candidly  admitted  that  al- 
though he  was  the  Administrative  Minister  of  the  Navy  in  the 
absence  of  Admiral  Takarabe,  the  issue  of  disarmament  must 
be  viewed  as  a  broader  question  affecting  the  peace  of  the  world 
and  the  welfare  of  the  nation  as  a  whole.  He  went  on  to  say  that 
reduction  in  naval  armament  was  necessary  to  lighten  the  finan- 
cial burden  on  the  people  and  also  to  insure  that  a  costly  naval 
armament  race  would  not  ensue  in  the  wake  of  the  collapse  of 
this  conference.  Thus,  Hamaguchi  made  it  clear  that  he  intended 
to  accept  the  draft  proposal  Wakatsuki  had  submitted. 

Kato  denied  that  the  breakup  of  the  conference  would  touch 
off  a  naval  building  race.  Moreover,  he  charged  that  agreements 
affecting  naval  combat  strength  were  the  primary  concern  of  the 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  67 

supreme  command;  if  the  government  were  to  conclude  a  treaty 
independently  of  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Generaf  Staff,  it  would 
raise  a  grave  constitutional  issue. 

Meanwhile,  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  had  completed  the 
draft  of  instructions  to  be  sent  back  to  London.  Thus,  on  the 
night  of  March  31,  high  officials  of  the  Foreign  Office  met  with 
the  leading  members  of  the  Admiralty  in  order  to  brief  the  latter 
on  the  substance  of  the  instructions  prior  to  the  cabinet  session 
to  be  held  on  April  1 .  Very  little  was  accomplished  at  this  gather- 
ing, however,  because  Admiral  Suetsugu  persisted  in  reiterating 
the  naval  side  of  the  argument.  Therefore,  early  the  following 
morning  Hamaguchi  invited  Admirals  Okada,  Kato,  and  Yamana- 
shi  to  the  Premier's  residence  where  they  were  shown  the  draft 
of  the  instructions.  While  Okada  responded  in  a  conciliatory 
tone,  since  it  was  his  role  as  an  insider  to  mitigate  the  intran- 
sigency  of  the  naval  diehards,  Kato  stuck  to  his  argument  that 
acceptance  of  the  draft  proposal  would  impair  Japan's  naval 
strategy. 

With  less  than  an  hour  remaining  before  the  cabinet  assembled, 
Okada  and  Yamanashi  withdrew  to  the  residence  of  the  Minister 
of  the  Navy  to  confer  hastily  with  the  representatives  of  the 
Admiralty.  For  reasons  which  would  soon  be  obvious,  Kato  ab- 
sented himself  from  this  gathering.8  Yamanashi  read  the  instruc- 
tions prepared  by  the  Foreign  Office.  Several  revisions  of  a  minor 
nature  were  suggested,  but  no  one  present  objected  to  either  the 
substance  of  the  instructions  or  the  precipitate  manner  in  which 
the  approval  of  the  instructions  was  being  obtained.  Then  Yama- 
nashi read  off  three  times  the  memo9  which  the  naval  men  had 
prepared  to  be  presented  to  the  cabinet  that  morning.  It  was 
accepted  without  revision.  The  general  tone  of  the  meeting  tends 
to  indicate  that  the  naval  leaders  were  resigned  to  the  fact  that 

8.  Some  two  months  later  in  June,  Kato  regretted  the  fact  that  he  had 
failed  to  take  a  positive  stand  on  April  1.  Aoki,  7,  51. 

9.  The  text  of  this  memo  so  far  has  not  been  located.  However,  it  was 
most  likely  couched  in  conciliatory  tones  and  called  for  some  means  of 
compensating  for  the  concession  made  in  the  10,000-ton  class  of  cruisers. 


68  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

their  opposition  would  be  futile,  and  therefore  in  return  for  their 
cooperative  attitude  they  felt  they  could  extract  concessions  from 
the  government  to  maintain  naval  strength  by  some  other  means. 

The  crucial  cabinet  meeting  was  held  later  the  same  morning. 
Foreign  Minister  Shidehara  opened  the  session  with  an  expla- 
nation of  how  the  struggle  for  a  month  and  a  half  on  the  part  of 
Japanese  delegates  to  have  the  United  States  accept  Japan's  pro- 
posals had  resulted  in  a  stalemate  because  both  the  British  and 
the  American  delegates  had  insisted  on  making  extensive  changes 
to  Japan's  proposal,  and  how  the  deadlock  had  finally  been 
broken  and  a  compromise  reached  by  means  of  informal  discus- 
sions between  Ambassador  Matsudaira  and  Senator  Reed.  Shide- 
hara pleaded  that  the  instructions,  which  were  based  on  the  draft 
proposal,  be  accepted  since  the  latter  was  an  end  product  of  a 
laborious  negotiation  and  no  further  concession  could  be  ex- 
pected from  the  United  States.  The  fact  was  that  Wakatsuki  was 
determined  to  tender  his  resignation  if  the  government  suggested 
a  major  change  in  the  draft  proposal  or  called  for  further  con- 
cessions of  a  far-reaching  nature.10 

Yamanashi,  repeating  the  familiar  theme,  deplored  the  down- 
ward revision  in  tonnage  of  the  cruisers  of  the  10,000-ton  class 
and  of  undersea  craft  but  accepted  the  instructions,  stating  that 
the  navy  was  left  with  no  choice.  He  did,  however,  request  that 
in  return  for  the  navy's  submitting  to  the  will  of  the  Premier  and 
the  Foreign  Office  the  government  redirect  the  700  million  yen 
realized  from  reduction  in  tonnage  of  cruisers  toward  increasing 
the  strength  of  the  navy  through  other  means,  such  as  naval 
aviation.  The  Premier  and  the  Minister  of  Finance  assured  Yama- 
nashi that  full  consideration  would  be  given  to  this  request. 
Thereupon  Hamaguchi  reported  the  action  of  the  cabinet  to  the 
Emperor  that  afternoon  and  received  his  sanction,  and  Shidehara 
sent  the  instructions  to  Wakatsuki  in  London. 

Admiral  Kato,  in  the  meantime,  having  realized  the  futility  of 
trying  to  reason  with  Premier  Hamaguchi,  was  determined  to 

10.  Yatsugi,  Showa  Jinbutsu  Hiroku,  p.  88. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  69 

block  the  instructions  and  sought  an  audience  with  the  Emperor 
on  the  morning  of  April  1 ,  but  he  was  told  thaf  His  Majesty's 
calendar  for  the  day  was  filled;11  he  waited  until  the  following 
day  and  made  a  direct  appeal  to  the  throne  on  the  morning  of 
April  2.  Details  of  this  address,  classified  as  top  military  secret, 
have  not  been  disclosed.  Aoki,  without  giving  his  sources,  men- 
tions that  Kato  protested  that  a  substantial  reduction  of  Japan's 
naval  armament  according  to  the  American  proposal  would 
gravely  alter  the  strategic  plans  based  on  the  national  defense 
policy  which  Emperor  Taisho  had  sanctioned  in  1923.1- 

On  the  same  day  that  Admiral  Kato  made  his  direct  appeal 
to  the  Emperor,  there  were  other  developments  which  bespoke 
the  troubles  yet  to  come.  On  the  afternoon  of  April  2  Premier 
Hamaguchi  invited  Yabuki,  Parliamentary  Vice  Minister  of  the 
Navy,  and  Vice  Admiral  Suetsugu,  Vice  Chief  of  the  Naval  Gen- 
eral Staff,  to  his  residence  for  a  frank  exchange  of  opinion.  That 
Hamaguchi  made  no  headway  with  Suetsugu  is  apparent  from 
the  interview  which  the  latter  subsequently  held  with  news  re- 
porters. Suetsugu  disclosed  that  he  had  remained  adamant  in  the 
face  of  Hamaguchi's  pleas  and  had  told  the  Premier  that  the  navy 
could  not  be  expected  to  alter  on  short  notice  a  long-standing 
policy  based  on  years  of  experience,  study,  and  sacrifice.13 

When  the  agreement  was  finally  ready  for  signing  in  London, 
Kato,  still  smarting  under  the  reverse  inflicted  upon  him  and  his 
staff  at  the  hands  of  the  government,  sent  an  official  protest  in  the 
form  of  a  memorial  to  the  throne  to  Admiral  Yamanashi,  Vice 
Minister  of  the  Navy.  When  Admiral  Okada  questioned  his 
motives,  Kato  replied  that  he  wished  to  resign  before  the  agree- 
ment was  signed.  However,  dissuaded  by  Okada  from  doing  so, 

1 1.  Mori  Kaku  summoned  Harada  and  asked  point-blank  if  he  had  had 
any  part  in  preventing  Admiral  Kato  from  making  a  direct  appeal  to  the 
throne  on  April  1  before  Premier  Hamaguchi  made  his  report  on  instruc- 
tions to  be  sent  to  London.  Harada  Diary,  1,  64. 

12.  Aoki,  The  Pacific  War,  1,  15.  The  nature  of  this  policy  is  not 
known. 

13.  Tokyo  Asahi,  April  3,  1930. 


70  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Kato  then  asked  that  this  memorial  be  kept  in  custody  until  it 
could  be  shown  to  Admiral  Takarabe  on  his  return  from  London. 

In  this  memorial,  which  Kato  later  tendered  to  Takarabe,  Kato 
insisted  that  there  must  be  direct  communications  between  the 
throne  and  the  Naval  General  Staff  if  the  national  defense  policy 
were  to  have  continuity  and  be  divorced  from  the  vagaries  of 
politics.  Article  12  of  the  Constitution,  together  with  Article  55, 
empowered  the  Emperor,  with  the  advice  of  the  Minister  of  the 
Navy,  to  determine  questions  of  naval  organization  and  the  stand- 
ing fleet;  Kato  argued  that  a  sound  decision  could  not  be  made 
unless  the  Naval  General  Staff,  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Emperor,  had  in  advance  determined  the  over-all  strategic 
requirements  of  the  empire.14  Insofar  as  the  London  Naval 
Agreement  called  for  a  change  in  the  composition  of  Japan's 
naval  fleets,  it  stood  to  affect  their  combat  strength.  Therefore, 
this  was  a  domain  of  utmost  concern  to  the  Naval  General  Staff. 
Moreover,  observed  Kato,  the  London  Agreement  limited  the 
size  of  auxiliary  fleets  in  terms  of  tonnage,  but  did  not  set  a  ceil- 
ing in  terms  of  allowable  expenditures.  This  lack  of  precision 
made  the  task  of  carrying  out  the  new  agreement  difficult  for 
those  who  were  charged  with  that  responsibility. 

Thus,  concluded  Kato,  Article  12,  which  gave  primacy  to  the 
government  in  matters  of  military  organization,  was  inseparably 
linked  with  Article  1 1 ,  which  gave  primacy  to  the  supreme  com- 
mand in  matters  affecting  strategy,  and  the  two  should  not  be  re- 
garded as  constituting  separate  entities.  Those  who  deliberately 
memorialized  the  Emperor  on  matters  of  grave  importance  to  the 
nation,  such  as  the  level  of  armaments  in  peacetime,  without  con- 
sulting the  Naval  General  Staff,  were  bound  to  err — as  had  hap- 

14.  Article  11:  The  Emperor  has  the  supreme  command  of  the  army 
and  navy.  Article  12:  The  Emperor  determines  the  organization  and  peace 
standing  of  the  army  and  navy.  Article  55:  The  respective  ministers  of 
state  shall  give  their  advice  to  the  Emperor,  and  be  responsible  for  it.  All 
laws,  imperial  ordinances,  and  imperial  rescripts  of  whatever  kind  that 
relate  to  the  affairs  of  state,  require  the  countersignature  of  a  minister  of 
state. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  71 

pened  when  the  government  dispatched  the  final  instruction  to 
the  delegation  in  London.15 

Takarabe  rejected  Kato's  memorial,  stating  that  the  right  to 
interpret  the  Constitution  did  not  belong  to  the  military,16  and 
that  he  had  therefore  no  right  to  make  a  direct  appeal  to  the 
throne  on  these  matters. 

It  was  well  toward  the  end  of  April,  along  about  the  time  that 
the  58th  Diet  Session  convened,  that  the  smoldering  dispute 
between  the  government  and  the  Naval  General  Staff  flared  into 
the  open.  The  government's  action  in  forcibly  railroading  the 
London  Naval  Agreement  through  was  labeled  "a  violation  of  the 
imperial  prerogative  of  supreme  command" — a  sanctimonious 
phrase  coined  by  the  navy  at  this  time  as  a  protest  against  the  gov- 
ernment's encroachment  upon  what  it  considered  to  be  its  prerog- 
ative.17 This  phrase  was  subsequently  employed  frequently  by 
the  military  to  escape  government  censure  for  its  arbitrary  actions. 
Admiral  Kato  probably  meant  either  ignoring  the  views  of  the 
Chief  of  the  Naval  General  Staff  or  entering  into  an  international 
agreement  relevant  to  national  defense  without  his  prior  con- 
sent.18 

15.  Aoki,  The  Pacific  War,  1 ,  33-34.  Aoki  cites  the  fact  that  Regulation 
No.  7  in  the  Procedures  of  Mutual  Consultation  on  Matters  pertaining  to 
Administrative  Matters  of  the  Ministry  of  the  Navy  prescribed  that  the 
Minister  of  the  Navy  reach  an  accord  with  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  General 
Staff  when  the  former  was  making  decisions  on  matters  pertaining  to  the 
state  of  naval  preparedness  or  increase  or  decrease  in  the  naval  strength. 
Ibid.,  p.  42.  For  helpful  background  accounts  of  the  Naval  General  Staff, 
see  Arthur  E.  Tiedman,  7The  Hamaguchi  Cabinet,  First  Phase,  July, 
1929-February,  1930:  A  Study  in  Japanese  Parliamentary  Government," 
dissertation  (Columbia  University,  1960),  pp.  26-29;  especially  footnote  1 
on  p.  26. 

16.  Aoki,  1,  52. 

17.  Prof.  Nakano  and  others  have  based  the  independence  of  the  su- 
preme command  on  the  establishment  of  the  General  Staff  Office  by 
Imperial  Ordinance  of  December  5,  1878.  Nakano  Tomio,  Tosuiken  no 
Dokuritsu  (The  Independence  of  Supreme  Command)  (Tokyo,  1934), 
pp.  360  ff. 

18.  Admiral  Okada  continued,  "If  this  were  to  be  the  case,  hereafter  no 
one  would  ever  accept  the  post  of  ambassador  plenipotentiary.  As  a  min- 


72  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

The  struggle  between  the  government  and  the  Naval  General 
Staff  to  determine  who  had  the  final  say  in  matters  of  armament 
developed  into  a  legal  battle  over  the  interpretation  and  relative 
merits  of  Articles  1 1  and  12  of  the  Japanese  Constitution.  Jurists 
of  the  new  school  like  Professor  Minobe,  who  championed  the 
cause  of  constitutional  government,  argued  that,  first  of  all,  the 
power  to  determine  the  strength  and  composition  of  the  military 
establishments  in  time  of  peace  stemmed  from  the  Emperor's 
prerogative  over  affairs  of  state  and  not  from  the  prerogative  of 
supreme  command.  Secondly,  they  contended  that  the  cabinet 
had  a  voice  in  military  matters,  as  seen  in  Prince  Ito's  commen- 
tary on  Article  12,  which  read  in  part,  "It  is  true  that  this  power 
is  to  be  exercised  with  the  advice  of  responsible  ministers."19 
These  jurists  insisted  that  "responsible  ministers"  meant  every 
member  of  the  cabinet  who  was  answerable  to  the  Diet  for  ad- 
ministrative decisions,  which  was  tantamount  to  saying  that  in 
peacetime  the  authority  to  determine  the  strength  and  organiza- 
tion of  the  armed  services  rested,  to  a  considerable  extent,  in  the 
cabinet. 

However,  the  jurists  of  the  new  school  lifted  Ito's  passage  out 
of  context.  The  balance  of  the  sentence  read,  "still,  like  the 
imperial  military  command,  it  nevertheless  belongs  to  the  sover- 


ister  of  state,  it  is  the  function  of  the  Minister  of  the  Navy  to  represent 
the  admiralty.  The  Naval  General  Staff  may  approach  the  Minister  of  the 
Navy,  but  it  is  not  within  his  power  to  deal  directly  with  the  government. 
It  would  be  a  grave  matter  if,  upon  the  objection  of  the  Chief  of  General 
Staff,  treaties  were  to  be  blocked.  Kato  is  being  used  as  a  cat's-paw  by 
conspirators  who  are  trying  to  prevent  the  ratification  of  this  treaty  by 
invoking  the  sanctity  of  the  supreme  command.  We  really  have  a  problem 
on  hand.  In  the  end  I  suppose  Kato  will  have  to  resign."  Harada  Diary,  1, 
62-63.  Author's  free  translation.  With  respect  to  the  inconsistent  behavior 
of  Kato,  Harada  observed  that  Kato  stayed  in  line  when  he  was  not  being 
goaded  by  Suetsugu;  but  that  he  acted  up  as  soon  as  Suetsugu  clamored  for 
action.  Thus,  while  Suetsugu  was  apparently  the  man  behind  Kato,  Suet- 
sugu in  turn  seems  to  have  been  under  the  influence  of  Hiranuma  Kiichiro, 
a  member  of  the  Privy  Council.  Ibid. 

19.  Quoted  in  Kenneth  W.  Colegrove,  Militarism  in  Japan   (Boston, 
World  Peace  Foundation,  1936),  p.  18. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  73 

eign  power  of  the  Emperor,  and  no  interference  in  it  by  the  Diet 
should  be  allowed."  Jurists  of  the  old  ultranationalistic  school — 
like  Professors  Hozumi  Yatsuka  and  Uesugi  Shinkichi — took 
this  to  mean  that  "responsible  ministers"  in  Article  12  referred 
only  to  the  Ministers  of  War  and  the  Navy  and  did  not  include 
civilian  cabinet  officials. 

Precedent  was  in  favor  of  the  latter  school.  Prior  to  the  pro- 
mulgation of  the  Meiji  Constitution,  the  Emperor  was  free  to 
issue  military  orders  without  the  countersignature  of  a  minister. 
Insofar  as  this  procedure  had  not  been  abrogated  by  subsequent 
enactments,  the  practice  prevailing  prior  to  the  promulgation  of 
the  Constitution  was  still  valid.20  In  actual  practice,  the  General 
Staffs  made  decisions  on  matters  pertaining  to  national  defense 
and  dispositions  of  troops,  and  the  Ministers  of  War  and  the 
Navy  were  informed  of  the  fact  later.  That  this  practice  was  not 
confined  to  Japan  is  seen  in  Quincy  Wright's  observation  that 
"on  certain  occasions  the  military  or  naval  authorities  [of  France] 
have  taken  action  on  their  own  responsibility,  and  the  cabinet, 
confronted  by  a  fait  accompli,  has  had  to  endorse  it."  Incidents 
of  this  nature  have  occurred  in  France  despite  the  fact  that,  unlike 
the  Japanese  Constitution,  "the  French  Constitution  is  based 
upon  parliamentary  sovereignty  with  full  cabinet  responsibility 
to  the  parliament  and  the  subordination  of  the  military  to  the 
civilian  cabinet."21 

Perhaps  the  most  convincing  argument  in  favor  of  the  Naval 
General  Staff  was  advanced  at  a  much  later  date.  The  defense 
counsel  for  the  young  naval  officers  who  were  implicated  in  the 
May  15  Incident  of  193222  maintained  that  the  instructions  for 

20.  Soejima  Giichi,  Nikon  Teikoku  Kenpo  Ron  (Principles  of  the  Con- 
stitutional Law  of  Japan),  p.  667,  cited  in  Tomio  Nakano,  The  Ordinance 
Power  of  the  Japanese  Emperor  (Baltimore,  1923),  p.  157. 

21.  This  quotation  and  the  one  immediately  preceding  were  taken  from 
Takeuchi,  War  and  Diplomacy  in  the  Japanese  Empire,  p.  xviii. 

22.  On  this  day  a  mixed  group  of  about  40  men  including  young  naval 
officers,  cadets  from  the  Military  Academy,  and  youths  of  peasant  back- 
ground participated  in  a  coup  d'etat  referred  to  as  the  "Five-One-Five 


74  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

the  Japanese  delegation  to  the  London  Naval  Conference  were 
based  on  the  draft  memorial  which  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Gen- 
eral Staff  had  submitted  to  the  throne.  Accordingly,  any  proposal 
to  modify  these  original  instructions  ought  to  have  gone  through 
the  same  procedure;  i.e.  after  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  General 
Staff  had  memorialized  the  Emperor  with  regard  to  changes  in 
the  instructions,  the  government  ought  to  have  waited  for 
imperial  approval  before  wiring  back  its  consent  to  the  delegates 
in  London.23 

En  route  home  from  the  conference,  Admiral  Takarabe,  Min- 
ister of  the  Navy,  acting  on  advice  from  Hamaguchi,  deliberately 
delayed  his  arrival  in  Tokyo  in  order  to  avoid  facing  the  hostile 
Diet.24  As  was  bound  to  happen,  however,  on  May  29  at  the 
meeting  of  the  Supreme  War  Council,  Takarabe  and  Kato 
clashed  head  on.  The  acrimonious  debate  that  ensued  lasted  more 
than  three  hours.  The  following  month  Kato  resigned,  on  the 
ground  that  he  had  no  confidence  that  an  adequate  defense  plan 
could  be  worked  out  on  the  basis  of  the  London  Naval  Treaty. 

The  row  between  the  Minister  of  the  Navy  and  the  Chief  of  the 
Naval  General  Staff  was  fraught  with  dire  consequences.  For 
one  thing,  it  marked  the  beginning  of  a  factional  strife  between 
the  "shore  duty"  and  "fleet"  groups.  The  former  stood  for  abid- 
ing by  the  terms  of  the  treaty  and  were  represented  by  Admirals 
Yamamoto,  Kiyoura,  Saito,  and  Okada — the  old  guard  of  the 


Incident."  A  contingent  broke  into  the  residence  of  Premier  Inukai  and 
assassinated  him  while  others  attacked  the  Bank  of  Japan,  the  Metropol- 
itan Police  Office,  and  the  headquarters  of  the  Seiyukai  party.  Their  stated 
object  was  to  effect  the  "Showa  Restoration"  by  putting  an  end  to  the 
parliamentary  form  of  government,  which  they  charged  was  corrupt  and 
compromised  Japan's  position  in  disarmament  conferences.  Since  their 
plans  did  not  go  beyond  tearing  down  the  existing  form  of  government,  it 
was  not  surprising  that  the  coup  failed.  Nevertheless,  this  incident  sounded 
the  knell  for  party  government,  with  the  result  that  the  military  eventually 
dominated  the  affairs  of  government  in  Japan. 

23.  Kiyose  Ichiro,  "Go-ichi-go  Jiken  no  Bengo  ni  Tachite"  (In  Defense 
of  the  May  15  Incident),  Kaizo  (November  1933),  pp.  283-91. 

24.  See  Aoki,  The  Pacific  War,  1,  29-30. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  75 

Japanese  navy.  The  latter  group,  often  referred  to  as  the  "anti- 
treaty"  faction,  was  composed  of  young  officers  who  were  in 
touch  with  the  Araki-Mazaki  faction  of  the  army.  It  was  the 
extremists  of  the  fleet  group  who  on  May  15,  1932,  staged  an 
abortive  coup  and  assassinated  Premier  Inukai. 

When  the  London  Treaty  reached  the  Privy  Council  for  ratifi- 
cation in  September,  the  issue  of  the  supreme  command  came 
to  a  head,  for  the  Council  was  dominated  by  staunch  supporters 
of  the  Naval  General  Staff. 

Ito  Miyoji  was  unrelenting  in  employing  obstructive  tactics. 
As  chairman  of  the  Treaty  Examination  Committee,  he  packed 
his  committee  with  members  of  the  Privy  Council  openly  hostile 
to  the  London  Treaty  and  deliberately  omitted  members  quali- 
fied in  matters  of  foreign  relations,  such  as  Viscount  Ishii 
Kikujiro,  dean  of  Japan's  diplomatic  corps,  who  was  known  to 
have  favored  the  success  of  the  London  Naval  Conference.  As 
a  means  of  embarrassing  the  government,  the  committee  took 
the  position  that  Admiral  Kato  should  be  permitted  to  testify 
before  the  Council.  It  also  demanded  access  to  data  submitted  to 
the  Emperor  on  Japan's  naval  strength. 

Premier  Hamaguchi  brooked  no  opposition  from  the  Privy 
Council  and  stoutly  rejected  all  its  proposals.  Moreover,  he  made 
known  his  firm  intention  to  effect  a  shakeup  in  the  personnel  of 
the  Council  by  appealing  directly  to  the  throne  if  the  body  per- 
sisted in  making  trouble.  The  most  tangible  clue  to  Hamaguchi's 
boldness  in  his  dealings  with  the  Council  is  to  be  found  in  his 
diary  under  the  date  of  March  27,  1930: 

This  day  I  had  an  audience  with  the  Emperor.  I  under- 
took to  outline  to  His  Majesty  the  issues  in  the  dis- 
armament talks  and  their  development  to  the  present. 
I  stated  the  government's  intention  to  do  its  utmost 
to  reach  an  accord  in  these  matters.  I  withdrew  from 
the  audience  chamber  awed  and  inspired  by  his  gra- 
cious words  and  was  conveying  the  gist  of  the  audience 


76  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

to  the  Grand  Chamberlain  in  the  anteroom  when  he 
was  summoned  by  the  Emperor.  After  a  while,  the 
Grand  Chamberlain  returned  with  further  wishes  from 
His  Majesty.  From  this  moment  my  mind  was  made  up 
about  the  Naval  Conference.25 

That  the  Emperor  was  determined  to  bring  the  London  Con- 
ference to  a  successful  conclusion  is  corroborated  by  Admiral 
Okada.  In  the  latter  part  of  January  1930,  as  the  fate  of  the  con- 
ference hung  in  the  balance,  Okada  met  with  Makino,  Lord 
Keeper  of  the  Privy  Seal,  who  said  to  Okada,  "For  the  sake  of 
Japan,  the  conference  must  not  be  allowed  to  break  up  or  our 
nation  will  be  in  trouble."  Okada  sensed  that  Makino  was  con- 
veying the  Emperor's  wish.26 

Hamaguchi's  hand  was  further  strengthened  by  the  vigorous 
backing  of  Prince  Saionji,  whose  prestige  was  second  only  to 
that  of  the  Emperor.  While  the  London  Conference  was  still  in 
progress,  Saionji  remarked  to  Harada,  "It  would  be  a  grave  mat- 
ter if,  as  the  result  of  our  naval  delegation's  vociferous  opposi- 
tion, the  conference  collapsed  and  Japan  were  to  be  blamed  for 
it.  If  any  of  the  delegates  should  give  Wakatsuki  trouble,  I  want 
him  to  send  them  home  and  remain  behind  by  himself  to  bring  the 
conference  to  a  successful  conclusion."27  On  another  occasion, 
when  Saionji  heard  Admiral  Saito  Makoto  express  deep  concern 
for  the  progress  of  the  London  Conference,  the  Prince  remarked, 
"Saito  will  be  rendering  infinitely  greater  service  to  Japan  by 
lending  his  support  now  to  bring  the  Naval  Conference  to  a  suc- 
cessful conclusion  than  by  serving  ten  years  in  Korea  as  a  Gover- 
nor General."28  Aside  from  Saionji  and  Makino,  moral  support 
came  from  others  who  were  close  to  the  throne.  Suzuki  Kantaro, 

25.  Kurihara,  Tenno,  p.  50.  Author's  translation. 

26.  Okada  Memoirs,  p.  44.  Author's  translation. 

27.  Harada  Diary,  1 ,  20.  Author's  translation. 

28.  Ibid.,  /,  23-24.  Author's  translation. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  77 

the  Grand  Chamberlain,  took  it  upon  himself  to  dissuade  Prince 
Fushimi  from  siding  with  Kato.  Furthermore,  he  exerted  his  in- 
fluence to  moderate  Kato's  demands.  Highly  significant  was  the 
vital  role  played  by  Admiral  Okada,  who  utilized  to  the  limit  the 
role  played  by  personal  ties  in  Japanese  group  relations.  Not  only 
was  he  the  senior  of  Admiral  Kato  in  the  navy,  but  the  two  came 
from  the  same  prefecture — Fukui — and  local  loyalties  are  a 
vital  tie  in  Japanese  politics.  As  much  as  Kato  may  have  fretted, 
in  the  end  he  had  to  bow  to  Okada.  In  regard  to  Okada's  excep- 
tional performance  in  placating  Kato,  Wakatsuki  speculated  in  his 
memoirs,  "Might  it  not  have  been  Okada's  distinguished  service 
at  the  time  of  the  London  Conference  which  brought  him  to 
Saionji's  attention,  and  later  prompted  the  Prince  to  recommend 
Okada  to  premiership?"29 

Two  additional  factors  contributed  to  the  unprecedented  vic- 
tory achieved  by  the  Hamaguchi  government.  The  general  elec- 
tion of  February  20  resulted  in  an  overwhelming  victory  for  the 
Minseito,  giving  Hamaguchi  absolute  control  over  the  Lower 
House  of  the  Diet.  The  government  also  enjoyed  a  measure  of 
popular  support  from  segments  of  the  informed  public  as  well  as 
from  the  liberal  press,  which  recently  had  changed  its  stand.  This 
was  an  unexpected  development,  since  throughout  the  conference 
the  press  of  Japan  had  been  united  in  support  of  the  navy.30 

Quick  to  sense  its  vulnerable  position,  the  Privy  Council 
backed  down,  and  the  reversal  came  so  unexpectedly  and  swiftly 
that  a  comedy  of  errors  ensued  for  the  opposition  party.  The 
Seiyukai  saw  in  the  protracted  duel  between  the  government  and 
the  Privy  Council  a  fair  chance  of  unseating  the  Hamaguchi 
cabinet.  Unaware  of  the  Council's  impending  change  of  policy, 
Inukai,  president  of  the  party,  at  a  mass  meeting  on  September 
1 6  denounced  the  Minseito's  violation  of  the  supreme  command 
and  pledged  his  party's  undivided  support  of  the  Privy  Council. 

29.  Wakatsuki  Memoirs,  p.  366.  Author's  translation. 

30.  Takeuchi,  War  and  Diplomacy  in  the  Japanese  Empire,  pp.  303-05. 


78  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

The  next  day  Inukai  suffered  loss  of  face  when  the  Council  sud- 
denly reversed  its  stand  and  gave  unconditional  approval  to  the 
London  Naval  Treaty. 

At  least  momentarily,  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  meant  a  re- 
sounding victory  for  the  cabinet  over  the  navy  and  the  Privy 
Council.  Indeed,  the  prestige  of  the  Naval  General  Staff  sank  to 
the  lowest  point  ever  reached.  Those  given  to  hasty  conclusions 
thought  that  the  event  heralded  at  long  last  the  dawn  of  respon- 
sible government  in  Japan.  Yet  the  triumph  of  parliamentary 
government  was  far  from  assured.  It  has  been  observed  already 
that  the  supremacy  of  the  Diet  over  other  governmental  bodies 
had  not  been  established  in  theory  or  practice.  Hamaguchi  did 
not  dare,  even  in  the  flush  of  victory,  to  state  the  constitutional 
grounds  on  which  his  government  assumed  responsibility  for  the 
London  Naval  Treaty.  "To  have  done  so  would  have  been  to 
assert  cabinet  superiority  in  state  affairs,  not  only  over  the  naval 
advisers,  but  also  over  the  army  advisers.  Such  treatment  would 
have  resulted  in  aligning  the  army,  even  more  powerful  than  the 
navy,  against  the  cabinet;  and  the  cabinet  could  not  face  the 
risk."31  An  episode  which  followed  less  than  five  months  later 
testified  eloquently  to  the  shaky  basis  of  the  Minseito  government, 
as  will  be  seen  below. 

Hamaguchi's  vigorous  stand  released  such  a  torrent  of  re- 
action from  his  opponents  that  in  the  long  run  the  cause  of  par- 
liamentary government  suffered  a  disastrous  blow — from  which 
it  was  unable  to  recover  until  after  Japan's  defeat  in  1945.  And 
for  his  temporary  success  Hamaguchi  personally  had  to  pay 
dearly:  on  the  morning  of  November  14,  just  as  he  was  boarding 
a  westbound  train  from  Tokyo,  he  was  shot  and  wounded  by  a 
young  "patriot"  named  Sagoya  Tomeo.  The  would-be  assassin 
was  a  member  of  the  Aikoku-sha,  an  ultranationalist  organiza- 
tion that  vehemently  denounced  communism  and  advocated  a 
positive  policy  on  the  continent. 

31.  Introduction  by  Quincy  Wright  in  Takeuchi,  War  and  Diplomacy 
in  the  Japanese  Empire,  p.  xviii. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  79 

It  has  been  stated  that  "assassination  is  an  index  of  the  gap 
between  the  driving  political  impulses  of  men  and  the  limit  for 
their  attainment  set  up  by  the  existing  political  forms."32  In  the 
case  of  Japan  in  the  early  thirties,  the  rising  counterelites  were 
the  ultranationalists,  of  whom  Sagoya  was  a  partisan.  This  group 
had  not  attained  anywhere  near  the  power  necessary  to  challenge 
the  rule  of  the  government  in  power.  Sagoya  was  driven  by  des- 
peration to  assault  the  head  of  the  government,  and  the  effect 
of  his  action  on  its  control  structure  was  minimal,  but  its  impact 
upon  the  public  could  hardly  be  overestimated. 

Finally,  the  most  significant  effect  of  the  London  Naval  Agree- 
ment was  the  fact  that  it  forced  the  hands  of  the  extremists.  How 
did  this  come  about?  By  virtue  of  this  treaty,  Japan  had  to  be 
content  with  a  navy  which  could  not  engage  the  American  fleet 
in  Far  Eastern  waters.33  With  respect  to  Manchuria  and  Inner 
Mongolia,  it  meant  that  Japan  had  to  conduct  herself  in  a  man- 
ner that  would  be  agreeable  to  the  United  States.  Such  a  prospect 
was  hardly  to  the  liking  of  the  continental  expansionists,  espe- 
cially those  of  the  Kwantung  Army,  who  considered  it  their 
mission  to  bring  these  areas  under  the  firm  control  of  Japan. 
They  were  already  restive,  some  even  desperate,  because  of  the 
rapid  inroads  which  the  Nationalist  government  was  making  into 
the  Three  Eastern  Provinces  then  under  the  aegis  of  Chang 
Hsueh-liang.  To  add  to  this  there  was  the  ever-present  fear  of 
the  Soviet  Union  to  the  north.  Also,  the  fact  that  the  attempt  to 
take  over  Manchuria  in  1928  had  been  quashed  only  heightened 
the  sense  of  urgency  and  frustration  among  the  activists  of  the 
Kwantung  Army  and  impelled  them  to  resort  to  a  desperate 
course  of  action  the  following  year — the  explosion  that  came  to 
be  known  as  the  Mukden  Incident. 


32.  Max   Lerner   in  Encyclopedia  of  Social  Science,   2    (New   York, 
1930),  271-75. 

33.  Sato  Kenryo,  Tdjo  Hideki  to  Taiheiyo  Senso  (Tojo  and  the  Pacific 
War)  (Tokyo,  1960),  pp.  164-65. 


80  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

After  the  Conference 

While  Hamaguchi  was  convalescing  from  the  bullet  wound,  it 
fell  to  Shidehara  to  face  the  Fifty-Ninth  Session  of  the  Diet  as 
Acting  Premier.  The  treatment  accorded  him  by  the  opposition 
party  in  the  Lower  House  was  anything  but  cordial;  for  the 
Seiyukai  it  was  humiliating  enough  to  be  soundly  defeated  in  the 
general  elections  without  having  to  put  up  with  an  Acting  Pre- 
mier who  was  not  even  a  member  of  the  Minseito  he  was  repre- 
senting.1 Mori  and  his  associates  bitterly  assailed  the  Minseito 
for  lifting  the  embargo  on  gold  and  ascribed  to  it  the  continuing 
economic  ills.  Their  real  target  of  attack,  however,  was  the  Lon- 
don Naval  Treaty,  which  they  pointed  out  as  another  example  of 
Shidehara's  weak-kneed  diplomacy.  Outnumbered  and  outma- 
neuvered  by  the  Minseito,  Mori  and  the  extremists  of  the  Seiyukai 
were  ready  to  resort  to  any  tactic  to  wrest  control  of  the  govern- 
ment from  the  party  in  power. 

A  rare  opportunity  presented  itself  on  February  3,  1931,  in  an 
incident  popularly  referred  to  as  "Acting  Premier  Shidehara's 
slip  of  the  tongue."  On  this  day,  Nakajima  Chikuhei,  a  newly 
elected  Seiyukai  member  of  the  Lower  House,  in  an  interpellation 
of  Shidehara  at  a  meeting  of  the  budget  committee,  asked  how  he 
could  reconcile  statements  made  by  Admiral  Abo  Kiyokazu,  the 
newly  appointed  Minister  of  the  Navy,  with  those  of  Shidehara 
and  Hamaguchi.  He  charged  that,  although  Premier  Hama- 
guchi and  Foreign  Minister  Shidehara  had  assured  the  Fifty- 
Eighth  Session  of  the  Diet  that  the  terms  of  the  London  Naval 
Treaty  did  not  endanger  Japan's  national  defense,  subsequently 
Admiral  Abo  had  testified  at  a  budget  meeting  of  the  Lower 
House  that  the  Japanese  navy  could  not  carry  out  its  strategic 
program  if  it  abided  by  the  terms  of  the  London  Naval  Treaty. 

Shidehara  replied  blandly  that  the  treaty  could  not  harm  Japan 
because  it  was  approved  by  the  Emperor.  Mori,  who  was  seated 

1.  As  a  career  diplomat,  Shidehara  was  not  affiliated  with  any  political 
party,  although  his  policies  were  closely  identified  with  those  of  the  Min- 
seito. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  81 

in  the  rear  of  the  room  that  day  as  a  spectator,  suddenly  rose  to 
his  feet  and  shouted,  "Shidehara,  retract  that!  Retract  that!"  im- 
plying that  Shidehara  was  using  the  throne  to  shield  a  grave  dip- 
lomatic blunder,  for  the  Meiji  Constitution  decreed  that  the 
person  of  Emperor  was  sacred  and  inviolable.  The  other  mem- 
bers of  the  Seiyukai  were  caught  unawares.  As  if  roused  from 
a  bad  dream  they  stood  up,  only  then  sensing  that  something 
grave  was  afoot.  For  the  following  three  quarters  of  an  hour  the 
House  was  in  an  uproar.  Members  of  the  Seiyukai,  including  the 
executives,  stormed  the  dais  shouting,  "This  is  no  ordinary  slip 
of  the  tongue!  Resign,  all  of  you!"  Referring  to  the  wild  melee, 
the  press  dubbed  the  incident  the  "mud-slinging  contest." 

After  two  days  of  recess,  the  General  Budget  Committee  re- 
convened, only  to  be  summarily  adjourned  on  account  of  the 
bitter  feeling  which  still  persisted.  As  Shidehara  and  Adachi 
Kenzo,  Minister  of  Home  Affairs,  left  the  committee  room  pro- 
tected by  a  cordon  of  guards,  Shidehara  was  again  surrounded 
by  a  hostile  crowd,  which  hurled  abusive  language  at  him.2  One 
of  the  lobbyists  for  the  Minseito  crashed  a  desk  nameplate 
through  a  glass  pane  to  distract  the  attention  of  the  unruly  mob. 
This  only  aggravated  the  tension.  When  the  fragments  of  glass 
showered  upon  the  heads  of  the  Seiyukai  lobbyists,  a  free-for-all 
ensued  in  which  two  members  of  the  Diet  and  several  scores  of 
lobbyists  were  injured.  Amidst  the  confusion,  Shidehara  was 
spirited  away  by  the  guards.  According  to  the  bylaws,  the  budget 
had  to  be  in  by  February  1 1 .  The  Seiyukai's  strategy  was  to  block 
passage  of  the  budget  by  obstructing  the  progress  of  the  meeting, 
thereby  forcing  the  Minseito  cabinet  to  resign. 

The  fracas  between  the  two  parties  was  settled  finally  at  the 

2.  According  to  Shidehara's  own  account,  as  he  left  the  Budget  Com- 
mittee's room,  a  suspicious-looking  character  who  was  crouched  by  the 
side  of  a  radiator  reached  for  the  cuffs  of  his  trousers  trying  to  trip  him. 
Shidehara  kicked  the  man  on  the  forehead  with  the  heel  of  a  shoe  causing 
blood  to  streak  down  his  face.  The  man  staggered  and  fell  backward.  Had 
Shidehara  tripped  and  fallen,  he  is  certain  he  would  have  been  trampled 
to  death  by  the  angry  crowd  surging  out  of  the  committee  room.  Shi- 
dehara Memoirs,  p.  133. 


82  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

highest  level,  between  Adachi  and  President  Inukai.  After  accord 
was  reached,  Inukai  summoned  Mori  to  his  residence  and  made 
him  accede  to  the  terms  of  interparty  compromise. 

Mori's  strategem  went  a  great  deal  farther  than  obstruction. 
Yamaura  had  reason  to  believe  that  Mori  entertained  a  secret 
plan  for  a  putsch  in  conjunction  with  action  by  certain  members 
of  the  army.  Their  plot  was  to  surround  the  Diet  with  antiparlia- 
mentary  forces  and  cause  a  collapse  of  the  cabinet,  after  which 
a  wholesale  reform  of  the  government  was  to  follow,  presumably 
with  General  Ugaki  as  Premier.  Shidehara's  conciliatory  policy 
would  be  swept  aside  to  bring  the  Manchurian  problems  to  a 
quick  settlement.  If  this  were  not  Mori's  plan,  Yamaura  asks, 
"Why  should  Mori  issue  a  secret  order  to  the  party  members  to 
desist  from  criticizing  General  Ugaki,  Minister  of  War?"3  Ac- 
tually, Ugaki  was  vulnerable  to  attack  since  he  made  no  effort  to 
reject  the  Minseito  platform,  one  of  the  planks  of  which  was  to 
reduce  army  expenditures.  Yamaura  implies  that  Mori  may  have 
been  playing  with  the  idea  of  grooming  Ugaki  for  the  premiership 
should  the  army  coup  d'etat  come  off  successfully.  There  is  a 
flaw  in  Yamaura's  theory,  however:  since  Mori  identified  him- 
self closely  with  General  Araki  and  the  young  officers  of  the 
Kodo-ha,  who  were  at  odds  with  General  Ugaki,  it  seems  un- 
likely that  he  would  have  forsaken  Araki  to  back  another  general 
whose  views  were  not  consonant  with  his. 

The  fracas,  coming  as  it  did  eight  months  before  the  Mukden 
Incident — a  deliberate  act  of  defiance  of  the  central  authority  by 
the  Kwantung  Army — was  but  a  symptom  in  the  syndrome  of 
a  nation  whose  body  politic  was  gravely  afflicted.  It  was  quite 
clear,  as  indicated  in  the  following  chapters,  that  between  the 
mounting  domestic  economic  crisis  and  the  relentless  attack  on 
the  government  by  Mori  and  the  extremists  of  the  right,  repre- 
sentative government  in  Japan  was  on  the  verge  of  collapse. 
Moreover,  the  intransigency  of  the  extremists  in  demanding  a 
positive  solution  of  the  Manchurian  problems  made  peaceful 

3.  Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku,  pp.  681-82. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  83 

adjustment  of  her  relation  with  China  or  the  world  in  general 
problematical. 


The  March  Plot 

Months  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  Manchuria  in  Sep- 
tember 1931,  restive  elements  of  the  military  were  planning  to 
stage  a  coup  d'etat  to  take  over  control  of  the  civil  government 
in  Tokyo.  Once  more  they  were  thwarted,  this  time  because  of 
a  change  of  heart  of  some  of  the  would-be  participants.  Our  pri- 
mary concern  in  the  abortive  coup — known  as  the  March  Plot1 
— is  not  so  much  with  uncovering  its  mechanism  as  in  identifying 
the  elements  working  for  and  against  the  conspiracy.  Generally 
speaking,  stresses  in  a  society — whether  social,  political,  or  eco- 
nomic— terminating  in  violent  action  result  from  a  sense  of  in- 
security and  inadequacy.2  Although  the  actions  of  malcontents 
may  be  quelled  temporarily,  as  long  as  the  basic  insecurity  exists 
it  must  be  presumed  that  the  tensions  will  persist.  Our  second 
concern,  therefore,  is  to  observe  the  new  direction  in  which  the 
revolutionary  force  moved  after  its  initial  attempt  had  been 
thwarted. 

The  March  Plot  was  a  conspiracy  to  set  up  a  military  govern- 
ment around  the  person  of  General  Ugaki,  then  Minister  of  War. 
The  extent  to  which  General  Ugaki  was  personally  involved  in 
the  plot  remains  a  mystery  to  this  day.  So  tight  was  the  censor- 
ship clamped  on  the  abortive  coup  that  it  was  a  year  before  news- 

1.  See  R.  Storry,  The  Double  Patriots  (Boston,  1957),  pp.  57-65,  for 
an  account  of  the  same  incident.  My  account  of  the  March  Plot,  the  Man- 
churian  Crisis,  and  the  October  Plot  were  completed  prior  to  the  summer 
of  1957,  and  were  submitted  as  an  integral  part  of  my  doctoral  dissertation 
to  Yale  in  September  1957.  Mr.  Storry's  treatment  of  these  incidents  did 
not  come  to  my  attention  until  much  later.  By  far  one  of  the  most  reveal- 
ing accounts  of  the  March  Plot  is  to  be  found  in  Aoki,  The  Pacific  War,  1, 
131-41. 

2.  Harold  D.  Lasswell  and  Abraham  Kaplan,  Power  and  Society  (New 
Haven,  1950),  p.  241. 


84  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

men  dared  mention  it  even  in  their  private  conversations,  and 
ordinary  people  did  not  learn  of  it  until  after  the  war. 

Either  participating  in  or  backing  the  conspiracy  were  influen- 
tial generals  of  Ugaki's  clique,  which  was  then  in  power.  Co- 
operating with  the  army  elite  were  the  extremists  of  the  Cherry 
Society.3  Lieutenant  Colonel  Hashimoto,  it  appears,  acted  as 
the  liaison  between  the  two  groups  since  he  headed  the  Cherry 
Society  and  was  a  member  of  the  Ugaki  faction  at  the  same  time. 
Also  working  closely  with  both  groups  was  Okawa  Shumei,  a 
civilian  propagandist,  whose  chore  it  was  to  make  contact  with 
ultranationalists  as  well  as  certain  leftist  organizations.  Con- 
spicuous for  their  absence  were  navy  personnel.  The  unique  fea- 
ture of  the  unsuccessful  coup  was  that  it  had  the  active  support 
in  varying  degrees  of  high-ranking  officers  in  the  army.4 

The  March  Plot  has  received  the  attention  of  many  writers,5 
but  they  have  invariably  based  their  accounts  on  sources  which 
came  to  light  before  1950,  principally  "Major  Tanaka's  Notes,"6 
supplemented  by  the  "Secret  Records  of  Japanese  Reform  Move- 

3.  See  below,  pp.  95-102. 

4.  These  included  Sugiyama  Hajime,  Vice  Minister  of  War;  Ninomiya 
Harushige,  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff;  Koiso  Kuniaki,  Chief  of  the  Military 
Affairs  Bureau;  Nagata  Tetsuzan,  Chief  of  the  Military  Affairs  Division; 
and  Tatekawa  Yoshitsugu,  a  section  chief  in  the  General  Staff.  Koiso  was 
probably  the  prime  mover  in  the  early  stages  of  planning.  Nagata,  who 
was  an  immediate  subordinate  of  Koiso,  worked  out  the  details  of  one 
plan  with  the  aid  of  Tojo  Hideki  and  Suzuki  Teiichi.  Nagata  and  Tojo 
later  became  the  mainstays  of  the  Tosei  (Control)  faction  of  the  army. 

5.  Mori,  Senpu  Nijilnen,  pp.  34-35;  Yamamoto  Katsunosuke,  Nihon  o 
Horoboshita  Mono  (Those  Who  Brought  About  the  Downfall  of  Japan) 
(Tokyo,  1949),  pp.  115-25;  Shiraki  Masayuki,  Nihon  Seitoshi  (Showa- 
hen)  (History  of  Japanese  Political  Parties,  Showa  Period)  (Tokyo,  1949), 
pp.  83-87;  Wald,  "The  Young  Officers  Movement  in  Japan,"  pp.  58-81. 
See  also  above,  n.  1. 

6.  This  is  said  to  have  been  distributed  among  the  members  of  the 
Cherry  Society  in  mimeograph  form  some  time  after  the  October  Plot  in 
order  to  head  off  a  cleavage  that  was  developing  within  the  society.  Hence 
the  document  is  neither  polemic  nor  inciting,  but  reflective  in  tone.  Major 
Tanaka  Kiyoshi,  as  an  active  participant  in  the  March  and  October  Plots, 
recorded  that  the  role  the  Cherry  Society  played  was  the  core  of  the 
national  reconstruction  movement.  Uyehara  Checklist,  p.  125,  IMT  271. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  85 

ments"7  and  the  records  of  the  Tokyo  War  Crime  Trials.  How- 
ever, a  number  of  diaries  and  memoirs  of  significant  value  that 
have  appeared  since  then8  help  both  to  bring  out  certain  points 
which  the  earlier  writers  have  failed  to  make  and  to  clarify  others 
— among  them  the  shift  in  plans,  subtle  changes  in  objectives, 
the  interplay  of  personalities,  defections  from  the  conspiracy, 
and  the  connection  between  the  March  Plot  and,  importantly, 
the  Mukden  Incident. 

From  about  the  end  of  May  to  early  December  1930  Ugaki 
was  absent  from  his  office,  having  undergone  a  painful  operation 
for  tympanitis,  and  was  convalescing  most  of  the  time  at  a  sea- 
side resort  in  Kozu.  During  his  absence,  General  Abe  Nobuyuki 
substituted  as  Acting  Minister  of  War.  In  early  June,  Ugaki  ap- 
parently expressed  a  desire  to  resign,  for  on  June  8  Prince  Saionji 
sent  Baron  Harada  to  Ugaki's  bedside  with  a  message: 

Although  I  should  come  to  see  you  in  person  to  make 
this  request,  as  you  know,  I  am  ill;  so  I  have  asked 
Harada  to  convey  my  message  to  you.  Certain  indivi- 
duals are  circulating  rumors  saying  that  you  intend  to 
resign.  For  the  sake  of  the  country,  I  ask  you  to  exer- 
cise prudence.  Entrust  the  cares  of  the  Ministry  [of 
War]  to  someone  else.  I  trust  that  you  will  take  ample 
time  to  rest  and  fully  recover.9 

Still  determined  to  resign,  on  June  14  Ugaki  summoned  Suzuki 
Fujiya,  Chief  Cabinet  Secretary,  and  the  Permanent  and  the  Par- 
liamentary Vice  Ministers  of  War,  and  let  his  intentions  be 
known.  Later  that  evening  the  two  Vice  Ministers  returned  with 

7.  The  Japanese  title  is  "Ninon  Kakushin  Undo  Hiroku."  This  docu- 
ment is  a  477-page  typescript  report  compiled  by  the  Public  Peace  Section, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs,  dated  August  1938 
and  stamped  "Top  Secret."  There  is  an  original  copy  in  the  Library  of 
Congress. 

8.  To  mention  a  few,  Harada  Diary;  Ugaki  Kazushige,  Ugaki  Nikki 
(Ugaki  Diary)  (Tokyo,  1954,  hereafter  referred  to  as  Ugaki  Diary); 
Ugaki  Memoirs;  Shidehara  Memoirs;  Okada  Memoirs;  Wakatsuki  Mem- 
oirs. 

9.  Ugaki  Diary,  p.  137.  Author's  translation. 


86  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Egi  Yoku,  Minister  of  Railways,  who  came  bearing  Premier 
Hamaguchi's  personal  plea  to  Ugaki  to  stay  on.  Still  later  Ugaki 
changed  his  mind  and  decided  to  continue  in  office.  The  follow- 
ing morning  he  sent  for  Baron  Harada  and  asked  him  to  inform 
Prince  Saionji  of  his  decision.  Harada  hastened  to  Saionji's  side 
in  Okitsu  and  was  back  at  seven  the  same  day  with  the  following : 

Never  before  have  I  made  the  kind  of  request  that  I 
have  made  to  you.  It  was  only  that  I  had  deep  reasons 
for  doing  so.  I  feel  relieved,  having  received  your 
message.  I  shall  tell  you  in  detail  what  I  have  in  mind 
when  you  or  I  will  visit  the  other,  depending  upon  who 
recovers  first.  Pray,  take  care  and  be  on  your  feet 
soon.10 

The  tone  of  Saionji's  language  should  be  carefully  noted.  Sel- 
dom before,  perhaps  never,  had  he  expressed  such  cordial  regard 
for  and  implicit  faith  in  any  person.  A  man  as  adroit  as  Ugaki 
must  have  instantly  sensed  that  he  was  marked  as  a  candidate  for 
a  future  premiership  by  Saionji,  the  designator  of  prime  minis- 
ters. It  therefore  does  not  seem  reasonable  that  Ugaki  would 
have  sought  by  unlawful  and  highly  risky  means  to  acquire  power 
when  it  was  virtually  assured  him  by  legitimate  means.  The  lan- 
guage of  the  message  in  Japanese  is  almost  unbecoming  a  man 
of  Saionji's  eminence.  The  seemingly  solicitous  language  is  re- 
plete with  political  significance.  It  can  only  be  taken  as  reflect- 
ing a  domestic  situation  so  shaky  that  in  the  face  of  the  rising 
tide  of  military  power  Saionji  was  desperate  enough  to  enlist  the 
support  of  an  influential  army  man  whose  integrity  and  ability 
he  could  trust. 

The  precise  period  of  Ugaki's  stay  in  Kozu  is  not  known.  How- 
ever, since  Abe's  temporary  assignment  lasted  from  June  16  to 
December  10,  it  is  presumed  that  Ugaki  spent  most  of  the  inter- 
vening months  at  the  seaside  resort  away  from  the  sultry  heat 

10.  Ibid.,  p.  138.  Author's  translation. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  87 

of  Tokyo.  Referring  to  this  period  when  Ugaki  was* absent,  Shide- 
hara  wrote: 

It  is  probably  true  that  while  Ugaki  was  away,  army 
officers — whether  young  or  advanced  in  age  I  do  not 
know — gathered  to  conspire  at  the  Minister  of  War's 
official  residence.  One  day  I  received  a  letter  from 
Ugaki  in  Kozu.  In  it  he  expressed  deep  concern  for  the 
disquieting  situation.  He  implored  me  to  exert  my 
utmost  and  pledged  his  moral  support.  By  the  time 
Ugaki  returned  to  Tokyo,  the  plan  for  the  coup  was 
already  in  an  advanced  stage.11 

The  implication  of  "Major  Tanaka's  Notes"  is  that  these  army 
officers  continued  to  meet  throughout  the  months  of  January  and 
February  under  Ugaki's  nose.  Nothing  is  said  about  Ugaki's 
having  frowned  upon  the  meetings,  still  less  disapproved  them. 
In  fact,  this  source  alleges  that  on  the  night  of  January  13  Ugaki 
himself  participated  in  a  meeting  at  which  national  reconstruc- 
tion was  discussed.  But  Major  Tanaka  does  not  specify  whether 
the  meeting  was  held  to  plan  the  coup  or  merely  to  deplore  the 
low  level  of  conduct  to  which  Diet  members  had  sunk.12 

About  this  time  something  happened  that  was  to  plague  Ugaki's 
political  career — perhaps  even  trouble  his  conscience — and  to 
make  it  difficult  for  him  to  disavow  completely  any  part  in  the 
March  Plot. 

According  to  "Major  Tanaka's  Notes,"  Lieutenant  Colonels 
Hashimoto  Kingoro,  Sakata  Yoshiro,  and  Nemoto  Hiroshi  and 
Major  Tanaka  himself  met  on  the  afternoon  of  February  7  at 
Colonel  Shigeto's  home  in  Shinagawa,  Tokyo.  There  they  reached 
a  decision  with  respect  to  the  first  phase  of  the  plan  for  national 
reconstruction — the  means  by  which  the  existing  government 
was  to  be  brought  to  an  end.  The  scheme  was  as  follows: 

11.  Shidehara  Memoirs,  p.  186.  Author's  translation. 

12.  See  above,  pp.  80-83. 


88  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

1 .  The  coup  was  to  be  staged  about  February  20,  the  day  on 
which  the  labor  bill  would  be  submitted  to  the  Diet.  Simulta- 
neously, Okawa's  confidants  were  to  bomb  the  Premier's  resi- 
dence and  the  party  headquarters  of  the  Seiyukai  and  the 
Minseito.  Mock  bombs  were  to  be  used  (for  loud  noise  rather 
than  destruction). 

2.  Okawa  was  to  arrange  for  10,000  demonstrators  to  con- 
verge on  the  Diet  Building. 

3.  Under  the  guise  of  protecting  the  Diet  Building,  the  troops 
were  to  isolate  it  by  surrounding  the  premises.  Members  of  the 
Cherry  Society  were  to  stand  guard  at  strategic  points  on  the 
roads  leading  to  the  Diet  Building. 

4.  At  the  height  of  the  confusion,  either  Major  General  Koiso 
Kuniaki  or  Tatekawa  Yoshitsugu  was  to  enter  the  Diet  and  from 
the  dais  demand  the  resignation  of  the  cabinet  en  masse. 

5.  By  prior  arrangement,  Ugaki  was  to  receive  the  imperial 
mandate  to  form  a  new  cabinet. 

6.  A  further  meeting  was  to  be  held  on  February  8  at  Major 
General  Tatekawa's  home  to  continue  discussion  on  means  of 
liquidating  the  existing  government  and  seizing  power.  The  com- 
pleted plan  was  then  to  be  submitted  to  General  Ugaki. 

According  to  this  schedule,  Ugaki  would  be  told  of  the  plot 
after  February  8.  Hence  it  can  be  presumed  that  he  had  no  part 
in  the  conspiracy  up  to  this  point.  Yet  Major  Tanaka's  earlier 
statement,  noted  above,  shows  that  Ugaki  was  present  at  a  meet- 
ing on  the  night  of  January  13. 

Mori,  on  his  own  initiative,  planned  a  mass  meeting  of  the 
Seiyukai  in  Shiba  Park  while  Okawa  was  holding  a  mass  meet- 
ing of  the  Proletarian  party  at  Hibiya  Park  on  the  day  assigned 
for  the  March  Plot.  After  sundown  the  mob  was  to  be  treated 
to  free  sake,  after  which  it  was  to  pour  into  the  Diet  Building 
and  effect  a  junction  with  Okawa's  force.13 

13.  Iwabuchi  Tatsuo,  Gunbatsu  no  Keifu  (The  Lineage  of  Military 
Cliques)  (Tokyo,  1948),  p.  35  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Iwabuchi,  Mili- 
tary Cliques). 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  89 

This  was,  indeed,  a  strange  alignment,  since  Mori's  confiden- 
tial adviser  was  Kita  Ikki,  a  known  rival  of  Okawa.14  Moreover, 
Mori  identified  himself  closely  with  General  Araki,  who  pre- 
sumably would  not  have  anything  to  do  with  the  Ugaki  faction. 
Nevertheless,  Mori  was  well  informed  about  the  plans  and  activ- 
ities of  the  Okawa  faction.  Otherwise  he  would  not  have  issued 
a  secret  order  to  the  members  of  the  Seiyukai,  at  the  height  of 
its  assault  on  the  Minseito,  to  cease  attacking  Ugaki.  Mori's 
conduct  may  perhaps  be  explained  by  noting  that,  as  an  oppor- 
tunist, he  could  not  bear  to  see  Okawa  walk  off  with  the  laurels. 
The  surest  way  to  be  assured  a  seat  at  the  council  table  when 
the  new  government  was  formed  was  to  take  part  in  the  putsch. 

In  addition  to  these  plans  for  phase  one,  Colonel  Nagata  Tetsu- 
zan  is  known  to  have  been  working  on  phase  two,  the  constructive 
portion  of  the  program.  It  was  worked  out  with  the  thoroughness 
typical  of  him,  from  the  text  of  the  memorial  that  Ugaki  was  to 
present  to  the  throne  to  a  detailed  program  for  the  political  ad- 
ministration of  Japan. 

All  evidence  points  to  Okawa  as  the  man  selected  to  meet 
Ugaki,  explain  the  plans,  and  enlist  his  support.  The  following 
testimony  by  Colonel  Hashimoto  at  the  War  Crimes  Trials  cor- 
roborates this  point: 

Once  Okawa  came  to  me  and  proposed  a  plan  to  make 
General  Ugaki  the  Prime  Minister  to  carry  out  the 
program  of  national  reconstruction.  I  told  him  that  I 
was  thoroughly  in  accord  with  him,  but  I  suggested 
that  he  first  approach  General  Ugaki  to  see  what  he 
thought  of  it. 

14.  One  of  the  reasons  for  the  cleavage  between  Kita  and  Okawa  is 
said  to  have  been  disagreement  over  the  role  of  the  army.  Kita  maintained 
that  the  army's  program  for  national  reconstruction  was  nothing  but  mil- 
itary fascism  and  not  a  genuine  revolution.  Okawa,  who  was  more  of  an 
opportunist,  maintained  that  it  was  no  concern  of  his  what  the  army's 
program  was  labeled,  because  he  was  merely  utilizing  the  movement  in 
the  army  for  the  attainment  of  his  own  goal. 


90  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

The  same  evening  Okawa  came  back  and  said  that 
General  Ugaki  did  not  seem  disinclined  about  the  ven- 
ture. Then  Okawa  asked  me  if  I  could  get  some  bombs 
for  him.  He  needed  the  kind  which  made  a  loud  noise 
just  for  the  effect.  I  got  the  type  he  wanted.15 

This  testimony  by  Hashimoto  is  in  keeping  with  the  story 
which  Ugaki  told  Baron  Harada  on  November  8,  1931 : 

Koiso,  Chief  of  the  Military  Affairs  Bureau,  came 
and  implored  me  to  meet  Okawa  .  .  .  but  since  I  re- 
called having  met  him  some  five  or  six  years  previously, 
I  declined.  However,  among  other  things,  Koiso  and 
Okawa  came  from  the  same  prefecture  and,  for  other 
reasons,  he  persisted  on  my  meeting  Okawa  again.  I 
had  to  give  in. 

According  to  my  diary,  I  met  Okawa  on  the  night 
of  February  1 1 .  His  story  was,  "Today's  parliamentary 
government  is  not  worthy  of  having  the  administration 
of  Japan  entrusted  to  its  care.  .  .  .  We  intend  to  get 
popular  movements  under  way  to  attack  the  evils  of 
the  present  government.  It  may  even  be  necessary  to 
resort  to  direct  action.  In  the  event  troops  are  mobi- 
lized, I  ask  of  you  to  work  to  support  such  actions  and 
not  suppress  them." 

I  said,  "That  is  an  outrage.  If  you  so  much  as  harm 
innocent  subjects,  disrupt  the  peace  of  Tokyo,  or  jeop- 
ardize the  security  of  the  imperial  family,  it  would  be 
the  duty  of  the  military  to  counter  such  dangers.  I 
cannot  accede  to  any  such  request." 

Then  Okawa  said,  "Party  cabinets  are  hopeless. 
Why  not  form  an  interim  cabinet  to  institute  a  dicta- 
tor government  with  you  as  premier?"  I  replied,  "Such 
an  act  would  be  out  of  accord  with  anyone  who  is  at 

15.  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  p.  28,810. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  91 

present  a  Minister  of  War.  When  the  cabinet  resigns, 
my  position  is  that  I  have  to  resign  with  it.  It  is  un- 
thinkable that  I  become  a  premier  and  organize  my 
own  cabinet." 

Finally,  Okawa  said,  "We  need  some  bombs  to  get 
the  popular  movement  under  way.  Will  you  please 
make  some  available  for  me?"  I  retorted,  "I  am  not  in 
any  position  to  do  such  a  thing."  Thus  I  turned  down 
every  request  which  Okawa  made.16 

It  must  be  noted  that  all  along  Ugaki's  tone  is  mild,  even  in 
refusal.  Nowhere  did  he  employ  strong  categorical  language,  such 
as  zettai  ni  dekinai  (absolutely  impossible)  or  label  Okawa's 
proposal  an  outright  act  of  insurrection.  Still  less,  Ugaki  neither 
admonished  nor  made  an  effort  to  dissuade  Okawa  from  com- 
mitting a  grave  crime. 

Moreover,  turning  now  to  Ugaki's  own  diary,  we  note  a 
passage  recording  the  conversation  which  Okawa  could  have  mis- 
construed as  meaning  that  Ugaki  was  not  wholly  unsympathetic 
with  Okawa's  cause.  Ugaki  states:  "I  am  also  keenly  aware  of 
the  fact  that  party  politics  has  degenerated.  And  for  the  sake 
of  the  nation,  I  feel  that  something  ought  to  be  done  about  it. 
Being  a  soldier,  I  am  always  ready  to  die  on  the  battlefield.  There- 
fore, I  shall  lay  down  my  life  at  any  time  if  I  can  be  of  service 
to  my  country."17 

It  would  not  be  surprising  if  Okawa  had  reported  back  to 
Hashimoto  Kingoro  that  General  Ugaki  was  not  unsympathetic 
toward  the  venture.  Okawa  now  busied  himself  lining  up  civilian 
groups.  He  made  his  overtures  toward  rightist  organizations 
through  his  confidants,  Shimizu  Gyonosuke  and  Kano  Satoshi. 
Shimizu  is  said  to  have  obtained  from  Marquis  Tokugawa  Yoshi- 
chika  200,000  yen.  Shimizu  promised  Tokugawa  the  post  of 
Minister  of  the  Imperial  Household,  but  the  Marquis  declined 

16.  Harada  Diary,  2,  122-23.  Author's  translation. 

17.  Ugaki  Diary,  p.  153.  Author's  translation. 


92  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

and  designated  Prince  Konoe  instead.18  As  for  the  leftist  groups, 
he  approached  the  Proletarian  party  (Musanto)  through  Matsu- 
nobe  Shigeji  and  sent  a  feeler  toward  Akamatsu  Katsumaro 
to  see  where  the  Social  Democratic  party  (Shakai  Minshuto) 
stood.  Overtures  were  also  made  toward  the  extreme  leftist  Labor 
Farmer  party  (Rodo  Nominto  through  Aso  Hisashi  and  Tado- 
koro  Teruaki.  It  is  quite  possible  that  a  rapprochement  between 
the  leaders  of  the  Labor  Farmer  party  and  the  extremists  of  the 
Cherry  Society  was  being  achieved  about  this  time.19  Meanwhile, 
Hashimoto  obtained  mock  bombs  variously  reported  as  rang- 
ing in  number  from  8  to  300,  and  turned  them  over  to  Shimizu. 
By  way  of  rehearsal  for  the  coup,  Okawa  staged  two  demon- 
strations: one  on  March  3  and  another  about  a  week  later.  Al- 
though the  latter  was  somewhat  more  effective  than  the  first,  on 
neither  occasion  did  the  participants  total  more  than  three  or 
four  thousand.  His  colleagues  were  taken  aback  by  the  poor 
showing,  and  Okawa  himself,  realizing  that  he  could  not  muster 
enough  civilian  support  to  stage  a  coup,  turned  to  General  Koiso 
Kuniaki,  Chief  of  the  Military  Affairs  Bureau,  requesting  that 
the  army  mobilize  some  troops.  Ugaki  does  not  recall  for  sure 
whether  it  was  General  Sugiyama  Hajime,  Vice  Minister  of  War, 
or  Koiso  who  told  him,  "They  [Okawa  and  his  civilian  colleagues] 

18.  Harada  Diary,  2,  27,  333.  See  Aoki,  The  Pacific  War,  1,  138-39, 
for  an  interesting  character  sketch  of  Shimizu  Gyonosuke  and  the  part 
he  played  in  the  plot. 

19.  One  writer  states  that  the  relationship  between  the  two  groups  be- 
came friendly  and  even  cordial.  In  January  1931,  at  a  district  convention 
of  the  Labor  Farmer  party  in  Hiroshima,  a  party  leader  is  said  to  have 
observed,  "The  present  military  are  exceedingly  well  disposed  toward  us. 
From  the  general  grades  down  to  the  company  grades,  the  officers  are,  if 
not  actual  supporters,  sympathetic  toward  our  party.  The  young  officers 
at  the  Army  Headquarters  have  organized  a  secret  society  to  overthrow 
the  present  parties"  (author's  translation).  This  attitude  of  mutual  sym- 
pathy presaged  the  open  conversion  of  Sano  Gaku  and  Nabeyama  Sada- 
chika,  Communist  leaders,  to  ultranationalism  in  June  1933.  Kinoshita 
Hanji,  Nihon  Fashizumu-shi  (History  of  Japanese  Fascism),  1  (Tokyo, 
1949),  109  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Kinoshita,  Japanese  Fascism). 

The  fact  that  in  the  spring  of  1931  Hashimoto  and  his  fellow  officers 
donned  civilian  clothes  and  witnessed  incognito  three  of  the  proletariat 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  93 

are  earnestly  asking  for  active  support  from  the  army,"20  but  he 
flatly  turned  down  the  proposal. 

Meanwhile,  on  March  7  Ugaki  had  received  a  formal  message 
from  Okawa  written  in  grandiose  language  and  the  classic  style. 
In  it  Okawa  warned  Ugaki  not  to  become  a  tool  of  corrupt  poli- 
tical parties  and  urged  him  to  rise  to  save  the  country  from  its 
plight.  This  is  the  document  Ugaki  cited  later  to  prove  that  he 
had  not  been  party  to  the  conspiracy. 

Now  alarmed  by  the  serious  turn  of  events,  Ugaki  summoned 
Sugiyama,  Vice  Minister  of  War,  and  Koiso,  Chief  of  the  Mili- 
tary Affairs  Bureau,  and  issued  a  stern  order  to  put  an  imme- 
diate stop  to  the  coup  d'etat.21  Just  to  make  certain,  however, 
Koiso  on  about  March  10  again  sounded  out  Ugaki  and  was 
again  upbraided:  "Don't  be  a  fool!  Do  you  think  you  can  use 
His  Majesty's  troops  for  such  a  purpose?"  Koiso  then  began  to 
talk  of  halting  the  coup.22 

The  March  Plot  collapsed  when  Koiso  changed  his  mind.  Un- 
reconciled to  the  sudden  turn  of  events,  Okawa  visited  Toyama 
Mitsuru,  the  time-honored  ultranationalist,  at  his  bedside,  only 
to  be  told  that  nothing  could  be  done.  Okawa's  next  decision 
was  to  stage  the  coup  singlehandedly.  General  Tatekawa  volun- 
teered to  cast  his  lot  with  him.  On  the  18th,  surprising  as  it  may 
seem,  Ugaki  sent  Komoto  Daisaku  to  Okawa  to  tell  him  to  put 
a  stop  to  the  plot.23  On  the  same  night  Marquis  Tokugawa  Yoshi- 
chika  pleaded  with  Okawa  to  give  up  his  plan;  otherwise  he,  too, 


parties  stage  a  demonstration  march  on  the  Diet  Building  was  indicative 
of  their  interest  in  the  political  movements  of  the  masses,  whose  activities 
reached  their  height  that  year.  Aoki,  The  Pacific  War,  1,  126;  Akamatsu 
Katsumaro,  Nihon  Shakai  Undo-shi  (History  of  Social  Movements  in 
Japan)  (Tokyo,  1952),  pp.  280-81.  It  is  well  to  bear  in  mind  that  Okawa's 
schemes  tended  to  be  impressive  in  scale  only.  He  was  quite  inept  in  mat- 
ters of  finance  and  in  working  out  details.  Therefore,  his  ability  to  estab- 
lish proper  working  relationships  with  the  various  extremist  groups  was 
also  open  to  question.  Yatsugi,  Showa  Jinbutsu  Hiroku,  pp.  173-74. 

20.  Ugaki  Diary,  p.  157.  Author's  translation. 

21.  Ugaki  Memoirs,  p.  244. 

22.  Ugaki  Diary,  p.  154.  Author's  translation. 

23.  Aoki,  The  Pacific  War,  1,  139. 


94  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

would  feel  obliged  to  join  him.  Okawa  was  reluctant  to  draw 
Tokugawa  into  a  venture  which,  now  that  the  army  had  with- 
drawn its  support,  was  destined  to  fail.  The  same  night  Okawa 
decided  to  abandon  the  plot. 

Several  significant  developments  within  the  army  also  con- 
tributed to  Koiso's  vacillation  and  the  eventual  collapse  of  the 
plot.  Perhaps  the  most  sobering  in  effect  was  the  angry  denun- 
ciation from  the  anti-Ugaki  faction.24  About  March  10,  Colonel 
Nagata,  probably  on  orders  of  his  superior  officer,  assembled 
the  field-grade  officers  and  confided  to  them  the  secret  plan  in 
order  to  enlist  their  support.  Colonel  Yamaoka  Shigeatsu,  a 
section  chief  in  the  Department  of  Military  Education,  rose  in 
indignation  and  said,  "This  is  an  outrage,  to  conspire  like  this! 
I'll  start  right  now  with  you  and  arrest  you."25  A  few  days  later 
Nagata  suffered  another  setback  when  Isoya,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the 
First  Division,  went  to  Lieutenant  General  Mazaki  Jinzaburo, 
his  commanding  officer,  to  report  on  the  plans  for  the  coup,  only 
to  be  sharply  rebuked.  "The  army  will  fall  apart  if  we  do  such 
a  thing,"  said  Mazaki.  "I  will  not  mobilize  the  troops  no  matter 
who  issues  the  order.  Hurry  back  to  the  Ministry  of  War  and  tell 
Nagata  so."26  Another  source  quotes  Mazaki  as  saying,  "I  will 
on  my  own  responsibility  punish  anyone — minister  or  vice  min- 
ister— who  issues  such  an  order."27 

Mazaki's  strong  stand  only  intensified  the  cleavage  between 
the  Ugaki  and  the  anti-Ugaki  factions  and  resulted  in  a  series  of 
sordid  retaliations.  Mazaki,  who  was  slated  for  promotion  to 
Commanding  General  of  the  Kwantung  Army,  was  ordered  at 
the  last  minute  to  head  the  Formosan  Army,  a  position  of  lesser 
importance.  In  his  stead,  Honjo  Shigeru,  a  comparatively  pliable 

24.  This  group,  which  later  came  to  be  known  as  the  K6do-ha  (Imperial 
Way  faction),  was  headed  by  Lieutenant  Generals  Araki  Sadao  and  Ma- 
zaki Jinzaburo,  Major  Generals  Yanagawa  Heisaku  and  Hata  Shinji,  and 
Colonels  Kobata  Toshishiro,  Yamashita  Tomoyuki,  and  Yamaoka  Shi- 
geatsu. 

25.  Iwabuchi,  Military  Cliques,  p.  39.  Author's  translation. 

26.  Ugaki  Memoirs,  p.  236.  Author's  translation. 

27.  Iwabuchi,  Military  Cliques,  p.  39.  Author's  translation. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  95 

general,  was  assigned  to  lead  the  Kwantung  Army.  It  has  been 
suggested  that  Mazaki  was  sent  off  to  Formosa  because  Nino- 
miya  Harushige,  Koiso,  and  Tatekawa,  later  supporters  of  the 
Kwantung  Army's  actions  in  Manchuria,  could  not  risk  having 
Mazaki  wreck  their  plans  again.28 

The  collapse  of  the  plot  was  also  due  to  opposition  from  within 
the  Ugaki  faction.  The  defectors  included  Colonels  Okamura 
Yasuji,  Yamashita,  and  Nagata  Tetsuzan,  and  Lieutenant  Colo- 
nel Suzuki  Teiichi — all  of  whom  contended  that  the  settlement 
of  Manchurian  problems  came  first.  In  fact,  they  had  arbitrarily 
set  1934  as  the  deadline  for  working  out  positive  solutions.  It 
was  not  that  these  men  did  not  see  the  eventual  necessity  of  in- 
ternal reconstruction,  but  that  they  opposed  the  plot  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  still  premature. 

This  group  also  realized  that  by  resorting  to  gradualism  the 
control  of  the  government  could  be  won  by  more  legitimate 
means,  and  once  power  was  seized,  the  internal  changes  that  the 
direct  actionists  were  stressing  could  be  instituted  at  will.  This 
line  of  thinking  was  identified  with  the  Tosei-ha  (Control  fac- 
tion), which  by  1937  managed  to  assume  a  position  of  dominance 
among  the  warring  cliques. 

The  Cherry  Society 

As  a  part  of  the  analysis  of  domestic  factors  leading  to  the  Man- 
churian invasion,  there  remains  the  task  of  assessing  the  role  of 
the  extremists  of  the  Cherry  Society  in  the  March  Plot  and  in  the 
Mukden  Incident. 

28.  Mazaki  suffered  more  deprivation  at  the  hands  of  the  Ugaki  clique. 
In  1934,  after  Hayashi  Senjuro  succeeded  Araki  and  became  the  Minister 
of  War,  Nagata  took  revenge  by  removing  Mazaki  from  the  post  of  In- 
spector General  of  Military  Education.  However,  Nagata  was  made  to  pay 
with  his  life  for  his  arbitrary  action.  In  August  1935  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Aizawa  Saburo,  an  admirer  of  Mazaki,  slashed  Nagata  in  his  office  in 
broad  daylight.  Aizawa,  in  turn,  was  executed  after  an  outbreak  by  the 
young  officers  of  the  K6do-ha  on  February  26,  1936.  The  ghost  of  the 
quashed  March  Plot  finally  returned  to  haunt  Ugaki  himself.  In  January 
1937  he  received  the  imperial  mandate  to  form  a  cabinet.  Though  the  Big 


96  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

An  informal  group  of  captains,  majors,  and  lieutenant  colonels 
began  to  meet  at  the  Army  Officers'  Club  at  Kudan  in  Tokyo 
toward  the  end  of  September  1930.  A  sense  of  urgency  aroused 
by  the  forced  ratification  by  the  government  of  the  London  Naval 
Treaty  was  initially  responsible  for  prompting  these  men  to 
meet.1  The  group  was  without  a  formal  designation  at  first,  but 
by  the  end  of  November  it  had  come  to  be  known  as  the  Cherry 
Society  (Sakura-kai),  cherry  blossoms  having  for  many  centuries 
been  associated  with  the  Japanese  warrior.  The  principal  spon- 
sors were  Lieutenant  Colonels  Hashimoto  Kingoro,  Higuchi 
Sueichiro,  and  Sakata  Yoshiro.  At  first  they  commanded  the  at- 
tention of  only  a  handful  of  members,  but  eventually  the  group 
was  to  count  about  a  hundred  members,  though  attendance  at 
any  one  meeting  did  not  exceed  forty  to  fifty.  Officers  from  the 
General  Staff  comprised  about  60  per  cent  of  the  total,  with  the 
remainder  coming  from  the  Ministry  of  War  and  the  Office  of 
the  Inspector  General  of  Military  Education. 

The  group,  by  no  means  unified,  included  extremists  as  well 
as  moderates,  although  both  were  greatly  outnumbered  by  neu- 
tralists. The  extremists  were  preoccupied  with  the  destruction 
of  the  existing  forms  of  government  to  the  point  of  minimizing 
the  significance  of  the  constructive  phase.  They  maintained  that 
a  new  and  improved  order  would  emerge  spontaneously  upon 
the  elimination  of  the  now  decrepit  old  order.  It  is  not  difficult  to 
appreciate  the  emotional  appeal  which  their  passionate  argu- 
ments must  have  exercised  upon  the  minds  of  the  comparatively 
naive  and  uninformed  elements  of  society. 

The  arguments  of  the  moderates  or  the  gradualists  commanded 
only  a  meager  following  because  their  program  was  time-consum- 
ing and  unspectacular.  Moreover,  the  men  of  this  group  did  not 


Three  of  the  army  recommended  three  candidates  for  the  post  of  Minister 
of  War,  all  three  declined  the  appointment.  Without  anyone  to  fill  the  post, 
Ugaki's  efforts  to  form  a  cabinet  failed.  He  thus  paid  a  price  for  having 
pushed  the  program  of  arms  reduction  in  the  1920s  and  having  refused  to 
cooperate  at  the  time  of  the  March  Plot. 
1.  See  Aoki,  The  Pacific  War,  1,  122-24. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  97 

present  their  thesis  with  the  passion  and  zeal  of  their  competitors, 
the  extremists.  The  moderates  maintained  that,  before  any  action 
could  be  contemplated,  the  objectives  of  the  national  reconstruc- 
tion had  to  be  carefully  outlined,  and  the  rationale  of  the  move- 
ment stated  in  understandable  terms.  In  stark  contrast  to  the 
extremists,  the  moderates  prescribed  the  removal  of  only  the 
cancerous  growth  in  society,  leaving  the  healthy  tissues  intact, 
thus  keeping  the  destructive  process  to  a  bare  minimum.2  Finally, 
the  neutralists,  who  comprised  the  bulk  of  the  group,  preferred 
not  to  commit  themselves  in  one  way  or  another. 

The  principal  pastime  of  this  loosely  knit  group  was  to  eat 
together  in  the  evening  and  engage  in  lively  discussion  of  current 
affairs.  Especially  spirited  were  the  conversations  involving  na- 
tional reform  and  Manchuria  and  Mongolia.  It  would  not  have 
been  at  all  surprising  if  at  times  the  extremists  carried  the  day 
with  their  fiery  talk.  It  was  in  part  to  offset  the  undue  influence 
they  exercised  and  to  prevent  the  Cherry  Society  from  turning 
into  a  terroristic  organization  that  Major  Tanaka  Kiyoshi  and 
Captains  Watanabe  Fujio,  Iwaaze  Hideo,  and  Yamaoka  hastened 
the  completion  of  concrete  plans  for  national  reconstruction. 

Hashimoto  headed  the  Russian  Specialist  faction,  the  radical 
element  within  the  group.  He  had  recently  returned  from  service 
as  a  military  attache  in  Istanbul,  and  while  stationed  there  he  had 
watched  with  interest  the  progress  of  Turkey  under  the  strong 
leadership  of  Kemal  Atatiirk.  He  had  also  observed  at  close  hand 
Russia's  Five- Year  Plan  and  the  resurgence  of  Italy  and  Germany 
under  Mussolini  and  Hitler.  On  his  month-long  voyage  home 
Hashimoto  pondered  the  problem  of  how  to  reform  Japan,  shap- 
ing his  dreams  into  a  comprehensive  plan.  Once  back  in  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  office  he  worked  out  the  means  of  implementing  it.  This 
was  some  time  after  January  1930.3 

2.  For  cleavages  of  a  similar  nature  cf.  above,  p.  95,  and  below,  pp. 
196-97. 

3.  See  IMTFE,  Judgment  (Tokyo,  1948),  pp.  532-33.  These  pages 
contain  a  translation  of  a  brief  passage  from  Hashimoto's  book,  The  Road 
to  the  Reconstruction  of  the  World. 


98  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Hashimoto  stealthily  made  up  an  attendance  book  and  en- 
deavored to  muster  like-minded  officers  under  his  banner.  Things 
did  not  always  go  smoothly,  however,  especially  after  Lieutenant 
Colonels  Muto  Akira  and  Kawabe  Torashiro  joined  the  society. 
These  men  bitterly  criticized  him  and  his  views.  According  to  a 
reasonably  reliable  source,  Hashimoto's  faction  numbered  barely 
10  per  cent  of  the  entire  group.  Thus,  even  by  generous  allow- 
ance, the  nucleus  of  the  extremists  could  not  have  totaled  more 
than  ten.  Hashimoto  once  engaged  Okawa  as  an  after-dinner 
speaker,  but  his  lecture  produced  little  sympathetic  response 
among  the  members  of  the  group.4 

However,  it  was  not  without  reason  that  Hashimoto's  group 
was  given  prominence  to  the  point  where  it  overshadowed  the 
existence  of  the  much  larger  but  amorphous  nonmilitant  group. 
"Major  Tanaka's  Notes"  refers  to  the  Hashimoto  clique  as  a 
"secret  society,"  prepared  to  resort  to  direct  action  to  effect 
national  reconstruction.5  According  to  Hashimoto's  own  testi- 
mony at  the  War  Crimes  Trials: 

In  October  1930,  I  inaugurated  a  study  and  discus- 
sion group  with  a  view  to  instituting  a  national  reform. 
Its  members  consisted  of  officers  of  the  rank  of  lieu- 
tenant colonel  and  lower.  The  so-called  Cherry  Society 
was  not  a  secret  society.  Neither  did  it  have  its  own 
bylaws,  nor  was  a  membership  fee  charged.  The  society 
had  no  connection  with  the  Kwantung  Army  or  its 


4.  Matsumura,  Miyakezaka,  pp.  46-47. 

5.  Shiraki,  Nihon  Seitoshi,  p.  80.  The  committee  comprising  Lieutenant 
Colonels  Sakata  Yoshiro,  Nemoto  Hiroshi,  Hashimoto  Kingoro,  Major 
Tanaka  Kiyoshi,  and  Captains  Cho  Isamu  and  Tanaka  Wataru  were  dele- 
gated with  the  task  of  drawing  up  the  plans  for  national  reconstruction. 
Aoki,  The  Pacific  War,  1,  124-25.  It  is  noteworthy  that  of  the  six  men- 
tioned above,  four — Sakata,  Nemoto,  Hashimoto,  and  Tanaka — were 
participants  in  the  preliminary  discussion  of  the  March  Plot  which  was 
held  at  the  residence  of  Colonel  Shigeto  on  the  night  of  February  7,  1931. 
Ibid.,  p.  107. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  99 

officers.  No  discussion  was  held  relative  to^the  Man- 
churian  problems,  nor  did  the  society  have  any  connec- 
tion with  the  Mukden  Incident. 

In  March  193 1, 1  participated  in  the  planning  of  the 
March  Plot  for  the  purpose  of  inaugurating  national 
reform.  Okawa  Shumei  planned  the  plot  with  a  view 
to  placing  General  Ugaki  at  the  head  of  a  cabinet. 
The  plan  fell  through  because  General  Ugaki  him- 
self disapproved.  The  March  Plot  was  not  linked  with 
the  Mukden  Incident.6 

Hashimoto's  testimony  is  corroborated  by  that  of  Major  Gen- 
eral Tanaka  Ryukichi,  who  turned  prosecution  witness  at  the 
trials.  He  stated,  "The  Meeting  in  October  did  not  touch  at  all 
on  the  question  of  Manchuria  because  Japan  was  plagued  with 
extremely  acute  domestic  problems  at  the  time."7 

Tanaka  Ryukichi,  however,  contradicted  himself  when  he  was 
asked  to  testify  about  Captain  Cho  Isamu,  who  played  a  leading 
part  in  the  October  Plot  with  Hashimoto:  "Captain  Cho  told  me 
in  Shanghai  that  the  purpose  of  the  Cherry  Society  was  twofold : 
first,  to  carry  out  internal  revolution  or  reconstruction;  second, 
to  solve  the  Manchurian  problems."8 

The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  is  that,  inasmuch  as  Hashimoto 
himself  denied  the  existence  of  the  Cherry  Society  as  a  corporate 
body,  it  is  immaterial  whether  the  society  as  a  group  had  any 
dealings  with  the  Kwantung  Army;  the  real  question  is  whether 
any  members  of  the  Cherry  Society  as  individuals  conspired  with 
the  staff  of  the  Kwantung  Army  or  were  sympathetic  with  its 
designs.  While  the  testimony  of  Wachi  Takaji  at  the  trials  proves 
rather  convincingly  that  Hashimoto  for  one  was  not  in  commu- 
nication with  the  members  of  the  Kwantung  Army,9  it  cannot 

6.  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  p.  28,793. 

7.  Ibid.,  p.  1961. 

8.  Ibid.,  p.  1963. 

9.  For  a  fuller  discussion  see  below,  p.  201. 


100  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

thereby  be  concluded  that  Hashimoto  was  indifferent  to  its 
objectives.  His  testimony  at  the  trials  to  the  contrary  notwith- 
standing, it  is  clear  from  an  earlier  report  prepared  for  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  in  1930 — to  be  discussed  shortly — that  Hashimoto  was 
just  as  ready  as  Cho  to  tie  national  reconstruction  and  the  Man- 
churian  problem  together.  And  it  is  highly  probable  that  there 
were  quite  a  few  others  among  the  extremists,  both  in  the  Cherry 
Society  and  in  the  high  offices  of  the  army,  who  tended  to  asso- 
ciate the  two  issues  rather  closely. 

However,  as  the  crisis  at  home  and  on  the  continent  deepened 
with  every  passing  day,  this  duality  in  their  objectives  had  to  be 
resolved.  It  was  obvious  that  both  issues  could  not  be  settled 
simultaneously  and  that  priorities  had  to  be  thrashed  out.  This 
was,  indeed,  a  momentous  issue,  and  it  was  inevitable  that  in  the 
ensuing  controversy  a  split  in  the  camp  should  occur.  In  the  case 
of  the  March  Plot  this  was  precisely  what  happened,  materially 
contributing  to  the  fiasco  that  followed. 

The  nature  of  the  schism  needs  closer  scrutiny.  There  is  evi- 
dence that  Hashimoto  was  convinced  early  of  the  need  to  give 
priority  to  internal  reconstruction  over  foreign  adventure.  This 
was  not  quite  the  case  with  Okawa.  As  an  official  in  the  employ 
of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Company,  he  was  just  as  much 
a  continental  expansionist  as  he  was  an  internal  reconstructionist. 
Becoming  impatient  with  the  desultory  progress  of  the  Japanese 
government  in  Manchuria,  he  launched  a  campaign  of  his  own 
as  early  as  April  1929  to  take  the  Manchurian  question  directly 
to  the  Japanese  people.  His  success  attracted  the  attention  and 
cooperation  of  the  General  Staff.  It  is  not  at  all  surprising,  there- 
fore, that  he  soon  had  a  following  among  certain  field-grade  offi- 
cers who  were  strongly  imbued  with  the  notion  that  immediate 
action  ought  to  be  taken  in  Manchuria.10 

But  it  was  gradually  concluded  that  a  prerequisite  to  suc- 
cessful Japanese  action  in  Manchuria  was  the  establishment  of 
a  military-controlled  government  at  home.  It  must  have  been 

10.  IMTFE,  Judgment,  p.  87. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  101 

this  line  of  reasoning  that  slowly  but  surely  began  to  pervade 
the  thinking  of  the  members  of  the  Chinese  Intelligence  Section 
under  Colonel  Shigeto  Chiaki  and  the  Russian  Intelligence  Sec- 
tion under  Lieutenant  Colonel  Hashimoto  Kingoro  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff.  So  fervent  were  these  men  in  their  conviction  that  their 
conclusion  found  its  way  into  the  1930  Report  on  the  State  of 
the  Nation,  an  annual  publication  by  the  intelligence  section  of 
the  General  Staff  which  heretofore  had  devoted  itself  exclusively 
to  the  question  of  strategy  vis-a-vis  potential  enemy  nations.  That 
portion  of  the  report  which  broke  precedent  read:  "If  a  positive 
solution  of  the  Manchurian  problems  is  to  be  sought,  it  is  inevi- 
table that  national  reconstruction  must  precede  it.  Our  thinking 
has  been  dominated  by  this  one  thought."11  This  was  tanta- 
mount to  declaring  that  the  General  Staff  was  now  making 
Japan's  internal  administration  its  business. 

We  can  only  deduce  that  the  issue  at  stake  was  that  of  priority. 
Defection  of  a  group  of  influential  army  officers  has  been  already 
mentioned.  At  the  head  of  the  group  was  Nagata,  followed  by 
Okamura,  Yamashita,  and  Suzuki.  It  was  their  contention  that 
the  proper  time  had  not  yet  arrived  to  institute  internal  recon- 
struction and  that  positive  settlement  of  the  Manchurian  and 
Mongolian  questions  must  come  first. 

There  is  probably  no  clear-cut  explanation  why  men  such  as 
Shigeto  and  Okawa  should  have  given  priority  to  internal  recon- 
struction. Suffice  it  to  note  that  the  cause  apparently  had  the  full 
backing  of  highly  placed  army  officers.  Moreover,  there  is  al- 
ways the  element  of  pride.  Once  the  factions  had  taken  sides,  each 
would  have  had  to  stick  to  its  argument.  It  is  significant  that  the 
highly  formal  letter  which  Okawa  addressed  to  Ugaki  on  March 
6  contained  no  reference  whatsoever  to  Japan's  continental  prob- 
lems, despite  the  fact  that  Manchuria  was  Okawa's  preoccupa- 
tion. 

Perhaps  the  most  persuasive  reason  why  the  Manchurian  prob- 
lem may  have  undergone  temporary  eclipse  in  the  minds  of  the 

11.  Kinoshita,  Japanese  Fascism,  1,  107.  Author's  translation. 


102  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

right-wing  revolutionists  was  the  dazzling  prospect  of  their  be- 
coming the  masters  of  Japan  overnight.  Not  only  did  these  lead- 
ers appear  to  have  become  oblivious  to  the  Manchurian  problem, 
they  were  even  suspected  by  the  young  officers  of  the  Kita  faction 
of  having  betrayed  the  ideals  of  national  reconstruction.  In  pre- 
mature anticipation  of  the  success  of  the  coup,  Okawa,  Hashi- 
moto, and  Shigeto  gave  themselves  up  to  debauchery  for  days 
on  end  at  a  Japanese-style  restaurant,  the  Kinryu-tei,  in  Tokyo. 
It  is  not  at  all  surprising  that  the  more  serious-minded  officers, 
principally  of  company  grade,  broke  off  and  formed  a  splinter 
group — the  Little  Cherry  Society — under  the  leadership  of  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Mitsui  Sakichi  and  Lieutenant  Sugaha  Saburo. 
In  short,  the  handful  of  zealous  army  officers  who  tried  to  direct 
the  activities  of  the  Cherry  Society  for  their  own  ends  never  quite 
succeeded. 


Sources  of  Military  Provocation 

In  the  Disarmament  Conference,  scheduled  to  meet  early  in  1932 
in  Geneva,  the  military  saw  nothing  but  disaster,  particularly 
after  the  Hamaguchi  government  had  scored  a  resounding  vic- 
tory over  the  Naval  General  Staff  in  the  ratification  of  the  London 
Naval  Treaty.  Understandably,  the  army  die-hards  took  the  navy 
defeat  as  a  signal  for  a  showdown  with  the  government.  Since  the 
early  twenties  the  army  had  been  subjected  to  a  series  of  drastic 
manpower  reductions,  with  telling  effect  on  the  morale  of  its 
career  officers;  rightly  or  wrongly  it  felt  it  could  retreat  no  more. 
In  the  initial  curtailment  of  army  personnel  in  1922  some 
60,000  officers  and  men  had  been  demobilized.  Under  the  second 
arms  reduction  program  of  1923  two  independent  garrison  units 
and  five  military  preparatory  schools  were  dissolved.  Neither  of 
these  two  programs,  however,  approached  in  devastation  the 
blow  which  the  third  retrenchment  program  administered  to  army 
morale.  During  the  second  Kato  government  in  1925  under  War 
Minister  Ugaki,  four  divisions — the  13th  at  Takata,  the  15th  at 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  103 

Toyohashi,  the  17th  at  Okayama,  and  the  18th  at  Kurume — 
were  demobilized,  resulting  in  the  discharge  of  some  34,000 
men  and  officers  and  the  decommissioning  of  6,000  mounts. 

The  officers  who  were  forced  to  accept  involuntary  retirement 
were  particularly  resentful  of  the  government's  drastic  retrench- 
ment program.  This  was  not  only  the  end  of  their  military  careers 
— one  of  the  very  few  channels  through  which  men  of  ordinary 
background  in  Japan  could  rise  to  eminence — but,  unlike  their 
brethren  in  Western  countries,  Japanese  officers  by  training  and 
outlook  were  neither  suitable  nor  desirable  for  civilian  employ- 
ment. About  the  only  vocations  open  to  them  were  positions  in 
high  schools  as  instructors  in  military  drill,  a  poor  substitute  for 
the  relatively  higher  glamor  and  prestige  of  military  office. 

And  the  prospects  of  those  fortunate  officers  who  remained  in 
regular  service  were  dim  and  getting  dimmer.  It  was  virtually 
pre-ordained  that  their  careers  would  terminate  after  a  colonelcy. 
If  an  officer  rose  to  generalship,  it  was  by  sheer  good  fortune. 
Thus  it  came  about  that  even  in  Japan,  where  by  tradition  mili- 
tary careers  were  held  in  high  esteem,  the  observation  could  be 
made  that  "aboard  a  streetcar  people  would  no  longer  offer  their 
seats  to  an  officer,  and  parents,  as  eager  as  they  were  to  marry 
their  daughters  off,  became  hesitant  about  giving  them  to  young 
officers.1 

The  world-wide  demand  for  disarmament  in  the  post- Versailles 
decade  of  international  good  will  was  given  sharp  local  emphasis 
in  Japan  with  the  financial  crisis  in  1927,  and  armed  forces  re- 
duction became  not  merely  a  slogan  but  a  pressing  necessity. 
Through  1930  and  1931  under  the  retrenchment  policy  of  Inoue 
Junnosuke,  Minister  of  Finance,  the  Hamaguchi  and  Wakatsuki 
governments  were  able  to  effect  a  considerable  reduction  in  civil 
and  military  expenditures.  As  a  part  of  Inoue's  economy  drive, 
not  long  after  the  Hamaguchi  government  succeeded  Tanaka's, 
an  army  reorganization  committee  was  formed  under  the  chair- 
manship of  General  Ugaki,  then  Minister  of  War.  After  two 

1.  Shidehara  Memoirs,  p.  167.  Author's  translation. 


104  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

and  a  half  years  of  protracted  study,  on  May  1,  1931,  the  Big 
Three  of  the  army — War  Minister  Minami,  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff  Kanaya,  and  Inspector  General  of  Military  Education  Mut6 
— met  to  arrive  at  a  decision.  The  three  were  fully  cognizant  of 
the  far-reaching  impact  of  their  decision,  once  it  was  made  and 
announced.  They  therefore  required  several  more  meetings  be- 
fore they  reached  unanimity  of  opinion.  Their  verdict  was  that 
further  reductions  in  armament  expenditures  were  unfeasible  and 
that  any  budgetary  surplus  that  might  be  realized  by  readjust- 
ment should  be  allocated  to  strengthening  other  branches  of  the 
armed  forces  by  replacing  obsolete  equipment.  The  decision 
proved  very  unpopular  in  the  face  of  the  suffering  that  was  be- 
coming more  widespread  and  acute  as  the  economic  crisis  con- 
tinued to  mount. 

Harada  reported  in  his  diary  that  in  mid- July  of  1931  the  army 
had  a  plan  to  preclude  any  possibility  of  further  arms  reduction.2 
Kanaya,  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  and  Minami,  Minister  of 
War,  each  was  to  have  a  private  audience  with  the  Emperor,  at 
which  time  they  were  to  report  that  a  further  reduction  of  arma- 
ments was  impossible.  Thereafter,  the  army  could  parry  any 
efforts  by  the  cabinet  to  push  through  the  retrenchment  program 
by  asserting  that  "once  something  has  been  reported  to  the 
Emperor,  it  can  no  longer  be  rescinded."3 

When  Prince  Saionji  was  alerted  by  Harada  to  the  army's 
scheme,  he  took  steps  to  caution  the  Emperor  through  Suzuki, 
the  Grand  Chamberlain,  not  to  commit  himself  in  any  way  should 
either  Kanaya  or  Minami  approach  him  with  matters  pertaining 
to  disarmament.  It  is  presumed  that  the  army  failed  to  follow 
through  with  its  scheme,  since  Harada  does  not  report  on  the 
outcome  of  the  purported  audience. 

The  antagonism  between  the  government  and  the  army  was 
further  heightened  by  an  incident  that  occurred  at  the  Conference 
of  Division  Commanders  on  August  4,  1931 .  Minami,  character- 

2.  Harada  Diary,  2,  7. 

3.  Ibid. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  105 

izing  the  government  as  run  by  uninformed  and  irresponsible 
people,  deplored  the  fact  that  they  were  capitalizing  on  the  cur- 
rent economic  and  financial  crisis  to  arouse  strong  sentiments 
for  disarmament  on  the  home  front.  Moreover,  he  accused  critics 
of  the  army  of  spreading  the  false  rumor  that,  impervious  to  the 
domestic  crisis,  the  armed  forces  were  asking  far  too  large  a  sum 
of  money  for  their  budget.  The  truth  of  the  matter,  he  said,  was 
that  the  army  authorities  had  drawn  up  the  army  reorganization 
plan  on  the  basis  of  minimum  needs,  and  that  this  meant  a  real 
sacrifice  to  the  military. 

Minami  then  touched  upon  the  disquieting  developments  in 
Manchuria  and  Mongolia  and  by  inference  blamed  Shidehara's 
weak-kneed  diplomacy  for  the  predicament  Japan  found  herself 
in.  He  exhorted  the  members  of  the  armed  forces  to  redouble 
their  efforts  to  cope  with  the  mounting  crisis.4 

While  the  language  of  his  blustering  denunciation  was  enough 
to  incense  the  younger  members  of  the  Minseito  in  the  Lower 
House  of  the  Diet,  his  statement  nevertheless  represented  the 
consensus  of  the  elites  of  the  army.  Breaking  precedent,  leading 
members  of  the  army  in  addition  to  division  commanders  had  at- 
tended the  conference.  These  included  Generals  Suzuki  Takao, 
Inoue  Ikutaro,  and  Shirakawa  Yoshinori,  all  of  whom  were  mem- 
bers of  the  Supreme  War  Council;  General  Hayashi  Senjuro, 
Commander  of  the  Tokyo  Garrison;  General  Kanaya  Hanzo, 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff;  and  General  Muto  Nobuyoshi,  In- 
spector General  of  Military  Education.  These  generals  reportedly 
prevailed  upon  Minami  to  express  at  the  next  cabinet  meeting 
the  army's  profound  dissatisfaction  with  Shidehara's  policy.5 

As  matters  turned  out,  at  the  cabinet  meeting  on  August  6  it 
was  Shidehara  who  took  the  initiative  and  reprimanded  Minami 
for  his  indiscretion  in  releasing  his  address  to  the  public.  The 

4.  Tokyo  Nichinichi  Shinbun  (August  5,  1931),  cited  in  Harada  Diary, 
2,  17. 

5.  Tokyo  Asahi  (August  5,  1931),  pp.  1-2,  cited  in  Takeuchi,  War  and 
Diplomacy  in  the  Japanese  Empire,  p.  345. 


106  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Foreign  Minister  was  distressed  that  Minami's  ill-advised  utter- 
ances might  arouse  undue  concern  in  the  United  States,  Great 
Britain,  and  China  at  a  highly  tense  moment  in  Japanese-Chinese 
relationships.6 

In  this  situation,  Minister  of  Finance  Inoue  made  the  fatal 
error  of  failing  to  assess  correctly  the  sharp  political  repercus- 
sions of  his  ill-timed  deflationary  policy.  During  the  decade  of 
the  twenties  the  trend  toward  concentration  of  capital  in  the 
hands  of  the  zaibatsu  continued  to  a  point  where  the  polarization 
of  society  into  the  haves  and  have-nots  became  obvious  even  to 
the  average  Japanese  on  the  street.  A  handful  of  gigantic  family 
holding  companies7  controlled  a  chain  of  subsidiaries  in  virtually 
every  field  of  heavy  industry,  mining,  finance,  insurance,  and 
banking,  with  a  resultant  influence  in  government  through  both 
the  bureaucracy  and  political  parties.  Since  in  the  same  period 
the  political  influence  of  the  militarists  was  on  the  wane  and 
political  authority  seemed  to  be  gravitating  toward  the  Diet  and 
the  zaibatsu,  the  two  naturally  incurred  the  enmity  of  the  military. 

As  the  only  means  available  to  reduce  substantially  the  bud- 
getary deficit,  throughout  the  summer  of  1931  Inoue  pressed  for 
a  lowering  of  military  and  naval  expenditures  despite  bitter  oppo- 
sition. And  by  early  September  Inoue  and  Minami  had  reached 
substantial  agreement  on  this  thorny  question.  However,  when 
Minami  bore  the  agreement  back  to  the  Ministry  of  War,  he  was 
rebuffed  by  Koiso,  Chief  of  the  Military  Affairs  Bureau,  and 
Onodera  Chojiro,  the  Accountant  General.8  Consequently,  the 
agreement  reached  after  much  labor  was  nullified,  and  the  nego- 
tiations were  right  back  where  they  had  been  in  early  summer. 
This  rather  obscure  incident  may  be  taken  as  just  another  in- 
stance in  which  the  military  decided  to  defy  the  government  and 
fight  back. 

6.  Ibid.  (August  7,  1931),  p.  1. 

7.  The  larger  ones  included  Mitsui,  Mitsubishi,  Sumitomo,  and  Yasuda. 

8.  Harada  Diary,  2,  42-43,  45. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  107 

Agrarian  Impoverishment  and  the  Young  Officers 

No  evidence  has  been  uncovered  thus  far  to  indicate  that  Japan's 
agrarian  problems  had  any  immediate  bearing  on  the  March 
Plot,  the  Mukden  Incident,  or  the  October  Plot.  It  is  more  ap- 
propriate to  say  that  these  plots  were  planned  by  a  relatively  re- 
stricted group  of  army  officers  to  further  the  immediate  interest 
of  their  own  clique  rather  than  to  bring  comprehensive  benefits 
to  a  large  segment  of  the  underemployed  Japanese  agrarian 
population.1 

In  the  twenties  the  number  of  agricultural  households  re- 
mained virtually  stationary  at  about  five  and  a  half  million,  and 
there  were  no  pronounced  changes  in  the  size  or  distribution  of 
the  farms.  The  trend  was  toward  an  increase  in  farming  families 
cultivating  medium-sized  plots  from  one  and  a  quarter  to  five 
acres,  with  a  decrease  in  the  very  large  and  the  very  small.  There 
was  comparatively  little  change  in  the  system  of  land  tenure, 
though  the  number  of  tenant  farmers  tended  to  decline  while 
the  number  of  those  who  owned  part  of  the  land  and  rented  the 
rest  grew.  Rice  continued  to  be  the  chief  food  crop,  and  well 
over  half  the  cultivated  area  was  devoted  to  it. 

In  the  middle  twenties  the  price  of  rice  maintained  a  fairly 
high  level,  in  part  because  of  the  absence  of  bumper  crops  and 
recurrence  of  several  poor  harvests.  But  from  1927  to  1930  there 
was  a  succession  of  large  crops,  with  the  one  in  1930  being  ex- 
ceptionally heavy. 

1.  In  contrast,  the  abortive  coups  which  came  later — on  May  15,  1932, 
and  February  26,  1936 — were  closely  tied  in  with  Japan's  agrarian  prob- 
lems. The  bitter  but  futile  struggle  which  young  officers  of  company  grade, 
with  the  backing  of  civilian  satellite  organizations — see  Yanaga,  Japan 
since  Perry,  pp.  502-05,  on  Ketsumeidan  (Blood  Brotherhood  League) 
and  Aikoku  Kinroto  (Patriotic  Workers'  Society) — carried  out  against 
the  T6sei-ha  in  order  to  pave  the  way  for  internal  reconstruction  can  be 
understood  only  when  cast  against  the  backdrop  of  the  extreme  impover- 
ishment of  Japan's  agrarian  population.  This  is  true  even  though  the  young 
officers  themselves  admittedly  had  no  comprehensive  program  of  their 
own. 


108  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Since  1927  the  government  had  tried  under  a  valorization 
scheme  to  support  the  price  of  rice  by  purchasing  surplus  rice 
whenever  its  market  price  fell  below  a  fixed  figure.2  However,  the 
price  continued  to  fall  steadily,  and  within  a  period  of  four 
months  in  1930-31  the  price  of  one  kokus  of  rice  collapsed  from 
twenty-seven  to  eighteen  yen. 

Moreover,  there  was  a  long-term  deterrent  to  any  rise  in  the 
price  of  domestically  produced  rice.  Under  the  encouragement 
of  the  government,  which  effected  improvements  in  irrigation 
and  the  use  of  fertilizer,  the  output  of  rice  in  Korea  increased  by 
30  per  cent  in  the  twenty-year  period  following  annexation  in 
1910.  Similar  development  had  taken  place  in  Formosa,  though 
on  a  smaller  scale. 

Between  1927  and  1929,  imports  from  these  two  areas  aver- 
aged about  13  per  cent  of  Japan's  domestic  production.  This 
amount  enabled  her  to  meet  the  increase  in  demand  created  by 
the  ever-growing  population.  However,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  Japanese  farmers,  an  increase  in  population  brought  no 
benefits,  since  the  inflow  of  rice  from  these  two  colonies  and  the 
ever-present  possibility  of  an  influx  of  inferior  and  cheaper  rice 
from  Southeast  Asia  tended  to  keep  the  price  of  domestically 
produced  rice  depressed. 

Although  certain  agrarian  groups,  such  as  the  Imperial  Agri- 
cultural Society  (Teikoku  Nokai),  agitated  in  favor  of  restrict- 
ing imports,  such  a  step  would  have  been  politically  hazardous. 
A  well-known  scholar  of  Japan's  economy  has  observed  that 
"to  have  listened  to  such  a  demand  would,  however,  have  pro- 
duced trouble  among  the  urban  population,  besides  endangering 
both  industrial  development  and  strategic  advantages."4  To  put 
it  bluntly,  the  backward,  inarticulate  mass  of  the  farming  popu- 
lace benefited  neither  from  the  rise  in  national  income  due  to 


2.  G.  C.  Allen,  A  Short  Economic  History  of  Modern  Japan,  1867-1937 
(London,  Allen  and  Unwin,  1946),  p.  109. 

3.  Equivalent  to  5.12  American  bushels. 

4.  Allen,  A  Short  Economic  History  of  Modern  Japan,  p.  1 10. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  109 

the  industrialization  of  Japan  nor  from  the  enlarged  demand  for 
rice  due  to  the  growth  in  population. 

However,  the  sudden  collapse  of  the  rice  market  was  not  the 
only  blow  the  Japanese  farmers  sustained  in  1930.  Raw  silk, 
their  principal  source  of  cash  income  and  their  second  most  im- 
portant agriculture  product,  suffered  an  even  more  disastrous 
drop  in  price  when  the  American  demand  slackened. 

Between  1914  an  1921  sericulture  saw  a  threefold  increase  in 
production,  until  two  fifths  of  all  farming  households  were  en- 
gaged in  that  occupation  as  a  secondary  source  of  income.  This 
remarkable  increase  in  the  production  of  raw  silk  in  turn  meant 
an  additional  demand  for  female  workers  who  came  mainly  from 
farming  households.  Wages  which  a  farmer's  daughters  earned, 
together  with  the  sale  of  cocoons,  comprised  a  very  important 
part  of  the  farmer's  cash  income,  since  much  of  his  rice  produc- 
tion was  either  consumed  by  his  family  or,  in  the  case  of  tenant 
farmers,  passed  to  the  landlords  as  rent. 

Commenting  on  the  highly  sensitive  role  raw  silk  played  in 
the  agrarian  economy,  Professor  Allen  writes: 

At  a  time  when  very  little  additional  land  was  available 
for  cereal  cultivation,  this  outlet  was  most  valuable  to 
the  peasants.  Such  improvements  in  their  standard  of 
living  as  occurred  in  this  period — and  they  can  hardly 
be  considered  substantial — are  attributable  largely 
to  fresh  opportunities  to  engage  in  industrial  occupa- 
tions and,  in  particular,  to  participate  in  this  rapidly 
growing  silk  trade.  Any  disturbance  to  the  growth  of 
that  trade  was  bound  to  have  disastrous  consequences 
for  them.5 

In  1923  the  average  export  price  of  raw  silk  per  100  kine  was 
2,150  yen.  After  1925  the  export  price  tended  to  fall,  because 

5.  Ibid. 

6.  One  kin  is  equivalent  to  1.323  pounds. 


110  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

of  the  rise  in  the  exchange  value  of  the  yen.  In  April  1929  the 
export  price  was  1 ,420  yen,  which  still  compared  favorably  with 
the  800-900  yen  of  pre- World  War  I  prices.  However,  after  the 
collapse  of  the  American  market,  the  price  slumped  to  540  yen 
by  October  1930,  and  it  continued  to  fall  for  the  next  two  years, 
hitting  a  low  of  390  yen  in  June  1932.  This  spelled  double  disas- 
ter for  the  farmers,  since  their  cash  income  had  already  been 
drastically  reduced  when  the  price  of  rice  had  collapsed. 

Over  the  course  of  three  years  there  was  almost  a  50  per  cent 
reduction  in  the  income  from  rice,  silk,  and  oats.  Rice  and  silk 
were  said  to  have  comprised  roughly  70  per  cent  of  the  cash  in- 
come of  Japanese  farmers.  In  terms  of  ratio,  the  rate  of  decline 
in  the  annual  income  of  Japanese  farm  households  from  rice, 
silk,  and  oats  was  62  for  1930  and  52  for  1931,  assuming  100  as 
an  index  figure  for  1929.7 

Ironically,  in  contrast  to  the  overabundance  of  rice  in  other 
parts  of  Japan,  the  five  prefectures  in  the  northeast  corner  of 
Honshu  and  Hokkaido  were  ravaged  by  an  unusually  early  frost 
in  1931,  which  caused  extensive  damage  to  the  crops.  Many 
farm  households,  on  the  verge  of  starvation,  were  compelled  to 
sell  their  daughters  to  procurers. 

Despite  the  misery  and  poverty  which  hung  like  a  heavy  pall 
over  the  countryside  of  Japan,  the  relief  measures  instituted  by 
the  Minseito  government  were  wholly  inadequate  and  slow  in 
being  administered.  Of  some  140  million  yen  earmarked  for  the 
relief  of  farmers,  only  a  little  over  4  million  had  actually  been 
spent  by  February  193 1.8  The  acute  condition  of  the  agrarian 
population  was  reflected  in  the  frequency  of  tenancy  disputes 
(as  indicated  in  Table  1),  which  continued  to  mount  through 
1931. 

7.  Kiyozawa  Retsu,  "Goichigo  Jiken  no  Shakaiteki  Konkyo"  (Social 
Origin  of  the  May  15,  1932  Incident),  Kaizo  (November  1933),  p.  265 
(hereafter  referred  to  as  Kiyozawa,  May  15,  1932  Incident). 

8.  Muramatsu  Yuji,  "Taiheiyo  Senso  Boppatsu  to  Nihon  Keizai"  (The 
Outbreak  of  the  Pacific  War  and  the  Japanese  Economy),  Taiheiyo  Senso 
Genin  Ron  (Causes  of  the  Pacific  War),  ed.  Ueda  Katsuo  (Tokyo,  1953), 
p.  566. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  111 

The  acute  distress  suffered  by  the  peasantry  was  not  by  any 
means  a  new  development  on  the  Japanese  social  scene;  for 
centuries  the  peasant  had  been  exploited  by  feudal  regimes.9 
Tokugawa  agrarian  policy  may  be  characterized  by  the  saying, 
"Impose  taxes  upon  farmers  to  such  an  extent  that  they  can 
neither  live  nor  die,"10  or,  "Peasants  and  rape  seeds — the  more 
they  are  squeezed,  the  more  is  gained."11  The  farmer's  lot  would 


table  1.  Number  of  Tenancy  Disputes,  1926-1932 
Year  Disputes  Participating  Tenants 


1926 

2,751 

151,061 

1927 

2,052 

91,336 

1928 

1,866 

75,136 

1929 

2,434 

81,998 

1930 

2,478 

58,565 

1931 

3,419 

81,135 

1932 

3,414 

61,499 

Source:  Toyama,  Imai.  and  Fujiwara,  Shdwa-shi  (History  of  the 
Showa  Era)   (Tokyo,  1955),  p.  45. 


9.  On  the  eve  of  the  Meiji  Restoration,  the  samurai  (warrior  class) 
numbered  about  two  million  or  roughly  6-7  per  cent  of  Japan's  popula- 
tion. The  maintenance  of  this  large  idle  class  in  an  agricultural  economy 
had  placed  a  heavy  burden  on  the  nonprivileged  peasant  class,  which  con- 
stituted about  75  per  cent  of  the  population.  The  annual  land  tax  paid  in 
rice  by  the  peasant  constituted  the  major  source  of  revenue  for  the  shogun 
and  daimyd  (feudal  lords).  Though  it  varied  from  province  to  province, 
the  revenue  amounted  to  40-50  per  cent  of  the  total  yield  of  paddy  fields. 
Allen,  A  Short  Economic  History  of  Modern  Japan,  p.  11.  For  precise 
delineation  of  the  term  Meiji  Restoration,  see  Albert  M.  Craig,  Choshu 
in  the  Meiji  Restoration  (Cambridge,  1961),  pp.  360-61. 

10.  E.  Herbert  Norman,  Japan's  Emergence  as  a  Modern  State  (New 
York,  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  1940),  p.  21. 

11.  It  goes  without  saying  that  exploitation  and  oppression  of  the  peas- 
ants gave  rise  to  innumerable  agrarian  uprisings  during  the  Tokugawa 


112  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

have  been  more  tolerable  had  it  shown  some  signs  of  improve- 
ment, as  had  other  sectors  of  the  nation's  economy  as  the  result 
of  the  Meiji  Restoration. 

Japan's  modern  agriculture  owed  its  distorted  development 
to  two  factors.  The  first  was  the  shaping  it  received  in  the  political 
settlements  of  the  early  Meiji  era,  and  the  second  was  the  enor- 
mous growth  in  Japan's  population  in  modern  times. 

The  former  theme  has  received  a  classic  treatment  in  E.  Her- 
bert Norman's  book  Japan's  Emergence  as  a  Modern  State.12 
The  author  maintains  that  the  two  factors  which  accelerated 
Japan's  transition  from  a  feudal  to  a  modern  state  were,  first,  that 
Tokugawa  feudalism  was  in  its  last  hours  and  the  regime  col- 
lapsed without  prolonged  and  wasteful  civil  war;  and  second, 
that  external  pressures  exerted  by  the  Western  nations  left  no 
choice  for  Japan  but  to  concentrate  her  national  resources  in 
building  her  defense  structure  by  banking  heavily  on  the  only 
sizable  resource  Japan  had,  namely  revenues  from  land  taxation. 
Under  this  program  it  was  inevitable  that  the  peasants  were 
made  to  shoulder  the  extremely  high  cost  required  to  modernize 
in  a  short  span  of  time.13 

The  policy  goal  pursued  by  Japan  is  succinctly  stated  by 
Norman: 

The  policy  of  the  Meiji  Government  was  to  initiate 
strategic  industries,  to  endow  lavishly  the  defense 
forces,  to  subsidize  generously  a  narrow  and  compara- 
tively weak  merchant-banking  class  in  order  to  en- 


period.  For  details  see  Hugh  Borton,  "Peasant  Uprisings  in  Japan  of  To- 
kugawa Period,"  Transactions  of  the  Asiatic  Society  of  Japan,  2d  ser.  16 
(1938). 

12.  See  in  particular  chap.  5,  "The  Agrarian  Settlement  and  Its  Social 
Consequences,"  pp.  136-66. 

13.  In  1899  the  land  tax  on  rural  sites  was  raised  from  2.5  per  cent  to 
3.3  per  cent.  In  1905  it  was  raised  again,  later  reaching  11.5  per  cent  on 
the  most  highly  taxed  sites.  Allen,  A  Short  Economic  History  of  Modern 
Japan,  p.  44.  The  theme  that  the  main  impetus  for  the  post-Restoration 
modernization  program  came  from  external  pressure  is  admirably  sum- 
marized in  Craig,  p.  373. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  113 

courage  its  entry  into  the  field  of  industry.  The  reverse 
side  of  this  policy  was  marked  by  a  disproportionately 
heavy  tax  burden  on  the  agricultural  classes,  by  the 
stinting  of  enterprises  less  vital  than  those  connected 
with  defense,  and  by  a  general  impatience  at  any  sign 
of  unrest  or  democratic  protest  which  might  precipitate 
a  domestic  crisis  and  so  hinder  or  retard  the  task  of 
reconstruction.  Nevertheless,  it  was  this  policy  which 
succeeded  in  the  very  speedy  creation  of  industries,  a 
merchant  marine,  an  overseas  market,  and  an  efficient 
navy.14 

In  the  words  of  Bertrand  Russell,  "Modern  Japan  is  almost 
exactly  what  it  was  intended  to  be  by  the  men  who  made  the 
revolution  of  1867."15 

In  the  early  decades  of  the  twentieth  century,  moreover,  the 
farmers  steadily  lost  ground  to  other  sectors  in  the  national  eco- 
nomy. As  shown  in  Table  2,  of  enormous  political  significance 
was  the  fact  that,  whereas  the  per  capita  share  in  the  national 
income  by  the  primary  industries16  followed  a  steady  path  of 
decline  from  about  1922  through  1940,  the  income  of  the  second- 
ary and  tertiary  industries  rose  steadily  upward  from  about  1915 
until  1930,  resulting  in  a  rather  conspicuous  gap  in  the  standard 
of  living  between  the  agrarian  population  and  the  urban  popula- 
tion engaged  in  other  sectors  of  the  economy.  As  Table  3,  on 
labor  wage  indices,  indicates,  even  after  the  depression  had  set 
in,  urban  wages  did  not  show  a  decline  anything  like  that  of  the 
farmers'  income. 

Still  another  indication  of  the  imbalance  of  the  agrarian  and 

14.  Japan's  Emergence  as  a  Modern  State,  p.  208.  Italics  added. 

15.  Quoted  in  G.  C.  Allen,  Japan:  The  Hungry  Guest  (New  York,  Dut- 
ton,  1938),  p.  116. 

16.  Primary  industries  include  agriculture,  forestry,  fisheries,  and  min- 
ing. Of  course,  the  latter  three  together  equal  only  a  small  fraction  of  the 
overwhelmingly  large  agricultural  industry.  Secondary  industries  comprise 
manufacturing  and  construction.  Tertiary  industries  comprise  the  service 
industries:  transportation  and  communication,  wholesale  and  retail, 
finance,  public  services,  professions,  rentals,  etc. 


114  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

table  2.  Ratio  of  Per  Capita  Income  of  Those  Engaged  in 

Primary  Industries  to  Per  Capita  Income  of  Those  Engaged  in 

the  Remaining  Sectors  (Secondary  -f-  Tertiary)  of  the  National 

Economy  on  the  Basis  of  Quinquennial  Average 

Periods 


1903-07 

36% 

1908-12 

39% 

1913-17 

42% 

1918-22 

40% 

1923-27 

32% 

1928-32 

27% 

1933-37 

29% 

1938-42 

27% 

Source:  Yamada  Yuzo,  Nikon  Kokumin  Shotoku  Suikei  Shiryo  (Statis- 
tical Estimates  of  Japan's  National  Income)  (Tokyo,  1951),  pp  .  128,  130 
(hereafter  referred  to  as  Yamada,  National  Income). 


table  3.  Indices  of  Labor  Wages  in  Japan,  1924-1930 
(1921-1923  =  100) 


(June) 

1924 

104 

1925 

103 

1926 

103 

1927 

101 

1928 

102 

1929 

102 

1930 

95 

Source:  Kiyozawa,  May  15,  1932,  Incident,  p.  267. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  115 

urban  economies  in  September  1931  was  the  discrepancy  in 
Tokyo  between  the  average  wholesale  index  and  the  average 
index  price  on  agricultural  products.  Using  1920  as  the  base 
year  with  an  index  of  100,  the  index  for  produce  had  shrunk  to 
37.5  in  comparison  with  the  average  wholesale  index  of  54.4  and 
the  index  of  42.1  for  farming  equipment  and  supplies — both 
appreciably  higher  indices  than  for  produce  but  still  substantially 
reduced  from  those  of  1920.17 

Although  space  will  not  permit  us  to  explore  all  the  intricate 
causes  underlying  the  profound  discrepancy  in  per  capita  income 
between  the  farming  population,  which  comprised  approximately 
half  of  Japan's  working  population  in  the  1928-32  period,18  and 
those  engaged  in  secondary  and  tertiary  industries — a  discrep- 
ancy which  gave  rise  to  the  phenomenon  known  as  the  "dual 
economy" — the  population  problem  certainly  was  a  contributing 
factor  of  great  importance. 

Between  1914  and  1930  the  population  of  Japan  proper  in- 
creased by  25  per  cent,  or  from  51  million  to  64  million  in 
absolute  figures.  In  the  mid-twenties,  even  before  financial  crisis 
had  overtaken  the  country,  the  national  economy  had  experienced 
considerable  difficulty  in  annually  absorbing  the  approximately 
450,000  new  workers  seeking  employment.  This  large  semi- 
stagnant  reservoir  of  surplus  population  was  at  best  semi- 
employed,  a  condition  marked  by  irregularity  of  work  and 
insecurity  of  employment,  and,  when  employed,  subject  to  long 
hours  of  work  at  meager  wages.  The  semi-employed  surplus 
lived  on  the  fringes  of  the  urban  economy  and  like  driftwood 
tended  to  shift  back  and  forth  between  the  cities  and  the  villages 
in  response  to  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  nation's  economic  activi- 
ties. In  the  latter  half  of  the  twenties  the  movement  of  this  sur- 
plus population  was  more  heavily  in  the  direction  of  the  rural 
areas  than  toward  the  cities,  with  the  result  that  the  standard 
of  living  in  the  already  congested  villages  was  depressed  to  a 

17.  Kiyozawa,  May  15,  1932  Incident,  p.  266. 

18.  Yamada  Yuzo,  National  Income,  p.  130. 


116  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

point  where,  in  some  localities  such  as  northeast  Honshu,  it  be- 
came intolerable.19 

Among  the  writers  of  tracts  espousing  the  agrarian  cause, 
Gondo  Seikyo  and  Tachibana  Kosaburo  attracted  considerable 
attention.  Both  men  attributed  the  existing  social  ills  of  Japan  to 
the  deplorable  state  of  the  once  healthy  villages.  On  the  other 
hand,  they  saw  in  the  unbridled  growth  of  huge  urban  centers  the 
eventual  undoing  of  Japan,  likening  them  to  cancerous  growths 
which  would  sap  the  nation's  strength.20 

They  associated  with  this  urban-rural  imbalance  the  growing 
influence  of  big  business  in  politics,  the  top-heavy  bureaucratic 
administration,  and  the  military,  suspecting  these  three  elements 
of  collusion  for  further  selfish  ends.  They  feared  that  this  state 
of  affairs  was  responsible  for  the  unhealthy  class  differentiations 
and  the  steady  deterioration  in  the  lot  of  the  average  man  on  the 
street.  They  expressed  a  nostalgic  longing  for  values  of  primitive 
communalism,  wherein  they  envisioned  more  local  autonomy, 


19.  From  July  1929  to  June  1930  the  number  of  workers  discharged 
from  factories  and  mines  employing  more  than  50  amounted  to  660,000. 
Of  these  unemployed  workers,  300,000  returned  immediately  to  their 
native  villages.  Thus,  allowing  for  a  lag  for  those  who  drifted  back  to  the 
villages  after  some  lapse  of  time,  it  must  be  presumed  that  the  majority 
of  the  unemployed  eventually  found  their  way  back  to  the  country.  Cited 
in  Toyama,  Imai,  and  Fujiwara,  Showa-shi  (History  of  the  Showa  Era) 
(Tokyo,  1955),  pp.  39-40. 

20.  Maruyama  Masao,  in  discussing  the  impact  of  the  "agriculture- 
first"  principle  on  the  development  of  fascism  in  Japan,  observes  that  this 
principle  tended  to  exercise  a  restraining  influence  upon  the  proclivity 
inherent  in  fascistic  movement  to  regiment  thinking  and  to  foster  a  highly 
centralized  economy.  Gondo  in  Jichi  Minpan  (Principles  of  Autonomous 
People)  and  Noson  Jikyii  Ron  (Essay  on  the  Salvation  of  Farm  Villages) 
indicated  that  he  was  a  thoroughgoing  agrarian,  even  to  the  extent  of 
showing  an  antinationalistic  tendency.  Tachibana  did  not  categorically 
disapprove  large-scale  manufacturing  industries.  Maruyama  Masao,  Gen- 
dai  Seiji  no  Shiso  to  Kodo  (Thought  and  Actions  Underlying  Contempo- 
rary Politics),  1  (Tokyo,  1958),  39-40,  44  (hereafter  referred  to  as 
Maruyama,  Contemporary  Politics).  For  a  description  of  the  various 
schools  of  thought  among  the  agrarian-centered  nationalists,  see  Scal- 
apino,  Democracy  and  the  Party  Movement  in  Prewar  Japan,  pp.  356-57. 


TENSIONS  WITHIN  JAPAN  117 

less  interference  from  the  central  authority,  ands  more  familial 
ties.  At  the  apex  of  the  amorphous  national  state  they  posited  an 
emperor  whose  function  was  to  reign  in  the  Confucian  manner, 
living  an  exemplary  life  and  thus  serving  as  a  model  to  be  emu- 
lated rather  than  ruling  by  rigid  codes  of  law. 

Although  Gondo  had  had  little  or  no  direct  dealings  with  the 
Army  extremists,  his  two  works  influenced  the  thinking  of  the 
young  officers  who  were  responsible  for  the  assassination  of  Pre- 
mier Inukai  in  May  1932. 

Many  young  officers  themselves  came  from  poor  country  dis- 
tricts. Since  the  wretched  conditions  at  home  affected  the  morale 
of  the  draftees  for  whose  training  they  were  responsible,  it  is 
not  at  all  surprising  that  the  officers  took  a  paternalistic  interest 
in  the  family  welfare  of  peasant  soldiers.21  As  they  brooded  over 
the  plight  of  the  farmers,  many  began  to  entertain  a  distrust  of 
the  parliamentary  government,  which  was  ineffective  in  alleviat- 
ing agrarian  problems,  and  the  zaibatsu,  which  they  suspected 
of  exercising  a  corrupting  influence  on  the  government.  Thus 
many  young  officers  turned  to  champion  radical  programs  to 
better  the  economic  status  of  the  underprivileged  peasantry 
against  the  big  business  interests  of  the  cities.22 

Actually,  the  young  officers  did  not  rise  in  open  rebellion  until 
the  May  15,  1932,  Incident.  However,  that  their  deep  discontent 

21.  That  the  depressed  living  conditions  in  the  farming  communities 
affected  even  General  Honjo,  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Kwantung 
Army,  is  borne  out  by  the  testimony  of  Katakura  Tadashi:  "Lieutenant 
General  Honjo  saw  Ambassador  Yoshizawa  in  the  presence  of  Miyake, 
Ishihara,  and  myself.  Among  the  three  points  Honjo  mentioned,  the  third 
was  his  hope  that,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  soldiers  who  had  served 
devotedly  in  the  incident  had  come  from  the  fishing  villages  and  farms  in 
Japan,  the  living  conditions  of  the  farming  communities  would  be  im- 
proved" (IMTFE,  Proceedings,  p.  19,004). 

22.  For  a  cogent  description  of  the  social  and  economic  conditions  in 
the  thirties  which  provoked  the  young  officers  into  taking  matters  into 
their  own  hands  and  the  climate  of  opinion  which  enabled  the  military  and 
the  ultranationalists  to  dominate  Japan,  see  "The  Nationalistic  and  Mili- 
taristic Reaction"  in  Edwin  O.  Reischauer,  Japan,  Past  and  Present  (New 
York,  1954),  pp.  157-85. 


118  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

with  the  existing  form  of  government  in  1931  acted  as  powerful 
force  in  nurturing  the  March  and  October  Plots  and  the  Mukden 
Incident  cannot  be  denied. 


4. 

MOUNTING  CRISIS  IN 

JAPANESE-CHINESE  RELATIONS 


With  the  final  settlement  on  April  28,  1929,  of  the  Tsinan  Inci- 
dent, followed  by  the  recognition  of  the  Nationalist  regime  on 
June  28,  it  appeared  that  relations  between  China  and  Japan 
had  at  last  returned  to  normal.  To  cap  this,  there  followed  the 
halcyon  days  of  the  spring  of  1930  when,  with  the  Minseito  back 
in  power,  Shidehara  restored  China's  tariff  autonomy.  Neverthe- 
less, even  while  the  tide  was  changing  visibly  in  China's  favor, 
her  officials  made  no  secret  of  the  fact  that  Japan  would  be  called 
upon  to  relinquish  additional  special  concessions  in  China.  The 
stage  was  thus  set  for  the  deterioration  of  Japanese-Chinese  re- 
lations which  led  inevitably  to  the  Manchurian  crisis.1 

Minister  Saburi's  "Suicide" 

At  this  critical  juncture  two  unfortunate  incidents  followed  hard 
on  each  other.  Taken  separately,  neither  could  have  been  serious; 
together  they  deepened  suspicion  between  the  two  nations. 

First  came  the  inexplicable  death  of  Saburi  Sadao,  Japan's 
Minister  to  the  Nanking  government.  Although  Saburi  was  origi- 
nally slated  for  promotion  to  the  post  of  Ambassador  to  Moscow, 
after  some  persuasion  he  had  accepted  the  lesser  post  at  Nanking. 

1.  The  brief  interlude  of  relaxation  of  tension  in  Sino-Japanese  rela- 
tions is  described  in  Horiuchi  Kanjo,  Chugoku  no  Arashi  no  Naka  de  (In 
the  Storms  in  China)  (Tokyo,  1950),  pp.  65-81. 

119 


120  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

The  Foreign  Office's  explanation  was  that  Saburi  was  the  logical 
choice  because,  having  attended  the  Peking  Tariff  Conference  in 
1928,  he  was  well  versed  in  the  problems  of  Sino-Japanese  trade. 

It  was  early  in  October  1929  that  Minister  Saburi  arrived  in 
Shanghai  to  undertake  the  onerous  task  of  revising  the  unequal 
treaties.  His  arrival  in  Nanking  was  hailed  with  much  fanfare, 
since  he  was  regarded  as  a  personal  friend  of  Chiang  Kai-shek. 
Saburi  engaged  in  a  series  of  conversation  with  Chang,  C.  T. 
Wang,  and  other  key  officials  of  the  Nanking  government.  In 
late  November  he  returned  by  way  of  North  China  to  consult 
Shidehara  in  Tokyo;  the  report  was  that  he  had  brought  highly 
important  proposals  for  discussion.  While  officials  at  Nanking 
awaited  his  return,  his  stay  in  Tokyo  lengthened  to  a  week.  Mean- 
while, the  delicate  Japanese-Chinese  relations  showed  signs  of 
deteriorating,  and  Shigemitsu,  the  Japanese  Consul  General  at 
Shanghai,  becoming  more  and  more  anxious  by  the  day,  wired 
Tokyo  time  and  again  to  no  avail.  Then,  on  November  29,  there 
suddenly  appeared  bulletins  posted  at  street  corners  in  Shanghai 
reporting  Minister  Saburi's  "suicide." 

Shidehara  claimed  that  Saburi  had  cleared  all  business  with 
him  and  was  set  to  return  to  Nanking  when  he  suddenly  died. 
Although  his  death  is  a  mystery  to  this  day,  there  were  circum- 
stances which  could  have  given  him  a  feeling  of  complete  frus- 
tration. Saburi's  return  to  Tokyo,  for  instance,  coincided  with  a 
period  of  extraordinary  confusion  at  the  Foreign  Office,  whose 
key  men,  feverishly  engaged  in  preparing  instructions  and  docu- 
ments for  the  delegation  attending  the  London  Naval  Conference, 
were  unable  to  devote  the  time  and  attention  to  the  China  prob- 
lem which  the  situation  demanded. 

To  the  end,  Shidehara  doubted  that  Saburi  actually  committed 
suicide.  The  pistol  which  he  purportedly  used  was  identified  as 
not  his,  and  his  own  was  found  packed  in  his  suitcase.  Also,  al- 
though Saburi's  body  was  found  with  the  pistol  in  his  right  hand, 
the  bullet  had  entered  his  head  from  the  left  temple  and  came 


MOUNTING  CRISIS  121 

out  from  the  right.1  This  unnatural  death  electrified  public  opin- 
ion in  China.  Some  suspected  that  his  proposals,  being  too  favor- 
able to  China,  had  been  rejected  by  the  Foreign  Office. 

Saburi's  death  was  followed  by  an  incident  even  more  des- 
tructive to  Japanese-Chinese  accord:  the  Japanese  government 
decided  on  Obata  Torikichi,  the  former  Ambassador  to  Turkey 
as  successor  to  Saburi.  No  one  could  blame  officials  of  the  Nan- 
king government  for  suspecting  that  Obata  was  chosen  because 
of  his  firm  attitude  toward  China.  The  Chinese  had  not  forgot- 
ten that  back  in  1915  Obata  had  participated  in  the  negotiations 
for  the  Twenty-One  Demands  as  a  counselor  to  Minister  Hioki 
Yasu.  As  might  be  expected,  the  Nanking  government  flatly  re- 
fused agrement  for  Obata.  Shigemitsu  spent  the  last  two  days 
of  December  in  Nanking  in  an  unsuccessful  effort  to  persuade 
Chiang  and  C.  T.  Wang  to  retract  their  refusal. 

Japan,  now  in  the  awkward  position  of  being  unable  to  appoint 
a  full-fledged  minister,  appointed  Shigemitsu  as  Acting  Minister. 
Chinese  feelings  toward  Japan  progressed  from  bad  to  worse. 
Meanwhile,  Japanese  ultranationalists  and  the  extremists  of  the 
military  were  busily  fanning  the  sentiments  of  the  people  in  an 
effort  to  produce  a  get-tough  policy  toward  China. 

China's  Positive  Diplomacy 

Throughout  the  early  months  of  1931  Shigemitsu,  in  the  capacity 
of  Acting  Minister,  continued  negotiations  with  the  Nanking  gov- 
ernment with  a  view  to  revising  the  treaties.1  The  onerous  issues 
of  Manchuria  were  discreetly  set  aside  in  order  that  an  accord 
might  first  be  reached  on  issues  pertaining  to  China  proper.  It 
was  Shigemitsu's  hope  that  the  touchy  subject  of  Manchuria 
could  be  brought  up  in  an  improved  atmosphere  after  the  initial 
goal  had  been  attained. 

1.  Shidehara  Memoirs,  pp.  92-95. 

1.  Shigemitsu,  Showa  no  Doran,  I,  42-43. 


122  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

However,  in  the  spring,  C.  T.  Wang,  Nanking's  able  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  seeing  that  the  tide  was  running  in  China's 
favor,  publicly  announced  the  five  stages  by  which  China  intended 
to  recover  her  full  rights. 

1.  Restoration  of  customs  autonomy 

2.  Abolishment  of  extraterritoriality 

3.  Restoration  of  foreign  settlements 

4.  Restoration  of  leased  territories 

5.  Restoration  of  railroads,  rights  to  navigate  inland  water- 
ways, and  rights  to  engage  in  coastal  trade. 

Wang's  schedule  called  for  recovery  of  these  rights  in  a  com- 
paratively short  span  of  time.  Moreover,  it  was  made  known  that 
should  the  schedule  tend  to  lag  as  the  result  of  deliberate  delays 
on  the  part  of  foreign  powers,  Wang  would  abrogate  such  treaties 
unilaterally. 

Shigemitsu  was  quick  to  perceive  the  almost  insurmountable 
difficulties  that  the  execution  of  such  policies  would  pose  in  Sino- 
Japanese  negotiations,  especially  in  respect  to  Manchuria,  and 
was  determined  to  visit  Tokyo  to  say  this.  Before  leaving  Shang- 
hai, he  called  on  Wang,  who  not  only  reiterated  his  fivefold 
program  but  added  that  it  also  applied  to  Manchuria,  indicating 
that  he  thought  the  Kwantung  Leased  Territory  and  the  operation 
of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  must  be  restored  to  China.  Since 
the  statement  came  directly  from  the  Foreign  Minister,  Shige- 
mitsu was  deeply  distressed :  this  meant  complete  nullification  of 
all  the  groundwork  he  had  done  up  to  that  time. 

Shigemitsu  could  not  help  being  puzzled  by  Wang's  change 
of  attitude,  because  it  was  not  consonant  with  the  understanding 
reached  by  Minister  Saburi  and  Wang  that  the  touchy  question 
of  Manchuria  would  be  set  aside  until  another  issue — the  unequal 
treaties  with  respect  to  China  proper — had  been  amicably  set- 
tled. 

The  already  difficult  situation  was  further  aggravated  by  the 


MOUNTING  CRISIS  123 

irresponsible  action  of  a  Japanese  news  agency.  Despite  Shige- 
mitsu's  insistence  that  the  home  government  not  publish  any 
portion  of  his  conversation  with  Minister  Wang,  the  Rengo  news 
agency  indiscreetly  released  the  story,  causing  most  unfortunate 
repercussions  in  both  Japan  and  China.  The  Japanese  military 
were  so  incensed  by  the  news  that  it  made  the  continuation  of 
Shidehara's  conciliatory  policy  impossible. 

Early  in  April  1931  Shigemitsu  headed  for  Tokyo.  His  pro- 
posals to  the  home  government  were  (1)  to  make  broad  con- 
cessions in  China  proper  at  once  to  relax  Japanese-Chinese 
tensions;  (2)  to  keep  the  powers  informed  of  the  current  Japa- 
nese-Chinese dispute  by  making  a  full  report  to  the  League  of 
Nations;  (3)  to  formulate  an  over-all  China  policy  at  once. 
There  was  no  doubt  in  Shigemitsu's  mind  that  the  time  to  act 
was  now  if  Japan  were  to  avert  a  major  crisis  with  China. 

One  can  well  appreciate  Shigemitsu's  disappointment  when 
he  reached  Tokyo.  It  turned  out  that  the  Wakatsuki  cabinet, 
which  had  just  been  installed,  was  a  weak  government  com- 
mitted to  continuing  the  policies  of  the  Hamaguchi  cabinet,  its 
predecessor.  It  simply  did  not  have  enough  vigor  and  imagination 
to  strike  forth  boldly  in  a  new  direction.  His  proposal  to  restore 
promptly  to  China  foreign  settlements  of  small  value — such  as 
Soochow  and  Hangchow — was  rejected.  He  was  told  that  the 
Privy  Council  would  not  tolerate  such  a  proposal.  A  cabinet 
member  even  called  Shigemitsu's  attention  to  the  fact  that  his 
general  pro-Chinese  attitude  would  put  Shidehara  in  an  untenable 
position.  It  appears  that  by  then  many  influential  members  of  the 
Privy  Council  and  the  Seiyukai  had  succumbed  to  the  ultrana- 
tionalistic  appeals  of  Ito  Miyoji  and  Mori  Kaku.  Morever, 
though  the  Hamaguchi  government  managed  to  have  the  London 
Naval  Treaty  ratified,  its  momentary  success  gave  rise  to  such 
a  violent  reaction  from  rightist  elements  that  the  net  effect  was 
to  enable  the  proponents  of  the  doctrine  of  the  "independence 
of  the  supreme  command"  to  become  more  firmly  entrenched 
than  before. 


124  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Since  neither  government  was  in  a  mood  to  make  any  con- 
cession, it  was  apparent  to  Shigemitsu  that  it  was  merely  a  ques- 
tion of  time  before  the  negotiations  would  reach  an  impasse.  All 
that  remained  for  Japan  to  do  was  sound  the  alarm  and  fore- 
warn the  world  that,  despite  the  fact  that  Japan  had  exercised 
every  precautionary  measure,  a  clash  was  certain  to  come. 

On  April  29  Shigemitsu  said  his  farewells  to  Shidehara  and 
Tani.  As  he  recalled,  it  was,  indeed,  a  departure  full  of  fore- 
boding. The  parting  catch  phrase  was  "to  reach  a  stalemate,  if 
one  must,  on  a  sound  ground."  In  other  words,  Japan  ought  to 
deport  herself  at  all  times  in  such  a  manner  that  when  and  if  the 
Japanese-Chinese  breach  occurred,  her  conduct  would  be  above 
reproach  in  the  eyes  of  the  world. 

Railroad  Negotiations1 

It  will  be  recalled  that,  during  Marshal  Chang's  short-lived  rule 
from  Peking,  Yamamoto  Jotaro,  president  of  the  South  Man- 
churia Railway  Company,  extracted  from  the  Marshal  conces- 
sions to  build  five  railways  in  Manchuria.2  After  Chang's  sudden 
death,  Saito,  a  director  of  the  company,  took  up  residence  in 
Mukden  preparatory  to  resuming  the  railroad  negotiations  with 
Chang  Hsueh-liang,  the  Marshal's  son.  However,  Hayashi,  the 
Consul  General  assigned  to  Saito  to  assist  him  in  the  negotiations, 
deliberately  postponed  the  discussions  despite  the  anxiety  of 
Tanaka  and  Mori  until  the  difficult  question  of  the  Tsinan  Inci- 
dent was  settled.  Lest  premature  resumption  of  the  touchy  ques- 
tion arouse  the  feelings  of  the  Chinese  people,  Hayashi  tactfully 
laid  aside  the  railway  issues  and  shifted  the  subject  of  his  nego- 
tiations to  that  of  the  rights  of  Japanese  residents  to  lease  land 
and  engage  in  business  enterprises. 

1.  For  a  quarter  of  a  century  after  1905,  international  politics  in  Man- 
churia for  the  most  part  had  revolved  around  the  issue  of  railroad  build- 
ing. A  comprehensive  treatment  of  this  intricate  subject  is  to  be  found  in 
the  Lytton  Report,  pp.  42-49.  The  treatment  in  the  present  book  is  con- 
fined to  the  highlights  of  events  in  the  period  after  1925. 

2.  See  above  p.  16. 


MOUNTING  CRISIS  125 

On  January  14,  1929,  stating  that  he  was  acting  under  direct 
orders  from  Premier  Tanaka,  Hayashi  again  broached  to  the 
younger  Chang  the  immediate  approval  of  the  extension  of  the 
Kitun  Line  to  Huining.  Chang  and  the  Northeast  Political  Council 
had  once  before  refused  to  approve  the  Japanese  request  on  the 
ground  that  the  elder  Chang  had  made  his  consent  under  duress 
at  a  critical  moment  when  he  was  pressed  by  the  Nationalist 
armies. 

Again,  Hayashi  made  no  headway.  The  younger  Chang  per- 
functorily referred  the  matter  to  Nanking.  From  Chiang  Kai-shek 
came  the  reply  that  inasmuch  as  China  was  now  a  unified  nation, 
all  matters  pertaining  to  foreign  relations  were  to  be  referred 
directly  to  the  central  government.  If  Japan  should  again  bring 
up  the  matter  of  railroad  concessions  in  Manchuria  and  Mon- 
golia, Chang  was  not  to  listen.3 

Moreover,  there  were  controversies  over  the  issue  of  through 
traffic.  The  Chinese  were  operating  nearly  one  thousand  kilo- 
meters of  their  own  railways  by  1921  and,  according  to  the  Lytton 
Report,  for  two  years  prior  to  the  Mukden  Incident  they  at- 
tempted to  operate  the  various  lines  as  a  unified  system,  by  rout- 
ing all  freight  exclusively  over  their  lines  to  Yingkow,  the  port 

3.  To  fully  appreciate  Japan's  vexation  when  the  railroad  negotiations 
reached  an  impasse,  one  must  go  back  another  four  years  to  1925.  In  the 
words  of  the  late  H.  F.  MacNair:  "In  the  years  just  after  the  Washington 
Conference,  the  Chinese  sought  by  obstructionism  and  numerous  devices 
to  make  life  as  uncomfortable  as  possible  for  the  Japanese  in  Manchuria. 
Contrary  to  the  Peking  declaration  which  accompanied  the  Sino-Japanese 
Treaty  of  1905,  the  Chinese  in  1925  began  to  construct  rail  lines  parallel- 
ing the  tracks  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway."  MacNair  and  Lach, 
Modern  Far  Eastern  International  Relations  (New  York,  Van  Nostrand, 
1950),  p.  351.  The  completion  in  October  1927  of  the  Tatung  Line  from 
Tahushan  to  Tungliao  was  to  the  Japanese  simply  a  revival  of  the  earlier 
Chinhai  Line.  The  latter's  construction  was  abandoned  when  Russia  and 
Japan  jointly  protested  that  it  paralleled  the  South  Manchuria  Railway. 
Also  in  the  planning  stages  were  the  Chinhai  Line  and  railroads  connect- 
ing the  various  coal  mines  to  compete  against  Fushun,  a  huge  open-pit 
coal  mine  owned  and  developed  by  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Com- 
pany. 


126  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

of  exit.  The  through-traffic  controversy,  in  turn,  gave  rise  to 
a  bitter  war  of  rates  between  the  Chinese  lines  and  the  South 
Manchuria  Railway  Company.  The  Chinese  railroads  had  an 
advantage  over  the  Japanese  because  of  the  decline  in  the  value 
of  Chinese  silver  currency  at  the  time.  The  Japanese  were  also 
apprehensive  over  the  plan  to  dredge  the  Port  of  Hulutao,  for 
upon  completion  of  it,  Hulutao  and  Yingkow  would  have  flanked 
Dairen  from  both  sides  to  divert  a  sizable  portion  of  its  marine 
cargoes. 

Contrary  to  Komoto's  grandiose  dream,  the  demise  of  Marshal 
Chang  did  not  bring  the  solution  of  Japan's  problems  in  Man- 
churia and  Mongolia  any  closer.  His  son,  Chang  Hsueh-liang, 
though  still  a  youth,  turned  out  to  be  a  tactful  and  cautious  ne- 
gotiator. He  took  extra  care  not  to  show  the  Japanese  that  he 
knew  who  was  responsible  for  his  father's  death,  lest  they  cease 
to  negotiate  with  him.  He  was  firmly  resolved,  however,  that  they 
would  not  receive  any  concessions  whatever. 

It  was  not  long  before  Tanaka  and  Mori  became  restive  over 
the  slow  progress  of  the  negotiations.  Early  in  1929  Tokyo  sent 
a  secret  directive  to  Japanese  authorities  in  Mukden  to  draw  up 
a  plan  entailing  the  use  of  police  power,  if  necessary,  to  bring  the 
issues  of  railroad  concessions  and  the  rights  of  Japanese  residents 
to  a  quick  settlement. 

In  Mukden,  Morishima  Morito  of  the  Consulate  General  met 
with  Saito,  a  director  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Company, 
and  Hata,  the  chief  of  the  local  Army  Special  Service  Agency. 
Together  they  worked  out  a  detailed  plan  providing  a  step-by- 
step  sequence  through  which  control  over  the  railroads  and  the 
exercise  of  rights  of  residents  were  to  be  put  into  effect.  In  case 
they  should  have  to  take  unilateral  measures,  the  plan  provided 
for  the  disposition  of  the  police  officials  and  also  for  concerted 
action  with  the  Kwantung  Army  if  armed  conflict  with  the 
Chinese  troops  should  ensue. 

Although  the  plan  was  ready  to  be  put  into  operation  the  in- 
stant word  came  from  Tokyo,  that  order  never  came:  the  Tanaka 


MOUNTING  CRISIS  127 

government  had  suddenly  been  confronted  with  an  explosive  po- 
litical issue  at  home — whether  the  Japanese  signers  of  the  recently 
concluded  Kellogg-Briand  Pact  had  committed  lese  majesty  in 
accepting  the  treaty  "in  the  name  of  the  people"  and  not  of  the 
Emperor. 

Chang  Hsueh-liang,  in  an  effort  to  gain  control  over  the  Chi- 
nese Eastern  Railway,  engaged  the  Soviets  in  a  series  of  military 
encounters  from  July  to  December  1929.  Although  Chang  was 
unsuccessful  in  his  attempts,  the  incident  served  as  a  reminder 
to  the  Kwantung  Army  of  Chang's  determination  to  oust  foreign 
interests  from  Manchuria.  Perhaps  even  more  significant,  how- 
ever, to  the  Kwantung  Army  was  the  fact  that  the  support  the 
Chinese  expected  from  the  Western  nations  failed  to  materialize. 
Might  the  Kwantung  Army  have  taken  this  as  a  cue  that  were  it 
to  start  an  action  in  Manchuria  it,  too,  would  have  a  relatively 
free  hand  to  do  as  it  pleased? 

Other  Irritants 

In  Manchuria  the  governing  policy  of  the  Chinese  officials  was 
to  limit  the  exceptional  privileges  of  the  Japanese  residents  as 
much  as  possible  in  order  to  strengthen  their  own  authority.  The 
Sino-Japanese  Treaty  of  1915  stated:  "Japanese  subjects  shall 
be  free  to  reside  and  travel  in  South  Manchuria  and  to  engage  in 
business  and  manufacture  of  any  kind  whatsoever."  In  the  in- 
terior of  South  Manchuria,  however,  these  rights  were  restricted 
by  a  provision  that  required  the  Japanese  to  carry  travel  permits 
and  observe  local  laws,  though  the  Chinese  officials  were  not  to 
enforce  this  regulation  until  they  had  come  to  an  understanding 
with  the  Japanese  Consul. 

Apparently  what  happened  was  that  the  Chinese  authorities, 
without  submitting  their  regulations  to  the  Japanese  Consul, 
exerted  pressure  upon  the  Japanese  residents,  sometimes  by 
severe  police  measures,  to  evict  them  from  many  cities  and  towns 
in  South  Manchuria  and  eastern  Inner  Mongolia.  Chinese  land- 


128  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

lords  were  discouraged  from  renting  houses  to  Japanese.  The 
Japanese  also  complained  that  Chinese  authorities  refused  to 
issue  travel  permits  and  harassed  them  by  illegal  taxes. 

Chinese  authorities  answered  by  pointing  out  that  the  Japa- 
nese were  attempting  to  reside  and  conduct  business  in  all  parts 
of  Manchuria  in  disregard  of  the  treaty  provision  which  limited 
their  residence  to  South  Manchuria.  The  basic  factor  contribut- 
ing to  Japanese-Chinese  differences  was  the  unwillingness  on  the 
part  of  the  Chinese  authorities  to  observe  the  provisions  of  the 
Treaty  of  1915,  on  the  ground  that  it  lacked  "fundamental 
validity."1 

Another  irritant  was  the  constant  controversy  over  the  right 
to  lease  land.  The  Treaty  of  1915  provided  that  "Japanese  sub- 
jects in  South  Manchuria  may,  by  negotiation,  lease  land  neces- 
sary for  erecting  suitable  buildings  for  trade  and  manufacture  or 
for  prosecuting  agricultural  enterprises."  The  phrase  "lease  by 
negotiation"  was  defined  by  an  exchange  of  notes  between  the 
two  governments  to  mean  "a  long-term  lease  of  not  more  than 
thirty  years  and  also  the  possibility  of  its  unconditional  renewal." 
For  some  unexplained  reason  the  word  "possibility"  was  missing 
from  the  Japanese  version,  with  the  result  that  their  text  read 
simply  "leases  for  a  long  term  up  to  thirty  years  and  uncondi- 
tionally renewable."2  It  was  inevitable  that  disputes  should  arise. 
The  Japanese  insisted  that  their  land  leases  were  renewable  at 
their  sole  option,  and  this  in  effect  was  tantamount  to  the  right 
of  perpetual  use.  And  such  an  interpretation  was  unacceptable 
to  the  Chinese,  especially  in  view  of  the  upsurge  of  the  rights 
recovery  movement. 

Obstacles  of  various  sorts  were  erected  to  prevent  the  Japa- 
nese from  leasing  land.  Most  widespread  in  effect  were  provincial 
and  local  orders  flatly  decreeing  that  leasing  of  land  to  Japa- 

1.  Lytton  Report,  p.  53. 

2.  Ibid.,  p.  54.  In  the  land-lease  dispute  involving  a  farm  near  Mukden, 
the  Consulate  General  removed  the  Chinese  narrow-gauge  tracks  which 
cut  across  the  land,  lest  the  issue  give  the  Kwantung  Army  a  pretext  to 
start  an  incident.  See  Morishima,  Conspiracy,  pp.  39-41. 


MOUNTING  CRISIS  129 

nese  was  punishable  under  the  criminal  laws.  Inssome  instances 
special  fees  and  taxes  which  were  payable  in  advance  were 
levied  upon  leased  land.  In  others,  local  officials  were  prohibited 
from  approving  transfers  of  leases  under  threat  of  punishment. 

Another  source  of  trouble  was  the  status  and  treatment  ac- 
corded the  many  Korean  farmers  who  immigrated  to  Chientao, 
an  area  adjacent  to  Korea.3 

After  the  Mukden  Incident  Japanese  publicists  busied  them- 
selves in  describing  hundreds  of  provocative  incidents  in  China 
proper  and  Manchuria:  "Among  the  fair-minded  students  there 
never  was  any  doubt  that  the  Chinese  during  and  after  the  Na- 
tionalist revolution  of  1925-28  had  needlessly  irritated  the  Jap- 
anese on  a  good  many  occasions,  and  if  each  irritation  in  itself 
has  been  only  a  pinprick,  it  was  still  the  case  where  a  thousand 
pinpricks  equaled  a  slash  of  the  sabre."4 

From  the  Chinese  point  of  view,  however,  Japanese  com- 
plaints of  provocation  were  nothing  but  rationalizations,  and 
the  incidents  themselves  nothing  but  expressions  of  irrepressible 
indignation  over  Japan's  assumption  that  certain  rights  and  privi- 
leges had  been  legally  established  when  in  fact  the  Chinese  had 
never  intended  that  the  treaties  were  to  be  so  construed. 

Japan's  Consulate  General  at  Mukden  realized  that  it  was  but 
a  question  of  time  when  all  the  issues  outstanding  since  the  time 
of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  would  have  to  be  settled.  On  numer- 
ous occasions  it  had  urged  the  home  government  to  begin  nego- 
tiations with  the  Chinese  government  as  soon  as  possible.  Thus, 
to  prepare  for  the  forthcoming  conference  with  the  Chinese,  early 
in  1931  the  Consulate  General  had  obtained  the  services  of  a 
specialist  in  documents  from  the  home  office  in  Tokyo.  Under 
his  supervision  and  with  the  cooperation  of  the  Public  Relations 
Division  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Company,  the  task 
of  sorting  and  classifying  a  mass  of  documents  which  had  ac- 

3.  See  below,  pp.  143-44. 

4.  R.  H.  Ferrell,  "The  Mukden  Incident:  September  18-19,  1931," 
Journal  of  Modern  History,  27  (1955),  67. 


130  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

cumulated  at  the  Consulate  General  ever  since  its  opening  some 
forty  years  before  was  begun. 

Documents  especially  needing  clarification  were  those  per- 
taining to  certain  rights  and  privileges  which  the  government  in 
Tokyo  assumed  were  firmly  established  when  in  reality  they 
rested  on  weak  treaty  rights.  Notable  examples  were  the  as- 
sumed rights  over  land  attached  to  the  South  Manchuria  Rail- 
way Company  in  Fushun,  Antung,  and  Yingkow;  the  assumed 
power  to  police  the  Mukden- Antung  Railroad;  and  the  assumed 
judicial  power  over  Chinese  criminal  offenders  in  the  Kwantung 
Leased  Territory.5 

The  "railroad  town"  sections  of  such  important  Manchurian 
cities  as  Mukden,  Changchun,  and  Antung  actually  included 
large,  heavily  populated  areas  of  these  cities. 

The  "railway  guards"  were  regular  Japanese  soldiers.  Their 
acts  offended  the  Chinese  officials  as  well  as  the  public,  because 
they  often  carried  their  police  functions  into  adjoining  districts 
or  engaged  in  maneuvers  without  permission  of  Chinese  authori- 
ties. The  legal  basis  for  Japan's  right  to  maintain  these  guards 
was  controversial.  It  went  back  to  the  original  Russo-Chinese 
Agreement  of  1 896,  which  granted  to  the  Chinese  Eastern  Rail- 
way "the  absolute  and  exclusive  right  of  administration  of  its 
lands."  From  the  outset,  China  denied  Russia's  claim  that  this 
gave  her  the  right  to  guard  the  railway  line  with  Russian  troops. 

In  the  Portsmouth  Treaty  of  1905,  Russia  and  Japan  agreed 
on  the  right  to  maintain  the  railway  guards  "not  to  exceed  fifteen 
men  per  kilometer."  However,  in  the  Treaty  of  Peking  signed 
by  China  and  Japan  later  in  the  same  year,  the  Chinese  govern- 
ment would  not  accede  to  this  particular  provision  in  the  Ports- 
mouth Treaty.  China  and  Japan  did  make  reference  to  the  touchy 
subject  in  Article  II  of  the  supplementary  agreement  of  Decem- 
ber 22,  1905,  which  was  appended  to  the  Sino-Japanese  Treaty 
of  Peking: 

5.  Morishima,  Conspiracy,  p.  45. 


MOUNTING  CRISIS  131 

In  view  of  the  earnest  desire  expressed  by  trje  Imperial 
Chinese  Government  to  have  the  Japanese  and  Rus- 
sian troops  and  railway  guards  in  Manchuria  with- 
drawn as  soon  as  possible,  and  in  order  to  meet  this 
desire,  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government,  in  the 
event  of  Russia's  agreeing  to  the  withdrawal  of  her 
railway  guards,  or  in  case  other  proper  measures  are 
agreed  to  between  China  and  Russia,  consents  to  take 
similar  steps  accordingly.  When  tranquillity  shall  have 
been  re-established  in  Manchuria  and  China  shall  have 
become  herself  capable  of  affording  full  protection  to 
the  lives  and  property  of  foreigners,  Japan  will  with- 
draw her  railway  guards  simultaneously  with  Russia.6 

Subsequently,  by  the  terms  of  the  Sino-Soviet  Agreement  of 
1924,  Russia  withdrew  her  guards.  Japan,  however,  would  not 
withdraw  hers  contending  that  tranquillity  had  not  been  estab- 
lished in  Manchuria  and  that  China  was  not  capable  of  affording 
full  protection  to  foreigners. 

The  two  loopholes  in  Article  II  were  that  it  did  not  define  pre- 
cisely the  point  at  which  "tranquillity  shall  have  been  re-estab- 
lished in  Manchuria  and  China  shall  have  become  herself  capable 
of  affording  full  protection  to  the  lives  and  property  of  foreigners" 
and  that  it  failed  to  specify  the  part  empowered  to  determine 
when  and  if  these  conditions  had  been  fulfilled. 

Finally,  it  is  noteworthy  that  China,  by  acceding  to  the  phrase 
"in  Manchuria  and  China,"  strengthened  Japan's  contention  that 
Manchuria  did  indeed  constitute  a  unique  territory  separate  from 
China  proper.  However,  before  even  a  semblance  of  order  could 
be  achieved  out  of  the  hodgepodge  of  documents,  Japanese- 
Chinese  relations  had  deteriorated  to  a  critical  point. 

6.  Quoted  in  the  Lytton  Report,  p.  52. 


5. 

THE  ACTORS 


Accomplices  in  Tokyo 

After  the  collapse  of  the  March  Plot,  both  the  army  extremists1 
and  the  civilian  ultranationalists2  for  the  time  being  abandoned 
the  idea  of  internal  reconstruction  and  turned  their  attention  to 
Manchuria.  In  the  summer  of  1931  Major  Cho  Isamu  contacted 
and  enlisted  the  support  of  a  select  group  of  about  a  hundred 
army  officers  from  the  twenty-eighth  to  the  forty-second3  graduat- 
ing classes  of  the  Military  Academy.  Jointly  the  officers  published 
a  pamphlet  entitled  "A  Manifesto  Concerning  Manchurian  Prob- 
lems" and  distributed  it  throughout  Japan  among  their  fellow 
classmates.  In  addition,  some  of  the  officers  of  this  group  who 
were  stationed  in  Tokyo  supplemented  the  pamphlet  by  circulat- 
ing their  own  private  appeals  throughout  Japan.  There  is  no 
available  information  regarding  either  the  names  or  the  exact 
number  of  individuals  who  comprised  the  nucleus  of  Major  Cho's 
group.  Like  Hashimoto's  group  in  the  Cherry  Society,  it  was 
probably  not  very  large. 

At  the  civilian  level  the  counterpart  of  Major  Cho's  role  was 
performed  by  Okawa  Shumei.  At  the  request  of  Hashimoto  and 

1.  This  group  included  Colonel  Shigeto  Chiaki,  Lieutenant  Colonels 
Nemoto  Hiroshi  and  Hashimoto  Kingoro,  and  Major  Cho  Isamu.  Backing 
them  were  Major  Generals  Koiso  Kuniaki,  Ninomiya  Harushige,  and 
Tatekawa  Yoshitsugu  and  Colonel  Nagata  Tetsuzan. 

2.  Okawa  Shumei  and  Mori  Kaku  were  among  the  most  prominent  in 
this  group. 

3.  These  classes  covered  a  period  from  1916  to  1930. 

132 


THE  ACTORS  133 

Cho,  Okawa  toured  Japan  and  made  speeches  in  some  twenty 
major  cities  from  the  latter  part  of  June  to  early  September.  His 
speeches  interwove  two  themes :  that  Manchuria  must  be  brought 
under  the  control  of  Japan,  and  that  at  home  the  time  was  ripe 
for  a  complete  rejection  of  party  politics  and  a  thorough  recon- 
struction of  the  government.  On  the  whole,  Okawa's  campaign 
was  effective,  reflecting  in  part  the  phenomenon  that  in  time  of 
economic  distress  the  words  of  a  demagogue  tend  to  command 
a  larger  following  than  in  normal  times. 

It  is  not  improbable  that,  as  the  immediate  superior  of  Hashi- 
moto and  Shigeto,  Major  General  Tatekawa  of  the  General  Staff 
not  only  gave  his  moral  support  but  may  even  have  gone  so  far 
as  covertly  to  direct  the  activities  of  these  two  field-grade  officers. 
According  to  the  testimony  of  Tanaka  Ryukichi  at  the  Tokyo 
War  Crimes  Trials,  General  Tatekawa  stated  in  early  1929  that 
if  Manchuria  were  not  placed  under  the  control  of  Japan,  Japan 
simply  could  not  develop  into  a  national-defense  state  and  there- 
fore a  world  power.  Tatekawa  then  sent  Major  Tanaka  to  Man- 
churia to  study  its  resources.  Tanaka  returned  to  report  that 
Manchuria  was  not  endowed  with  enough  basic  resources  to 
become  a  self-sustaining  state.  The  area  was  found  to  be  parti- 
cularly wanting  in  petroleum. 

Tanaka  went  on  to  testify  that  despite  his  findings,  at  a  meeting 
of  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  in  August  1929  Tatekawa  saw  to  it  that  a 
plan  for  developing  Manchuria  into  a  self-sufficient  area  was 
distributed  among  those  who  attended  the  conference.  This  ma- 
terial was  prepared  with  a  definitive  objective:  to  inculcate  the 
notion  that  Manchuria  was  the  lifeline  of  Japan.4 

In  the  spring  of  1931  Lieutenant  Colonel  Ishihara  arranged 
with  Colonel  Nagata,  then  chief  of  the  General  Affairs  Section 
in  the  Ministry  of  War,  to  have  two  large  howitzers  of  24-cm. 
caliber  quietly  transferred  from  Port  Arthur  to  Mukden.5  A  huge 

4.  Testimony  of  Tanaka  Ryukichi,  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  pp.  2002-03. 

5.  One  writer  thinks  that  General  Tatekawa  may  have  had  some  knowl- 
edge of  the  transfer  of  these  howitzers,  but  feigned  ignorance.  Matsumura, 
Miyakezaka,  p.  39. 


134  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

shed  was  built  within  the  garrison  compound  to  conceal  the 
guns,  one  of  which  was  carefully  trained  on  the  North  Barracks; 
the  other  was  aimed  at  the  hangars  housing  the  Chinese  fighter 
planes.  The  reason  for  this  was  that  the  Chinese  were  armed  with 
several  score  of  the  latest  fighter  planes  purchased  from  France. 
The  Kwantung  Army  had  none.  Therefore,  in  the  event  of  armed 
conflict,  the  planes  had  to  be  prevented  from  taking  to  the  air.  On 
the  night  of  the  Mukden  Incident  shells  were  dropped  around 
the  hangars  in  such  a  pattern  that,  although  neither  the  hangars 
nor  the  planes  inside  were  harmed,  the  Chinese  were  prevented 
from  taking  off.6 

Thus  it  is  definite  that  the  field-grade  officers  of  the  Kwantung 
Army  were  in  touch  with  the  field-grade  officers  of  the  Ministry 
of  War  and  the  General  Staff.7  The  howitzer  mountings  were 
permanently  anchored  in  concrete,  and  while  we  have  no  word 
from  either  Nagata  or  Ishihara  that  the  basic  purpose  of  the  guns 
was  to  support  an  offensive,  it  is  certain  that  they  were  moved 
to  Mukden  with  a  reasonable  expectation  of  early  use. 


Itagaki  Seishiro 

There  is  very  little  doubt  that  Colonel  Itagaki  was  the  prime 
mover  behind  the  Mukden  Incident;  after  it  was  over,  Morishima, 
the  section  chief  of  the  Asia  Bureau  of  the  Foreign  Office,  visited 

6.  Takamiya  Taihei,  "Waribashi  kara  Umareta  Manshu  Jihen"  (The 
Manchurian  Incident,  Which  Started  from  a  Fall  of  a  Chopstick  [i.e. 
flipping  of  a  coin]),  Showa  Memo,  Supplement  to  Bungei  Shunju  (July 
1954),  pp.  28-29. 

7.  Representing  the  clique  which  was  plotting  the  Mukden  Incident, 
Hanaya  visited  Tokyo  several  times  in  the  summer  of  1931  to  sound  out 
the  reaction  of  certain  members  of  army  headquarters  toward  the  secret 
undertaking.  In  his  article  some  25  years  later,  Hanaya  has  shown  the 
varying  degrees  to  which  he  divulged  the  plan,  depending  on  his  estimate 
of  their  reliability:  Hashimoto  and  Nemoto  95  per  cent,  Tatekawa  and 
Shigeto  90  per  cent,  Nagata  85  per  cent,  and  Koiso  and  Ninomiya  50  per 
cent.  Hanaya  Tadashi,  "Manshu  Jihen  wa  Koshite  Keikaku  Sareta"  (This 
is  how  the  Manchurian  Incident  Was  Planned),  Himerareta  Showashi, 
p.  43  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Hanaya,  Himerareta  Showashi). 


THE  ACTORS  135 

Mukden  and  reported  back  to  Tokyo  that  Honjo,  Commander 
in  Chief  of  the  Kwantung  Army,  was  virtually  confined  to  quar- 
ters. Itagaki,  Ishihara,  and  Hanaya  were  at  the  controls  of  military 
activities  in  Manchuria.  Since  Major  General  Miyake  Mitsuharu, 
Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Kwantung  Army,  could  no  longer  assert  his 
authority,  the  three  were  left  to  do  as  they  pleased.  Whenever 
Itagaki  and  Hanaya  indulged  in  wine  after  the  incident,  they 
boasted: 

The  Manchurian  Incident  was  planned  well  in  advance. 
Field  pieces  were  arranged  in  positions  around  Mukden 
as  early  as  July  25.  Since  we  succeeded  in  Manchuria, 
our  next  move  is  to  engineer  a  coup  d'etat  after  we 
return  to  Japan  and  crush  the  party  government  and 
set  up  a  government  based  on  national  socialism  with 
the  Emperor  at  the  center.  Capitalists,  such  as  Mitsui 
and  Mitsubishi,  will  be  liquidated  and  there  will  be 
equitable  distribution  of  wealth.  You  can  rest  assured 
that  we  will  do  this.1 

Itagaki,  unlike  Ishihara,  was  neither  a  theoretician  nor  a  bril- 
liant strategist.  However,  he  possessed  soldierly  qualities.  He 
had  stamina  and  fortitude.  He  was  open  to  suggestions  from  his 
subordinates  and  thus  was  able  to  win  their  loyalty.  For  his 
knack  of  pushing  projects  through  he  was  nicknamed  "the  Loco- 
motive." 

The  gist  of  Itagaki's  lengthy  testimony  at  the  Tokyo  War 
Crimes  Trials  was  as  follows :  As  the  Chinese  officers  and  men  be- 
came imbued  with  vigorous  anti-Japanese  sentiment,  they  became 
openly  frank  and  boastful  of  the  superiority  of  their  army  be- 
cause, they  said,  their  men  had  had  more  combat  experience  in 
the  frequent  internal  wars  in  which  they  had  participated.  Itagaki 
further  observed  that  Chinese  troops  were  shifted  about  so  as  to 
encircle  Japanese  garrisons  along  the  South  Manchuria  Rail- 

1.  Harada  Diary,  2,  11.  Author's  translation. 


136  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

way.2  Japanese  troops  totaling  several  ten  thousands  in  number 
were  sparsely  distributed  over  a  distance  of  almost  1,000  kilo- 
meters and  pitted  against  some  200,000  Chinese  troops.3  In  the 
eyes  of  staff  officers  the  situation  was  fraught  with  great  danger. 

Moreover,  the  Kwantung  Army  did  not  have  a  single  aircraft 
to  match  the  several  scores  of  late-model  fighter  planes  the  Chi- 
nese Army  had  just  purchased  from  France.  At  this  critical  junc- 
ture in  the  relations  between  two  nations,  war  could  have  been 
averted  only  if  Japan  had  been  willing  to  relinquish  entirely  the 
rights  and  interests  she  had  acquired  in  Manchuria.  But  such  a 
retreat  would  not  have  been  feasible  strategically,  and  national 
sentiment  in  Japan  would  not  have  tolerated  it. 

Although  the  Kwantung  Army  needed  additional  troops  and 
equipment,  army  headquarters  in  Tokyo  would  not  accede  to 
its  requests.  In  view  of  the  imminent  collision  with  Chinese 
troops,  therefore,  the  Kwantung  Army  had  to  devise  emergency 
countermeasures,  and  about  a  year  prior  to  the  Mukden  Incident 
had  mapped  out  a  plan  whereby  it  hoped  to  cope  with  contin- 
gencies with  only  the  troops  and  equipment  on  hand. 

In  the  event  of  hostilities,  the  Kwantung  Army's  strategy  was 
to  concentrate  its  main  force  in  the  vicinity  of  Mukden  and  deliv- 
er a  heavy  blow  to  the  nucleus  of  Chinese  forces  concentrated 
in  the  area.  The  transfer  of  the  two  heavy  howitzers  from  Port 
Arthur  to  Mukden  was  an  integral  part  of  this  emergency  mea- 
sure. This,  in  brief,  was  Itagaki's  statement,  made  to  mitigate 
the  charges  brought  against  him  for  the  part  he  played  in  the 
Mukden  Incident. 

In  private,  however,  Itagaki  was  being  considerably  more 
positive  in  his  views.4  In  May  1930  he  told  a  friend  that  there 
were  many  unsolved  problems  between  China  and  Japan  of  such 

2.  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  pp.  30,256-85. 

3.  According  to  the  testimony  of  General  Honjo  Shigeru,  the  Com- 
mander of  the  Kwantung  Army  at  the  time  of  the  Mukden  Incident,  the 
army  consisted  of  the  Railway  Guard  Battalions  and  the  Second  Infantry 
Division  from  Sendai,  totaling  10,500  men.  IMTFE,  Exhibit  2403. 

4.  IMTFE,  Judgment,  p.  535. 


THE  ACTORS  137 

a  serious  nature  that  they  could  no  longer  be  handled  by  diplo- 
macy; hence  there  was  no  choice  left  but  to  use  force.  He  advo- 
cated that  Marshal  Chang  Hsueh-liang  be  driven  out  of 
Manchuria  in  order  that  a  new  state  might  be  established  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  principle  of  Kodo,  or  benevolent  imperial 
rule.  Despite  the  fact  that  Itagaki  was  through  and  through  a 
man  of  action,  it  is  possible  that  his  associates  influenced  him 
into  believing  that  once  Kodo  had  gained  a  foothold  in  Man- 
churia, it  could  be  transplanted  to  Japan,  where  the  spiritual 
regeneration  of  the  Showa  era  could  be  fostered. 

lshihara  Kanji 

In  June  preceding  the  Mukden  Incident  the  office  of  the  General 
Staff  summoned  to  Tokyo  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Kwantung 
Army,  Major  General  Miyake  Mitsuharu,  to  impress  upon  him 
the  peaceful  course  the  central  government  intended  to  pursue 
in  Manchuria.  He  was  also  briefed  on  the  necessity  of  exercising 
surveillance  in  order  to  localize  any  incident  should  a  conflict 
occur  between  the  Kwantung  Army  and  Chang  Hsueh-liang.  As 
we  have  seen,  officers  in  the  high  command  of  the  Kwantung 
Army,  like  Lieutenant  Colonel  lshihara  Kanji  and  his  fellow 
activists  thought  differently.1  lshihara  vigorously  deprecated  the 
conciliatory  policy  of  the  Tokyo  government  as  weak  kneed,  all 
but  stating  openly  that  he  had  a  mind  to  act  in  defiance  of  the 
army  authorities  in  Tokyo  when  the  time  arrived. 

Ishihara's  association  with  the  Kwantung  Army  began  in 
October  1928  after  the  untimely  death  of  Chang  Tso-lin.  Upon 
graduating  from  the  War  College  at  the  top  of  his  class,  the  way 
was  open  for  him  to  embark  on  the  gay  and  colorful  career  of 
a  military  attache  in  some  European  capital.  Instead,  by  his  own 
insistence,  he  chose  to  join  the  Kwantung  Army  as  Chief  of  Mili- 

1.  The  gist  of  Ishihara's  role  in  the  Mukden  Incident  described  in  this 
and  the  three  following  paragraphs  are  a  summary  of  statements  from 
Ito,  Gunbatsu  Koboshi,  2,  191-92. 


138  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

tary  Operations  in  order  to  study  at  first  hand  the  strategic  prob- 
lems of  Manchuria  and  China  vis-a-vis  Russia. 

Brilliant  and  aloof,  he  made  no  effort  to  conceal  his  belief  in 
his  superiority  as  a  strategist.  At  headquarters  in  Port  Arthur  he 
proceeded  to  work  out  the  first  phase  of  his  plan — the  occupation 
of  Manchuria.  In  the  beginning  he  thrashed  out  the  strategic 
problems  with  Major  Hanaya  Tadashi.  The  twosome  was  later 
joined  by  Colonel  Itagaki  Seishiro  when  he  arrived  as  the  Senior 
Staff  Officer  in  May  1929.  Although  Itagaki  initially  objected  to 
Ishihara's  plans,  he  succumbed  to  the  latter's  zeal  and  by  1930 
had  consented  to  assume  leadership  in  the  conspiracy.  The  trio 
was  later  joined  by  one  more  accomplice,  Captain  Imada  Shin- 
taro.  These  men  together  laid  the  plans  for  blasting  rail  lines,  as- 
saulting the  North  Barracks  under  cover  of  darkness,  occupying 
Mukden  and  other  key  cities,  disrupting  peace  and  order  and  ter- 
rorizing the  public,  maintaining  liaison  with  the  Japanese  army  in 
Korea,  and  winning  the  support  of  headquarters  in  Tokyo.  Their 
plans  were  completed  by  January  1931,  and  in  a  sense  the  Muk- 
den Incident  was  a  product  manufactured  by  these  four  army 
officers. 

Some  months  after  the  Incident,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Ishihara, 
reminiscing,  said:  "Indeed,  that  evening  in  Changchun  was  the 
actual  inception  of  the  Manchurian  crisis."  He  was  referring  to 
July  3,  1929,  when  the  staff  of  the  Kwantung  Army  spent  the 
first  night  of  their  field  trip  at  a  hotel  in  Changchun.  There  Ishi- 
hara gave  a  discourse  concerning  modern  warfare.  He  suggested 
that  a  study  be  undertaken  to  delineate  the  means  by  which  Man- 
churia would  be  administered  after  its  occupation  by  Japanese 
troops.  The  research  project  was  assigned  to  a  Captain  Sakuma, 
who  was  to  complete  it  within  a  year  from  the  date.  It  is  not 
known  whether  Sakuma  accomplished  his  task. 

Another  likely  source  for  such  a  master  plan  was  the  Research 
Section  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Company,  which  from 
the  time  of  its  founding  was  considered  the  brains  of  the  Kwan- 
tung Army.  It  was  established  by  President  Goto  Shinpei  almost 


THE  ACTORS  139 

simultaneously  with  the  founding  of  the  company  after  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War.  Okawa  Shumei  had  been  associated  with  the  Re- 
search Section  since  1919,  becoming  its  director  in  1929. 
Inevitably  Okawa's  idealistic  schemes  became  a  part  of  the  plans 
of  that  organization.  These  schemes  were  referred  to  by  grandiose 
slogans  like  "concord  among  the  five  nationalities"  (Manchus, 
Chinese,  Mongolians,  Koreans,  Japanese — sometimes  with  White 
Russians  as  the  sixth  nationality)  and  "a  Utopia  based  on  the 
kingly  way."  Such  schemes  included  a  generous  leavening  of  a 
peculiar  revolutionary  spirit  based  on  an  indiscriminate  mixture 
of  rightist  and  leftist  doctrines.  The  Research  Section  main- 
tained elaborate  establishments  in  Dairen  and  Tokyo  and  engaged 
in  broad  research  projects  pertaining  to  the  political  and  eco- 
nomic problems  of  Manchuria  and  Inner  Mongolia.  On  the  basis 
of  those  findings  it  drafted  long-term  plans  and  policies  for  the 
development  and  exploitation  of  these  areas.  As  the  eyes  of 
Japan's  imperialism  on  the  continent,  it  functioned  like  its  coun- 
terparts in  the  colonial  offices  of  the  many  European  powers  in 
the  late  nineteenth  century. 

Another  master  plan,  whose  existence  has  been  vaguely  sug- 
gested, was  drawn  up  by  the  staff  of  the  Kwantung  Army.  It  was, 
in  fact,  a  broad  program  of  political  and  economic  reform  encom- 
passing Manchuria  and  Japan  proper  under  the  aegis  of  a  Nazi- 
type,  one-party  system.  The  complete  contents  of  this  so-called 
bible  of  the  reform  was  known  only  to  a  select  few  among  the 
extremist  officers  of  the  Kwantung  Army.  In  order  to  further  its 
purpose  of  taking  over  the  government,  it  employed  the  Com- 
munist technique  of  cells  whose  members,  by  undercover  activi- 
ties, were  to  subvert  the  various  ministries  and  departments  of 
the  government.  Through  such  means  the  over-all  pattern  of 
total  national  reconstruction  was  eventually  to  emerge.  It  is  not 
known  whether  a  copy  of  this  plan  is  still  extant. 

It  is  possible  that  the  plan  described  above  was  either  closely 
related  to,  or  identical  with,  another  plan  in  the  custody  of  the 
Kwantung  Army  and  labeled  top  secret.  Copies  of  this  plan,  each 


140  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

bearing  a  stamped  serial  number,  were  distributed  to  a  select 
few.  Morishima  Morito,  the  Japanese  Consul  in  Mukden,  suc- 
ceeded in  obtaining  a  copy  by  stealth  through  the  efforts  of  a 
medical  doctor,  Morita  Fukumatsu,  a  long-time  resident  of  Muk- 
den. It  revealed  among  other  things  the  Kwantung  Army's  plans 
for  the  occupation  of  the  whole  of  Manchuria  from  Shanhaikwan 
to  Manchouli;  for  its  administration,  finances,  and  banking;  for 
the  disposition  of  customs  and  gabelle;  and  for  the  operation  of 
a  postal  service.  The  text  of  this  plan  is  not  available. 

The  only  plan  with  details  readily  available  is  the  one  found 
in  a  book  by  Yamamoto  Katsunosuke.2  This  plan  was  said  to 
have  been  presented  by  a  staff  officer  of  the  Kwantung  Army  at 
a  gathering  in  Manchouli  some  time  in  1929  under  the  title  "Plan 
for  the  Annexation  of  Manchuria  and  Mongolia  by  the  Kwan- 
tung Army."  It  is  suggested  that  this  unnamed  staff  officer  may 
have  been  Lieutenant  Colonel  Ishihara. 

Briefly,  Part  One  deals  with  "the  restoration  of  peace  and 
order."  It  provides  for  dissolving  the  Chinese  military  and  civil 
administrative  establishments,  disbanding  the  Chinese  Army, 
disarming  troops,  confiscating  public  and  private  properties,  and 
apprehending  escaped  soldiers  and  bandits.  Expenses  for  the 
operations  were  to  be  met  by  taxation  and  by  income  realized 
from  disposing  of  confiscated  properties. 

Part  Two  pertains  to  administrative  policy.  The  territory  was 
to  be  entrusted  to  a  military  government  simple  in  structure  but 
highly  effective.  Government  interference  was  to  be  kept  to  a 
minimum  except  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  order.  Nomi- 
nally, the  economic  development  of  the  area  was  to  be  based 
on  laissez  faire  among  the  three  nationalities:  Chinese,  Korean, 
and  Japanese.  Actually,  however,  the  traditional  colonial  pattern 
of  a  large  native  population  subjected  to  exploitation  by  a  ruling 
foreign  minority  would  have  been  followed.  The  Chinese  were 
designated  for  labor  and  the  retail  trade,  the  Koreans  were  to 

2.  Nihon  o  Horoboshita  Mono,  pp.  127-38.  See  also  Asahi,  Taiheiyo,  1, 
366-69. 


THE  ACTORS  141 

develop  rice  fields,  and  the  Japanese  were  to  engage  in  large- 
scale  enterprises. 

The  plan  counsels  against  sudden  and  drastic  changes  in 
administrative  procedures.  The  capital  was  to  be  located  in  either 
Harbin  or  Changchun.  Under  the  office  of  governor  general  there 
were  to  be  six  departments:  general  affairs,  military,  civil  admin- 
istration, provincial  administration,  army  division  chiefs,  and 
provost  marshal.  Manchuria  and  Inner  Mongolia  were  to  be 
divided  into  ten  provinces.  Law  courts  were  to  be  established  at 
the  seat  of  each  provincial  government.  Approximately  four 
divisions  were  to  be  assigned  to  guard  the  borders  against  Rus- 
sian invasion. 

That  Ishihara's  primary  interest  was  in  Manchuria  is  borne 
out  by  the  fact  that  he  sternly  reprimanded  Major  Cho  for  his 
active  participation  in  the  October  Plot,  with  which  Okawa  also 
was  associated.3  Ishihara's  preoccupation  with  the  continent 
stemmed  from  both  the  overriding  strategic  importance  he  at- 
tached to  Manchuria  and  Mongolia  vis-a-vis  Russia  and  the  eco- 
nomic potentiality  of  a  region  that  Japan  would  have  to  draw 
upon  if  she  were  to  attain  the  dream  of  every  strategist — a  state 
with  a  self-contained  national  defense. 

Notwithstanding  Ishihara's  views,  the  so-called  Miyazaki  Re- 
port on  the  natural  resources  of  Manchuria,  prepared  by  the 
Research  Section  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Company, 
maintained  that  the  resources  of  Manchuria  alone  were  inade- 
quate to  make  Japan  self-sufficient  enough  to  cope  with  the 
world-wide  trend  toward  autarky.  The  report  stressed  the  abso- 
lute necessity  of  developing  the  resources  of  North  China.  There 
is  little  doubt  that  the  leaders  of  the  Japanese  army  who  were 
concerned  with  converting  Japan  into  a  national-defense  state 
took  this  advice  to  heart.  Hence  the  military  operations  of  the 
Kwantung  Army  in  North  China  and  Inner  Mongolia  following 
the  Manchurian  crisis  and  lasting  through  1936  in  defiance  of 
the  Saito  and  Okada  governments  were  events  linking  the  Man- 

3.  See  below,  pp.  201-02. 


142  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

churian  crisis  with  the  China  Incident,  and  ultimately  with  the 
Greater  East  Asia  War. 

After  World  War  II,  Ishihara  was  asked  by  Sung  Te-ho,  a 
correspondent  from  Chungking,  why  it  was  that  Japan  in  the 
thirties  was  so  highly  apprehensive  of  a  Soviet  thrust  from  Siberia. 
Ishihara  replied  that,  despite  the  imminent  threat  from  the  north, 
the  defensive  strength  of  the  existing  regime  in  Manchuria  was 
appallingly  inadequate  to  cope  with  the  Soviets.  However,  since 
China  and  Japan  were  continually  at  odds  with  each  other,  it 
was  impossible  to  come  to  terms  over  Manchuria,  a  region  of 
vital  importance  to  Japan  by  virtue  of  its  history  and  geographi- 
cal location.  It  was  thus  decided  to  cut  Manchuria  off  from  China 
proper  in  order  that  Japan  might  exercise  freer  rein  over  this  area. 
Ishihara  also  pointed  out  that  his  idea  for  an  independent  Man- 
churia was  put  into  effect  with  the  understanding  and  backing  of 
Chinese  residents  in  Manchuria.  It  is  presumed  that  he  was  re- 
ferring to  individuals  such  as  Yu  Chung-han,  who  spearheaded 
the  independence  movement,  and  later  became  a  key  official  of 
Manchukuo.  That  Ishihara  and  his  fellow  alarmists  had  somewhat 
exaggerated  the  Soviet  threat  in  1931  was  later  revealed  when, 
in  1936,  the  Russians  relinquished  to  Japan  their  interest  in  the 
Chinese  Eastern  Railway.4 

While  Ishihara  may  not  have  shared  Okawa's  enthusiasm  for 
internal  reconstruction  of  Japan,  in  matters  pertaining  to  the 
philosophy  guiding  the  administration  of  Manchuria  he  seems 
to  have  accepted  some  ideas  of  Okawa  while  rejecting  others. 

With  the  naivete  often  typical  of  soldiers,  Ishihara  apparently 
believed  in  absolute  equality  of  political  rights  among  the  different 
nationalities  residing  in  Manchuria.  If  the  plan  submitted  by  a 
staff  officer  at  Manchouli  were  Ishihara's  own  idea,  however,  he 
does  not  seem  to  have  extended  his  notions  of  equality  to  cover 
economic  rights.  Among  other  things  he  advocated  the  immediate 

4.  See  M.  Vinacke,  A  History  of  the  Far  East  in  Modern  Times  (New 
York,  1950),  p.  525;  also  David  J.  Dallin,  Soviet  Russia  and  the  Far  East 
(New  Haven,  1953),  pp.  17-21. 


THE  ACTORS  143 

restoration  to  Manchuria  of  the  South  Manchuria.Railway  Com- 
pany (the  advance  guard  of  Japanese  imperialism),  Port  Arthur, 
and  Dairen.  Moreover,  Japanese  rights  and  privileges  of  every 
description  in  Manchuria  were  to  be  restored  unconditionally  to 
Manchuria.  Only  by  taking  such  drastic  steps  did  he  believe  that 
Japan  and  Manchuria  could  put  up  a  united  front  against  Rus- 
sia's encroachment.  But  the  turn  of  events  in  Manchuria  follow- 
ing the  Mukden  Incident  went  contrary  to  Ishihara's  wishful 
thinking. 

The  Wanpaoshan  Incident 

Two  events  in  the  summer  of  1931  preceded  the  Mukden  Inci- 
dent. In  early  July  about  a  hundred  Korean  farmers  were 
attacked  by  four  hundred  irate  Chinese  farmers  at  Wanpao- 
shan, a  village  eighteen  miles  north  of  Changchun.  The  trouble 
began  when  a  group  of  Koreans,  after  having  leased  a  large  tract 
of  land  near  Wanpaoshan,  proceeded  to  irrigate  it  by  digging  a 
ditch  several  miles  long  across  land  occupied  by  the  Chinese 
farmers. 

The  Chinese  farmers  protested  en  masse  to  the  authorities  at 
Wanpaoshan.  Thereupon  Chinese  police  were  sent  to  the  site 
and  the  Koreans  were  told  to  leave  the  area  at  once.  At  this  point 
the  Japanese  Consul  at  Changchun  stepped  in,  dispatching  the 
consular  police  to  back  the  Koreans.  Negotiations  ensued  but 
without  results.  Exasperated,  the  Chinese  farmers  took  matters 
into  their  own  hands,  drove  the  Koreans  away,  and  began  to  fill 
in  the  ditch,  at  which  point  the  Japanese  consular  police  coun- 
tered by  opening  fire  on  the  Chinese  farmers  and  scattering  them. 
Then  the  Koreans  returned  and  completed  the  ditch  under  the 
watchful  eyes  of  the  Japanese  police. 

Although  there  were  no  casualties,  the  repercussions  were  im- 
mediate. A  series  of  anti-Chinese  riots  broke  out  in  Korea,  start- 
ing at  Inchon  on  July  1  and  spreading  to  Seoul,  Pusan,  and 
Pyongyang.  All  told,  393  Chinese  were  massacred  and  their 


144  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

property  destroyed.  The  Chinese  retaliated  with  anti-Japanese 
activities  in  Tsingtao,  Shanghai,  Tientsin,  and  other  cities  with 
large  Japanese  resident  populations.  For  example,  at  Inchang  on 
the  upper  Yangtze,  members  of  the  Anti-Japanese  Association 
attacked  a  Japanese  hospital. 

The  Chinese  government  protested  against  the  stationing  of 
Japanese  consular  police  in  China  and  also  charged  that  the 
Koreans  were  living  outside  the  Chientao  District,  the  only  area 
in  which  they  were  permitted  to  reside  by  virtue  of  the  Chientao 
Agreement  of  September  4,  1909.1 

At  the  root  of  the  trouble  lay  the  now  all-too-familiar  ques- 
tion of  Japan's  right  to  engage  in  commerce  and  lease  land  in 
Manchuria,  and  here  her  demands  flew  directly  in  the  face  of 
China's  fervent  rights  recovery  movement.  Moreover,  as  long 
as  the  Nanking  government  and  Chang  Hsueh-liang  refused  to 
recognize  the  exceptional  relationship  between  Japan  and  Man- 
churia, any  basic  solution  of  the  Wanpaoshan  Incident  was  im- 
possible. 

The  Death  of  Nakamura  Shintaro 

Negotiations  to  settle  the  Wanpaoshan  Incident  had  barely  begun 
when  the  tale  of  the  death  of  a  Japanese  intelligence  officer  at 
the  hands  of  Chinese  troops  in  the  region  bordering  Inner  Mon- 
golia trickled  into  the  office  of  the  Japanese  Consul  General  at 
Tsitsihar.  As  the  culmination  of  a  long  series  of  altercations  be- 
tween the  two  nations,  no  other  incident  gave  the  military  and 
ultranationalists  in  Japan  a  more  persuasive  argument  in  favor 
of  using  force  to  settle  once  and  for  all  the  outstanding  issues 
pertaining  to  Manchuria. 

Captain  Nakamura  Shintaro  was  a  Japanese  army  officer  on 
active  duty.  In  early  June  he  left  Harbin  on  a  military  mission 
and  traveled  westward,  accompanied  by  a  Japanese  assistant  and 

1.  See  the  Lytton  Report,  pp.  62-63,  for  a  comprehensive  treatment  of 
this  incident. 


THE  ACTORS  145 

Russian  and  Mongolian  interpreters.  They  detrained  at  Ilikotu, 
a  station  on  the  western  section  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway, 
on  June  9  and  headed  south  toward  Taonan  along  the  Hingan- 
ling  mountain  range.  About  June  27,  after  the  party  had  reached 
an  eating  place  in  Solun  near  the  terminus  of  the  Taoan-Solun 
Line,  the  men  were  arrested  by  Chinese  soldiers  under  Kuan 
Yu-hing,  Commander  of  the  Third  Regiment  of  the  Reclamation 
Army.  Several  days  later  Nakamura  and  his  party  were  taken 
to  a  hill  in  back  of  the  barracks  and  shot;  their  bodies  were 
cremated. 

In  Harbin  the  party  obtained  traveling  permits.  At  the 
time,  Captain  Nakamura  declared  himself  to  be  an  agricultural 
expert  and  did  not  state  his  true  identity.  After  the  arrest  in  Solun, 
the  Chinese  soldiers  discovered  on  the  men  a  Japanese  military 
map,  surveying  instruments,  six  revolvers,  and  narcotic  drugs 
for  nonmedical  purposes;  it  was  therefore  only  natural  that  they 
suspected  Nakamura  and  his  party  of  being  military  spies  or 
officers  on  a  special  military  mission. 

The  Japanese  insisted  that  the  execution  of  Captain  Nakamura 
and  his  aides  was  unwarranted,  despite  the  questionable  nature 
of  their  mission.  Even  more  objectionable  was  the  arrogant 
attitude  of  the  Chinese  and  the  affront  to  the  Japanese  army  and 
nation.  The  Chinese  authorities  in  Manchuria  were  accused  of 
forestalling  official  inquiries,  evading  responsibility,  and  being 
insincere  in  their  efforts  to  track  down  those  responsible  for  order- 
ing the  execution. 

The  initial  investigation  was  instituted  by  Governor  Tsang 
Shih-yi  of  Liaoning  Province,  but  Consul  General  Hayashi 
called  on  General  Yung  Chen,  the  Chinese  Chief  of  Staff,  and 
informed  him  that  the  findings  were  unacceptable  to  the  Japanese. 
Meanwhile,  Major  Mori  had  conducted  an  independent  investi- 
gation on  behalf  of  the  Japanese  General  Staff. 

Marshal  Chang  Hsueh-liang,  having  been  informed  of  the 
seriousness  of  the  situation  by  General  Yung  Chen,  instructed 
the  latter  and  Governor  Tsang  Shih-yi  to  conduct  a  second  in- 


146  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

quiry  without  delay.  Marshal  Chang  also  sent  to  Tokyo  his  ad- 
viser, Major  Shibayama,  who  arrived  there  on  September  12  to 
explain  the  Marshal's  sincere  desire  to  settle  the  case  amicably. 

In  addition,  Marshal  Chang  sent  Tang  Ei-ho,  a  high  official, 
to  Tokyo  to  hold  conversations  with  Foreign  Minister  Shidehara, 
War  Minister  Minami,  and  other  high  officials.  The  object  of 
the  special  missions  was  to  ascertain  whether  any  common 
ground  could  be  found  for  solving  outstanding  Sino-Japanese 
differences  in  Manchuria.  Although  it  was  now  futile,  Marshal 
Chang  made  additional  concessions  by  announcing  on  Septem- 
ber 16  that  the  Nakamura  case,  to  comply  with  Japanese  de- 
mand, would  be  handled  by  Governor  Tsang  Shih-yi  and  the 
Manchurian  authorities  instead  of  by  the  Nanking  government. 
Inasmuch  as  Marshal  Chang  had  previously  refused  to  deal 
directly  with  the  Tokyo  government  in  the  case  of  the  railroad 
negotiations,1  this  was  a  major  concession. 

At  this  highly  critical  juncture,  there  was  clearly  something 
seriously  amiss  in  the  liaison  between  the  Marshal  and  the  Nan- 
king government.  On  September  14  the  Nanking  government 
announced  that  it  would  appeal  the  case  of  Captain  Nakamura 
to  the  League  of  Nations.  On  the  15th  it  countered  Japan's  de- 
mand to  settle  all  outstanding  issues  between  the  two  countries 
by  declaring  that  the  Wanpaoshan  and  all  subsequent  incidents 
were  the  responsibility  of  Japan.2  Needless  to  say,  these  ill-timed 
statements  only  nullified  Marshal  Chang  Hsueh-liang's  desperate 
efforts  to  localize  Sino-Japanese  disputes  and  avert  all-out  war. 

Meanwhile,  on  September  16  the  second  Chinese  Commission 
of  Investigation  returned  to  Mukden  from  Solun  with  Com- 
mander Kuan  Yu-hing  under  arrest.  On  September  18,  the  day 
of  the  Mukden  Incident,  General  Yung  Chen  informed  the  Japa- 
nese Consul  that  Commander  Kuan  would  be  immediately  tried 
before  a  court-martial  for  the  death  of  Captain  Nakamura.  After 
the  Kwantung  Army  occupied  Mukden,  it  found  Commander 
Kuan  still  detained  in  the  military  prison  there. 

1.  See  above,  p.  125. 

2.  Shigemitsu  Memoirs,  p.  104. 


THE  ACTORS  147 

The  dilatory  attitude  of  the  Chinese  officials  in  the  early  stages 
of  the  incident  and  the  series  of  delays  following  it  had  tried  the 
patience  of  the  Japanese  people.  In  Tokyo  the  Association  of 
Full  Generals  counseled  the  Minister  of  War  to  assume  a  firmer 
attitude  toward  China.  The  Imperial  Veterans'  Association  took 
to  inciting  the  public  by  demanding  immediate  settlement  of  the 
Nakamura  Incident.  And,  to  add  fuel  to  the  already  explosive 
situation,  there  were  other  incidents.  In  Tsingtao  an  unruly  Chi- 
nese mob  demonstrated  in  denunciation  of  the  activities  of  the 
local  Japanese  patriotic  societies,  and  negotiations  relevant  to 
the  incident  of  the  Japanese  maneuvers  across  the  Tumen  River 
on  the  Manchurian-Korean  border  had  yet  to  be  undertaken.  In 
the  course  of  September,  "settlement  of  all  pending  issues,  if 
necessary  by  force"  became  a  popular  slogan  in  Japan. 

Mori  Kaku  again  made  his  appearance  on  the  troubled  scene. 
He  traveled  about  Korea  and  Manchuria  from  the  middle  of 
July  to  the  middle  of  August,  at  one  point  visiting  the  site  of  mob 
violence  in  the  Wanpaoshan  Incident.  He  was  accompanied  by 
several  fellow  members  of  the  Seiyukai  and  a  news  reporter.3 
Ostensibly  the  purpose  of  his  trip  was  a  tour  of  inspection,  but 
his  real  intention,  suggests  Yamaura,  his  biographer,  was  to 
effect  a  complete  about-face  in  Shidehara's  China  policy.  Before 
Mori  left  Tokyo  he  said,  "There  is  really  no  need  for  me  to  visit 
the  site  of  the  Wanpaoshan  Incident.  The  Investigating  Commis- 
sion will  take  care  of  that.  I  have  a  different  idea  [implying  that 
he  had  far  more  important  business  in  mind]."4 

Prior  to  his  departure  Mori  had  made  careful  arrangements 
with  the  army  authorities  in  Manchuria;  upon  his  arrival  he  was 
therefore  greeted  and  accorded  special  courtesy  by  military  police 
at  every  stop.  At  Antung,  Mukden,  Kirin,  Changchun,  Harbin, 
Dairen,  and  Chientao  he  met  with  the  local  Japanese  residents 
in  round-table  conferences  to  sound  out  their  reactions  to  the 
current  crisis.  Yamaura  reported  that  the  Japanese  residents  of 

3.  Yamazaki  Takeshi,  Tojo  Sadashi,  and  a  journalist,  Yamaura  Kanichi. 

4.  Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku,  p.  695.  Author's  translation.  Bracketed  phrase 
supplied. 


148  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Chientao  and  Kirin  especially  were  experiencing  difficulties  with 
the  local  Chinese  authorities.  Those  who  had  arrived  quite  re- 
cently were  leaving  the  area  and  only  those  with  deep  roots  were 
staying  on. 

In  Mukden,  Mori  held  private  talks  with  Honjo.  Commanding 
General  of  the  Kwantung  Army;  Miyake  Mitsuharu,  Chief  of 
Staff;  Itagaki  Seishiro,  a  high-ranking  officer  of  the  Staff;  Doihara, 
head  of  the  Army  Special  Service  Agency5  in  Mukden;  and 
Miura,  head  of  the  Mukden  Military  Police.  Mori  also  met 
Colonel  Komoto  Daisaku,  who  had  perpetrated  the  murder  of 
Chang  Tso-lin.  Komoto  acted  as  a  liaison  agent  for  Mori  in  his 
contacts  with  Itagaki  and  Ishihara.  It  was  through  Mori's  good 
office  that  Komoto  in  1932  became  a  director  of  the  South  Man- 
churia Railway  Company. 

In  Dairen  at  a  banquet  held  in  Mori's  honor  by  Uchida  Yasuya, 
president  of  the  company,  Mori  bluntly  criticized  the  railroad's 
action  in  discharging  a  large  number  of  company  employees 
when  it  ought  to  have  been  taking  on  more  personnel,  the  way 
a  general  increases  his  forces  before  a  battle.  Yamaura  states 
that,  among  the  directors,  only  Sogo  Shinji6  was  cooperating 
with  the  Kwantung  Army.  President  Uchida  and  the  others7 
stood  for  the  status  quo  and  a  nonaggravation  policy. 

Since  the  party  to  which  Mori  belonged  was  not  in  power  at 
the  time,  he  met  the  high  officers  of  the  Kwantung  Army  in  a 
private  capacity.  However,  once  the  Seiyukai  returned  to  power 

5.  An  organization  devoted  largely  to  the  gathering  of  political  intelli- 
gence. 

6.  As  a  continental  expansionist  Sogo  had  seen  eye  to  eye  with  Mori  as 
early  as  1917.  He  facilitated  matters  for  the  military  by  acting  as  a  liaison 
official  between  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Company  and  the  Kwan- 
tung Army.  He  was  politely  shunned  by  the  other  directors  of  the  com- 
pany on  account  of  his  close  association  with  the  army. 

7.  Eguchi  Sadanaga.  vice  president,  was  affiliated  with  the  Mitsubishi 
interests  and  the  Minseito.  Kimura  Eiichi  was  formerly  an  official  of  the 
Foreign  Office.  Godo  Takuo  was  then  still  politically  uncommitted,  though 
later  he  joined  the  ranks  of  the  national  reconstructionists. 


THE  ACTORS  149 

the  following  December,  Mori  exerted  his  utmost  efforts  to  push 
the  Manchurian  crisis  to  its  conclusion.  For  the  part  he  played 
in  bringing  Manchuria  under  Japanese  control,  he  was  posthu- 
mously awarded  the  Second  Order  of  Merit. 

Colonel  Doihara  Kenji  of  the  Kwantung  Army  was  another 
individual  busily  fishing  in  troubled  waters.  Just  before  the  Muk- 
den Incident  he  traveled  to  Shanghai,  Nanking,  and  other  parts 
of  China  on  an  undisclosed  mission.  He  arrived  in  Tokyo  on 
September  10  and  immediately  went  into  conference  with  Minis- 
ter of  War  Minami,  Vice  Minister  of  War  Sugiyama,  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  Kanaya,  Vice  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  Ninomiya, 
Chief  of  Military  Affairs  Bureau  Nagata,  and  Major  Shibayama, 
adviser  to  Chang  Hsueh-liang.  His  mission  was  to  apprise  key 
personnel  at  army  headquarters  that  the  Kwantung  Army  was  in 
no  mood  to  stand  idly  by  in  the  face  of  further  provocations  and 
to  make  certain  that,  in  the  event  of  armed  conflict  with  the 
enemy,  headquarters  would  support  such  an  action.  Doihara  told 
members  of  the  staff  that  the  Chinese  authorities  had  no  intention 
of  reaching  an  amicable  settlement  with  the  Japanese  represent- 
atives over  the  Nakamura  Incident.  Nevertheless,  both  Minami 
and  Kanaya  counseled  Doihara  to  exercise  prudence. 

To  fellow  activists  in  Tokyo,  in  utmost  stealth,  Doihara  com- 
municated "the  plans  to  start  action  from  our  side"  and  asked 
for  their  vigorous  support.  Colonel  Hashimoto  Kingoro  coun- 
tered with  a  fervent  plea  for  the  postponement  of  military  action 
in  Manchuria  until  October,  when  the  newly  established  military 
government  in  Tokyo  would  have  instituted  a  program  of  na- 
tional reconstruction.  With  the  effete  Wakatsuki  government 
swept  aside,  contended  Hashimoto,  the  Kwantung  Army  would 
be  free  to  act  as  it  willed  in  Manchuria.  By  so  arguing,  Hashimoto 
revived  the  familiar  controversy  over  the  priority  between  the 
military  coup  d'etat  at  home  and  the  settlement  of  Manchurian 
problems.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  on  this  issue  Hashimoto 
himself  could  not  make  up  his  mind.  It  would  appear  that,  for  a 


150  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

while  following  the  abortive  March  Plot,  he  conceded  priority 
to  the  solution  of  Manchurian  problems.8  However,  some  time 
between  August  and  September  he  seems  to  have  reverted  to  his 
original  position  of  going  through  with  internal  reconstruction 
first. 

On  the  11th,  the  following  day,  Doihara  called  on  Foreign 
Minister  Shidehara  and  Tani,  Chief  of  the  Asia  Bureau.  Shide- 
hara  expressed  his  hope  to  Doihara  that  the  army  would  exercise 
prudence  and  not  engage  in  precipitous  actions. 

By  the  15th  or  thereabouts  Doihara  was  on  his  way  back  to 
Manchuria,  prepared  to  press  for  immediate  settlement  of  all 
questions  then  outstanding  between  China  and  Japan.  Doihara 
made  a  stopover  in  Seoul  to  see  Lieutenant  Colonel  Kanda  and, 
on  the  night  of  the  Incident,  was  en  route  to  Mukden.  As  out- 
lined above,  only  the  general  drift  of  the  conversations  which 
Doihara  held  with  the  army  leaders  on  the  10th  are  known 
today;  however,  since  Shibayama  two  days  later  reported  on 
Chang  Hsueh-liang's  conciliatory  attitude,  it  is  conceivable  that 
the  attitude  of  some  of  the  army  leaders  had  further  stiffened  to 
the  point  where  they  may  have  decided  to  capitalize  on  the 
Nakamura  Incident,  demand  everything,  and  fight  in  case  their 
demands  were  rejected.  This  belief  is  corroborated  by  the 
statement  Doihara  made  to  news  reporters  en  route  to  Mukden. 
He  said  that  if  the  Chinese  authorities  should  show  reluctance  to 
comply  with  the  demands  put  before  them,  there  might  be  trou- 
ble. The  measures  to  be  taken  by  the  Kwantung  Army  under 
certain  circumstances  were  already  determined,  but  Doihara  was 
doubtful  that  the  Foreign  Office  would  be  willing  to  support  such 
actions.9 

8.  See  below,  particularly  pp.  194-96. 

9.  Tokyo  Asahi,  September  16,  1931,  cited  in  Takeuchi,  War  and 
Diplomacy  in  the  Japanese  Empire,  pp.  348-49. 


6. 

THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II 


We  are  now  ready  once  more  to  focus  attention  on  the  fateful 
day  of  the  Mukden  Incident — September  18,  1931.  In  the  after- 
noon, a  formal  conference  was  held  between  General  Yung  and 
Hayashi,  the  Japanese  Consul  General,  to  settle  the  Nakamura 
Incident.  The  Chinese  admitted  the  guilt  of  their  soldiers  and 
expressed  their  earnest  intention  to  reach  a  settlement  forthwith; 
it  appeared  likely  that  a  satisfactory  accord  could  be  reached  by 
means  of  diplomatic  negotiation. 

The  conference  adjourned  for  a  recess  at  eight  o'clock.  Since 
the  incident  involved  a  Japanese  army  officer,  the  Consul  Gen- 
eral felt  that  he  should  confer  with  an  appropriate  officer  of  the 
Kwantung  Army  before  further  statements  were  made  to  the 
Chinese  representative.  Accordingly,  he  designated  Morishima  of 
the  consular  staff,  who  had  just  come  from  a  meeting  of  the  staff, 
to  locate  the  officer  and  take  him  to  the  meeting,  which  was  to 
reconvene  later  the  same  evening.1 

Meanwhile,  other  high  officials  of  the  Japanese  Consulate 
General  had  been  locked  in  a  secret  conference  discussing  the 
nature  of  the  various  demands  to  be  made  to  the  Chinese  repre- 
sentatives. These  included  an  official  apology,  indemnities,  pun- 
ishment of  the  responsible  party,  and  assurances  for  the  future. 
On  the  last  topic  there  was  a  heated  discussion,  but  in  the  end  they 
agreed  to  accept  Morishima's  proposal:  that  Japan  would  open 
a  consulate  in  Taonan,  since  China  had  already  given  her  tacit 
approval  many  years  previously  but  had  never  come  to  the  point 

1.  IMTFE,  Judgment,  pp.  548-49.  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  pp.  3017-18. 

151 


152  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

of  permitting  Japan  actually  to  carry  out  the  undertaking.2  By 
coincidence,  this  meeting  also  ended  about  eight  o'clock  the  same 
evening.  These  were  the  circumstances  which  sent  Morishima  off 
on  the  evening  of  the  18th  to  look  for  an  appropriate  officer  of 
the  Kwantung  Army.3 

He  first  tried  to  reach  Colonel  Doihara  and  then  Major  Hana- 
ya,  but  neither  could  be  located.  He  tried  desperately  to  track 
down  any  officer  attached  to  the  Army  Special  Service  Agency, 
but  not  one  could  be  found.  Only  later  did  it  become  evident 
that  these  officers  had  already  assumed  their  assigned  stations 
in  anticipation  of  the  bombing  of  the  railroad  at  Liutiaohu. 

Colonel  Itagaki  and  his  fellow  conspirators  apparently  did 
not  make  up  their  minds  about  the  timing  of  the  Incident  until 
they  learned  from  Tokyo  that  General  Tatekawa  was  being  sent 
to  put  a  stop  to  their  plot.4 

Portents  of  military  action  in  Manchuria  were  evident  from 
about  September  12.  Shidehara  later  recalled  it  was  about  this 

2.  Fujimura  Toshifusa,  a  ranking  official  of  the  staff  who  had  partici- 
pated in  on-the-spot  negotiations  at  Tsinan  in  1927  and  1928,  strongly 
advocated  a  guarantee  occupation  of  the  old  section  of  Mukden  enclosed 
by  protective  walls.  Morishima  objected  to  Fujimura's  proposal,  stating 
that  to  ask  the  Kwantung  Army  to  mobilize  their  troops  and  occupy 
Mukden  was  to  play  right  into  the  army's  hands,  since  that  was  precisely 
the  kind  of  pretext  it  was  waiting  for  to  start  military  action.  Morishima, 
Conspiracy,  pp.  50-52. 

3.  Ibid. 

4.  There  have  been  several  theories  regarding  the  premeditated  date  of 
the  Liutiaohu  Incident.  The  Tokyo  War  Crimes  Tribunal  stated:  "Upon  a 
consideration  of  all  the  fact  relating  to  the  incident  of  18th  of  September, 
the  Tribunal  unhesitatingly  rejects  this  explanation  [an  argument  by  the  de- 
fense that  the  Mukden  Incident  was  not  premeditated]  and  holds  that  Ka- 
wakami  [a  Japanese  army  officer  in  charge  of  a  garrison  army  in  Fushun] 
had  orders  to  take  certain  action  in  an  emergency,  which  would  occur  on 
the  night  of  the  18th  of  September"  (IMTFE,  Judgment,  p.  547).  Mori- 
shima, a  consular  official  in  Mukden  at  the  time  of  the  Liutiaohu  Incident, 
who  probably  had  more  firsthand  knowledge  of  the  Incident  than  any 
person  except  those  directly  implicated  in  the  plot,  states  in  his  book,  pub- 
lished several  years  after  the  War  Crimes  Trials,  that  the  Incident  was 
originally  planned  for  September  28,  but  when  Tokyo  became  aware  of 
the  plot  the  date  had  to  be  advanced  (p.  57).  This  date  is  corroborated  by 
Hanaya,  Himerareta  Showashi,  p.  44. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  153 

time  that  certain  delegates  from  Manchuria  came  .to  see  him  and 
reported  that  some  young  army  officers  had  been  making  requests 
for  military  supplies  to  be  stockpiled  at  prescribed  places  by  a 
certain  time.5  On  September  17  Chief  of  Police  Terada  of  Fushun 
came  into  Mukden  to  report  to  Morishima  that  he  had  been  fore- 
warned by  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  garrison  in  Fushun  to  make 
plans  to  evacuate  and  protect  Japanese  residents  and  maintain 
peace  and  order  in  town.6 

Kimura  Eiichi,7  a  director  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway 

5.  Shidehara  Memoirs,  p.  170;  also  his  testimony,  IMTFE,  Proceedings, 
p.  33,589. 

6.  Shortly  before  the  Incident,  Captain  Kawakami,  in  command  of  the 
garrison  at  Fushun  (the  Second  Company  of  the  Second  Battalion  of  the 
Independent  Infantry  Garrison),  received  orders  from  the  headquarters  of 
the  Kwantung  Army  to  entrain  at  Fushun  with  his  company  upon  the 
occurrence  of  a  certain  emergency.  This  order,  the  contents  of  which  were 
not  established  at  the  Tokyo  Trials,  was  probably  sent  out  without  Honjo's 
knowledge  [a  presumption  made  by  the  Tokyo  War  Crimes  Tribunal 
(IMTFE,  Judgment,  p.  545)]  by  one  of  his  subordinates — either  Itagaki 
himself  or  one  of  his  fellow  conspirators.  Thereupon  Kawakami  assem- 
bled the  Japanese  police,  ex-servicemen,  and  prominent  residents  of 
Fushun  on  or  about  September  16  and  explained  that  the  findings  of  the 
second  investigation  of  the  Nakamura  Incident  would  be  announced  on 
the  18th  and  that,  depending  on  the  position  taken  by  the  Chinese  author- 
ities, the  crisis  in  Sino-Japanese  relations  might  come  to  a  head.  He  there- 
fore asked  these  men  what  measures  they  were  prepared  to  take  in  the 
event  that  his  company  had  to  leave  Fushun  unguarded  on  September  18 
(IMTFE,  Judgment,  p.  546;  also  testimony  by  Katakura  Tadashi,  IMTFE, 
Proceedings,  p.  18,933). 

Next,  Captain  Kawakami  assembled  the  officials  of  the  South  Man- 
churia Railway  Company  in  Fushun  and  announced  that  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  an  acute  situation  might  arise  after  the  17th,  an  arrangement 
should  be  made  to  have  a  night  train  standing  by  at  Fushun  in  the  event 
his  troops  had  to  entrain  under  emergency  orders  (IMTFE,  Judgment, 
p.  546).  It  appears  that  Captain  Kawakami  made  so  much  out  of  what  was 
intended  to  be  an  alert  order  that  he  stirred  up  a  great  deal  of  commotion 
among  the  Japanese  officials  and  residents  of  Fushun.  The  South  Man- 
churia Railway  Company  became  alarmed  and  sent  one  of  its  directors  to 
Fushun  to  confirm  Kawakami's  statements.  This  director  is  said  to  have 
returned  to  Mukden  on  the  17th  stating  that  it  did  not  seem  that  anything 
of  consequence  was  in  the  offing. 

7.  At  that  time  Morishima  and  Kimura  were  working  closely  together 
in  an  attempt  to  settle  the  Nakamura  Incident  (IMTFE,  Judgment,  p. 
546).  For  Kimura's  background  see  above,  p.   148,  n.  7. 


154  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Company,  who  also  anticipated  trouble,  together  with  Morishima 
called  on  Consul  General  Hayashi  to  persuade  him  to  act 
immediately  to  prevent  the  army  from  starting  an  incident.  How- 
ever, Hayashi,  having  had  a  reassuring  talk  with  Lieutenant  Gen- 
eral Honjo  of  the  Kwantung  Army  only  three  days  before,  could 
not  bring  himself  to  take  the  situation  as  seriously  as  did  Mori- 
shima and  Kimura.  Hayashi  interpreted  the  portents  as  mere 
signs  of  a  large-scale  maneuver  to  take  place  soon,  and  there- 
fore confined  his  efforts  to  sending  a  private  wire  calling  General 
Honjo's  attention  to  the  disquieting  news  he  was  receiving  in 
Mukden.  It  became  evident  only  after  the  incident  that  this  tele- 
gram, which  might  have  altered  the  course  of  events,  was  inter- 
cepted by  the  members  of  Honjo's  staff  at  Port  Arthur  and  did 
not  catch  up  with  Honjo  until  he  arrived  in  Mukden  on  Septem- 
ber 19. 

In  Tokyo  on  September  1 1 ,  meanwhile,  War  Minister  Minami 
was  summoned  to  the  Imperial  Palace  and  sternly  cautioned  by 
the  Emperor  to  restore  discipline  in  the  army.  The  Emperor 
made  a  particular  point  of  singling  out  the  Kwantung  Army.8 

On  September  12  Foreign  Minister  Shidehara  received  a  cable 
from  Hayashi,  the  Consul  General  of  Mukden,  stating  that  the 
company  commander  of  a  garrison  unit  in  Fushun  had  warned 
that  a  big  incident  would  break  out  within  a  week.9  Thereupon 
Shidehara  immediately  called  the  attention  of  Minami  to  the  dis- 
quieting situation  in  Manchuria.  The  Foreign  Minister  warned 
that,  if  matters  were  allowed  to  ride,  not  only  would  the  young 
officers  blight  their  own  careers  but  they  would  put  the  nation's 
security  in  jeopardy.10 

It  was  perhaps  a  few  days  later  that  Minami  spoke  to  Kanaya, 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  of  the  warning  he  had  been  given  by 
the  Foreign  Minister.  Kanaya  became  apprehensive,  for  the  news 

8.  Harada  Diary,  2,  52-53.  Kurihara,  Tenno,  p.  58. 

9.  Testimony  by  Tanaka  Ryukichi,  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  p.  2006. 

10.  Testimony  by  Shidehara,  ibid.,  p.  33,589;  Shidehara  Memoirs, 
pp.  170-71. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  155 

followed  too  closely  on  the  heels  of  the  caution  which  Minami 
had  received  from  the  Emperor  only  a  short  while  before. 

An  emergency  meeting  was  immediately  held  at  the  official 
residence  of  the  Minister  of  War.11  It  was  attended  by  Minami, 
Kanaya,  Sugiyama,  Koiso,  Ninomiya,  Tatekawa,  Nagata,  and 
Imamura.  Minami  spoke  up  by  saying,  "We've  already  had  one 
incident  involving  the  death  of  Chang  Tso-lin,  but  you  don't 
think  there  is  any  chance  that  the  Kwantung  Army  would  take 
action  without  consulting  Army  Headquarters,  do  you?" 

After  various  opinions  had  been  expressed  by  the  generals, 
Tatekawa,  scraping  his  pipe,  asserted  confidently  that  there  was 
no  need  for  worry  on  that  score,  because  the  present  Kwantung 
Army  was  not  that  stupid.  Minami  retorted,  "Well,  it  seems  as 
if  you  have  some  inside  information  on  the  doings  of  the  Kwan- 
tung Army."  Flustered,  Tatekawa  said,  "No,  that  I  don't  know. 
No,  no."12  Kanaya  became  suspicious:  "Then  we  had  better  ad- 
vise Honjo13  of  the  Emperor's  admonition  of  the  11th  by  tele- 
gram." Koiso  quickly  interposed,  "We  shall  be  taking  chances  by 
telegram.  It  might  possibly  be  misinterpreted.  Though  we  will  be 
troubling  Tatekawa,  let's  have  him  deliver  in  person  the  letters 
by  the  Minister  of  War  and  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff."  Al- 
though Minami  and  Kanaya  had  misgivings  about  the  letters  not 
reaching  Honjo  in  time  to  head  off  an  incident,  each  wrote  a  mes- 
sage and  handed  it  to  Tatekawa. 

Tatekawa  returned  to  his  office  and  summoned  Shigeto,  Chief 
of  the  Chinese  Section;  Nemoto,  Chief  of  the  Chinese  Subsection; 
and  Hashimoto  of  the  Russian  Section.  He  issued  secret  orders, 
following  which  two  sets  of  telegrams  were  dispatched.  An  official 

11.  The  entire  account  of  this  meeting  has  been  selectively  taken  from 
Takamiya,  Showa  Memo,  pp.  28-29. 

12.  According  to  Hanaya,  Tatekawa  replied,  "I  cannot  say  that  there 
are  not  rumors  that  such  plans  are  afoot"  (Hanaya,  Himerareta  Showashi, 
pp.  45^6).  This  and  quotations  immediately  following  are  author's  trans- 
lations. 

13.  Lieutenant  General  Honjo  Shigeru,  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
Kwantung  Army. 


156  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

telegram  advising  the  departure  of  Tatekawa  for  Manchuria  went 
out  from  the  General  Affairs  Section  of  the  General  Staff  office 
to  General  Honjo,  of  the  Kwantung  Army.  Simultaneously, 
Hashimoto  sent  a  secret  telegram  to  Itagaki:  "Tatekawa  is  ex- 
pected to  arrive  in  Mukden  tomorrow,  hospitable  treatment  will 
be  appreciated.  His  mission  is  to  prevent  the  incident."14  Mean- 
while Tatekawa,  having  planned  his  itinerary  to  arrive  in  Muk- 
den on  September  18,15  left  his  office  in  Tokyo  with  a  nonchalant 
air  on  September  15.16 

When  Itagaki  and  the  young  officers  of  the  Army  Special  Serv- 
ice Agency  in  Mukden  saw  the  cable,  they  were  shocked.  If  the 
letters  from  Minami  and  Kanaya  embodying  the  Emperor's 
admonition  were  to  reach  simple  and  honest  Honjo,  it  would 
spell  the  end  of  the  plot.  On  the  night  of  the  16th,  Itagaki,  Hana- 
ya,  Imada,  Ishihara,  Kawashima,  Ono,  Kojima,  and  one  or  two 
more  officers  gathered  at  the  office  of  the  Army  Special  Service 
Agency  for  a  crucial  meeting.  Ishihara  had  originally  planned 
to  start  the  Incident  on  the  night  of  September  28,  immediately 
after  the  harvest  of  the  tall  sorghum  which,  owing  to  its  extreme 
height,  would  have  otherwise  materially  hampered  the  military 

14.  Yamaguchi  Shigeji,  Ishihara  Kanji — Higeki  no  Shdgun  (Ishihara 
Kanji,  The  Tragic  General)  (Tokyo,  1952),  p.  112.  The  Japanese  text 
read,  asu  tatekawa  hotenchaku  no  yotei  kantai  tanomu  tomeotoko. 
It  is  puzzling  that  the  cable  sent  from  Tokyo,  presumably  on  the  15th, 
should  have  read,  "Arrive  in  Mukden  tomorrow,"  because  even  by  the 
fastest  means  of  transportation  it  is  estimated  that  the  trip  would  have 
required  about  sixty  hours  from  Tokyo  to  Mukden.  Hanaya  states  that 
Tatekawa  left  Tokyo  on  the  night  of  the  15th  (Hanaya,  Himerareta  Sho- 
washi,  p.  46).  Author's  translation.  Hanaya  received  a  separate  cable  from 
Hashimoto  the  gist  of  which  was  bareta  tatekawa  yuku  mae  ni  yare, 
meaning  "(plot)  exposed  execute  (plan)  before  Tatekawa's  arrival." 
Asahi,  Taiheiyo,  1 ,  434.  Author's  translation. 

15.  So  far,  no  evidence  has  been  uncovered  showing  that  Tatekawa 
deliberately  chose  this  date  because  of  a  tacit  understanding  between  him 
and  the  young  officers  of  the  Kwantung  Army  that  the  Liutiaohu  Incident 
would  be  staged  on  this  date. 

16.  This  date  is  deduced  from  the  fact  that  Itagaki  showed  Hashimoto's 
telegram  to  Ishihara  on  September  16  (Yamaguchi,  p.  112). 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  157 

operations.17  The  question  now  was  whether  to  stage  the  Incident 
after  discussing  the  matter  with  Tatekawa  upon  his  arrival  or  to 
go  through  with  it  before  consulting  him.  Hanaya  argued  that  it 
would  be  more  prudent  to  wait  until  they  had  consulted  Tate- 
kawa, because  of  the  danger  of  being  branded  as  traitors  if 
Tatekawa  were  to  bring  orders  directly  from  the  Emperor  calling 
a  halt  to  the  operation.  Imada  on  the  other  hand  insisted  that  they 
go  ahead  with  their  plans,  since  the  secret  had  already  leaked  out 
and  Tatekawa  might  well  put  a  damper  on  the  venture.  In  the 
end  the  decision  was  left  to  chance,  and  Hanaya  carried  the 
day  by  winning  the  toss.  But  on  the  following  day  Imada  ap- 
proached Hanaya  and  again  insisted  that  they  carry  out  their 
plans  before  Tatekawa's  arrival.  Hanaya  finally  consented  to  go 
through  with  the  plans  on  the  night  of  the  18th;  he  also  assumed 
full  responsibility  for  the  task  of  persuading  Tatekawa.18 

Meanwhile,  on  September  17,  Lieutenant  General  Honjo,  who 
had  been  appointed  commander  of  the  Kwantung  Army  in  the 
August  reshuffling  of  army  personnel,19  had  just  completed  his 
initial  tour  of  inspection  of  his  troops  and  installations  and  was 
addressing  the  Second  Division  at  Liaoyang  when  he  received  a 

17.  See  above,  n.  15. 

18.  Hanaya,  Himerareta  Showashi  p.  46.  The  following  is  a  variant 
version  describing  the  same  episode  based  on  Takamiya,  "Waribashi  kara 
Umareta  Manshu  Jihen,"  Showa  Memo,  pp.  22-31:  The  younger  officers 
argued  that  postponement  now  would  mean  abandoning  the  plan  forever. 
Itagaki  then  proposed  leaving  the  decision  to  chance.  He  would  stand  up  a 
chopstick,  and  if  it  fell  to  the  right,  they  would  postpone  the  operation  and 
discuss  it  with  Tatekawa;  but  if  it  fell  to  the  left,  they  would  go  ahead  with- 
out the  benefit  of  Tatekawa's  advice.  When  Itagaki  stood  the  chopstick  up, 
it  fell  to  the  right.  A  moment  of  silence  followed.  Then  Captain  Imada 
jumped  up  and  refused  to  accept  the  vagary  of  chance.  Hanaya,  too,  sided 
with  Imada.  At  this  point  Itagaki  reversed  himself  and  joined  the  two.  A 
round  of  toasts  followed,  after  which  it  was  decided  that  Ishihara  would 
draw  up  the  mobilization  order  to  be  handed  to  the  battalion  commander 
as  soon  as  the  Incident  began.  The  excuse  would  be  given  that  immediate 
mobilization  was  essential  and  time  would  not  permit  waiting  for  the 
orders  from  General  Honjo.  See  also  Asahi,  Taiheiyo,  1,  434-35. 

19.  See  above,  pp.  94-95. 


158  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

telegram  from  his  Chief  of  Staff  Miyake  at  Port  Arthur.  The 
message  stated  that  General  Tatekawa  was  en  route  to  Mukden 
on  a  visit  and  suggested  that  one  of  the  staff  officers,  either 
Itagaki  or  Ishihara,  be  detailed  to  meet  Tatekawa  and  escort  him 
on  his  tour  of  inspection.20  General  Honjo  chose  Colonel 
Itagaki. 

Before  Itagaki  left  Liaoyang,  Ishihara  said  to  him,  "In  view 
of  the  decision  reached  at  Mukden  last  night,  we  cannot  very 
well  back  out  now.  We  will  have  to  go  through  with  it."  Itagaki 
replied,  "That  is  the  way  I  feel  about  it.  I  am  glad  that  we  both 
see  it  the  same  way.  I'll  take  care  of  matters  in  Mukden,  so  will 
you  look  after  the  arrangements  in  Port  Arthur?"21 

That  day,  September  18,  Ishihara  and  other  members  of  the 
staff  accompanied  General  Honjo  back  to  Port  Arthur.  Itagaki 
alone  proceeded  in  the  opposite  direction  to  Penhsihu  on  the 
Anfeng  Line  and  awaited  the  arrival  of  General  Tatekawa,  who 
was  aboard  an  express  train  from  Antung  bound  for  Mukden.22 

When  Itagaki  greeted  Tatekawa,  the  latter  complained  that  he 
had  not  been  able  to  rest  on  the  way  and  was  therefore  not  in- 
clined to  discuss  business  right  at  the  moment.  However,  he  did 
mention  the  fact  that  his  superiors  were  concerned  about  the 
reckless  conduct  of  the  young  officers.  Itagaki  reassured  him  that 
there  was  no  need  for  worry  if  this  was  the  object  of  his  visit.  He 
then  added  that  he  would  see  Tatekawa  the  following  day  after 
the  General  had  rested.23 

Upon  arriving  at  Mukden  at  about  1  p.m.  of  the  18th,  they 
were  met  by  Doihara's  assistant,  Major  Hanaya  of  the  Army 
Special  Service  Agency,  who  escorted  them  to  an  inn,  Kikubun. 
Tatekawa  later  told  a  friend  that  he  allowed  himself  to  be  spirited 

20.  IMTFE,  Judgment,  p.  549. 

21.  Yamaguchi,  Ishihara  Kanji,  p.  112.  Author's  translation. 

22.  It  was  during  this  stage  in  his  itinerary  that  General  Tatekawa  was 
recognized  by  a  fellow  passenger  and  tried  to  conceal  his  identity  (Mori- 
shima,  Conspiracy,  p.  49). 

23.  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  p.  30,261. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  159 

away  to  an  inn  because  he  did  not  intend  to  block  the  young 
officers  from  hatching  their  plot.24 

By  9  o'clock  Tatekawa  lapsed  into  sleep,  having  drunk  freely 
of  sake.  At  about  10  o'clock,  he  was  awakened  by  a  bombard- 
ment and  the  crackling  of  rifle  fire.  He  donned  his  uniform  and 
staggered  out  toward  the  vestibule  of  the  inn,  where  he  was  sur- 
rounded by  waiting  soldiers.  As  the  men  escorted  him  back  to 
his  room,  he  was  told:  "We  were  ordered  to  guard  you  and  stop 
you  from  walking  outdoors,  since  it  is  dangerous."  Tatekawa 
was  forcibly  confined  to  his  quarters  even  after  daybreak  of  the 
19th.  It  was  only  after  Mukden  had  been  placed  fully  under  the 
control  of  Japanese  forces  that  he  was  led  to  a  room  located 
above  the  Special  Service  Agency,  where  he  was  joined  by  Gen- 
eral Honjo  from  Port  Arthur.  The  two  exchanged  greetings  ex- 
claiming, "Are  we  in  for  real  trouble!"25 

The  Night  of  September  18 

After  dining  with  Tatekawa,  Itagaki  excused  himself  and  re- 
turned to  the  office  of  the  Army  Special  Service  Agency,  appar- 
ently expecting  a  telephone  call.  This  was  at  about  9  o'clock.  At 
about  10  Itagaki  was  on  the  verge  of  returning  to  his  billet  when 
a  telephone  message  from  the  garrison  troops,  probably  Lieuten- 
ant Kawamoto's  patrol,  reported  the  blasting  of  the  railroad  line 

24.  IMTFE,  Judgment,  p.  550. 

25.  Ito,  Gunbatsu  Koboshi,  2,  195.  Author's  translation.  At  variance 
with  Ito's  story  is  a  firsthand  account  to  the  effect  that  Tatekawa  confided 
to  another  person  in  1932  that  he  personally  went  to  witness  the  assault 
on  the  city  of  Mukden  on  the  night  of  the  Incident.  Key  Kiyokazu  Koba- 
yashi,  "The  Kwantung  Army  and  the  Manchurian  Incident"  (unpublished 
essay,  Columbia  University,  1956),  p.  59,  n.  34.  This  is  a  penetrating  study 
principally  of  the  events  and  actions  which  occurred  on  the  night  of  the 
Mukden  Incident  and  the  following  day.  Mr.  Kobayashi,  in  drawing  his 
own  conclusion,  has  questioned  the  validity  of  the  assumption  made  by 
the  Prosecution  of  the  Tokyo  Trials  that  the  Mukden  Incident  represented 
the  "initial  phase  of  a  gigantic  Japanese  conspiracy  to  conquer  the  world" 
(ibid.,  p.  ii). 


160  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

at  Liutiaohu.  It  required  several  more  calls  before  Itagaki  could 
make  out  what  had  happened — that  just  after  10  p.m.  the  rail  line 
of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  on  the  southwest  side  of  the 
North  Barracks  had  been  blasted  and  that  patrolling  scouts  under 
Lieutenant  Kawamoto  of  the  Third  Company1  had  been  fired  on 
by  enemy  troops  lying  in  ambush.2 

However,  there  are  indications  that  mobilization  in  and  around 
Mukden  and  Fushun  were  executed  on  orders  from  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Shimamoto  even  before  Colonel  Itagaki  issued  his  own 
order.  According  to  Shimamoto,  on  the  night  of  September  18 
he  returned  from  a  party  slightly  intoxicated  and  went  to  bed, 
receiving  the  initial  report  by  telephone  at  10:25  p.m.  When  he 
picked  up  the  receiver,  he  heard  the  voice  of  Lieutenant  Naga- 
mine  Yasuo,  the  officer  on  duty  at  headquarters  of  the  Second 
Railway  General  Battalion,  saying,  "This  is  an  emergency  call." 
Shimamoto  asked,  "Is  this  a  maneuver?"  Nagamine  replied, 
"No,  it's  real."  Shimamoto  asked  again,  "What  do  you  mean 
by  real?"  The  answer  came,  "Right  now  the  Hushihtai  unit  is 
engaged  in  battle  with  Chinese  troops."3  Sobered,  Shimamoto  at 
once  ordered  his  battalion  to  muster,4  but  there  were  only  the 
First  and  Fourth  Companies  on  hand  at  Mukden,  since  the  Third 
was  already  engaging  the  enemy  at  Hushihtai  and  the  Second  was 
stationed  in  Fushun,  about  twenty-five  miles  to  the  east. 

After  notifying  Shimamoto,  Lieutenant  Nagamine,  hardly  sus- 

1.  The  Third  Company  of  the  Second  Railway  Guard  Battalion  was 
sometimes  referred  to  as  the  Hushihtai  Unit;  it  was  under  the  command 
of  Captain  Kawashima  Tadashi. 

2.  Testimony  by  Itagaki,  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  p.  30,262.  A  slightly 
different  version  states  that  "just  a  little  before  10  p.m.  Itagaki  received  a 
telephone  call  from  an  undisclosed  party.  Thereupon  he  took  leave  of 
Tatekawa.  From  the  inn  he  presumably  proceeded  to  the  office  of  the 
Army  Special  Service  Agency,  where  he  waited  for  news  that  the  action 
had  started.  He  then  issued  the  mobilization  order  drawn  up  by  Ishihara, 
ordering:  'Officers  in  charge,  execute  mobilization.  Take  your  posts,  and 
start  action  immediately'"  (Yamaguchi,  Ishihara  Kanji,  pp.  114-15). 
Author's  translation. 

3.  Mori,  Senpu  Nijunen,  p.  52.  Author's  translation. 

4.  Ibid. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  161 

pecting  that  he  was  calling  the  brain  center  of  the  jntrigue,  phoned 
the  Army  Special  Service  Agency  in  Mukden  and  asked  that  it 
relay  the  emergency  message  on  to  Kwantung  Army  headquarters 
at  Port  Arthur.  The  staff  of  the  Army  Special  Service  Agency 
delayed  transmission  of  the  message  to  Honjo,  the  Commanding 
General,  until  the  Incident  was  well  under  way.  In  addition, 
Nagamine  alerted  the  headquarters  of  the  Railway  Guard  Bat- 
talion at  Kungchuling,  the  29th  Infantry  Regiment  at  Mukden, 
the  Mukden  Military  Police  Unit,  and  the  Mukden  Railway  Sta- 
tion, which  was  requested  to  have  a  specified  amount  of  rolling 
stock  ready.5 

A  few  minutes  before  1 1  Shimamoto  received  a  direct  report 
from  the  Third  Company  that  it  was  engaging  Chinese  troops  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  northwestern  approaches  to  the  North  Bar- 
racks after  having  pursued  them  to  this  point.  Thereupon  Shima- 
moto informed  Colonel  Hirata  Yukihiro,  Commanding  Officer 
of  the  29th  Regiment,  of  his  intention  to  lead  the  First,  Third,  and 
Fourth  Companies  in  a  direct  assault  upon  the  North  Barracks 
itself,  saying  that  the  Second  Company  from  Fushun  was  pro- 
ceeding to  Liutiaohu  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

Colonel  Hirata  approved  Shimamoto's  decision,  and  he  him- 
self decided  to  attack  the  walled  city  within  Mukden.6  This  was 
later  verified  by  Hirata  in  testimony  at  the  Tokyo  Trials,  in  which 
he  stated:  "The  operational  plan  of  the  Kwantung  Army  had 
been  that  in  case  of  an  emergency  the  army  should  concentrate 
its  main  forces  around  Mukden  to  attack  the  walled  city  if  the 
occasion  demanded  such  an  action."7 

Before  these  two  officers  could  lead  their  men  into  action, 
however,  they  were  summoned  to  the  office  of  the  Mukden  Spe- 
cial Service  Agency  located  immediately  outside  the  gate  of  the 
29th  Regiment's  quarters.  There,  much  to  their  surprise,  they 
found  Colonel  Itagaki.  Shimamoto  received  an  "army  order" 

5.  Aoki,  The  Pacific  War,  1,  149. 

6.  Lytton  Report,  p.  69. 

7.  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  p.  19,286. 


162  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

from  Itagaki  which,  as  it  turned  out,  merely  affirmed  the  deci- 
sion Shimamoto  and  Hirata  had  reached  earlier  with  regard  to 
the  attack  on  the  North  Barracks.  In  addition,  however,  Itagaki's 
order  authorized  Shimamoto  to  assume  command  over  the  Fifth 
Railway  Guard  Battalion  from  Tiehling,  which  Itagaki  had  or- 
dered to  hasten  to  Mukden.8  Also  ordered  to  come  to  Mukden 
from  a  distance  of  about  a  hundred  miles  was  the  Third  Railway 
Guard  Battalion  at  Tashihchiao  to  the  southwest.  This  battalion, 
however,  never  made  Mukden  because,  as  will  be  seen  shortly, 
it  was  ordered  by  General  Honjo  to  proceed  elsewhere.9  After 
the  momentary  interruption  by  Itagaki,  Shimamoto  continued  on 
his  way  to  the  Mukden  Station,  where  he  boarded  the  train  with 
his  First  and  Fourth  Companies  at  11:40  p.m.  and  arrived  at 
Liutiaohu,  the  scene  of  the  skirmish,  shortly  after  midnight. 

Although  one  source  alleges  that  Itagaki  ordered  Hirata  to 
attack  the  walled  city  within  Mukden,10  Hirata's  own  account  is 
somewhat  different.  When  he  arrived  at  the  office  of  the  Army 
Special  Service  Agency,  he  found  that  Hanaya,  who  was  sup- 
posedly in  charge  during  Doihara's  visit  to  Tokyo,  was  absent 
and  in  his  stead  Itagaki  was  busily  directing  the  operation.  Hirata 
said  he  did  not  know  why  Itagaki  was  there  in  Mukden,  nor  was 
he  aware  of  the  fact  that  Tatekawa  was  also  in  Mukden  that 
night. 

Hirata  testified  that  Itagaki  gave  him  no  direct  orders  simply 
because  he  did  not  have  the  right  to  do  so.11  Hirata  had  very 
little  to  do  with  Itagaki  that  night,  although  when  the  latter  said 
he  thought  the  attack  should  stop  short  of  the  west  wall  of  the  city, 
despite  the  fact  that  Hirata  wanted  to  capture  it,  Hirata  had  to 
persuade  Itagaki  to  acquiesce.12 

8.  Aoki,  The  Pacific  War,  1,  150. 

9.  See  below,  p.  168. 

10.  Aoki,  The  Pacific  War,  1,  153. 

11.  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  p.  19,306. 

12.  Ibid.,  p.  19,132.  Hanaya  corroborates  the  assumption  that  Shima- 
moto was  kept  in  the  dark  (Hanaya,  Himerareta  Showashi,  p.  44).  Also, 
Morishima  Morito  of  the  consular  staff  at  Mukden  wrote  in  his  book,  "For 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  163 

Other  units  also  apparently  were  caught  unawares.  Ishihara 
Kanji  stated  in  his  deposition  13  that  the  Second  Company  from 
Fushun,  despite  the  pre-incident  flurry  for  which  its  commanding 
officer,  Captain  Kawakami  Seiichi,  was  responsible,  arrived  in 
Mukden  on  the  early  morning  of  the  19th  in  no  shape  for  combat. 
The  only  reasonable  assumption  is  that  Captain  Kawakami  was 
never  told  of  the  pending  incident,  although  he  was  warned  that 
an  emergency  might  occur. 

In  another  part  of  Manchuria,  in  a  red-brick  barrack  in  Chang- 
chun, a  handful  of  Japanese  soldiers  of  the  Hasebe  Brigade  was 
overhauling  a  pack  artillery  piece  on  the  evening  of  September 
18.  When  night  fell,  they  were  still  tinkering  with  the  breech 
mechanism  but  were  unable  to  put  it  back  into  working  order. 
They  finally  gave  up  and  left  the  mechanism  in  a  disassembled 
state  on  the  shop  floor  for  the  night. 

During  the  night  came  the  sudden  call  for  mobilization.  The 
infantry  unit  split  into  two.  One  half  proceeded  to  Nanling  to 
attack  the  Chinese  artillery  unit  there,  while  the  other  half  at- 
tacked an  infantry  unit  at  Kuanchangtzu.  The  dismantled  artillery 
piece  could  not  be  put  to  use,  and  as  a  result  the  casualties  sus- 
tained by  the  Hasebe  Brigade  were  said  to  have  been  heavier 
than  expected.14  If  this  story  is  true,  Hasebe  cannot  be  charged 
with  complicity  in  the  conspiracy  any  more  than  Hirata,  Shima- 
moto,  or  Kawakami.  Taken  together,  these  instances  corraborate 
reservations  made  in  the  Lytton  Report  that  the  findings  do  "not 
exclude  the  hypothesis  that  the  officers  on  the  spot  may  have 
thought  they  were  acting  in  self-defense."  Similarly,  the  observa- 
tion that  on  the  night  of  September  1 8  the  Japanese  by  their  own 


the  sake  of  their  reputations,  I  make  a  special  note  of  the  fact  that  the 
mobilization  order  [from  Itagaki]  came  as  a  complete  surprise  to  Shima- 
moto  and  Hirata  [that  night]  ...  the  actual  plotting  of  the  Incident  was 
the  work  of  two  or  three  men  and  was  confined  to  Itagaki  and  his  con- 
fidants" (Morishima,  Conspiracy,  p.  58).  Author's  translation. 

13.  IMTFE,  Exhibit,  No.  2584,  cited  in  Kobayashi,  "The  Kwantung 
Army  and  the  Manchurian  Incident,"  p.  38. 

14.  Matsumura,  Miyakezaka,  p.  38. 


164  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

admission  executed  "with  swiftness  and  precision"15  a  plan  that 
had  been  laid  out  in  advance  needs  to  be  qualified.  The  wording 
of  the  Report  on  its  face  suggests  that  the  whole  of  the  Kwantung 
Army  was  aware  of  Itagaki's  plot,  when  in  reality  even  the  garri- 
son officers  in  Mukden  were  taken  by  surprise,  as  were  those 
in  more  remote  regions  such  as  Changchun. 

With  respect  to  the  question  of  the  high  degree  of  preparation 
shown,  it  would  seem  that  the  testimony  by  Katakura  Tadashi 
was  reasonably  true  and  correct.  At  the  War  Crimes  Trials  he 
stated  that  since  the  Kwantung  Army  was  a  small  force  in  com- 
parison with  the  Chinese  in  Manchuria,16  the  standing  policy  of 
the  army  was  that,  in  the  event  of  an  emergency,  it  would  execute 
a  carefully  worked  out  operational  plan  depending  for  success 
upon  its  thoroughly  trained  troops.17 

It  is  now  time  to  assess  the  role  played  by  Colonel  Itagaki  on 
the  night  of  September  18.  At  10:40  p.m.  there  was  a  sudden 
telephone  call  for  Morishima,  who  was  asked  to  hasten  to  the 
Army  Special  Service  Agency  because  Chinese  troops  had 
bombed  the  tracks  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  at  Liutiaohu 
and  Japanese  troops  were  already  engaging  them.  Morishima 
hurriedly  summoned  his  staff  to  report  to  the  Consulate  General, 
instructing  it  to  come  prepared  to  work  all  night,  and  then  rushed 
to  the  office  of  the  Army  Special  Service  Agency.  There,  much 
to  his  surprise,  in  a  brightly  lit  room  he  found  Colonel  Itagaki  and 
the  office  personnel  in  a  flurry  of  activity.  Itagaki  told  Morishima 
that  the  Army  had  been  mobilized  because  an  important  Japanese 
right  relating  to  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  had  been  violated, 
and  asked  him  for  the  cooperation  of  the  Consulate  General. 
Morishima  asked  who  had  issued  the  mobilization  order.  Itagaki 
replied,  "Since  it  was  an  emergency  situation  and  the  command- 

15.  See  above,  p.  6. 

16.  The  ratio  was  roughly  one  to  thirteen.  Toyoshima  Fusataro,  "Cho- 
sengun  Ekkyo  Shingeki  su"  (Japan's  Korea  Army  Crosses  the  Border  and 
Advances),  Himerareta  Showashi,  p.  55  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Toyo- 
shima, Himerareta  Showashi). 

17.  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  p.  18,939. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  165 

ing  officer  was  in  Port  Arthur,  I  issued  the  order  in  his  behalf." 
Morishima  repeatedly  emphasized  the  necessity  of  seeking  a 
peaceful  solution  by  means  of  diplomatic  negotiations.  Itagaki 
became  provoked  and  retorted  harshly,  "Does  the  Consulate 
General  wish  to  interfere  with  the  prerogative  of  the  Imperial 
Command  after  it  has  been  invoked?"  Hanaya,  who  by  then  was 
back  in  the  office  and  standing  by,  drew  his  service  sword  and 
menacingly  brandished  it,  roaring,  "No  meddler  in  the  Supreme 
Command  will  be  tolerated."  Realizing  the  futility  of  arguing 
with  army  officers  in  such  a  high  state  of  excitement,  Morishima 
returned  to  the  Consulate  General  and  reported  the  entire  affair 
to  the  Consul  General.18 

Who  placed  the  bomb  on  the  rail  bed?  For  some  inexplicable 
reason,  this  point  does  not  seem  to  have  been  clarified  by  the  War 
Crimes  Tribunal  at  Tokyo.  According  to  Morishima  and  Hanaya 
it  was  Captain  Imada  Shintaro19  of  the  Army  Special  Service 
Agency  who  directed  the  blasting  of  the  rail.  On  the  night  of 
September  18  he  accompanied  a  railroad  maintenance  worker 
on  a  hand  car  to  a  spot  north  of  Liutiaohu  and  ordered  the  blast- 
ing. The  bomb  employed  in  the  explosion  was  selected  with  a 
view  to  keeping  the  damage  to  a  minimum.  When  the  mainte- 
nance worker  protested  that  his  duty  was  the  maintenance  of  the 
railroad  and  not  its  destruction,  Imada  drew  his  sword  and  forced 
him  to  set  the  bomb  against  the  rail.20  After  the  explosion,  sen- 
tries were  posted  at  the  site;  when  railroad  crewmen  tried  to 
approach  it  the  next  day,  they  were  rudely  driven  away. 

Presumably  the  actual  damage  to  the  rail  was  of  such  a  minor 
nature  that  neither  Captain  Imada  nor  his  confederates  cared 
to  have  the  facts  disclosed.  Therefore,  representatives  from  the 
Kwantung  Army,  the  Mukden  Consulate  General,  and  Man- 
chukuo  met  before  the  Lytton  Commission  arrived,  in  order  to 
avoid  making  contradictory  statements  to  the  Commission.  The 

18.  Morishima,  Conspiracy,  pp.  52-53. 

19.  He  later  became  Major  General  and  died  after  World  War  II. 

20.  Morishima,  p.  58.  Hanaya,  Himerareta  Showashi,  pp.  44,  46-47. 


166  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Lytton  Commission,  however,  refrained  from  assessing  the  re- 
sponsibility for  the  explosion,  stating  that  its  mission  lay  in  set- 
tling the  issues  which  had  arisen  subsequent  to  it.21 

Meanwhile,  what  was  Honjo,  Commanding  General  of  the 
Kwantung  Army,  doing  at  this  critical  juncture?  As  noted  pre- 
viously, he  had  delivered  an  address  at  the  headquarters  of  the 
Second  Division  at  Liaoyang  on  the  afternoon  of  September  18 
and  had  returned  to  Port  Arthur  with  his  staff  at  about  9  o'clock 
that  night. 

At  11:30  p.m.  Katakura  Tadashi  received  a  telephone  call 
from  Captain  Konishi,  officer  of  the  day.  Katakura  rushed  to 
headquarters.  After  he  read  the  telegram  from  Mukden,  he  ran 
to  the  residence  of  General  Miyake,  the  Chief  of  Staff.  It  was 
therefore  around  1 1 :40  p.m.  when  General  Honjo  learned  from 
his  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  hostilities  between  the  Chinese  and  Japa- 
nese troops  at  Liutiaohu.  At  the  time  General  Honjo  received 
the  news,  he  was  in  his  quarters  taking  a  bath,22  which  would 
indicate  that  this  benign  General  was  not  aware  of  the  drastic 
actions  which  Itagaki  and  his  associates  had  planned  for  that 
night. 

It  must  be  noted,  moreover,  that  there  was  a  lag  of  approxi- 
mately one  hour  between  the  time  Lieutenant  Nagamine  at  the 
headquarters  of  the  Second  Railway  Guard  Battalion  in  Mukden 
relayed  the  initial  report  from  the  Third  Company  of  its  encoun- 
ter with  enemy  troops  to  the  Mukden  Army  Special  Service 
Agency  (10:30)  and  the  time  Katakura  was  informed  of  the 
incident  in  Port  Arthur  (11:30).23  The  delay,  because  of  its 
length,  was  presumably  deliberate,  and  it  should  be  noted  that 
it  occurred  at  the  Special  Service  Agency,  where  Itagaki  was 
frantically  issuing  mobilization  orders  with  the  specific  intention 

21.  Lytton  Report,  p.  68. 

22.  Ferrell,  "The  Mukden  Incident,"  Journal  of  Modern  History,  27 
(1955),  72. 

23.  See  above,  pp.  160-61. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  167 

of  aggravating  the  situation  in  order  that  the  clash  at  Hushihtai 
might  be  turned  into  a  major  incident. 

Honjo  called  a  staff  meeting.  Ishihara  cautiously  handed  to 
the  General  the  mobilization  order  which  the  former  had  drawn 
up  after  he  had  parted  company  with  Itagaki  at  Liaoyang  the 
previous  day.  There  followed  a  few  anxious  moments,  for  Ishi- 
hara well  knew  by  then  that  Itagaki  had  on  his  own  issued  the 
mobilization  order,  and  if  General  Honjo  were  to  refuse  to  au- 
thorize it  Itagaki  presumably  had  but  one  way  out — hara-kiri. 
Honjo  meditated  for  a  few  moments  with  his  eyes  closed;  then 
having  made  up  his  mind  to  authorize  the  action  already  taken 
by  his  subordinates  in  Mukden,  he  stated  resolutely,  "Let  the 
matter  be  carried  out  on  my  own  responsibility."24 

Katakura  Tadashi  has  testified  that  Ishihara  was  nevertheless 
annoyed  by  Honjo's  subsequent  indecisive  handling  of  the  de- 
veloping operations;  for  twice  during  the  same  evening  he  modi- 
fied his  original  plans,  thereby  losing  precious  moments  when 
instant  mobilization  was  tactically  essential.25  Initially,  Honjo 
ordered  the  military  operations  to  be  carried  out  according  to  a 
predetermined  plan  defensive  in  nature  and  localized  in  scope: 
Japanese  forces  in  Manchuria  were  to  concentrate  in  and  around 
Mukden  and  wait  for  the  enemy  to  make  its  move. 

However,  after  receiving  the  second  report  from  Mukden 
stating  that  one  company  of  Japanese  troops  at  Hushihtai  was 
engaging  three  to  four  hundred  enemy  troops  armed  with  ma- 
chine guns  and  that  the  enemy  was  receiving  reinforcements, 
Honjo  took  steps  to  reinforce  his  local  forces  in  order  that  they 
might  separately  engage  the  enemy  troops  in  the  locality  in 
which  they  were  stationed.26  Presumably  it  was  at  this  point  that 
Honjo  issued  the  blanket  order  which  brought  all  Japanese  forces 
in  Manchuria  into  action.  The  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Japa- 

24.  Testimony  by  Takeda  Hisashi,  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  p.  19,326. 

25.  Ibid.,  p.  18,939. 

26.  Ibid.,  p.  18,894. 


168  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

nese  Garrison  Army  in  Korea  was  asked  to  send  reinforcements 
in  accordance  with  prearranged  plans,  so  that  the  Kwantung 
Army  could  take  the  offensive.  The  Second  Overseas  Fleet  was 
requested  to  leave  Port  Arthur  and  steam  toward  Yingkow.27 

Honjo  then  made  a  further  modification  in  his  strategy,  calling 
for  partial  abandonment  of  the  initial  phase  of  trying  to  draw 
the  brunt  of  the  enemy  attack  toward  Mukden.  His  revised  plan — 
and  here  one  can  almost  detect  the  guiding  hand  of  Colonel 
Ishihara — called  for  the  Hasebe  Brigade  in  Changchun  to  receive 
a  counterorder  to  stay  put,  since  the  situation  in  the  north  around 
Changchun  and  Kirin  was  obscure.  Also  noteworthy  is  the  fact 
that  in  a  single  stroke  General  Honjo's  final  order  altered  the 
orders  initially  issued  by  Colonel  Itagaki  to  the  Third  Railway 
Guard  Battalion  at  Tashihchiao.  Whereas,  according  to  Itagaki's 
instruction,  the  unit  was  to  go  to  Mukden  to  support  the  action 
of  the  Second  Railway  Guard  Battalion,  Honjo's  final  instruction 
ordered  it  to  attack  the  enemy  troops  at  Yingkow,  a  port  city 
approximately  twelve  miles  west  of  the  town  where  it  was  sta- 
tioned.28 

General  Honjo  left  Port  Arthur  for  Mukden  between  3  and 
3:30  a.m.  of  September  19.  He  took  with  him  Ishihara  and  the 
main  body  of  staff  officers,  but  left  behind  most  of  the  heads  of 
the  various  departments — i.e.  ordinance,  medical,  intendance, 
legal,  etc.,  to  clear  up  affairs  in  Port  Arthur.29 

When  Honjo  arrived  in  Mukden,  Hayashi  must  have  reproved 
him  for  permitting  the  military  action  of  the  Kwantung  Army  to 
get  out  of  hand  despite  the  warning  he  had  cabled  to  the  Gen- 
eral.30 

It  was  then  that  Honjo  became  suspicious,  for  he  had  not 

27.  See  the  Lytton  Report,  p.  69;  IMTFE,  Judgment,  p.  558;  Hanaya, 
Himerareta  Showashi,  p.  47. 

28.  For  details  of  General  Honjo's  orders  given  between  1:30  and  2:30 
a.m.  on  September  19,  1931,  see  Kobayashi,  "The  Kwantung  Army  and 
the  Manchurian  Incident,"  p.  33  and  appendix  1. 

29.  Testimony  by  Katakura  Tadashi,  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  p.  18,896. 

30.  See  above,  p.  154. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  169 

read  such  a  telegram.  He  immediately  sent  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Shimamoto  to  Port  Arthur  to  investigate  the  circumstances  of 
the  delay  in  Hayashi's  telegram.  On  September  20  Itagaki  and 
Katakura  paid  a  visit  to  Hayashi  and  explained  the  matter  fully,31 
although  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  Consul  General  expressed 
satisfaction  with  their  explanation.  So  incensed  did  Katakura  be- 
come over  this  incident  that  on  the  following  day,  the  21st,  he 
returned  to  the  Consulate  General  to  give  vent  to  his  anger  and 
to  reprove  Hayashi  for  interfering  with  military  operations.32 

On  the  night  of  September  19  the  staff  officers  of  the  Kwan- 
tung  Army  held  a  conference  in  Mukden.  Because  of  the  suc- 
cession of  telegrams  from  Tokyo  calling  for  nonaggravation  and 
nonextension  of  the  military  situation,  Honjo's  second  and  third 
orders — taking  the  offensive  by  calling  for  reinforcements  from 
the  Korean  Army,  and  then  extending  the  theater  of  conflict  to 
Changchun  and  Kirin — had  to  be  abandoned.  It  is  highly  prob- 
able that  Ishihara  objected  strenuously  to  Honjo's  effort  to  com- 
ply with  the  directives  from  Tokyo.  To  secure  the  northern  plains 
of  Manchuria  against  a  possible  thrust  later  from  the  Soviet 
army  was  almost  an  obsession  with  Ishihara.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances it  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  General  Honjo  exper- 
ienced great  difficulty  in  turning  down  Ishihara  and  other  young 
officers  itching  for  further  action.33 

Katakura  was  sent  out  to  bring  Tatekawa  to  the  meeting.  Much 
to  Ishihara's  disappointment,  Tatekawa  sided  with  General 
Honjo.  He  strongly  stressed  the  opinion  that  no  matter  what  the 
Chinese  did  Japan  should  not  advance  her  forces  into  northern 
Manchuria.34 

31.  Testimony  by  Katakura,  ibid.,  pp.  18,934-35. 

32.  Morishima,  Conspiracy,  p.  56. 

33.  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  p.  18,901. 

34.  Ibid.,  p.  18,905:  also  see  below,  pp.  178-79.  As  the  Chief  of  the 
Division  of  Strategy,  Tatekawa  had  composed  a  plan  of  his  own,  "An  Out- 
line of  the  Solution  of  Manchurian  Problems,"  and  circulated  the  draft 
copies  among  his  section  chiefs.  His  plan  called  for  a  full  year  to  reach 
fulfillment. 


170  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Crossing  the  Yalu 

It  would  have  been  little  short  of  recklessness  had  the  officers 
of  the  Kwantung  Army  planned  the  Mukden  Incident  without 
taking  into  account  reinforcements  which  they  hoped  to  receive 
from  Korea.  Sometime  between  1 :20  and  2  a.m.  on  September 
19  Lieutenant  General  Hayashi  Senjuro,  Commander  of  the 
Korean  Army,  received  an  urgent  call  from  General  Honjo  of 
the  Kwantung  Army  requesting  an  immediate  dispatch  of  rein- 
forcements to  Mukden.1 

At  6:24  a.m.  a  detachment  of  the  Japanese  air  force  stationed 
at  Pyongyang  suddenly  took  off  for  Mukden.2  On  whose  order 
these  planes  were  moved — a  highly  relevant  point — has  not  been 
clarified  by  the  various  writers  who  have  dealt  with  the  question 
of  the  unauthorized  crossing  of  the  Yalu.3  There  are  seemingly 
only  two  alternative  explanations.  Either  General  Hayashi  issued 
an  order  authorizing  the  departure,  or  the  members  of  the  flying 
corps  decided  to  take  off  on  their  own.  The  weight  of  circum- 
stantial evidence  seems  to  tip  the  scale  slightly  in  favor  of  the 
latter.  It  is  generally  known  that  the  Korean  Army  was  inter- 
cepting communications  between  Mukden  and  army  headquar- 
ters in  Tokyo  about  this  time.  Even  more  significant  is  the  fact 
that  Lieutenant  Colonel  Kanda  Masatane,  a  staff  officer  of  the 
Korean  Army,  was  in  personal  contact  with  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Ishihara  Kanji  of  the  Kwantung  Army.4  Thus  it  is  quite  conceiv- 
able that  either  a  junior  staff  officer  of  the  Korean  Army  or  the 

1.  Aoki,  The  Pacific  War,  1,  150. 

2.  Japan  proper  and  Korea  were  on  the  same  standard  time.  At  present, 
Seoul  time  is  half  an  hour  behind  Tokyo  time.  Manchuria,  however,  was 
one  hour  behind  Japan  and  Korea. 

3.  Mori,  Senpii  Nijiinen,  p.  56;  Matsumura,  Miyakezaka,  p.  41;  Mori- 
shima,  Conspiracy,  p.  64;  Ito,  Gunbatsu  Koboshi,  2,  167-69;  Takeuchi, 
War  and  Diplomacy  in  the  Japanese  Empire,  p.  353;  Hanaya,  Himerareta 
Showashi,  pp.  47-48;  Toyoshima,  Himerareta  Showashi,  pp.  52-58;  Asahi, 
Taiheiyo,  2,  6-18.  Readers  are  cautioned  that  the  accounts  found  in  these 
publications  are  spotty  and  not  infrequently  at  variance  with  one  another. 

4.  Ito,  Gunbatsu  Koboshi,  2,  168,  192,  Matsumura,  Miyakezaka,  p.  41. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  171 

squadron  leader  of  the  flying  corps  was  incited  by  the  activists 
of  the  Kwantung  Army  into  issuing  an  unauthorized  order. 

By  early  dawn  General  Hayashi  almost  certainly  had  ordered 
the  various  contingents  of  the  Twentieth  Division  in  Seoul  and 
Pyongyang  to  proceed  by  rail  to  the  Korean-Manchurian  border 
to  await  further  instructions.  Already  concentrated  at  the  border 
town  of  Shingishu  were  approximately  4,000  men  of  the  Thirty- 
Ninth  Mixed  Brigade,  which  had  reportedly  been  engaging  in 
maneuvers  since  the  16th.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  Thirty-Ninth 
Brigade  did  not  cross  the  Yalu  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  since 
it  could  have  done  so  in  an  hour  had  General  Hayashi  so  or- 
dered. That  he  did  not  intend  to  is  implied  in  the  text  of  the  tele- 
gram he  addressed  to  the  Minister  of  War  and  the  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  the  same  morning:  "In  response  to  an  urgent  re- 
quest from  the  Kwantung  Army,  I  have  decided  on  my  own  and 
am  about  to  send  my  troops  across  the  border.  Request  is  made 
to  secure  promptly  His  Majesty's  sanction."5  The  intent  of  this 
telegram  seems  to  be  that  while  General  Hayashi  had  on  his  own 
initiative  taken  preliminary  steps  to  mobilize  his  troops,  he  would 
await  imperial  sanction  before  executing  the  crucial  act  of  cross- 
ing the  border.6 

Tokyo  was  dismayed  when  it  learned  of  the  precipitate  action 
of  the  Korean  Army,  for  its  hands  were  full  trying  to  restrain  the 
Kwantung  Army.  The  Minister  of  War  wired  General  Hayashi: 

5.  Ito,  2,  168.  Author's  translation. 

6.  Somewhat  more  difficult  to  explain  is  the  curious  statement  by  one 
writer  that  at  8  a.m.  of  the  19th  a  telegraphic  instruction  went  out  to 
General  Hayashi  from  the  office  of  the  General  Staff  to  mobilize  one 
brigade  at  once  to  support  the  actions  of  the  independent  garrisons  in 
Manchuria  (Mori,  Senpu  Nijunen,  p.  56).  What  gives  this  statement  an 
air  of  unreality  is  that  General  Hayashi  did  not  act  upon  the  instructions, 
although  they  came,  supposedly,  while  he  was  anxiously  waiting  for  a 
response  from  Tokyo.  The  same  writer  goes  on  to  say  that  at  1  p.m. 
another  wire  had  to  be  dispatched  to  countermand  the  earlier  instructions, 
since  the  emergency  session  of  the  cabinet  had  decided  in  the  meantime 
"not  to  enlarge  the  incident."  All  this  is  in  direct  contradiction  to  the 
statement  by  another  writer,  who  asserts  that  Army  headquarters  in 
Tokyo  was  shocked  when  it  learned  of  the  mobilization  of  the  Korean 


172  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

"Arbitrary  crossing  of  the  border  is  absolutely  inadmissible. 
Stand  by  until  imperial  sanction  is  secured."7  At  the  same  time 
emergency  orders  were  dashed  off  to  General  Muro  of  the  Twen- 
tieth Division,  to  General  Yoshimura  who  was  aboard  the  train 
with  the  Brigade,  and  to  the  gendarmery  at  Shingishu  and  the 
independent  garrison  at  Anto,  to  "stop  mobilizing"  and  to  "report 
the  present  location  of  the  Brigade."8  Yoshimura's  Brigade  was 
made  to  detrain  near  Shingishu.  It  was  only  then  that  Tokyo 
heaved  a  deep  sigh  of  relief. 

Army  headquarters  at  Tokyo,  after  a  conference,  decided  to 
go  ahead  and  take  steps  to  secure  imperial  sanction.  Some  of  the 
younger  members  of  the  staff  persisted  in  the  conviction  that  the 
Korean  Army  should  be  permitted  to  cross  the  Yalu,  and  the 
matter  of  securing  imperial  sanction  should  be  deferred  until  the 
mission  had  been  accomplished.  However,  Colonel  Nagata  Tetsu- 
zan,  Chief  of  the  Military  Affairs  Section,  resisted  and  with  the 
backing  of  General  Kanaya,  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  head- 
quarters was  able  to  adhere  to  its  initial  decision. 

In  the  meantime,  determined  not  to  allow  the  Korean  Army 
to  join  the  conflict  in  Manchuria,  the  government  had  taken  steps 
through  the  Minister  of  the  Imperial  Household  to  forestall  Gen- 
eral Kanaya  should  he  apply  for  an  audience  to  secure  His  Maj- 
esty's sanction  to  cross  the  Yalu.  Thus,  when  General  Kanaya 
requested  an  audience  on  the  20th,  he  was  told  that  the  Emperor 
was  indisposed,  and  the  Minister  of  War  had  no  choice  but  to 
advise  General  Hayashi  by  wire  to  hold  his  troops  at  the  border. 

In  the  higher  circles  of  the  government  strong  criticism  was 


Army  (Matsumura,  Miyakezaka,  p.  41).  Conceivably,  General  Kanaya 
could  have  been  in  the  dark  as  to  the  doings  of  his  immediate  subordi- 
nates, Ninomiya,  Tatekawa,  and  Hashimoto — all  fellow  conspirators  in 
the  March  Plot.  Nevertheless,  even  if  the  Japanese  army  at  this  time  had 
been  riddled  with  rank  insubordination,  this  statement,  in  which  Kanaya 
is  seen  as  a  tool  of  his  subordinates,  does  not  explain  why  General  Ha- 
yashi did  not  carry  out  the  order  and  send  his  troops  across  the  Yalu 
shortly  after  8  a.m.  on  the  19th. 

7.  ltd,  2,  168.  Author's  translation. 

8.  Mori,  p.  41. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  173 

being  directed  against  Premier  Wakatsuki  for  assuming  a  de- 
featist attitude.  On  the  evening  of  the  19th  the  Premier  sum- 
moned Baron  Harada,  Prince  Saionji's  private  secretary,  and 
complained: 

For  one  thing,  I  have  received  reports  from  neither 
the  Foreign  Office  nor  the  Ministry  of  War.  When  I 
rebuked  the  Minister  of  War  by  asking  him,  "Isn't  it 
an  outrage  to  send  troops  from  Korea  without  an  order 
from  the  government?"  he  replied,  "There  was  a  prece- 
dent for  mobilizing  without  imperial  sanction  at  the 
time  of  the  Tanaka  cabinet."  So  you  can  see,  I  am 
unable  to  restore  order  under  the  present  circum- 
stances. What  do  you  suppose  I  ought  to  do?  ...  It  is 
not  that  I  am  asking  you  to  consult  Prince  Saionji,  but 
I  am  really  in  a  fix.9 

When  Harada  reported  Wakatsuki's  unhappy  plight  to  the  Grand 
Chamberlain  and  the  Minister  of  the  Imperial  Household,  neither 
of  the  gentlemen  took  kindly  to  Wakatsuki's  negative  attitude. 

On  September  20  Harada  called  on  Shidehara.  The  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  expressed  his  misgivings  regarding  Wakatsuki's 
attitude.  Moreover,  Shidehara  seemed  displeased  with  the  luke- 
warm attitude  shown  by  cabinet  members  with  party  backgrounds 
toward  efforts  to  restrain  the  unbridled  actions  of  the  army.  On 
the  21st  Harada  went  to  Kyoto  to  report  to  Prince  Saionji  on 
his  current  findings  on  the  cabinet's  action.  There  Harada  was 
told  to  instruct  Kido  Koichi,  Chief  Secretary  to  the  Keeper  of 
Privy  Seal,  that  the  Emperor  must  not  under  any  circumstances 
sanction  the  unauthorized  mobilization  of  the  Korean  Army 
should  either  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  or  the  Minister  of 
War  report  to  His  Majesty  on  the  incident.  Instead,  the  Emperor 
should  withhold  his  word  and  intimate  that  he  would  give  the 
matter  further  thought. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  afternoon  of  September  20,  high  army  offi- 

9.  Harada  Diary,  2,  64-65.  Author's  translation. 


174  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

rials10  met  at  the  residence  of  the  Minister  of  War  to  discuss  what 
position  the  army  ought  to  take  with  respect  to  the  crisis  in  Man- 
churia. After  the  conference  Minami  set  forth  the  army's  views. 
Of  the  five  points  which  he  made,  only  those  relevant  to  the  re- 
lationship between  the  army  and  the  Foreign  Office  are  cited 
here. 

2.  Cabinet  approval  must  be  obtained  before  Japa- 
nese troops  stationed  in  Korea  cross  the  Korean  fron- 
tier. In  case  of  necessity,  however,  if  approval  from 
Tokyo  cannot  be  obtained  in  time,  the  Commanders 
in  Chief  of  the  Kwantung  Army  and  the  Korean  Army 
are  given  the  authority  to  take  appropriate  measures. 

4.  Solution  of  problems  pertaining  to  Manchuria 
should  be  sought  at  the  local  level  and  not  between 
Nanking  and  Tokyo. 

5.  The  army  agrees  with  the  government  in  its  policy 
of  nonaggravation,  but  desires  to  point  out  that  the 
nonaggravation  of  the  situation  does  not  necessarily 
mean  the  nonenlargement  of  the  theater  of  operations. 
This  point  is  made  clear  to  the  government.11 

Among  other  things,  these  statements  of  policy  suggest  ( 1 ) 
a  divergence  in  points  of  view  within  high  army  circles  toward 
the  Foreign  Office,  (2)  a  preponderance  of  those  who  preferred 
to  allow  the  Kwantung  Army  a  wide  latitude  in  its  actions. 

Point  number  2  strongly  suggests  that  the  army  was  willing  to 
make  concessions  to  the  government.  Presumably,  General 
Kanaya  was  the  only  person  present  who  spoke  up  for  nonen- 

10.  Those  present  at  the  conference  included  Minami,  Minister  of  War; 
Kanaya,  Chief  of  the  General  Staff;  Muto,  Inspector  General  of  Military 
Education;  Sugiyama,  Vice  Minister  of  War;  Ninomiya,  Vice  Chief  of 
Staff;  Araki,  Vice  Chief  of  Military  Education;  and  Koiso,  Chief  of  the 
Military  Affairs  Bureau  of  the  Ministry  of  War. 

11.  Tokyo  Asahi,  September  21,  1931,  quoted  in  Takeuchi,  War  and 
Diplomacy  in  the  Japanese  Empire,  p.  352. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  175 

largement  of  military  operations.  The  remainder  stood  for  a 
hands-off  policy,  insofar  as  headquarters'  direction  of  the  Kwan- 
tung  and  Korean  Armies  was  concerned.  It  is  quite  possible  that 
some  men,  like  Koiso  and  Araki,  even  came  out  strongly  for 
giving  free  rein  to  the  Kwantung  Army,  so  that  Manchuria  could 
be  brought  under  Japan's  control  with  a  minimum  of  delay. 
Minami,  the  War  Minister,  was  in  a  ticklish  situation.  Not  only 
did  he  condone,  he  was  positively  in  favor  of  the  actions  taken  by 
his  subordinates. 

The  seemingly  pious  pronouncement  concerning  cabinet  ap- 
proval in  the  opening  clause,  moreover,  is  completely  nullified 
by  the  reservation  made  in  the  succeeding  clause.  For  one  thing 
a  situation  of  emergency  already  existed  in  Manchuria.  For  an- 
other, it  is  almost  impossible  not  to  create  tension  whenever 
troops  are  stationed  on  foreign  soil  where  they  are  not  welcome. 
Because  of  the  ever-present  possibility  that  the  radicals  of  the 
Kwantung  Army  might  take  matters  into  their  own  hands,  and 
because  hostilities  not  only  between  the  Japanese  and  Chinese 
troops  but  also  among  the  several  Chinese  factions  were  in  pro- 
gress,12 Japanese  commanding  officers  in  Manchuria  or  Korea 
did  not  have  to  look  far  for  a  situation  of  emergency. 

Actually,  the  second  statement  was  tantamount  to  allowing 
the  Kwantung  Army  and  the  Korean  Army  to  take  military  action 
on  any  provocation.  It  indicated  that  the  majority  of  the  Japanese 
officers  at  the  highest  level  unmistakably  favored  action  in  Man- 
churia. It  would  also  seem  that  these  high  army  officials  had  few 
qualms  about  crossing  the  Yalu,  an  international  frontier,  without 
declaring  war.  Of  course  in  this  instance,  Japan,  as  a  signa- 
tory to  the  League  Covenant  and  the  Kellogg-Briand  Pact,  offi- 
cially designated  the  armed  conflict  as  an  "incident"  and  China 
refused  to  recognize  that  a  state  of  war  existed.  Nor  were  they 

12.  See  Map  7  attached  to  the  Lytton  Report  for  the  military  situation 
in  Manchuria  about  September  30,  1931.  General  Chang  Hai-peng,  in  the 
vicinity  of  Taonan,  and  General  Hsi  Hsia,  poised  just  east  of  Kirin,  are 
designated  as  generals  of  doubtful  allegiance. 


176  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

unduly  concerned  about  freely  mobilizing  His  Majesty's  troops 
and  moving  them  onto  foreign  soil  without  imperial  sanction.13 

Since  by  this  time  there  was  no  duly  constituted  local  Chinese 
authority  with  which  the  Kwantung  Army  could  negotiate,  state- 
ment 4  could  mean  but  one  thing:  the  army  was  determined  to 
settle  the  Manchurian  questions  by  means  of  force.  The  army 
shunned  diplomatic  settlements  of  any  sort  between  Nanking  and 
Tokyo,  because  such  settlements  would  have  meant  success  for 
the  moderate  policy  represented  by  Shidehara  and  Shigemitsu. 

Statement  5,  like  statement  2,  is  self-contradictory.  One  can- 
not but  wonder  how  it  would  have  been  possible  to  enlarge  upon 
military  operations  without  aggravating  the  situation.  It  can  only 
be  interpreted  as  an  expression  of  the  army's  wishful  and  absurd 
thinking  that  the  occupation  could  be  extended  over  the  whole 
of  Manchuria  without  interference  from  either  the  Chinese  or 
the  Japanese  governments. 

It  was  possibly  on  the  20th  that  an  interesting  episode  occurred 
at  a  cabinet  meeting.14  Minami  read  a  report  on  the  Liutiaohu 
Incident  and  subsequent  events.  Shidehara,  in  his  memoirs,  re- 
marks that  it  went  into  somewhat  more  detail  than  the  reports 
found  in  the  press.  Minami's  report  concluded  with  an  appended 
notation  stating  in  effect  that  it  was  hoped  the  conflict  would  not 
be  further  enlarged.  Shidehara  then  pressed  Minami,  saying, 
"There  isn't  much  that  can  be  done  about  what  has  already  hap- 
pened, but  'hope,'  mere  wishful  thinking,  will  not  do.  Can  you 

13.  Article  XIII  of  the  Meiji  Constitution  read,  "The  Emperor  declares 
war,  makes  peace,  and  concludes  treaties." 

14.  In  his  memoirs  (p.  172),  Shidehara  states  that  he  does  not  recall 
whether  this  episode  occurred  on  the  20th  or  the  21st.  It  is  suggested, 
however,  that  this  cabinet  meeting  probably  took  place  during  the  morn- 
ing of  the  20th.  The  statements — especially  2  and  5 — made  by  Minami 
after  the  high-level  meeting  of  the  army  men  on  the  afternoon  of  the  same 
day,  strongly  suggest  that  they  were  made  to  hedge  against  the  commit- 
ment he  was  pressed  to  make  earlier  the  same  day.  To  pursue  this  point  a 
bit  farther,  on  the  21st  Minami  sought  the  cabinet's  approval  to  send  an 
additional  three  to  four  thousand  troops  from  Korea  to  Manchuria.  It 
hardly  seems  possible  that  he  could  on  the  same  day  pledge  nonenlarge- 
ment  of  the  military  operation  on  the  one  hand  and  on  the  other  ask  for 
an  increase  in  fighting  forces. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  177 

guarantee  that  the  conflict  will  not  be  further  enlarged?"  The 
Minister  of  War  said,  "Wait  a  moment,"  and  left  the  room  with 
the  written  report.  After  a  while  he  came  back  with  the  same 
report  to  which  the  notation  "will  be  guaranteed"  had  been 
added. 

At  long  last,  the  members  of  the  cabinet  breathed  more  easily. 
It  was  only  then  that  the  Foreign  Office,  for  the  first  time,  felt 
sufficiently  confident  to  wire  the  Japanese  delegation  in  Geneva 
an  account  of  the  Mukden  Incident.  This  episode  illustrates  that 
it  was  not  within  Minami's  power  to  determine  the  course  of  the 
Manchurian  crisis  but  that  he  was  speaking  in  behalf  of  a  power- 
ful group  which  manipulated  him  from  behind  the  scene.  We 
have  just  noted  how  Minami's  report  was  rigidly  edited  and  how 
he  dared  not  change  a  word  without  the  consent  of  this  amor- 
phous body  of  army  men.15 

At  the  extraordinary  meeting  of  the  cabinet  on  the  morning 
of  September  2 1  Minami  tried  to  get  the  cabinet  to  agree  to  send 
three  to  four  thousand  troops  to  Changchun  and  Chientao,  a 
district  in  the  southeastern  part  of  Manchuria  and  partially  bor- 
dering on  Korea,  in  view  of  the  critical  situation  which  prevailed 
in  these  localities.  Minami  had  the  audacity  to  suggest  to  the 
cabinet  members  that  they  were  being  consulted  as  a  matter  of 
form.  The  Minister  of  War  maintained  that  the  army  could  go 
ahead  and  dispatch  troops  from  Korea  without  consulting  them 
if  it  so  desired,  since  the  decision  had  been  reached  by  the 
so-called  Big  Three  of  the  army. 

Shidehara,  Inoue,  and  other  members  of  the  cabinet  vocifer- 
ously opposed  Minami's  proposal  and  counseled  caution  by  re- 

15.  Harada,  in  his  diary,  gives  some  inkling  of  the  kind  of  situation 
with  which  Minami  had  to  contend.  "When  I  saw  the  Minister  of  Finance 
on  September  4,  1931,  Inoue  said  to  me,  'The  Minister  of  War  held  ideas 
very  similar  to  mine  with  respect  to  military  reorganization;  so  we  came 
to  an  understanding  on  all  matters  before  we  parted  company.  However, 
after  he  returned  to  his  ministry,  he  was  rebuffed  by  Onodera  Chojiro, 
Accountant  General,  and  Koiso  Kuniaki,  Chief  of  the  Military  Affairs 
Bureau.  So  Minami  had  to  come  back  and  retract  everything  we  had 
agreed  upon,  with  the  result  that  we  were  right  back  where  we  had 
started.'  "  Harada  Diary,  2,  45.  Author's  translation. 


178  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

minding  him  of  the  decision  reached  on  September  19  not  to 
aggravate  the  situation.  The  session  ended  inconclusively  at  5 
o'clock  that  day. 

Since  fighting  continued  daily  on  the  Manchurian  side  of  the 
Yalu,  it  was  doubtful  whether  the  Korean  Army  could  be  re- 
strained indefinitely.  Even  while  the  cabinet  was  engaged  in 
heated  discussions  over  the  very  problem,  4,000  troops  of  the 
Thirty-Ninth  Mixed  Brigade,  concentrated  at  Shingishu,  crossed 
over  into  Manchuria.  The  troops  could  no  longer  wait  for  author- 
ization from  General  Kanaya,  Chief  of  the  General  Staff.16  How 
did  this  eruptive,  defiant  action  by  the  Korean  Army  come  about 
on  the  heels  of  the  Mukden  Incident?  The  answer  to  this  question 
must  be  sought  in  the  actions  of  the  Kwantung  Army.  We  may 
start  with  the  fact  that  for  a  time  immediately  after  the  opening 
of  hostilities  there  was  indecision  in  the  high  councils  of  the 
Kwantung  Army  with  respect  to  the  question  of  strategy. 

When  Kwantung  Army  headquarters  moved  up  to  Mukden 
from  Port  Arthur  on  the  morning  of  September  19,  there  was  a 
strong  inclination  on  the  part  of  the  army  to  settle  the  Man- 
churian and  Mongolian  issues  once  and  for  all.  When  General 
Tatekawa  heard  of  this,  he  is  said  to  have  counseled,  "The  estab- 
lishment of  a  new  administrative  regime  in  South  Manchuria 
comes  first.  If  we  dawdle,  there  will  be  intervention  by  some 
third  power.  We  must  make  haste.  Northern  Manchuria,  I  would 
say,  comes  later."17 

Lieutenant  Colonel  Ishihara,  the  master  strategist  of  the  Kwan- 
tung Army,  thought  differently.  He  was  irresistibly  attracted 
toward  Harbin  because  he  was  primarily  concerned  with  Rus- 

16.  According  to  one  source,  "It  was  a  known  fact  that  General  Ha- 
yashi's  staff  was  in  touch  with  Lieutenant  Colonel  Ishihara  of  the  Kwan- 
tung Army.  Hayashi  was  said  to  have  been  railroaded  by  his  staff  into 
ordering  his  troops  to  cross  the  border.  It  was  even  rumored  that  Hayashi, 
unable  to  make  up  his  mind,  was  trembling  in  his  office."  Matsumura, 
Miyakezaka,  pp.  42-43.  Author's  translation. 

17.  Ibid.,  p.  39.  Author's  translation.  See  also  Asahi,  Taiheiyo,  2,  29-30, 
and  Supplement,  pp.  5-6. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  179 

sian  intervention.  Once  strategic  command  of  the  northern  plains 
had  been  secured,  the  Kwantung  Army  would  be  in  the  advan- 
tageous position  of  possessing  interior  lines  of  communication 
according  to  the  classic  strategy  employed  by  Napoleon  at 
Leipzig. 

Though  Tatekawa  listened  to  Ishihara's  plan,  he  already  had 
his  hands  full  trying  to  stabilize  the  situation  in  and  around  Muk- 
den. Moreover,  he  countered  by  saying  that  if  the  Kwantung 
Army  advanced  into  the  northern  plains,  the  Russians  would  be 
provoked  into  intervening.  Also  to  be  contended  with  was  the 
order  from  army  headquarters  in  Tokyo  to  withdraw  to  the  rail- 
way zone  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway — the  reverse,  so  to 
speak,  of  the  nonaggravation  policy. 

Meanwhile,  an  urgent  call  came  in  to  headquarters  in  Mukden 
from  the  Army  Special  Service  Agency  in  Kirin.  The  Japanese 
army  detachment  there  was  trying  to  draft  Hsi  Ch'ia18  to  act  as 
a  front  for  the  army  regime,  but  he  did  not  dare  oblige  as  long 
as  stragglers  from  the  North  Barracks  in  Mukden  occupied  Kirin. 
All  of  a  sudden  headquarters'  eyes  were  trained  on  Kirin.  Tech- 
nically, of  course,  the  army  was  not  permitted  to  engage  in  mili- 
tary actions  outside  the  railway  zone  without  imperial  sanction. 
General  Honjo,  Commanding  General  of  the  Kwantung  Army, 
counseled  caution  and  delayed  making  any  decisive  move.  Ex- 
tremists among  his  staff,  however,  were  fearful  that  Tokyo  might 
decide  to  impose  further  stringent  restrictions  on  the  actions  of 
the  Kwantung  Army.  They  feared  that  at  any  moment  they  would 
be  ordered  to  relinquish  the  huge  advantages  they  had  gained  in 
a  short  time. 

On  September  21,  three  days  after  the  Mukden  Incident,  Colo- 
nel Itagaki  finally  prevailed  upon  General  Honjo  to  order  an 
attack  on  Kirin.  Once  the  decision  had  been  reached,  the  attack 
was  launched  swiftly  and  boldly.  Ishihara  rounded  up  all  avail- 
able troops,  incorporated  them  into  the  Second  Division  under 

18.  Once  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Kirin  Army,  he  later  headed  the  puppet 
regime  of  Kirin  under  the  tutelage  of  the  Kwantung  Army. 


180  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

General  Tamon,  and  made  a  dash  for  Kirin,  leaving  Mukden 
completely  unguarded.  Kirin  was  occupied  without  firing  a  shot. 
What  happened  next  is  a  story  already  known.  Hsi  Ch'ia  reluc- 
tantly proclaimed  the  independence  of  the  province  of  Kirin  under 
the  threat  of  General  Tamon,  who  held  a  revolver  to  his  head.19 

The  Korean  Army,  which  was  itching  for  action,  immediately 
seized  the  opportunity  to  fill  the  vacuum  and  crossed  the  Yalu 
into  Manchuria.  The  unauthorized  crossing  of  the  border  was 
excused  by  Korean  Army  spokesmen  on  the  grounds  that  Muk- 
den was  in  peril  without  Japanese  soldiers  for  protection.  After 
arriving  in  Mukden,  detachments  were  sent  to  occupy  Liaoyuan 
and  Hsinmin.  This  phase  of  the  operation  was  completed  on 
September  22. 20 

News  of  the  precipitate  moves  of  the  Kwantung  and  Korean 
Armies,  reached  the  General  Staff  at  5:30  p.m.  on  September  21 
and  deeply  distressed  General  Kanaya.  The  next  day  he  hastened 
to  the  Imperial  Palace  to  see  whether  the  Emperor  would  grant 
an  ex  post  facto  sanction  for  the  unauthorized  mobilization  of 
the  Korean  Army.  It  is  presumed  that  by  this  time  Kido  had 
apprised  the  Emperor  of  Saionji's  counsel  not  to  sanction  the 
action  of  the  Korean  Army,21  since  the  Emperor  refused  Kanaya's 
petition,  stating  that  there  was  no  decision  by  the  government  to 
cover  the  cost  of  the  expedition.22  Minami,  equally  concerned, 

19.  Morishima,  Conspiracy,  p.  75.  For  a  singular  eye-witness  account 
of  the  Kwantung  Army's  Kirin  operation  and  its  subsequent  hostile  atti- 
tude toward  the  members  of  Japan's  Foreign  Office,  see  Ishii,  Gaikokan 
no  Issho,  pp.  181-90. 

20.  Asahi,  Taiheiyo,  2,  16-17.  One  can  only  be  puzzled  by  Exhibit  3423 
of  the  IMTFE,  which  cites  from  Man-Mitsu-Dai-Nikki  (Manchurian 
Secret  Great  Diary)  that  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  under  date  of 
September  22,  1931,  sent  a  top  secret  order  to  the  commanders  of  the 
Kwantung  Army  and  the  Korean  Army  authorizing  the  dispatch  of  the 
Korean  Army  into  Manchuria.  First,  on  the  19th,  the  Office  of  the  General 
Staff  was  compelled  to  rescind  a  mobilization  order  to  the  Korean  Army 
dispatched  earlier  the  same  day;  secondly,  why  would  the  Office  of  the 
General  Staff  issue  an  order  for  an  action  already  completed? 

21.  See  above,  p.  172. 

22.  Wakatsuki  Memoirs,  p.  377. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  181 

sent  General  Sugiyama,  his  Vice  Minister,  to  see  Wakatsuki. 
Sugiyama  pleaded  with  the  Premier  to  hasten  to  the  Imperial 
Palace  the  same  night  and  report  to  the  Emperor  that  the  com- 
mander of  the  Korean  Army  had  arbitrarily  dispatched  one  bri- 
gade into  Manchuria  and  that  the  details  would  be  reported  to 
His  Majesty  after  the  matter  had  received  attention  at  the  cabinet 
meeting  the  next  day. 

On  the  morning  of  September  23  the  Emperor  summoned 
Wakatsuki  and  said,  "The  government's  policy  not  to  aggravate 
the  situation  is,  indeed,  an  appropriate  one.  You  will  see  to  it 
that  this  policy  is  carried  out."23  When  Wakatsuki  withdrew,  he 
found  Kanaya  in  the  waiting  room.  The  General  had  come  in 
utmost  secrecy  to  plead  with  Wakatsuki  to  report  to  the  Emperor 
that  the  expedition  by  the  Korean  Army  had  been  passed  upon 
by  the  cabinet.  Without  the  Premier's  word,  Kanaya  said,  he 
could  not  receive  the  Emperor's  sanction.  Wakatsuki  remained 
adamant  in  the  face  of  Kanaya's  plea  and  returned  to  his  resi- 
dence. 

Harada  gives  no  reason  for  Wakatsuki's  refusal.  Legally  speak- 
ing, this  was  a  problem  only  between  the  Emperor  and  the  Chief 
of  the  General  Staff.  As  a  student  of  the  Meiji  Constitution  ob- 
serves, "The  supreme  military  command  ...  is  exercised  by  the 
Emperor  not  through  the  ministers  of  the  Departments  of  War 
and  the  Navy  but  through  the  Chiefs  of  the  General  Staff  of  the 
Navy  and  War,  who  are  responsible  only  to  the  Emperor.  The 
General  Staffs  are  organizations  independent  of  the  Cabinet  and 
discharge  their  business  under  the  direct  control  and  supervision 
of  the  Emperor."24 

If  what  is  quoted  here  had  been  the  established  practice,  then 
the  actions  of  both  Kanaya  and  Minami  were  extraordinary.  The 
aid  which  they  sought  from  Wakatsuki  was  more  in  the  nature 
of  a  personal  favor  than  anything  else.  What  then  was  responsible 

23.  Harada  Diary,  2,  71.  Author's  translation. 

24.  Nakano,  The  Ordinance  Power  of  the  Japanese  Emperor,  pp.  1 54— 

55. 


182  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

for  creating  this  curious  situation  in  which  two  full  generals  had 
to  solicit  the  Premier  for  his  moral  support?  The  only  answer 
seems  to  lie  in  the  manner  in  which  the  Emperor  had  interposed 
the  authority  of  the  civil  government  between  himself  and  the 
army.  We  therefore  come  to  the  crucial  question :  Was  this  either 
by  established  practice  or  by  constitutional  interpretation  the 
proper  way  of  disposing  of  the  issue?  It  is  apparent  that  the  ver- 
dict should  be  negative.  The  real  charge  should  have  been  that 
General  Hayashi  of  the  Korean  Army  had  overstepped  his  author- 
ity. And  since  the  line  of  command  in  case  of  military  operation 
came  down  from  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  Kanaya  too  was 
responsible  for  the  improper  act  of  Hayashi.  But  the  effect  of  the 
Emperor's  failure  to  assert  at  a  crucial  juncture  the  constitutional 
authority  which  rightfully  was  his  must  be  presumed  to  have  had 
an  unfortunate  and  far-reaching  effect  on  the  future  conduct  and 
behavior  of  the  military  men.  Actually,  Hayashi  had  encroached 
upon  the  imperial  prerogative  and  the  Emperor  could  have  simply 
stated  so.  In  the  last  analysis,  the  responsibility  of  advising  the 
Emperor  on  the  course  of  action  to  take  rested  with  the  men  who 
surrounded  him:  Among  others  the  Grand  Chamberlain,  the 
Lord  Keeper  of  Privy  Seal,  the  Minister  of  the  Imperial  House- 
hold, Saionji,  and  the  Premier  himself. 

The  cabinet  met  on  September  23.  The  members  expressed 
their  indignation  at  Minami's  inability  to  compel  the  Kwantung 
Army  to  comply  with  the  government's  order.  Certain  members 
went  so  far  as  to  disavow  the  government's  responsibility  for 
military  ventures  which  the  Kwantung  Army  might  undertake 
in  the  future  without  receiving  prior  consent.  Referring  to  this 
particular  meeting,  Harada  in  his  diary  wrote,  "At  any  rate  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  the  Minister  of  War,  and  the  Minis- 
ter of  Finance  reached  an  agreement.  Minami  promised  that  he 
would  not  take  independent  action  thereafter."25  It  was  reliably 
reported  that  even  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  had  sided  with 
Shidehara's  nonaggravation  policy.26 

25.  Harada  Diary,  2,  73-74.  Author's  translation. 

26.  Takeuchi,  War  and  Diplomacy  in  the  Japanese  Empire,  p.  354,  n.  58. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  183 

The  cabinet  was  left  with  no  choice  but  to  appropriate  funds 
for  the  Korean  Army  lest  it  be  left  without  subsistence  in  the 
field.  Moreover,  if  the  Korean  Army  were  withdrawn  from  Man- 
churia, it  was  not  certain  whether  the  Kwantung  Army  with  a 
force  of  1 1 ,000  could  hold  its  ground  against  some  250,000  Chi- 
nese soldiers27  in  the  event  of  a  counterattack  on  a  wide  front. 
There  was  also  the  fear  that,  without  adequate  armed  protection, 
the  life  and  property  of  the  Japanese  residents  might  be  seriously 
jeopardized.  It  was  not  that  Inoue,  the  Minister  of  Finance,  ap- 
proved of  the  additional  expenditures  for  the  Korean  Army;  he 
was  merely  submitting  formally  to  a  fait  accompli.  Moreover, 
Minami  pleaded  with  Wakatsuki  to  save  Kanaya's  face.  The 
Prime  Minister  had  no  choice  but  to  proceed  to  the  Imperial 
Palace  the  same  evening  to  report  to  the  Emperor  that  he  in- 
tended to  defray  the  additional  expenditures  which  the  Korean 
Army  had  incurred  by  its  actions. 

After  Wakatsuki,  both  Minami  and  Kanaya  had  audiences 
with  the  Emperor.  Kanaya  did  not  emerge  from  his  unscathed; 
the  Emperor  reprimanded  him  with  the  terse  words,  "Hereafter, 
take  heed."28  Kanaya  is  said  to  have  come  away  from  the  audi- 
ence completely  mortified. 

With  the  opening  of  hostilities,  unstinting  cooperation  from 
the  directors  and  officials  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Com- 
pany became  indispensable  to  the  mobility  of  the  Kwantung 
Army.  It  has  been  indicated  already  that  the  majority  of  the 
directors,  except  for  Sogo,  were  oriented  to  Shidehara's  foreign 
policy.  Therefore,  the  Wakatsuki  government  thought  of  sum- 
moning President  Uchida  and  Vice  President  Eguchi  to  Tokyo 


27.  The  Chinese  regulars  with  the  Fengtien  Army  as  the  nucleus  num- 
bered about  250,000.  Chang  Hsueh-liang  at  the  time  had  approximately 
110,000  troops  directly  under  his  command,  stationed  in  and  about  Peking 
and  Tientsin.  The  remaining  140,000  were  stationed  roughly  as  follows  in 
the  four  provinces:  Fengtien  45,000;  Kirin  55,000;  Heilungkiang  25,000; 
and  Jehol  15,000.  Toyoshima,  Himerareta  Showashi,  p.  55. 

28.  Wakatsuki  Memoirs,  p.  378.  Author's  translation. 


184  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

for  a  conference,  with  a  view  to  using  their  influence  to  restrain 
the  unbridled  actions  of  the  Kwantung  Army. 

Uchida  and  Eguchi  had  booked  passage  aboard  the  same  ship 
from  Dairen  to  Tokyo.  Sog6,  who  sensed  what  would  be  in  store 
for  the  two  men  in  Tokyo,  quickly  resorted  to  a  divisive  tactic. 
He  succeeded  in  persuading  Uchida  to  change  his  itinerary  and 
proceed  to  Tokyo  by  rail  via  Mukden  and  Seoul.  Thus  Eguchi 
had  to  sail  alone  from  Dairen.  In  Mukden,  Uchida  met  General 
Honjo  for  a  conversation.  The  staff  of  the  Kwantung  Army  joined 
forces  and  talked  Uchida  into  taking  sides  with  the  army,  to  fol- 
low up  the  Mukden  Incident  with  vigorous  military  action  until 
the  whole  of  Manchuria  fell  under  Japan's  control. 

Buoyant  with  enthusiasm,  Uchida  summoned  the  directors 
and  executives  of  the  Mukden  office  and  pledged  the  undivided 
support  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Company  to  the  Kwan- 
tung Army.  He  made  a  statement  to  the  effect  that  Japan  must 
fight  until  her  ultimate  objectives  had  been  attained.  The  direc- 
tors were  flabbergasted  to  hear  such  a  statement  from  Uchida, 
for  it  represented  a  complete  departure  from  Shidehara's  diplo- 
macy. En  route  to  Tokyo,  in  Seoul,  Governor  Ugaki  and  General 
Hayashi,  Commander  of  the  Korean  Army,  awaited  Uchida's 
arrival,  and  they  too  voiced  full  support.  After  arriving  in  Japan, 
Uchida  continued  to  talk  in  the  same  vein,  much  to  the  disappoint- 
ment of  his  friends. 

On  October  14  Saionji  told  Harada,  "Uchida  dropped  in 
today,  so  I  listened  to  his  story  and  was  greatly  disappointed  in 
him.  Though  on  the  one  hand  he  talked  about  exercising  pru- 
dence in  order  to  enable  the  League  of  Nations  to  maintain  its 
prestige  and  to  reciprocate  America's  friendly  attitude,  on  the 
other  hand  when  our  conversation  dwelt  upon  Manchuria,  I  was 
amazed  by  his  positive  views.  He  must  have  succumbed  to  the 
atmosphere  in  Manchuria  and  perhaps  has  even  been  browbeaten 
by  the  army."29 

29.  Harada  Diary,  2,  93.  Author's  translation. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  185 

On  the  following  day,  October  15,  Shidehara  described  to 
Harada  a  conversation  he  had  had  with  Uchida.  "Last  night  I 
had  a  talk  with  Uchida,"  he  said.  "Since  he  assumed  such  a  posi- 
tive attitude  with  respect  to  Manchuria,  I  told  him.  'If  you  think 
you  can  get  by  with  what  you  are  saying,  why  don't  you  take  over 
my  office  and  see  for  yourself?'  He  suddenly  shifted  his  stand 
and  said,  'Oh  no,  we  cannot  do  any  such  thing.  There  is  the 
League  and  America  to  consider.'  "30 

Thus  it  is  quite  clear  that  Uchida,  while  recognizing  the  neces- 
sity for  Japan  to  conduct  her  foreign  relations  within  the  frame- 
work of  the  League  and  other  treaty  commitments,  nevertheless 
shared  the  objectives  of  the  Kwantung  Army  in  respect  to  Man- 
churia, which  were  wholly  inconsistent  with  those  of  the  Foreign 
Office. 


Sidelights  at  Nanking  and  Tokyo 

In  a  last-minute  attempt  to  ease  Japanese-Chinese  tensions, 
Shigemitsu  and  T.  V.  Soong,  Finance  Minister  of  the  Nationalist 
regime,  had  agreed  to  visit  Manchuria  together.  They  had  booked 
passage  aboard  a  steamer  scheduled  to  sail  from  Shanghai  on 
September  20,  1931,  when  the  Mukden  Incident  suddenly  broke 
out.  Undaunted,  Shigemitsu  continued  his  efforts.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  19th,  after  receiving  news  of  the  Liutiaohu  Incident,  he 
called  on  Soong  and  expressed  regret  that  their  efforts  had  come 
too  late,  but  at  the  same  time  expressed  his  determination  to 
settle  the  Incident  as  quickly  as  possible.  Soong  agreed  that  an 
early  settlement  was  desirable,  and  suggested  that  the  two  con- 
tinue with  their  original  plan  to  go  to  Manchuria.  Shigemitsu  re- 
sponded that  he  would  try  immediately  to  get  the  approval  of 
the  home  office  if  Mr.  Soong  would  kindly  wait. 

Chang  Chun,  a  graduate  of  the  Japanese  Military  Academy 

30.  Ibid.,  p.  95.  Author's  translation. 


186 


CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 


who  chanced  to  be  with  them,  asked  Shigemitsu,  "Do  you  really 
think  the  Japanese  government  can  localize  the  conflict  by  re- 
straining the  army?"  Shigemitsu  could  only  reply,  "Irrespective 
of  the  outcome,  the  Japanese  government  has  decided  to  localize 
the  incident.  We  shall  have  to  do  everything  we  can."1 

Shigemitsu  reported  to  Shidehara  the  conversation  he  had  had 
with  Soong.  At  the  end  of  the  message  he  stressed  the  absolute 
necessity  of  prompt  action.  As  in  the  Saburi  case,  there  was  a 
delay.  Shigemitsu  had  to  send  a  follow-up  telegram  emphasizing 
the  urgency  of  the  situation.  Meanwhile,  the  Kwantung  Army 
continued  to  enlarge  its  theater  of  operations.  Since  localization 
of  the  conflict  no  longer  appeared  practicable,  Shigemitsu  con- 
cluded that  Shidehara  was  deliberately  withholding  a  reply  to 
Soong's  suggestion. 

In  Tokyo,  Shidehara  was  heartened  by  the  report  from  Shige- 
mitsu on  his  conversation  with  Soong.  Elated,  he  reported  the 
fact  to  the  Minister  of  War  and  to  the  Emperor  and  followed 
it  by  dispatching  a  congratulatory  telegram  to  Shigemitsu  on 
September  21:  "Well  done!  Make  every  effort  to  complete  the 
action."  He  wanted  Shigemitsu  immediately  to  take  up  the  Man- 
churian  issues  with  Soong  along  the  lines  he  had  suggested.  In 
addition,  the  Foreign  Minister  suggested  that  the  conversations 
extend  over  all  outstanding  Sino- Japanese  problems. 

When  Shigemitsu  saw  Soong,  the  latter  said:  "The  enlarge- 
ment of  the  theater  of  conflict  in  Manchuria  subsequent  to  our 
conversation  has  been  entirely  the  doing  of  the  Japanese  army 
according  to  their  plans.  The  matter  is  out  of  our  hands.  China 
has  already  appealed  directly  to  the  League.  There  is  no  point 
in  opening  conversations  with  the  Japanese  government  at  this 
stage." 

To  counter  the  unbridled  actions  of  the  Kwantung  Army  in 
Manchuria  the  Chinese  resorted  to  every  possible  means  of  re- 


1.  The  desperate  attempt  by  Shigemitsu  and  T.  V.  Soong  to  head  off 
Sino-Japanese  collision  is  taken  from  Shigemitsu  Memoirs,  pp.  105  ff. 
Author's  translation. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  187 

sistance  short  of  military  action.  Shigemitsu  expressed  his  ap- 
prehension to  the  home  government  in  the  following  terms: 

The  Chinese  government  is  fully  aware  of  the  gravity 
of  the  situation.  Though  they  will  adhere  to  their  time- 
honored  practice  of  not  resisting  by  force,  they  are 
bringing  into  motion  every  means  and  method  to  com- 
bat Japan.  Not  only  has  the  Nationalist  government 
unity  of  leadership  now,  but  the  anti-Japanese  ma- 
chinery which  is  experienced  and  disciplined  has  be- 
gun to  operate.  Economic  boycott  is  bad  enough,  but 
now  the  nationwide  student  organization,  which  did  not 
so  much  as  stir  in  the  Korean  incident,2  has  taken  up 
the  cudgels.  Its  actions  are  fraught  with  extreme  con- 
sequences. Anti- Japanese  sentiment  is  even  more  vio- 
lent than  that  which  flared  up  during  the  time  of  the 
Twenty-One  Demands  and  is  expected  to  become 
worse.  In  the  present  situation  there  is  no  telling  when 
the  sparks  may  leap  to  regions  other  than  Manchuria. 
In  this  connection,  it  is  requested  of  the  government 
that  it  especially  warn  the  navy3  to  exercise  utmost 
prudence.4 

While  Shidehara  awaited  the  aforementioned  disappointing 
report  from  Shigemitsu  on  the  response  from  T.  V.  Soong,  Shide- 
hara summoned  Chiang  Tso-pin,  the  Chinese  Minister  to  Japan, 
and  said: 

I  understand  that  your  country  has  appealed  the  case 
of  the  Liutiaohu  Incident  to  Geneva.  This  strikes  me  as 

2.  An  incident  in  Pyongyang,  Korea,  on  July  5,  1931.  Chinese  residents 
in  the  city  were  persecuted  in  retaliation  for  the  Wanpaoshan  Incident 
which  had  occurred  two  days  earlier  in  Manchuria. 

3.  Shigemitsu  does  not  explain  why  the  Japanese  navy  was  singled  out. 
However,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  Shanghai  Incident  which  started  on 
January  28,  1932,  was  a  navy  show — a  counterpart  to  the  army's  Mukden 
Incident — it  is  presumed  that  he  had  grounds  for  concern. 

4.  Shigemitsu,  Showa  no  Doran,  1,  53-54.  Author's  translation. 


188  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

an  ill-advised  move.  At  the  League,  nations  unfamiliar 
with  the  situation  in  the  Far  East  will  argue  the  issues 
back  and  forth  until  they  have  turned  the  place  into  a 
debating  contest.  It  will  be  most  humiliating  for  any 
nation  to  admit  its  fault  under  such  circumstances.  In- 
stead, each  country  is  bound  to  defend  its  position 
obstinately.  That  is  certainly  not  the  way  to  bring  two 
parties  to  terms.  I  believe  that  the  best  way  is  to  hold 
direct  conversations  between  China  and  Japan.  It  is 
stated  in  the  League  Covenant  that  every  means  of  di- 
plomacy5 ought  to  be  explored  before  an  issue  is 
brought  to  the  League's  attention.  I,  for  one,  cannot  see 
why  it  is  not  possible  for  us  to  come  to  terms  were  our 
representatives  to  engage  in  frank  discussion  before 
airing  the  issue  before  the  forum  of  nations.6 

Shidehara  states  that  from  5  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  to  8 
in  the  evening  he  took  extra  pains  to  explain  and  to  win  Chiang 
over  to  his  approach  to  the  Sino-Japanese  rift.  Chiang  seemed 


5.  The  Covenant  of  the  League  did  not  enunciate  this  thesis  as  clearly 
as  does  the  United  Nations  Charter  under  Article  33,  paragraph  1.  It  must 
be  presumed  that  Shidehara  had  inferred  the  statement  from  Article  13, 
paragraph  1  of  the  Covenant,  which  read,  "The  Members  of  the  League 
agree  that  whenever  any  dispute  shall  arise  between  them  which  they  rec- 
ognize to  be  suitable  for  submission  to  arbitration  or  judicial  settlement, 
and  which  cannot  be  satisfactorily  settled  by  diplomacy,  they  will  submit 
the  whole  subject-matter  to  arbitration  or  judicial  settlement,"  and  Article 
15,  paragraph  1,  which  read,  "If  there  should  arise  between  Members  of 
the  League  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture,  which  is  not  submitted 
to  arbitration  or  judicial  settlement  in  accordance  with  Article  13,  the 
Members  of  the  League  agree  that  they  will  submit  the  matter  to  the 
Council."  The  Chinese  delegates  at  Geneva,  however,  appealed  under 
Article  11,  paragraph  1:  "any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  immediately 
affecting  any  of  the  Members  of  the  League  or  not,  is  hereby  declared  a 
matter  of  concern  to  the  whole  League,  and  the  League  shall  take  any 
action  that  may  be  deemed  wise  and  effectual  to  safeguard  the  peace  of 
nations." 

6.  Shidehara  Memoirs,  p.  174.  Author's  translation. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  189 

to  agree  with  Shidehara's  point  of  view,  and,  apparently  went 
back  and  sent  a  long  telegram  to  his  home  government.  After 
that,  however,  Chiang  declined  to  see  Shidehara  for  a  long  time, 
although  the  Foreign  Minister  repeatedly  requested  another  in- 
terview. It  became  known  much  later  to  the  Japanese  Foreign 
Office  that  Chiang  had  been  ordered  by  his  government  not  to 
see  Shidehara  for  the  time  being. 

By  hindsight  the  appraisal  of  the  situation  in  Manchuria  by 
the  Nanking  government  was  far  more  realistic  than  that  of 
Japan's  Foreign  Office.  They  had  but  two  choices:  either  fight 
or  appeal  to  the  League.  They  chose  the  latter. 

In  direct  contrast,  the  Foreign  Office  of  Japan  failed  to  under- 
stand the  designs  of  the  Kwantung  Army.  In  the  latter  part  of 
September  the  Foreign  Office  sent  Morishima  Goro,  Chief  of 
the  First  Section  of  the  Asia  Bureau,  to  Mukden.  Upon  arrival, 
he  is  said  to  have  remarked  earnestly  to  Consul  General  Hayashi, 
"It  is  the  consensus  of  the  Japanese  cabinet  not  to  expand  the 
conflict.  Will  you  see  to  it  that  this  policy  is  observed."  Hayashi 
retorted,  "That's  impossible"  and  indicated  the  manner  in  which 
the  Kwantung  Army  was  enlarging  its  operations  each  day.  When 
Morishima  returned  to  Tokyo,  he  reported  that  even  the  Consul 
General's  own  safety  was  in  jeopardy,  since  some  of  the  extremist 
members  of  the  Kwantung  Army  who  were  annoyed  by  Hayashi's 
interference  harbored  designs  on  his  life.7 

Equally  in  the  dark  regarding  the  true  state  of  affairs  in  Man- 
churia were  Japan's  diplomats  stationed  abroad.  A  case  in  point 
was  Ambassador  Yoshizawa  Kenkichi,  who  played  a  leading 
role  at  Geneva  during  the  early  months  of  the  Manchurian  crisis. 
En  route  to  Tokyo  he  stopped  at  Berlin  and  was  flabbergasted 
to  learn  for  the  first  time  from  Ambassador  Obata  Torikichi  the 
story  of  the  conspiracy  by  Itagaki  and  Ishihara  of  the  Kwantung 
Army.8  There  was  little  that  Japan's  foreign  representatives 
could  do  except  to  palliate  the  fait  accompli  in  Manchuria.  In 

7.  Harada  Diary,  2,  11.  Author's  translation. 

8.  Morishima,  Conspiracy,  pp.  70-71. 


190  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

their  thankless  task  of  transmitting  to  foreign  governments  the 
empty  pronouncements  and  proposals  of  their  home  government, 
they  earned  for  themselves  an  unwished-for  reputation  for  dupli- 
city. 

Although  the  Nanking  government  was  more  astute  in  pene- 
trating the  true  intentions  of  the  Kwantung  Army  than  was 
Wakatsuki's  government,  it  too  fell  short  in  assessing  the  extent 
to  which  the  army  was  prepared  to  defy  the  League.  At  the  cabi- 
net meeting  on  October  1  Shidehara  said  it  was  desirable  that 
Japan  should  make  her  intentions  known  before  the  League 
Council  met  on  October  14.  The  Foreign  Minister  said,  "There 
would  be  no  problem  if  Japan  evacuated  her  troops  by  then. 
Though  it  would  be  permissible  to  maintain  some  troops  for  the 
purpose  of  self-protection,  it  would  be  ill-advised  to  leave  troops 
in  numbers  over  and  above  the  requirements  at  such  points  as 
Kirin  and  Tunhua." 

War  Minister  Minami  countered  by  saying,  "If  we  withdraw 
our  troops  now,  we  will  no  longer  be  able  to  maintain  control 
over  Mukden  and  Kirin  and  will  place  ourselves  in  a  vulnerable 
postion.  Why  in  the  world  do  we  not  withdraw  from  the 
League?"9  Wakatsuki  was  helpless  in  the  face  of  this  attitude. 

The  Bombardment  of  Chinchow 

On  the  afternoon  of  September  23  the  resolution  of  the  League 
Council,1  together  with  Yoshizawa's  report,  reached  the  Foreign 
Office  in  Tokyo.  On  the  25th  a  reply  was  drafted  and  made  pub- 
lic. The  following  morning  Wakatsuki  had  an  audience  with  the 
Emperor  and  explained  the  delicate  situation:  "The  reply  to  the 

9.  The  exchange  of  views  between  Shidehara  and  Minami  is  from  the 
Harada  Diary,  2,  84.  Author's  translation. 

1.  In  the  present  work  the  actions  taken  by  the  League  will  be  men- 
tioned only  insofar  as  they  had  a  direct  bearing  on  the  decisions  made  in 
Tokyo.  For  the  details  of  the  proceedings  at  Geneva  during  the  Manchur- 
ian  crisis  see  Sara  R.  Smith,  The  Manchurian  Crisis,  1931-32:  A  Tragedy 
in  International  Relations  (New  York,  1948).  With  respect  to  Japan's 
reaction  to  the  proceedings  in  Geneva  see  Takeuchi,  War  and  Diplomacy 
in  the  Japanese  Empire,  pp.  354-66. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  191 

League  was  deliberately  withheld  because  there  were  misgivings 
that  the  army  might  not  withdraw  its  troops  despite  the  decision 
of  the  cabinet  and  the  promise  made  by  the  Minister  of  War.  We 
were  fearful  that  the  army  might  later  commit  acts  which  would 
contradict  our  pronouncement  and  thereby  place  our  nation's 
honor  in  serious  jeopardy."2 

Wakatsuki's  suspicion  was  not  unfounded  for  on  October  8, 
within  two  weeks  of  Japan's  profession  of  peaceful  intentions  to 
the  League,  the  Kwantung  Army  bombed  Chinchow.  The  fact 
was  that  army  headquarters  in  Tokyo  and  the  headquarters  of 
the  Korean  Army  were  still  in  the  midst  of  ironing  out  differences 
over  the  unauthorized  crossing  of  the  Yalu  River  by  the  Thirty- 
Ninth  Mixed  Brigade. 

When  General  Kanaya  read  the  coded  message  from  Mukden 
at  noon  on  October  8,  the  bombing  of  Chinchow  was  over.  The 
language  of  the  telegram  was  enigmatic:  "Chinchow  is  the  head- 
quarters of  Chang  Hsueh-liang.  It  is  the  center  of  disturbances 
in  Manchuria.  The  Kwantung  Army  contemplates  taking  some 
sort  of  action  against  it.  Please  be  so  advised."  The  same  evening 
army  headquarters  in  Tokyo  was  startled  by  a  follow-up  telegram 
from  Mukden  boldly  stating:  '"Chinchow  was  bombed.  We  beg 
your  thoughtful  disposal  of  the  matter."3 

Meanwhile  the  Big  Three  of  the  army — Generals  Minami, 
Kanaya,  and  Muto — met  to  formulate  terms  of  settlement 
for  the  Manchurian  crisis  which  would  be  acceptable  to  the  army. 
They  were:  (1)  outstanding  Sino-Japanese  issues,  including  the 
railway  and  land-lease  problems,  had  to  be  settled  immediately; 
(2)  settlement  was  to  be  reached  with  the  local  authorities,  not 
with  the  Nanking  government;  (3)  until  a  new  government  was 
formed  in  Manchuria,  Japan  should  maintain  the  status  quo;  the 
League  was  not  to  be  permitted  to  intervene  in  the  affairs  of 
Manchuria.4 

2.  Harada  Diary,  2,  75.  Author's  free  translation. 

3.  Matsumura,  Miyakezaka,  p.  44.  Author's  translation. 

4.  Tokyo  Asahi,  October  9,  193 1,  cited  in  Takeuchi,  pp.  357-58. 


192  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

These  army  demands  obviously  ran  directly  counter  to  the 
policy  the  Wakatsuki  government  was  desperately  trying  to  carry 
out.  However,  the  cabinet's  authority  was  already  waning  so 
rapidly  that  it  could  not  bring  itself  to  ask  the  Minister  of  War 
to  soften  the  army's  extreme  demands.  And  at  its  meeting  on 
October  9  no  member  of  the  cabinet  even  dared  censure  Honjo 
for  the  bombing  of  Chinchow.  Having  wrested  the  initiative  from 
Tokyo,  the  Kwantung  Army  had  begun  to  expand  its  military 
ventures  at  will,  leaving  Tokyo  no  choice  but  to  accept.  Each 
army  action  that  defied  the  government  had  the  effect  of  sapping 
the  cabinet's  strength.  The  body  politic  of  Japan  was  already 
afflicted  with  creeping  paralysis;  although  it  still  made  decisions, 
it  could  no  longer  enforce  them. 

In  utter  desperation  the  Premier  made  a  round  of  calls  on 
senior  statesmen  and  opposition  leaders  on  October  12  and  13. 
They  included  Admiral  Count  Yamamoto  Gonbei,  Count 
Kiyoura  Keigo,  Takahashi  Korekiyo,  Baron  Yamamoto  Tatsuo, 
Inukai  Tsuyoshi,  Prince  Konoe  Fumimaro,  and  Tokugawa 
Iesato.  Kidb  Koichi,5  critical  of  Wakatsuki's  irresoluteness, 
wrote  in  his  diary:  "The  cabinet  at  the  time,  despite  the  fact  that 
the  responsibility  lay  with  it,  did  not  attempt  to  work  out  a  policy 
of  its  own.  Instead,  it  indiscriminately  sought  aid  from  outside, 
which  was  most  reprehensible."6 

Wakatsuki  was  disturbed  by  the  fact  that  the  passage  quoted 
above  was  read  into  the  record  at  the  Tokyo  Trials,  and  he  re- 
futed Kido's  charge  as  unfounded.  He  explained  that  despite  the 
fact  that  he  viewed  with  alarm  the  Kwantung  Army's  flaunting 
disregard  of  governmental  authority,  he  deemed  as  ill  advised 
any  move  to  appeal  directly  to  the  people  even  if  the  Diet  were 
in  session  at  the  time,  because  such  an  act  might  cause  the  cabi- 
net to  topple.  Instead,  he  reasoned  that  it  was  in  the  best  interest 

5.  Kido's  official  position  at  the  time  was  Chief  Private  Secretary  to  the 
Keeper  of  Privy  Seal. 

6.  Wakatsuki  Memoirs,  p.  379.  Author's  translation.  For  explanations 
of  the  dilemma  which  Wakatsuki  faced  see  Scalapino,  Democracy  and  the 
Party  Movement  in  Prewar  Japan,  p.  240. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  193 

of  the  country  that  these  disinguished  men  who  were  versed  in 
the  affairs  of  the  nation  be  informed  about  the  crisis. 

It  would  seem  that  more  credence  ought  to  be  given  to  Wakat- 
suki's  own  explanation  of  his  purpose  in  visiting  these  men  of 
eminence  than  those  of  his  critics.  Nevertheless,  it  was  all  too 
patent  that  he  was  at  his  wit's  end  trying  to  bring  the  ram- 
paging Kwantung  Army  under  the  control  of  the  cabinet. 

On  the  evening  of  October  12  Wakatsuki  summoned  Harada 
and  complained: 

We  are  in  real  trouble.  In  the  interest  of  Japan,  I  have 
done  all  I  can  to  improve  her  relations  with  other 
nations.  I  have  repeatedly  called  the  attention  of  the 
Minister  of  War  at  cabinet  meetings  to  the  fact  that  our 
armed  forces  stationed  abroad  must  exercise  utmost 
prudence  not  to  engage  in  any  action  that  would  betray 
the  professions  which  the  government  has  already 
made  to  its  people  and  to  the  world.  I  have  constantly 
endeavored  to  base  the  conduct  of  our  foreign  rela- 
tions on  good  faith. 

I  would  summon  the  Minister  of  War  to  explain  to 
him  at  great  length  the  necessity  of  maintaining  orderly 
conduct  of  our  troops  abroad.  He  would  then  agree, 
"Indeed,  it  is  as  you  say.  I  shall  send  out  an  instruction 
right  away."  Then  what  would  happen?  The  troops  sta- 
tioned abroad  would  commit  acts  which  would  run 
completely  counter  to  the  agreement  that  the  Minister 
of  War  and  I  had  just  made.  This  is  followed  by  imme- 
diate repercussions  at  Geneva.  I  am  as  good  as  be- 
trayed. Too,  they  are  blemishing  Japan's  reputation. 
I  am  at  a  loss  as  to  what  to  do.  I  cannot  go  on  like  this. 
Yet,  I  cannot  very  well  resign  at  this  point.  Indeed, 
matters  have  come  to  a  serious  pass.7 

7.  Harada  Diary,  2,  91-92.  Author's  translation. 


194  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

On  the  14th,  Harada  departed  for  Kyoto  to  convey  Wakat- 
suki's  depressing  thoughts  to  Prince  Saionji. 

The  October  Plot1 

The  Wakatsuki  cabinet  was  tottering  from  the  effects  of  the  Man- 
churian  crisis  when  another  conspiracy,  the  October  Plot,  was 
uncovered.  It  died  at  birth,  like  its  predecessor  the  March  Plot; 
the  news  was  so  shocking,  however,  that  it  hastened  the  collapse 
of  the  Wakatsuki  government. 

On  August  4  Lieutenant  Colonel  Hashimoto  told  Major 
Tanaka  Kiyoshi,  "A  thorough  reform  is  being  planned  to  take 
place  about  the  middle  of  September.  It  will  capitalize  on  an  inci- 
dent which  is  to  occur  in  Manchuria.  Understanding  has  been 
reached  already  with  the  key  men  of  the  General  Staff  with 
respect  to  the  nature  of  domestic  reconstruction.  Will  you,  there- 
fore, draw  up  a  plan  for  the  military  to  spearhead  a  movement  to 
wrest  power  from  the  present  government?"2 

Briefly,  the  plot3  called  for  Lieutenant  Colonel  Hashimoto  and 
Major  Cho  to  rally  the  extremists  of  the  Cherry  Society  and  with 
the  cooperation  of  the  Okawa  and  the  Kita-Nishida4  factions 
to  stage  a  coup  on  October  24.  To  be  mobilized  were  some 
twelve  companies  of  army  troops,  thirteen  naval  bombers,  and 
three  or  four  army  planes.  Their  plan  of  attack  was  threefold:  ( 1 ) 
to  bomb  the  Premier's  residence  while  the  cabinet  was  holding 

1.  See  Storry,  The  Double  Patriots,  pp.  86-93.  As  in  the  case  of  the 
March  Plot,  my  account  of  the  October  Plot  was  written  without  any 
knowledge  of  Mr.  Storry's  publication. 

2.  Mori,  Senpu  Nijunen,  p.  80.  Author's  translation.  The  staff  under 
General  Kanaya  consisted  of  Lieutenant  General  Ninomiya,  Assistant 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  and  Major  Generals  Umezu,  Chief  of  the 
General  Affairs  Department,  Tatekawa,  Chief  of  the  First  Department, 
and  Hashimoto  Toranosuke,  Chief  of  the  Second  Department.  Matsumura, 
Miyakezaka,  p.  51. 

3.  For  details,  see  Mori,  Senpu  Nijunen,  pp.  76-82. 

4.  Nishida  Zei,  a  former  army  officer,  and  Kita  Ikki,  author  of  Nihon 
Kaizo  Hoan  Taiko  (An  Outline  of  Measures  for  the  Reconstruction  of 
Japan)  were  advocates  of  an  extreme  form  of  national  socialism. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  195 

a  meeting  and  to  wipe  out  the  Wakatsuki  government;  (2)  to 
occupy  the  Metropolitan  Police  Office,  the  War  Ministry,  and 
the  General  Staff  Office;  and  (3)  to  eliminate  such  undesirable 
army  officers  as  Major  General  Katsuki  Kiyoshi,  Director  of  the 
War  College,  and  Major  Nakano  Naozo  of  the  Military  Academy. 
These  men  had  strongly  opposed  the  Cherry  Society.  Included 
among  the  undesirables  were  also  the  top  officials  of  the  Imperial 
Household,  key  figures  in  political  parties,  and  executives  of  the 
zaibatsu. 

Except  for  the  premiership,  important  cabinet  posts  in  the 
proposed  new  government  were  to  go  to  active  participants  in 
the  coup:  Hashimoto,  Home  Minister;  Tatekawa,  Foreign  Min- 
ister; Okawa  Finance  Minister;  Cho,  Superintendent  General  of 
the  Metropolitan  Police  Board;  and  Rear  Admiral  Kobayashi, 
Commander  of  Kasumigaura  Airbase,  Navy  Minister.  The  posts 
of  Premier  and  War  Minister  were  to  be  proffered  to  Lieutenant 
General  Araki  Sadao.  It  is  a  moot  point  whether  General  Araki's 
reaction  had  been  obtained  in  advance. 

The  October  and  March  Plots  differed  from  each  other  in 
several  respects.  By  the  time  of  the  October  Plot  the  locus  of 
decision  had  shifted  from  the  officers  of  general  grade  to  those 
of  field  grade.  In  part  this  was  due  to  Hashimoto's  decision  to 
cut  his  group  off  from  high-ranking  officers  and  concentrate  on 
company-grade  officers.  There  is  evidence  that  civilians  were 
excluded  despite  the  interest  shown  in  Hashimoto's  plot  by  the 
Kita-Nishida  wing  and  the  Inoue  Nissho  faction.  These  two 
groups,  which  had  a  strong  following  among  the  young  extremist 
army  and  navy  officers,  met  on  August  26  at  the  Outer  Garden 
of  Meiji  Shrine  to  discuss  what  position  they  ought  to  assume 
with  respect  to  this  new  plot. 

Okawa's  clique  also  may  have  been  excluded,  although  there 
seems  to  be  evidence  to  the  contrary.  Thus  on  August  31  Inoue 
is  said  to  have  instructed  one  Fujii  Sei  to  approach  Okawa  with 
a  proposal  that  their  clique  be  allowed  to  participate  in  the  Octo- 
ber Plot.  Another  source,  "Major  Tanaka's  Notes,"  states  that 


196  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Okawa  and  his  group  were  the  only  civilians  utilized  in  the  Octo- 
ber Plot.5 

General  Tanaka  Ryukichi,  testifying  at  the  Tokyo  Trials,  said, 
"Hashimoto,  Cho,  and  Okawa  planned  the  October  Plot  in  1931 
for  the  purpose  of  overthrowing  the  Government  then  in  power 
and  setting  up  in  its  place  a  new  Government  which  would  sup- 
port the  Manchurian  Incident.  Tatekawa  said  he  would  support 
such  a  Government."6  Moreover,  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that 
Okawa  could  have  been  promised  a  post  in  the  new  cabinet  unless 
he  had  played  a  significant  role  in  plotting  the  fall  of  the  govern- 
ment. 

All  this,  however,  is  hearsay  or  secondary  evidence.  Hashi- 
moto himself  denied  that  Okawa  participated  in  the  October 
Plot.  At  the  Tokyo  Trials,  Hashimoto  was  asked  point-blank, 
"Did  Dr.  Okawa  assist  you  in  the  October  Plot?"  He  replied, 
"No,  Dr.  Okawa  did  not.  In  the  March  Plot,  Okawa  and  I  were 
co-conspirators.  However,  I  began  to  entertain  misgivings  about 
the  advisability  of  allowing  civilians  to  participate  in  a  plot  of 
this  nature  lest  they  become  a  source  of  leakage.  It  was  therefore 
decided  that  no  civilian  would  be  let  in  on  the  October  Plot."7 

What  caused  the  collapse  of  the  October  Plot?  Above  all,  the 
conspirators  brought  failure  upon  themselves  by  their  personal 
misbehavior.  Hashimoto  and  Cho  were  said  to  have  thrown  a 
round  of  extravagant  geisha  parties,  to  which  were  invited  a  num- 
ber of  company-grade  officers  who  were  persuaded  to  cast  their 
lot  with  the  cause.  The  more  serious-minded  young  officers  joined 
an  extreme  ultranationalist  group  called  the  Kokutai  Genri-ha 
(National  Foundation  Principle  faction)  which,  under  the 
leadership  of  Captain  Sugaha  Saburo,  had  close  ties  with  the 
Kodo-ha. 

Serious  disagreements  arose  within  the  Cherry  Society  over 
the  question  of  the  means  to  bring  about  national  reconstruction.8 

5.  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  p.  19,676. 

6.  Ibid.,  p.  2013. 

7.  Ibid.,  p.  28,815. 

8.  See  above  pp.  96-97. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  197 

The  extremists  insisted  that  the  old  political  order  must  first  be 
completely  demolished,  after  which  the  new  order  would  emerge 
from  the  ruins  like  a  phoenix.  Hashimoto  and  his  followers  be- 
longed to  this  school  of  thinking.  Opposing  them  was  the  more 
moderate  faction,  which  argued  that  destruction  need  not  go  quite 
so  far  and  that  it  should  in  fact  be  kept  to  a  minimum.  These 
men  thought  of  reform  in  terms  of  concrete  proposals  and  of  a 
new  ideology  which  would  be  appealing  enough  to  attract  a  mass 
following. 

Closely  identifying  themselves  with  these  young  officers  of 
ultranationalist  bent  were  Muranaka  Koji  and  Isobe  Asaichi.9 
So  disturbed  did  they  become  with  the  flamboyant  attitude  of 
Hashimoto  and  his  group  that  the  two  collaborated  in  writing 
a  pamphlet  entitled  Views  Regarding  Housecleaning  in  the 
Army.10  In  it  they  gave  their  reasons  for  their  opposition,  stating 
that  "because  we  had  begun  to  entertain  misgivings  about  the 
soundness  of  the  ideology  of  the  ringleaders  even  before  we 
reached  the  point  of  drawing  up  plans  for  the  October  Plot,  we 
decided  to  make  a  clean  break  with  them.  It  was  from  this  time 
on  that  the  officers  interested  in  national  reconstruction  were 
split  into  roughly  two  camps  .  .  .  resulting  in  oppression  of  and 
malicious  slander  being  directed  against  the  younger  officer 
group." 

Another  defector  was  Major  Tanaka  Kiyoshi,  who  until  the 
October  Plot  had  worked  closely  with  Hashimoto.  In  his  "Notes" 
he  writes:  "Hashimoto's  plot  violated  the  founding  principle  of 
the  Japanese  army.  It  would  have  inflicted  untold  damage  on  the 
army,  which  was  the  only  body  able  to  effect  national  reconstruc- 
tion. Thereupon  I  decided  to  block  the  coup  by  any  means." 

9.  Later  both  men  resigned  from  the  army  and  were  executed  as  civilian 
leaders  in  the  February  26,  1936,  uprising  of  young  officers. 

10.  The  Japanese  title  is  Shukugun  ni  Kansuru  Ikensho.  It  is  interesting 
to  note  that  the  leaders  who  brought  down  the  Tokugawa  rule  were  acting 
under  an  impulse  closely  parallel  to  that  of  the  leaders  of  the  October 
Plot.  See  Yoshio  Sakata  and  John  W.  Hall,  "The  Motivation  of  Political 
Leadership  in  the  Meiji  Restoration,"  Journal  of  Asian  Studies,  16  (1959), 
50. 


198  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Also  prominent  among  these  who  had  a  change  of  heart  was 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Nemoto  Hiroshi.  The  circumstances  of  his 
defection  are  not  clear. 

Apart  from  the  information  filtering  into  the  Ministry  of  War 
through  the  mouths  of  those  who,  like  Colonel  Nemoto,  had 
defected,  plans  for  the  coup  also  became  known  as  the  unre- 
strained talk  of  Hashimoto  and  his  men  drifted  beyond  the  con- 
fines of  their  favorite  places  of  rendezvous.  Their  plans  and  every 
move  were  known  to  the  gendarmery  and  the  civil  police.  How- 
ever, the  gendarmery  did  not  dare  take  positive  action  because 
it  was  alleged  that  Prince  Chichibu  and  Prince  Kaya  were  im- 
plicated in  the  plot.11 

The  army  leaders,  however,  became  alarmed  when  on  October 
1 5  Colonel  Hashimoto  confronted  General  Sugiyama,  Vice  Min- 
ister of  War,  and  demanded  that  he,  too,  lend  his  moral  support 
to  the  coup.  Meanwhile,  queries  from  worried  government  offi- 
cials singled  out  as  targets  for  the  coup  continued  to  pour  into 
the  Ministry  of  War. 

Minami,  Minister  of  War,  and  Kanaya,  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  were  anxious  to  pacify  the  rebellious  officers  with  a  mini- 
mum of  commotion  lest  this  latest  evidence  of  internal  strife  dis- 
credit the  army  in  the  eyes  of  the  Japanese  people.  On  an  earnest 
request  by  these  two  generals,  General  Araki  visited  the  scene  of 
a  party  on  the  night  of  October  1612  to  placate  the  officers.  Major 

11.  The  two  quotations  from  preceding  paragraphs  are  from  Shiraki, 
Nihon  Seitoshi,  pp.  89  and  90.  Author's  translations.  Tanaka  Sogoro, 
Nihon  Fashizumu  no  Genryu  (The  Wellspring  of  Japanese  Fascism) 
(Tokyo,  1949),  p.  324.  This  is  the  only  book  that  makes  an  allegation  of 
this  nature,  and  its  veracity  is  open  to  doubt  for  Tanaka  does  not  give  the 
source  of  his  information.  It  should  be  pointed  out  that  the  October  Plot 
is  sometimes  dubbed  "The  Imperial  Flag  Revolution"  (Kinki  Kakumei). 
However,  this  is  not  because  members  of  the  imperial  family  were  al- 
legedly implicated  in  the  plot  but  because  those  who  participated  in  the 
October  Plot  had  planned  to  hoist  a  banner  with  the  phrase  "Kinki 
Kakumei"  near  the  Land  Survey  Department  in  the  General  Staff  Office 
which  was  to  be  their  headquarters.  Mori,  Senpu  Nijunen,  p.  80. 

12.  Testimony  by  General  Araki,  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  p.  28,126.  Also 
Harada  Diary,  2,  106-07. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  199 

Cho,  according  to  one  source,  is  said  to  have  responded  angrily 
by  flinging  down  the  gauntlet.  There  is  another  version  which 
states  that  Araki  had  to  promise  the  unruly  officers  to  prosecute 
the  Manchurian  crisis  to  a  successful  conclusion  and  to  over- 
throw the  Wakatsuki  cabinet. 

On  the  same  evening  Minami  summoned  a  number  of  his  sub- 
ordinates to  his  residence  for  an  all-night  conference.  It  was  not 
until  3  o'clock  the  following  morning  that  a  decision  was  reached. 
At  4,  Hashimoto,  Nemoto,  Cho,  and  nine  others  were  arrested, 
bringing  the  October  Plot  abruptly  to  an  end.13 

There  is  evidence  indicating  that  toward  the  end  Hashimoto 
himself  grew  faint-hearted;  Major  Tanaka  believes  that  Hashi- 
moto deliberately  confronted  the  Vice  Minister  of  War  with  his 
demand  so  that  the  Ministry  would  officially  quash  the  plot.  This 
would  have  enabled  Hashimoto  to  save  face.  Another  source 
cites  the  fact  that  one  day  Hashimoto  came  to  Lieutenant  General 
Araki  begging  him  to  take  the  lead  in  voicing  opposition  to  the 
scheme. 

When  the  conspirators  were  arrested  in  Tokyo,  one  of  them — 
perhaps  Colonel  Hashimoto — blurted  out,  "You  might  make 
arrests  in  Tokyo,  but  in  Manchuria  the  Kwantung  Army  will 
attain  autonomy  just  the  same."  The  army  leaders  received  an- 
other jolt  from  a  rumor  that  Colonel  Itagaki  of  the  Kwantung 
Army  had  provided  200,000  yen  to  finance  the  October  Plot.14 

In  a  flurry  of  nervous  excitement,  a  severe  warning  was  wired 
to  the  Kwantung  Army  under  the  joint  signature  of  the  three  sub- 
chiefs  of  the  supreme  command  in  Tokyo — Sugiyama,  Vice 
Minister  of  War,  Ninomiya,  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  and  Araki, 
Assistant  Chief  Inspector  of  Military  Education.  The  wire  read: 
"Any  act  of  conspiracy,  such  as  one  aimed  at  attainment  of  in- 
dependence of  the  Kwantung  Army  or  the  like,  will  not  be  toler- 

13.  Testimony  of  Marquis  Kido,  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  p.  30,739. 

14.  Matsumura,  Miyakezaka,  p.  51.  It  is  possible  that  the  200,000  yen 
was  not  from  Itagaki  but  a  sum  which  Marquis  Tokugawa  Yoshichika 
gave  Okawa.  Author's  translation. 


200  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

ated."  In  addition,  Sugiyama  wired  a  coded  message  to 
detachments  of  the  Kwantung  Army  warning  them  that  "even 
if  the  headquarters  of  the  Kwantung  Army  rise  in  open  revolt, 
detachments  are  not  to  lend  their  support."  These  wires  were 
followed  by  a  visit  of  General  Shirakawa  to  Mukden.  The  Kwan- 
tung Army,  in  anger,  retorted  in  a  wire:  "What  manner  of  mis- 
judgment  would  you  call  this?"  Army  headquarters  had  taken 
another  slap  in  the  face.15 

As  in  the  case  of  the  March  Plot,  we  are  again  confronted 
with  a  question:  Was  there  collusion  between  the  instigators  of 
the  Mukden  Incident  and  the  conspirators  of  the  October  Plot? 
It  is  tempting  to  link  the  March  Plot,  the  Mukden  Incident,  and 
the  October  Plot  together  as  part  of  a  unified  conspiracy  master- 
minded by  a  single  intelligence  operating  behind  the  scenes,  but 
this  was  not  the  case.  Many  popular  writers,  including  those  in 
Japan  and  particularly  those  with  leftist  leanings,  have  found 
it  convenient  to  lump  all  these  outrages  together  as  the  doings 
of  the  "military  clique,"  a  vague  collective  term  for  a  group  of 
men  bent  on  saber  rattling  and  continental  expansion.  As  has 
been  demonstrated,  the  so-called  military  clique,  composed  pri- 
marily of  army  men,  in  the  early  thirties  was  far  from  an  efficient, 
unified  body. 

Moreover,  since  all  three  occurred  within  a  period  of  seven 
months  and  were  all  in  violent  reaction  against  Shidehara's  for- 
eign policy  and  the  corruption  and  inefficiency  of  the  parliamen- 
tary form  of  government,  the  temptation  is  all  the  stronger  to 
presume  that  collusion  of  one  sort  or  another  must  have  existed 
between,  perhaps,  Colonel  Itagaki  of  the  Kwantung  Army  and 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Hashimoto  in  Tokyo.  Nevertheless,  the  evi- 
dence developed  at  the  Tokyo  Trials  seems  to  point  in  another 
direction.  According  to  the  testimony  of  Lieutenant  General 
Wachi  Takaji,  who  was  on  intimate  terms  with  Hashimoto  and 
was  once  his  subordinate,  Hashimoto  had  never  met  Itagaki, 
Ishihara,  and  Doihara  up  to  the  time  of  the  Manchurian  crisis. 

15.  Ibid.,  pp.  51-52.  Author's  translation. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  201 

Wachi  stated  that  Hashimoto  had  no  occasion  to  communicate 
with  these  men  by  telephone,  telegraph,  or  any  other  means. 

At  the  Tokyo  Trials,  Wachi  recounted  his  experiences  during 
the  October  Plot  when  he  was  arrested  and  sent  to  Utsunomiya, 
a  city  sixty  miles  north  of  Tokyo.  There  he  met  two  other  army 
officers  who  had  been  similarly  detained  for  having  taken  part 
in  the  Plot  as  private  secretaries  of  Hashimoto.  During  their 
fifteen  days  of  confinement  they  had  ample  time  to  compare 
notes.  One  of  these  men  said  that  he  had  personally  handled  all 
of  Hashimoto's  telephone  calls,  telegrams,  and  correspondence, 
but  he  had  found  nothing  in  these  communications  to  indicate 
that  Hashimoto  was  acting  in  collusion  with  staff  members  of  the 
Kwantung  Army.16 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  inconceivable  that  a  tacit  understand- 
ing of  some  sort  did  not  exist  between  Koiso  and  Tatekawa  of 
the  General  Staff  and  Itagaki  of  the  Kwantung  Army.  One  re- 
calls only  too  well  how  Tatekawa  deliberately  forestalled  seeing 
General  Honjo  until  the  Liutiaohu  Incident  had  occurred  on 
the  night  of  September  18.17 

The  case  of  Major  Cho  may  be  somewhat  different  from  that  of 
Hashimoto.  Our  information  on  Cho  is  incomplete  for  the  reason 
that  he  committed  ceremonial  suicide  after  the  Battle  of  Okinawa. 
Nevertheless,  he  may  have  been  an  important  link  between  the 
Kwantung  Army  and  the  conspirators  of  the  October  Plot  in 
Tokyo.  According  to  the  testimony  of  Major  General  Tanaka 
Ryukichi  at  the  Tokyo  Trials,  Cho  told  Tanaka  that  he  was  the 
virtual  leader  in  planning  the  October  Plot18  and  that  its  object 
was  to  found  a  new  government  in  Japan  which  would  facilitate 
internal  reconstruction  and  the  settlement  of  Manchurian  issues 
by  the  total  mobilization  of  Japan's  national  resources. 

Cho,  because  of  his  violent  personality,  was  under  surveillance 
of  army  authorities  in  Tokyo,   and  in  September    1931    was 

16.  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  pp.   1956-79. 

17.  See  above,  pp.    158-59. 

18.  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  pp.  2015-16. 


202  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

abruptly  transferred  to  Peking  as  a  military  attache.  Highly  in- 
censed at  the  move,  which  he  regarded  as  tantamount  to  banish- 
ment, Cho  balked  at  the  order  and  would  not  go  until  sternly 
reprimanded  by  his  superior.  Within  a  week  after  his  arrival  in 
Peking,  however,  he  left  the  capital  city  and  was  again  back  in 
Tokyo,  a  few  days  prior  to  the  date  on  which  the  coup  was  to 
be  engineered.  One  must  presume  therefore  that  his  unauthorized 
presence  in  Tokyo  was  made  possible  by  the  connivance  of  influ- 
ential superiors  stationed  on  the  continent;  the  alternative  is  that 
he  was  simply  absent  without  leave.  If  the  story  of  200,000  yen 
supplied  by  Colonel  Itagaki  has  any  credibility,  Major  Cho  might 
have  had  something  to  do  with  transferring  the  funds  to  Tokyo 
to  supervise  their  usage. 

General  Tanaka's  testimony19  bears  out  another  fact  which 
tends  to  corroborate  the  notion  that  Cho  must  have  had  some 
connection  with  the  Kwantung  Army.  Cho  told  Tanaka  once  that 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Ishihara  was  unalterably  opposed  to  the 
October  Plot.  Just  after  the  collapse  of  the  plot,  Ishihara  was  en 
route  to  North  China  when  he  stopped  at  Mukden.  There  he  is 
said  to  have  reprimanded  Cho  for  taking  an  active  part  in  it. 

Several  pertinent  implications  might  be  drawn  from  General 
Tanaka's  testimony.  It  is  obvious  that  Ishihara  had  nothing  to  do 
with  the  October  Plot.  If  any  officer  of  the  Kwantung  Army  had 
anything  to  do  with  it,  that  officer  most  likely  was  Itagaki.  This 
points  up  the  existence  of  a  vast  gulf  in  political  outlook  between 
Itagaki  and  Ishihara,  although  the  two  worked  as  teammates  in 
the  Mukden  Incident. 

Lacking  the  most  essential  ingredient  of  any  successful  revo- 
lution, a  unified  ideology,  it  is  no  wonder  that  the  army  coups 
d'etat  ended  in  failure.  Not  only  was  the  leaders'  thinking  ap- 
pallingly slipshod  in  the  planning  stage,  but  as  a  group  they  were 
wholly  lacking  in  the  organization  and  discipline  which  is  found 
only  in  a  tightly  knit  group  fired  by  a  doctrine  that  permits  no 
deviation.  The  conspirators  were  often  torn  asunder  by  mutual 

19.  Ibid.,  p.  2016. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  203 

suspicion  and  jealousy  and  by  the  deliberate  attempts  of  oppos- 
ing factions  to  obstruct  each  other.  This  was  true  both  of  army 
and  of  civilian  groups,  as  was  shown  in  the  discussion  of  the 
Ugaki  and  anti-Ugaki  factions  and  the  Okawa  and  Kita-Nishida 
factions.  Although  the  conspiracy  fell  apart,  the  mere  disclo- 
sure of  what  might  have  happened  was  a  terrible  blow  to  the 
Wakatsuki  government.  Members  of  the  cabinet  were  shocked 
when  they  learned  that  they  were  marked  as  targets  for  bombing 
attack  from  the  air. 

The  army  disposed  of  the  October  Plot  in  utmost  stealth  by 
administrative  measures.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Hashimoto,  the 
ringleader,  received  a  sentence  of  twenty  days  in  confinement, 
while  Major  Cho,  Captain  Tanaka  Wataru,  and  others  each  re- 
ceived ten  days.  They  were  escorted  by  military  police  to  resorts 
in  the  vicinity  of  Tokyo  and  were  entertained  royally  for  the 
duration  of  their  detention. 

The  gravity  of  the  plot  necessitated  a  shake-up  in  personnel 
at  the  top.  As  a  result  of  a  meeting  of  the  Big  Three  of  the  army, 
the  Minister  of  War  and  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  agreed 
to  resign.  Kanaya  stuck  to  his  word,  but  Minami  made  an  unsuc- 
cessful attempt  to  stay  on  as  the  Minister  of  War,  only  to  be 
replaced  by  Araki,  a  member  of  the  rival  faction,  when  the 
Wakatsuki  cabinet  collapsed  shortly  thereafter. 

Minami,  as  in  the  case  of  Ugaki  in  the  March  Plot,  strove  to 
cover  up  the  abortive  plot.  He  dared  not  prefer  charges  against 
the  conspirators,  since  he  was  fearful  that  his  immediate  subor- 
dinates and  the  extremist  field-grade  officers  might  openly  defy 
him.  It  has  already  been  mentioned  that  on  the  night  of  October 
16  Minami  had  to  plead  with  Araki  personally  to  postpone  his 
departure  for  Kumamoto  in  order  that  he  might  go  to  Hashimoto 
and  his  group  to  placate  them.  Had  Minami  chosen  to  prosecute 
the  plotters  publicly,  he  would  have  made  himself  the  target  of 
the  undying  resentment  of  the  entire  Japanese  army  for  dis- 
crediting it  in  the  eyes  of  the  nation. 

The  effect  of  the  October  Plot  on  the  Foreign  Office  was  star- 


204  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

tling,  to  say  the  least.  "Secretary  Stimson  noticed  that  Baron 
Shidehara  had  been  compelled  to  adopt  in  his  communications  a 
position  supporting  his  government,  which  strained  the  credulity 
of  Americans,  especially  since  his  excuses  for  Japan's  action  did 
not  tally  with  the  facts  that  had  already  been  disclosed."20  Among 
other  things,  the  Foreign  Minister  abandoned  his  previous  stand 
that  Japanese  troops  would  be  evacuated  from  Manchuria  when 
and  if  negotiations  were  concluded,  and  showed  signs  of  veering 
toward  the  point  of  view  of  the  army — nonrecognition  of  Chang 
Hsueh-liang's  regime  and  the  fostering  of  a  local  political  force  to 
supplant  Chang's  government.  Indeed,  Stimson  was  not  the  only 
person  to  be  startled,  for  even  Japan's  own  delegates  at  Geneva 
were  astonished  by  Shidehara's  abrupt  demarche.21  It  has  been 
suggested  that  this  sudden  shift  in  Shidehara's  policy  was  oc- 
casioned by  the  October  Plot.  The  Foreign  Minister  feared  that 
if  the  government  continued  its  policy  of  restraining  the  Kwan- 
tung  Army's  action  in  Manchuria,  the  army's  urge  to  expand 
would  become  internalized  and  result  in  a  major  explosion  at 
home — an  explosion  that  would  bring  down  the  entire  Japanese 
government  and  would  be  followed  by  a  reign  of  terror. 

Baron  Harada,  too,  observed  that  the  Foreign  Office  was  yield- 
ing ground  to  the  army.  On  October  19  he  wrote:  "After  seeing 
the  Premier  ...  I  went  over  to  the  Foreign  Office.  There  I  was 
told  that  the  younger  officers  of  the  Foreign  Office  were  effecting 
a  rapprochement  with  the  army,  and  relations  were  working  out 
smoothly."  Earlier  in  his  diary  we  come  across  an  incident  that 
may  have  marked  the  beginning  of  the  meeting  of  minds  between 
the  Foreign  Office  and  the  army.  Under  date  of  September  27 
Harada  wrote : 

Three  or  four  days  ago,  Shiratori  Toshio,22  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Suzuki  Teiichi,  and  I  dined  together. 
It  appeared  that  the  two  saw  eye  to  eye  on  many  mat- 

20.  Yanaga,  Japan  since  Perry,  p.  554. 

21.  Kurihara,  Tenno,  p.  63. 

22.  Chief  of  the  Information  Bureau  of  the  Foreign  Office.  Together 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  205 

ters.  Thus,  after  I  had  left  the  place,  the  two  stayed  on 
and  talked  until  late  that  night. 

On  October  1,  I  came  back  to  Tokyo  and  saw 
Shiratori  at  the  Foreign  Office.  He  said,  "As  I  talked 
with  Suzuki,  I  realized  that  he  too  was  going  about  his 
task  [national  reconstruction]  with  strong  determina- 
tion. Though  I  do  go  along  with  many  things  which  he 
had  to  say,  if  the  military  were  to  be  given  free  rein 
there  is  no  telling  how  far  and  where  they  will  push  it 
[the  reconstruction].  Therefore,  we  [referring  to  like- 
minded  members  of  the  Foreign  Office  and  other  non- 
military  men]  too  would  like  to  get  in  on  this  [the  move- 
ment] so  we  can  get  in  on  the  ground  floor.  How  about 
you  coming  along  too?"  So  I  said,  "Of  course,  let's  get 
together  and  see  what  this  is  all  about,"  and  we  parted 
company  that  day. 

According  to  Shiratori,  there  is  a  prevailing  senti- 
ment among  them  [the  military  clique  of  which  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Suzuki  was  a  member]  that  some  kind 
of  drastic  action  ought  to  be  taken  during  the  Diet  ses- 
sion in  December.23 

Further  evidence  of  a  high-level  shift  in  policy  by  the  Foreign 
Office  is  revealed  by  Prince  Konoe  Fumimaro's  own  words: 
"Immediately  after  the  Mukden  Incident,  Shiratori  began  to  move 
completely  in  the  same  direction  as  Mori  Kaku.  That  Shiratori 
took  to  championing  the  cause  of  withdrawing  from  the  League 
was  due  in  large  measure  to  Mori's  influence."24 

The  army's  inability  to  do  its  own  housecleaning  had  an  un- 
healthy effect  on  itself  and  on  the  nation.  Instead  of  bringing  to 
trial  the  army  officers  who  had  conspired  to  overthrow  the  gov- 


with  the  Chiefs  of  the  Asia,  Europe,  and  America  Bureaus,  he  was  a  rank- 
ing career  officer,  second  only  to  the  Vice  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

23.  Harada  Diary,  2,  83.  Author's  translation. 

24.  Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku,  p.  789.  Author's  translation. 


206  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

ernment,  the  leaders  of  the  army  defended  the  young  officers  on 
the  ground  that  they  were  sincere  and  well  meaning,  but  in  the 
same  breath  they  condemned  the  corrupt  practices  of  party  gov- 
ernment. This  attitude  by  officers  in  high  places  only  fostered 
the  notion  that  as  long  as  revolutionary  activities  were  committed 
in  the  name  of  national  reconstruction  punitive  action  would 
not  be  taken.  The  upshot  was  that  while  discipline  in  the  army 
deteriorated  woefully,  the  fever  to  engage  in  direct  action  was 
heightened  among  the  young  officers. 

Further  Military  Operations  on  the  Continent 

After  the  bombing  of  Chinchow,  Japanese  military  operations 
were  suddenly  shifted  to  the  northwestern  part  of  the  Manchurian 
plain.  The  initial  encounter  with  Chinese  troops  began  with  skir- 
mishes around  the  Nonni  River  bridges  in  mid-October  1931 
and  ended  with  the  occupation  of  Tsitsihar.  Only  a  general  out- 
line of  the  military  operations  is  given  here,  since  there  is  very 
little  to  be  gained  by  going  into  the  details,  which  are  elaborated 
in  the  Lytton  Report.1  Our  primary  concern  is  to  seek  an  expla- 
nation for  the  unabated  extension  of  military  operations  by  the 
Kwantung  Army  despite  frantic  efforts  of  the  Wakatsuki  govern- 
ment to  confine  it.  For  the  answer  we  must  turn  to  behind-the- 
scene  activities  within  the  Kwantung  Army  and  in  Tokyo. 

In  early  October,  General  Chang  Hai-peng  advanced  with  his 
troops  along  the  Taonan-Angangchi  Railway  to  seize  Tsitsihar, 
the  seat  of  the  provincial  government  of  Heilungkiang.  The  Jap- 
anese, it  is  said,  incited  the  General  into  opening  the  offensive.2 
Ma  Chan-shan,  the  defending  general,  ordered  the  destruction 
of  the  bridges  over  the  Nonni  River. 

The  South  Manchuria  Railway  Company  had  reason  to  be 
concerned,  since  it  had  advanced  the  necessary  capital  for  the 
construction  of  the  Taonan-Anganchi  Railway  in  the  form  of  a 

1.  Lytton  Report,  pp.  72-75.  Asahi,  Taiheiyo,  2,  49-84. 

2.  Lytton  Report,  p.  72. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  207 

loan.  Even  more  pressing  was  the  prospect  that  .shipments  of 
soybeans,  the  all-important  product  of  the  northern  plains,  might 
be  interrupted  at  the  height  of  the  harvest  season.  At  the  Kwan- 
tung  Army's  suggestion,  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  Company 
applied  to  the  government  in  Tokyo  for  armed  protection  while 
the  bridges  were  being  repaired. 

The  Japanese  Consul  General  at  Tsitsihar  asked  General  Ma 
Chan-shan  to  repair  the  bridges  as  soon  as  possible.  The  situation 
became  aggravated  when  a  small  party,  consisting  of  employees 
of  the  Taonan-Angangchi  Railway  and  the  South  Manchuria 
Railway,  was  fired  upon  while  it  was  inspecting  the  damage  to 
the  bridges.  The  Kwantung  Army  now  stepped  into  the  picture. 
It  served  an  ultimatum  to  both  Chinese  generals:  if  Ma  Chan- 
shan  did  not  repair  the  bridges  by  November  3,  the  South  Man- 
churia Railway  Company  would  feel  free  to  do  the  repairing 
itself,  in  which  event  obstruction  by  the  troops  of  either  general 
would  be  regarded  as  an  unfriendly  act.  The  Japanese  detach- 
ment was  under  orders  to  advance  to  Tahsing  Station  on  the 
north  side  of  the  valley  in  the  event  of  hostilities. 

On  November  4  a  joint  commission  consisting  of  Major  Haya- 
shi,  a  representative  from  the  Japanese  Consulate  General,  and 
Chinese  military  and  civil  officials  made  two  visits  to  the  bridges 
in  a  last-minute  effort  to  forestall  an  outbreak  of  hostilities.  The 
Kwantung  Army  would  not  accede  to  the  request  made  by  the 
Chinese  representative  for  the  postponement  of  Japanese  action, 
and  that  same  morning  engineers  under  the  command  of  Captain 
Hanai  began  the  repairs.  By  noon  one  infantry  company  was 
headed  in  the  direction  of  Tahsing  Station.  Fierce  fighting  then 
broke  out.  The  following  day,  Chinese  troops  repeatedly  re- 
pulsed determined  Japanese  attacks  from  a  strong  line  of  trenches. 
On  the  second  day  of  the  encounter  the  troops  fought  the  Japa- 
nese to  a  standstill,  and  turned  their  flanks  in  a  counterattack, 
taking  a  heavy  toll  of  the  enemy.  It  was  only  after  the  Japanese 
received  reinforcements  of  two  battalions  that  they  were  able  to 
capture  Tahsing  Station.  This  was  as  far  as  army  headquarters 


208  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

in  Tokyo  permitted  the  Kwantung  Army  to  advance  in  support 
of  the  bridge-repairing  operation. 

Meanwhile,  although  there  was  talk  of  postponing  or  canceling 
the  army's  annual  grand  maneuvers  on  account  of  the  Man- 
churian  crisis,  the  maneuvers  were  held  as  usual,  for  it  seemed 
unlikely  that  there  would  be  a  further  enlargement  of  military 
operations.  The  Emperor  left  Tokyo  for  Kumamoto,  site  of  the 
maneuvers,  on  November  8  and  did  not  return  until  November 
21.  He  was  accompanied  by  a  sizable  cortege  consisting  of  cabi- 
net officials  and  high-ranking  military  officers  headed  by  Gen- 
eral Kanaya,  Chief  of  the  General  Staff.  Since  many  of  the  key 
officials  were  in  Kumamoto,  government  activities  in  Tokyo  lan- 
guished for  about  two  weeks.  A  more  opportune  moment  could 
hardly  have  presented  itself  for  the  Kwantung  Army  to  make 
its  next  bold  move.  It  was  not  without  reason  that  the  Wakatsuki 
government  bided  its  time  uneasily  during  the  interim. 

Foremost  among  the  government's  concerns  was  the  disap- 
pearance from  Tientsin  of  Henry  Pu-yi,  heir  to  the  old  Manchu 
dynasty.  There  were  rumors  that  Colonel  Doihara  had  gone  to 
Tientsin  in  an  attempt  to  entice  him  from  hiding  and  that  he 
might  appear  in  Mukden  at  any  moment.  The  government  was 
equally  apprehensive  over  the  likelihood  that  the  Kwantung 
Army  might  advance  beyond  the  Nonni  River  to  Tsitsihar. 
Finally,  the  government  suspected  that  the  riots  of  November  8  in 
Tientsin  had  been  instigated  by  Japanese  ruffians,  despite  the  as- 
surance of  Chang  Hsueh-ming3  to  the  contrary.  Since  the  next 
meeting  of  the  League  Council  was  scheduled  for  November  16, 
the  government  had  all  the  more  reason  to  be  cautious,  for  any 
untoward  incident  could  jeopardize  Japan's  precarious  status  in 
Geneva. 

It  was  thought  in  some  quarters  that  the  outcome  of  these 
issues  could  well  determine  the  fate  of  the  Wakatsuki  cabinet. 
There  were  some  in  the  Foreign  Office  who  felt  that  if  these 

3.  Younger  brother  of  Chang  Hsueh-liang  and  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of 
Public  Safety,  Tientsin  municipal  government. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  209 

issues  took  a  turn  for  the  worse,  the  cabinet  should  be  put  out 
of  office  to  show  the  world  that  Japan  was  resolutely  against  any 
act  committed  in  violation  of  international  treaties.  Only  by  tak- 
ing drastic  action  was  it  thought  that  the  nation  could  hope  to 
retain  a  semblance  of  her  former  reputation.4 

The  concerns  of  army  headquarters  were  quite  different  from 
those  of  the  government.  Uppermost  in  its  mind  was  the  setting 
up  of  a  new  regime  in  South  Manchuria  as  rapidly  as  possible, 
leaving  the  thankless  task  of  diplomatic  adjustments  to  the  For- 
eign Office.  It  has  been  indicated  already  that  Major  General 
Tatekawa  was  an  outspoken  proponent  of  this  view,  in  opposi- 
tion to  Lieutenant  Colonel  Ishihara,  who  was  strongly  tempted 
to  occupy  Harbin  in  North  Manchuria  to  head  off  a  possible 
Soviet  thrust  from  Siberia.5 

Closely  associated  with  the  question  of  instituting  an  inde- 
pendent political  regime  in  South  Manchuria  was  the  question 
whether  to  inaugurate  Henry  Pu-yi  as  head  of  a  new  govern- 
ment. Apparently  the  decision  was  cast  in  his  favor  for,  as  many 
had  expected,  he  appeared  in  Mukden  on  November  13,  1931, 
as  the  result  of  the  machinations  of  Colonel  Doihara.6  Doihara 
testified  at  the  Tokyo  Trials  that  although  General  Honjo,  com- 
manding officer  of  the  Kwantung  Army,  was  responsible  for 
issuing  orders  to  proceed  to  Tientsin,  the  details  of  his  meeting 
with  Henry  Pu-yi  were  arranged  by  Colonel  Itagaki.  The  latter 
cautioned  Doihara  when  he  was  about  to  depart  for  Tientsin  that 
Henry  Pu-yi  was  not  to  be  coerced  into  returning  to  Manchuria 
and  that  the  matter  ought  to  be  left  to  his  own  discretion.  If  Pu-yi 
were  willing,  that  would  be  all  the  better.7  This  rather  minor 
incident  again  corroborates  the  view  that,  in  matters  of  political 
strategy  affecting  the  Kwantung  Army,  Colonel  Itagaki  was  the 
real  power  and  General  Honjo  was  merely  a  figurehead. 

4.  Harada  Diary,  2,  126-27. 

5.  See  above,  pp.  178-79. 

6.  See  Hanaya,  Himerareta  Showashi,  p.  50,  for  details. 

7.  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  pp.  15,727-28. 


210  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

The  Kwantung  Army  would  not  brook  any  interference  from 
the  Foreign  Office  on  the  question  of  Pu-yi.  Kawashima,  the  Con- 
sul General  at  Tientsin,  in  describing  the  defiant  attitude  of  the 
army  in  a  top  secret  telegram8  to  Foreign  Minister  Shidehara 
on  November  3,  stated  that  Doihara  had  reminded  the  staff  of 
the  Japanese  Consulate  General  at  Tientsin  that  it  had  been 
solely  through  the  actions  of  the  Kwantung  Army  that  Man- 
churia had  been  brought  under  Japanese  control.  If  the  time 
should  come  that  enthronement  of  Pu-yi  was  necessary,  the  army 
would  not  tolerate  interference  from  the  government. 

Doihara  made  it  clear  that  if  the  Tokyo  government  persisted 
in  obstructing  the  actions  of  the  Kwantung  Army,  the  army  would 
secede  from  the  government,  and  once  it  had  attained  autonomy, 
there  was  no  telling  what  action  it  might  choose  to  take.  He  then 
made  the  veiled  threat  that,  in  such  an  event,  political  troubles 
would  descend  upon  Japan  from  unexpected  quarters — such  as 
from  political  assassins,  who  for  the  time  being  were  under  con- 
finement.9 

Although  War  Minister  Minami  did  not  say  so  outright,  an- 
swers he  made  to  Premier  Wakatsuki  on  several  occasions  hardly 
left  room  for  doubt  that  not  only  did  he  favor  the  establishment 
of  a  new  regime  in  South  Manchuria  but  he  took  its  inevitability 
for  granted.  During  the  first  week  of  October  1931  Wakatsuki 
summoned  the  Minister  of  War  and  explained: 

We  should  not  have  any  part  in  setting  up  a  new  regime 
in  Manchuria.  If  we  do,  we  shall  be  going  back  on  our 
own  profession  that  we  have  no  territorial  ambitions. 
Not  only  would  we  be  violating  the  Nine-Power  Treaty, 
we  would  be  making  enemies  of  the  whole  world.  We 

8.  Ibid. 

9.  IMTFE,  International  Prosecution  Section  Document  (Tokyo, 
1948),  no.  290.  IPS  documents  which  are  designated  as  IMT  in  Uyehara 
Checklist  consisted  of  depositions,  publications,  memoirs,  reports,  etc. 
used  for  exhibits  in  the  Tokyo  Trials. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  211 

stand  a  chance  of  being  isolated  by  means  of  economic 
sanctions.  Whatever  the  nature  of  the  political  entity 
which  may  attain  independence  in  Manchuria,  our 
negotiations  must  be  carried  out  with  the  central  Gov- 
ernment [of  China].10 

To  this  the  Minister  of  War  retorted,  "Then  the  status  of  Man- 
churia would  revert  right  back  to  where  it  stood  prior  to  the 
Mukden  Incident." 

About  two  weeks  later  Premier  Wakatsuki  was  again  sorely 
tried  by  an  intemperate  statement  made  by  War  Minister 
Minami:  "There  is  no  need  to  be  restrained  in  our  attitude  toward 
the  League  and  the  like.  What's  wrong  with  quitting  it?  .  .  .  If 
we  are  set  on  engaging  the  rest  of  the  world  in  a  war — that  is, 
if  we  have  the  fortitude  to  do  so — what  is  there  to  be  feared?"11 

Army  headquarters  favored  General  Tatekawa's  views,  how- 
ever, with  the  result  that  few  advocated  military  operations  in 
northern  Manchuria.  The  military  protection  which  headquarters 
had  sanctioned  while  the  bridges  over  the  Nonni  River  were  being 
repaired  was  unavoidable,  since  the  South  Manchuria  Railway 
Company  claimed  that  the  unimpeded  flow  of  the  soybean  crop 
at  the  height  of  the  harvest  season  was  essential  to  the  survival 
of  this  segment  of  the  railway.  But  headquarters  had  grave  mis- 
givings that  the  Kwantung  Army  might  advance  too  far  north 
and  stir  the  Russian  army  into  action,  in  which  event  Japan 
would  have  had  to  cope  with  a  real  menace. 

Meanwhile  as  repairs  to  the  Nonni  River  bridges  got  under 
way,  it  was  found  that  Lieutenant  Colonel  Ishihara  had,  for  rather 
obvious  reasons,  been  placed  in  charge  of  guarding  the  repair 
crews.  While  he  was  on  his  detail,  he  thought: 

10.  This  statement  was  made  by  the  Japanese  government  on  September 
24,  1931,  after  the  Mukden  Incident.  Harada  Diary,  2,  89,  482-83. 
Author's  translation. 

11.  Ibid.,  p.  105.  Author's  translation. 


212  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

While  we  are  taking  time  repairing  the  bridges,  it  is 
more  than  likely  that  Ma  Chan-shan's  forces  will  con- 
centrate toward  Tsitsihar  and  Angangchi.  Meanwhile, 
we  shall  quietly  assemble  the  Kwantung  Army's  main 
strength  around  Taonan  and  crush  Ma's  forces  with  a 
single  blow.  Russia  has  no  intention  of  intervening  at 
this  stage.  Therefore,  if  we  cannot  advance  on  Harbin 
directly,12  we  might  as  well  clinch  the  control  of 
northern  Manchuria  from  the  northwest  region.13 

Just  as  Ishihara  had  anticipated,  the  Heilungkiang  troops — 
twenty  to  thirty  thousand  strong — converged  on  Tsitsihar  and 
Angangchi.  On  November  7  the  Kwantung  Army  opened  an 
attack  on  the  provincial  forces  stationed  at  Sanchienfang, 
twenty  miles  north  of  Tahsing.  Between  November  6  and  12  the 
Kwantung  Army  made  four  separate  demands,  each  increasingly 
stringent,  in  which  General  Ma  Chan-shan  was  asked  to  resign 
from  the  governorship  of  Heilungkiang  Province  in  favor  of  Gen- 
eral Chang  Hai-peng  and  to  withdraw  his  troops  from  Tsitsihar 
and  Angangchi.  In  each  instance  General  Ma  replied  that  Tsitsi- 
har had  nothing  to  do  with  the  Taonan-Angangchi  Railway. 

Wakatsuki,  again  deeply  distressed,  spoke  to  Harada  of  the 
government's  plight: 

Please  tell  this  only  to  Prince  Saionji.  At  the  cabinet 
meeting  the  Minister  of  War  tried  to  push  through  a 
proposal  to  increase  the  number  of  troops  in  Man- 

12.  General  Tatekawa  was  not  the  only  one  who  objected  to  extending 
military  operations  into  the  northern  plains  of  Manchuria.  Premier  Wa- 
katsuki, concerned  that  the  Kwangtung  Army  might  extend  its  operations 
to  Harbin,  had  Assistant  Chief  of  General  Staff  Ninomiya  wire  the  Kwan- 
tung Army  on  two  separate  occasions.  See  Harada  Diary,  2,  73,  86.  An- 
other factor  that  delayed  the  Kwantung  Army's  direct  assault  on  Harbin 
was  the  difference  in  gauge  of  the  South  Manchuria  and  Chinese  Eastern 
Railways,  necessitating  alterations  on  the  rolling  stock.  Morishima,  Con- 
spiracy, p.  64. 

13.  Matsumura,  Miyakezaka,  p.  53.  Author's  translation. 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  213 

churia,  but  he  failed.  At  the  time  I  told  him  firmly  to 
halt  the  Kwantung  Army  this  side  of  the  Chinese  East- 
ern Railway.  So  far  I  have  made  every  effort  to  main- 
tain our  country's  face  by  offering  to  the  League 
explanations  regarding  the  Kwantung  Army's  actions 
which,  though  at  times  rather  flimsy,  still  had  some 
semblance  of  truth.  But  if  the  army  should  ever  ad- 
vance beyond  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  and  attack 
Tsitsihar,  I  can  no  longer  assume  responsibility  for  its 
actions.14 

On  November  14  the  Kwantung  Army  renewed  its  attacks, 
with  the  support  of  four  airplanes.  On  the  16th  General  Honjo 
demanded  that  General  Ma  withdraw  his  troops  to  a  point  north 
of  Tsitsihar  and  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway;  Ma  refused.  On 
the  1 8th  General  Tamon  launched  an  attack  and  occupied  Tsitsi- 
har the  following  day.  With  this  the  Kwantung  Army  attained 
the  objective  of  its  military  operations  in  the  northwest  sector 
of  Manchuria.  General  Ma  retreated  to  Hailun,  to  which  the 
temporary  seat  of  the  provincial  government  was  also  removed. 

It  is  a  truism  to  say  that  quite  often  activities  that  take  place 
behind  the  scenes  are  more  revealing  of  the  true  state  of  affairs 
than  those  that  occur  publicly.  An  episode  of  this  kind,  which 
suggests  that  there  existed  sharp  differences  in  opinion  among 
high-ranking  officers  of  the  General  Staff,  occurred  at  the  tem- 
porary headquarters  at  Kumamoto  during  the  closing  days  of  the 
grand  maneuvers.  It  appears  that  bitter  words  were  exchanged 
by  General  Umezu  Yoshijiro15  and  General  Tatekawa,  because 
Umezu  had  taken  the  liberty  of  altering  the  text  of  a  telegram 
drafted  initially  under  Tatekawa's  supervision.  Although  Gen- 
eral Matsumura,  the  narrator  of  the  incident,  does  not  recall  the 

14.  Excerpts  from  statement  made  on  November  16,  1931.  Harada 
Diary,  2,  132-33.  Author's  translation. 

15.  As  Chief  of  the  General  Affairs  Department,  General  Umezu  was 
immediately  below  the  Assistant  Chief  of  General  Staff  in  rank  and  there- 
fore General  Tatekawa's  superior. 


214  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

exact  content  of  the  telegram,  he  is  certain  that  it  was  addressed 
to  the  Kwantung  Army.  And  if  the  episode  occurred,  as  he 
states,  very  near  the  end  of  the  maneuvers,  it  must  have  been  on 
November  16,  17,  or  18,  when  the  Kwantung  Army  was  girding 
itself  for  the  assault  on  Tsitsihar. 

When  Umezu  and  Tatekawa  took  their  arguments  to  General 
Kanaya,  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  ruled  in  favor  of  Umezu. 
Knowing  as  we  do  something  of  the  character  of  both  Kanaya 
and  Tatekawa,  there  is  hardly  a  doubt  that  the  text  of  the  tele- 
gram drawn  up  by  Tatekawa  represented  a  point  of  view  more 
extreme  than  that  held  by  Umezu.  Tatekawa  left  Kumamoto  in 
a  huff.  Umezu,  however,  stayed  on  with  the  imperial  cortege  in 
order  that  the  Emperor  might  be  advised  of  any  sudden  new  de- 
velopments in  North  Manchuria. 

At  about  the  same  time  General  Ninomiya,  Assistant  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff,  left  for  Manchuria  to  improve  the  rapidly  de- 
teriorating liaison  between  army  headquarters  in  Tokyo  and 
the  Kwantung  Army.  During  the  absence  of  Ninomiya  it  fell  upon 
Tatekawa  to  substitute  for  him,  since  General  Umezu,  next  in 
the  line  of  command,  was  still  in  Kumamoto.  Tatekawa  saw  an 
opportunity  to  take  revenge  on  Umezu.  Instead  of  assuming 
Ninomiya's  duties  from  his  own  office,  Tatekawa  took  it  upon 
himself  to  move  into  Ninomiya's  office.  One  can  well  imagine 
the  embarrassment  of  Umezu  when  he  returned  to  Tokyo.  Tate- 
kawa had  interposed  himself  betwen  Umezu  and  General  Kanaya 
and  intercepted  all  the  administrative  papers  from  Kanaya  to 
Umezu. 

Officials  of  the  Foreign  Office  in  Manchuria  also  did  not  al- 
ways see  eye  to  eye  with  each  other  in  regard  to  Japan's  continen- 
tal strategy.  Shimizu  Momokazu,  Japanese  Consul  at  Tsitsihar, 
was  anxious  to  head  off  the  Kwantung  Army's  assault  on  Tsitsi- 
har. On  or  about  November  16  he  went  to  Mukden  and  met 
Itagaki,  the  Chief  of  Staff,  and  pleaded  with  him  not  to  attack 
Tsitsihar.  He  stressed  the  fact  that  the  safety  of  the  Japanese 
residents  there  would  not  be  jeopardized  so  long  as  the  Kwantung 
Army  did  not  bomb  the  city.  Shimizu's  plea  fell  on  deaf  ears, 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  215 

since  Itagaki  was  bent  on  marching  on  Tsitsihar  in  any  case.  The 
Kwantung  Army,  soon  after  Shimizu's  visit  to  Mukden,  resorted 
to  the  now  familiar  ruse  of  ordering  a  hired  ruffian  to  spark  off 
a  shooting  incident  in  Tsitsihar,  and  the  attack  on  the  city  was  on. 

Ohashi  Chuji,  the  Consul  General  at  Harbin,  was  quite  a  dif- 
ferent person.  From  the  beginning  of  the  Manchurian  crisis  he 
favored  the  actions  of  the  Kwantung  Army  and  strongly  advo- 
cated sending  an  expeditionary  force  to  North  Manchuria.16  It 
is  therefore  not  at  all  surprising  that  he  was  at  odds  with  the 
Foreign  Office  in  Tokyo.  Ohashi,  anticipating  the  occupation 
of  Tsitsihar,  sent  a  troupe  of  female  entertainers  from  Harbin, 
who  were  turned  back  by  Shimizu,  fearful  that  they  would  cor- 
rupt public  morale.  Ohashi  then  sent  them  to  Tsitsihar,  only  to 
have  them  turned  back  again.  The  shuttling  of  the  troupe  back 
and  forth  reminded  at  least  one  observer  of  a  scene  from  a  comic 
opera.17 

Once  the  Tsitsihar  operation  was  under  way,  army  head- 
quarters at  Tokyo  ordered  the  Kwantung  Army  to  withdraw  to 
the  railroad  zone  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  as  soon  as 
Tsitsihar  was  taken.  From  Mukden  came  the  reply:  "The  Ssu- 
Tao  line18  is  damaged.  It  is  hardly  fit  for  use.  If  we  detour  and 
return  by  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  via  Harbin,  not  only 
shall  we  be  using  a  Russian  line  but  we  shall  take  about  two 
weeks."  Headquarters  at  Tokyo  conceded  that  some  part  of  the 
line  might  have  been  damaged,  since  only  recently  the  railway 
areas  had  been  the  scene  of  battle.  Nevertheless,  headquarters 
reiterated  its  order  in  a  second  telegram:  "Since  the  government 
has  already  committed  itself  at  home  and  abroad  to  evacuate 
the  troops  to  the  railroad  zone,  withdraw  from  Tsitsihar  as  soon 
as  possible."19 

On  November  26  a  riot  broke  out  in  Tientsin  for  the  second 

16.  Between  September  22  and  24  Ohashi  sent,  all  told,  three  telegrams 
to  Mukden  requesting  that  troops  be  dispatched,  in  view  of  the  extremely 
acute  situation  around  Harbin.  IMTFE,  Proceedings,  pp.  18,  912-14. 

17.  Morishima,  Conspiracy,  p.  66. 

18.  Railway  running  from  Ssupingkai  to  Taonan. 

19.  Matsumura,  Miyakezaka,  pp.  56-57.  Author's  translation. 


216  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

time.20  It  was  engineered  by  the  Army  Special  Service  Agency 
of  Colonel  Doihara.21  The  staff  officers  of  the  Kwantung  Army 
saw  in  the  threatening  situation  at  Tientsin  a  long-coveted  oppor- 
tunity to  attack  Chinchow  under  the  pretext  of  sending  reinforce- 
ments to  the  small  Japanese  garrison  at  Tientsin.  Much  to 
Tokyo's  astonishment,  the  evacuation  of  Tsitsihar,  which  was 
supposed  to  require  two  weeks,  was  accomplished  in  a  matter 
of  a  few  days.  By  the  time  army  headquarters  received  a  tele- 
gram stating,  "Disturbance  in  Tientsin,  Kwantung  Army  is  im- 
mediately advancing  to  Chinchow,"  one  armored  train,  one  troop 
train,  and  two  airplanes  had  crossed  the  Liao  River.22  Incensed 
by  the  precipitate  action  of  the  Kwantung  Army,  army  head- 
quarters sent  out  a  terse  reminder  that  the  "Kwantung  Army 
must  not  advance  beyond  the  Liao  River."  But  from  Mukden 
came  an  equivocal  reply,  "Cannons  are  booming  at  the  front. 
Telephone  line  is  down.  No  contact  with  the  front  yet."  How- 
ever, even  after  contact  was  established  with  the  front,  the  Kwan- 
tung Army  continued  to  advance  in  the  direction  of  Chinchow.23 

20.  The  first  outbreak  occurred  on  November  8,  1931.  For  details  of 
both  see  the  Lytton  Report,  pp.  75-77.  Asahi,  Taiheiyo,  2,  93-95. 

21.  When  Harada  went  to  Okitsu  on  November  24,  Saionji  said,  "I  am 
inclined  to  think  that  the  Kwantung  Army  will  not  attack  Chinchow. 
However,  caution  must  be  exercised,  since  this  is  a  grave  issue.  Will  you 
therefore  approach  Ugaki  [then  Governor  General  of  Korea]  in  private 
and  ask  him  to  exert  his  every  effort,  so  that  an  attack  on  Chinchow  will 
be  absolutely  averted?  Tell  him  that  Saionji  is  extremely  concerned."  The 
same  day  Harada  returned  to  Tokyo  and  saw  Ugaki  at  his  daughter's  wed- 
ding reception  at  the  Imperial  Hotel.  Ugaki  said,  "I  have  just  had  a  talk 
with  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  and  the  Minister  of  War.  Neither 
thought  Chinchow  would  be  attacked,  but  I  shall  make  further  efforts  to 
stress  this  point."  Harada  Diary,  2,  141^2.  Author's  translation. 

22.  Matsumura,  Miyakezaka,  p.  57.  Author's  translation.  This  unauth- 
orized mobilization  of  the  Kwantung  Army  must  be  distinguished  from 
an  order  that  army  headquarters  at  Tokyo  sent  to  Port  Arthur  to  dispatch 
one  battalion  to  Tientsin.  The  action  was  taken  in  accordance  with  the 
decision  reached  at  a  special  cabinet  meeting  on  November  27.  Harada 
Diary,  2,  143.  It  is  presumed  that  this  expeditionary  force  proceeded  by 
ship  from  Port  Arthur  to  Tientsin.  It  could  have  been  a  countermove  to 
head  off  the  Kwantung  Army's  unauthorized  movement  by  railway. 

23.  It  was  alleged  that  the  code  officer  failed  to  insert  the  negative  par- 


THE  MUKDEN  INCIDENT,  II  217 

After  news  of  the  army's  movement  toward  Chinchow  began 
trickling  into  Tokyo,  Shidehara  had  to  wait  a  whole  day  before 
he  saw  the  Minister  of  War  who  had  gone  away  for  the  week- 
end. When  Shidehara  told  Minami  about  the  rumor,  the  latter 
asked  the  Foreign  Minister  to  wait  while  he  checked  the  news 
with  Kanaya,  but  Kanaya  had  received  no  communication  about 
a  march  on  Chinchow.  He  said  that  he  would  investigate  imme- 
diately, since  quite  often  bureau  and  departmental  chiefs  dis- 
posed of  incoming  telegrams  on  their  own  responsibility. 

That  night  Minami,  clad  in  full-dress  uniform  and  apparently 
unconcerned  about  Chinchow,  left  for  the  Imperial  Palace  to 
attend  a  ceremony.  His  parting  words  to  Shidehara  were  that  the 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff  would  get  in  touch  with  him  later. 
Shidehara,  on  the  other  hand,  declined  the  invitation  from  the 
palace  and  waited  all  evening  in  his  office  at  the  Foreign  Office 
for  the  report  from  Kanaya.  Finally,  at  about  11  p.m.,  he  re- 
ceived a  telephone  call.  Kanaya  had  looked  everywhere  but  had 
not  located  the  telegram  from  the  Kwantung  Army.  He  promised 
that  he  would  continue  the  search  and  report  again. 

The  following  morning  an  adjutant  came  to  Shidehara  from 
the  office  of  the  General  Staff  and  reported,  "At  this  very  mo- 
ment, the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  is  being  received  by  the 
Emperor.  He  has  received  an  imperial  instruction  ordering  the 
troops  sent  to  Chinchow  to  be  withdrawn  to  Mukden."24  At  last 
Shidehara  felt  momentary  relief  from  anxiety. 

The  Lytton  Report  refers  to  the  crisis  as  follows:  "The  Kwan- 
tung Army  repeatedly  bombed  Chinchow,  but  news  of  the  im- 
proved situation  at  Tientsin  soon  deprived  the  expedition  of  its 
original  object  and,  on  November  29,  to  the  great  surprise  of 
the  Chinese,  the  Japanese  forces  were  withdrawn  to  Hsinmin."25 


tide  zu  in  the  telegram  which  ordered  the  Kwantung  Army  "not"  to  cross 
the  Liao  River.  Matsumura,  Miyakezaka,  p.  58. 

24.  Shidehara  Memoirs,  pp.  79-80.  Author's  translation. 

25.  Lytton  Report,  p.  77. 


218  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Henry  L.  Stimson,  in  his  Far  Eastern  Crisis,  expressed  his  ad- 
miration for  Shidehara's  stout  heart — how  single-handedly  he 
had  compelled  the  withdrawal  of  the  Kwantung  Army  from  Chin- 
chow.26  However,  Shidehara,  in  his  Fifty  Years  of  Diplomacy, 
disclaims  any  credit  for  the  alleged  feat  and  ascribes  it  to  General 
Kanaya,  who  without  even  consulting  him  had  compelled  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Kwantung  Army.27 

Only  later  did  it  become  known  that  the  young  officers  of  the 
Kwantung  Army  on  the  scene  had  become  so  incensed  by  the 
restraining  order  that  they  had  gone  on  a  rampage  marked  by 
vandalism  and  property  destruction.  But,  since  General  Kanaya28 
remained  adamant,  they  had  given  in  and  retreated  to  Mukden. 

26.  Stimson  wrote:  "But  whatever  the  reason,  Shidehara  made  on  this 
occasion  a  very  vigorous  effort  and  for  once  was  temporarily  successful." 
The  Far  Eastern  Crisis  (New  York,  Harper,  1936),  p.  78. 

27.  Shidehara  Memoirs,  p.  80. 

28.  An  episode  indicative  of  General  Kanaya's  character  is  cited  by 
Shidehara  in  his  Memoirs.  It  occurred  some  time  in  the  early  part  of  1932. 
The  General  by  then  had  resigned  from  the  post  of  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  because  of  the  October  Plot.  Shidehara  was  also  no  longer  associated 
with  the  Foreign  Office,  the  Inukai  cabinet  of  the  opposition  party  having 
taken  over  in  the  preceding  December.  One  day  Kanaya  sent  a  note  to 
Shidehara,  who  was  then  residing  in  Kamakura  in  semi-retirement,  in- 
viting him  to  dinner  in  Tokyo.  Shidehara,  reluctant  to  go  to  Tokyo,  at 
first  declined,  but  since  Kanaya  persisted  by  sending  his  aide,  Shidehara 
gave  in  and  went  to  the  Japanese  restaurant  which  Kanaya  had  designated. 
There,  much  to  Shidehara's  surprise,  he  found  Kanaya  with  only  two  or 
three  of  his  aides.  When  Shidehara  took  his  place  in  the  room,  the  General 
bade  the  waitresses  to  withdraw  to  an  adjoining  room.  Thereupon  Kanaya 
approached  Shidehara.  As  the  General  solemnly  bowed  on  his  hands  and 
knees,  he  said,  "No  person  is  more  painfully  aware  of  the  untold  troubles 
I  have  caused  you  while  you  were  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  I  am 
responsible  and  feel  deeply  mortified  that  matters  have  been  allowed  to 
come  to  such  a  pass  on  account  of  my  incompetency.  That  is  why  I  have 
asked  for  your  presence  in  order  that  I  may  at  least  tender  my  sincere 
regrets.  I  therefore  beg  you  to  understand  my  motive  for  having  invited 
you  here  today."  Shidehara  related  that  he  was  deeply  impressed  by 
Kanaya's  forthrightness,  so  much  so  that  after  World  War  II  he  reported 
the  incident  to  a  member  of  the  prosecution  section  of  the  International 
Tribunal  for  War  Crimes.  Shidehara  Memoirs,  pp.  183-84.  Author's  trans- 
lation. 


7. 

COLLAPSE  OF  THE 

WAKATSUKI  CABINET 


The  Kwantung  Army  stalked  the  Chinese  army  like  a  beast 
after  its  prey.  The  League  Council  meanwhile  passed  a  resolu- 
tion stipulating  that  Japanese  troops  withdraw  within  the  railway 
zone  by  November  16.  This  made  the  helpless  Premier  Wakatsuki 
all  the  more  nervous.  Equally  at  a  loss  was  Tani  Masayuki,  Chief 
of  the  Asia  Bureau  of  the  Foreign  Office,  who  deplored  the  fact 
that  the  reckless  actions  of  the  Kwantung  Army  had  brought 
Japan  to  the  brink  of  ruin.  As  a  diplomat  he  felt  he  could  no 
longer  bear  the  brunt  of  the  censures  directed  against  Japan 
from  many  quarters  of  the  world. 

At  this  juncture  the  nation's  conduct  of  foreign  relations  was 
further  compromised  by  forces  bent  on  subverting  the  govern- 
ment from  within.  Foreign  Minister  Shidehara  had  to  back  down 
and  make  a  series  of  concessions  to  the  army  lest  extremist  ele- 
ments attempt  another  coup  d'etat  on  the  order  of  the  March 
and  October  Plots.  Despite  Japan's  rapidly  deteriorating  repu- 
tation, Shidehara  no  longer  dared  insist  that  the  Kwantung  Army 
comply  with  the  League  resolution  and  retreat  within  the  railway 
zone.  Needless  to  say,  the  Foreign  Minister's  decision  left  the 
position  of  Japan's  delegation  at  Geneva  virtually  untenable. 

After  the  October  Plot  was  foiled,  it  was  decided  at  a  meeting 
of  the  Big  Three  that  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  and  the  Min- 
ister of  War  should  jointly  assume  the  responsibility  for  the 
abortive  plot  and  resign.  Wakatsuki,  confronted  with  the  task 
of  appointing  a  successor  to  Minami,  wondered  whether  it  would 

219 


220  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

be  at  all  possible  to  obtain  closer  cooperation  from  a  new  war 
minister  than  he  had  received  from  Minami.  The  Premier  was 
exasperated  with  Minami's  laxity  in  carrying  out  the  cabinet's 
decision  during  the  crisis.  In  his  memoirs  Wakatsuki  states: 

I  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  reason  the  Kwantung 
Army  slighted  the  government's  order  was  that  the 
cabinet  consisted  only  of  the  members  of  the  Minseito. 
Therefore,  it  represented  the  opinion  of  only  a  segment 
of  the  public  and  did  not  necessarily  reflect  the  views 
of  the  majority.  Hence,  if  a  coalition  cabinet  were  to  be 
formed,  the  Kwantung  Army  might  obey  the  govern- 
ment's orders,  since  such  a  cabinet  would  then  repre- 
sent the  wishes  of  the  whole  nation.  Thereupon,  I 
decided  to  find  out  if  it  were  feasible  to  form  a  coalition 
government  under  the  existing  party  system.1 

Still,  Wakatsuki  was  not  completely  convinced  of  either  the 
desirability  or  feasibility  of  a  coalition  government,  and  he 
turned  to  elderly  Adachi  Kenzo,2  his  Minister  of  Home  Affairs, 

1.  Wakatsuki  Memoirs,  pp.  383-84.  Author's  translation.  Wakatsuki,  to 
be  sure,  was  aware  of  the  grumbling  voiced  from  quarters  outside  his  own 
party.  To  cite  a  few,  Lieutenant  General  Matsui  Iwane  told  Harada  that 
a  quick  change  of  cabinet  was  imperative,  since  the  military  harbored 
intense  enmity  toward  Wakatsuki  and  Shidehara.  The  tension  would  be 
greatly  lessened  were  Adachi  Kenzo  to  become  premier  and  Inukai  Tsu- 
yoshi  vice  premier,  thereby  forming  a  coalition  cabinet  of  the  Minseito 
and  the  Seiyukai.  Mori  Kaku,  the  Seiyukai  extremist,  told  Harada  that 
unless  there  was  a  change  in  the  government  "the  present  unrest  will  not 
be  quelled."  On  another  occasion,  looking  forward  to  the  60th  Session  of 
the  Diet  to  convene  on  December  26,  Mori  said:  "Even  if  it  means  blood- 
shed, we  will  not  permit  the  majority  party  [the  Minseito]  to  act  willfully." 
Shiraki,  Nihon  Seitoshi,  p.  92.  Author's  translation. 

2.  Adachi,  a  man  of  sixty-eight,  was  a  veteran  politician  who  had  good 
reason  to  feel  that  the  Premier  should  defer  to  him  in  matters  of  such 
importance.  He  was  Wakatsuki's  senior  in  age,  and  when  Hamaguchi  had 
resigned,  he  had  stepped  aside,  because  of  his  rapidly  advancing  years, 
and  personally  solicited  Wakatsuki  to  assume  the  presidency  of  the  Min- 
seito, though  he  had  coveted  the  position  himself. 


COLLAPSE  OF  THE  WAKATSUKI  CABINET  221 

for  advice.  When  Wakatsuki  asked  Adachi,  if  there  were  any 
way  to  stabilize  the  political  situation,  Adachi  replied  that  at 
this  juncture,  there  was  no  formula  but  to  rise  above  party  differ- 
ences and  form  a  coalition  cabinet.  Since  Wakatsuki  was  at  his 
wit's  end,  he  must  have  lent  an  attentive  and  conceivably  even 
a  sympathetic  ear  to  Adachi's  proposal. 

On  October  3 1  Wakatsuki  admitted  to  Harada  that  for  several 
days  after  his  conversation  with  Adachi  he  was  in  favor  of  the 
idea,  but  he  had  to  give  it  up.  Shidehara  and  Inoue,  the  two  most 
influential  members  of  the  cabinet,  were  firmly  against  any  form 
of  coalition.  Their  principal  objection  was  that  if  the  Minseito 
were  to  join  hands  with  the  Seiyukai,  the  current  foreign  and 
financial  policies  would  have  to  be  overhauled,  to  the  detriment 
of  the  nation's  best  interests.  The  two  ministers  earnestly  be- 
sought Wakatsuki  to  give  up  the  idea. 

Wakatsuki  now  showed  signs  of  wavering.  His  vacillation,  how- 
ever, only  incited  Adachi  to  advocate  even  more  vociferously  the 
cause  of  a  coalition  cabinet.  Therefore,  to  put  an  end  to  any 
further  exploratory  talk,  Wakatsuki  summoned  Adachi  and 
asked  him  to  drop  the  idea,  because  influential  members  of  the 
cabinet  had  voiced  strong  objection  to  the  proposal.  Adachi  per- 
sisted that  his  idea  was  an  inspired  one,  but,  since  Wakatsuki 
would  not  yield,  Adachi  acquiesced  for  the  time  being,  and  soon 
afterward  joined  the  imperial  cortege  and  left  for  Kumamoto  to 
attend  the  army's  grand  maneuvers. 

Meanwhile,  the  members  of  the  Wakatsuki  cabinet,3  alarmed 
by  the  turn  of  events,  consulted  each  other  while  Adachi  was 
away.  They  agreed  to  fight  to  the  bitter  end  any  attempt  to  form 
a  coalition  cabinet  and  also  to  dissuade  Wakatsuki  from  enter- 
taining such  a  notion. 

Adachi,  having  arrived  in  Kumamoto,  called  on  General  Araki 

3.  This  group  included  Inoue  Junnosuke,  Finance;  Tanaka  Ryuzo, 
Education;  Machida  Chuzo,  Agriculture  and  Forestry;  Sakurauchi  Yukio, 
Commerce  and  Industry;  Koizumi  Matajiro,  Post  Office;  and  Hara  Shu- 
jiro,  Railroads. 


222  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

several  times.  Araki  had  by  then  become  the  Commander  of  the 
Fifth  Division.  Although  no  one  knows  the  subjects  of  these 
private  conversations,  it  is  highly  probable  that  the  two  touched 
upon  a  change  in  the  government. 

It  has  been  alleged  that  on  the  night  of  October  16,  when 
General  Araki  went  to  placate  and  to  dissuade  Hashimoto,  Cho, 
and  his  group  from  staging  the  October  Plot,  he  was  forced  to 
promise  them  that  he  would  help  overthrow  the  Wakatsuki  gov- 
ernment.4 It  is  thus  likely  that  there  was  a  close  meeting  of  minds 
between  Adachi  and  Araki.  Adachi  must  have  felt  emboldened 
after  having  received  the  backing  of  a  general  who  was  the  idol 
of  young  officers  and  whose  star  was  rapidly  rising.  Actually, 
Adachi  had  been  intrigued  by  the  idea  of  a  nonparty  pro-military 
government  even  before  he  had  gone  to  see  Araki  in  Kumamoto. 
On  the  night  of  November  4  Adachi  summoned  Harada  to  his 
residence  and  confided,  "I  am  intent  on  pushing  this  through  on 
the  basis  of  coalition.  I  believe  the  way  to  go  about  it  is  to  get 
the  military's  understanding,  then  make  the  Minseito  and  the 
Seiyukai  join  hands."5 

In  a  buoyant  mood,  Adachi  had  started  back  to  Tokyo  when 
he  was  cornered  by  press  reporters  at  Shimonoseki.  When  the 
question  of  coalition  government  was  put  to  him,  he  no  longer 
could  resist  the  temptation.  Despite  Wakatsuki's  repeated  re- 
quests not  to  speak  on  the  question  of  a  coalition  government, 
Adachi  stated  that  the  political  situation  called  for  just  that. 
Since  the  pronouncement  came  directly  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Minister  of  Home  Affairs,  it  created  a  great  sensation.  Moreover, 
it  gave  rise  to  many  adverse  rumors,  undermining  the  nation's 
confidence  in  the  Wakatsuki  government.  Wakatsuki  waited  until 
Adachi  arrived  in  Tokyo  and  remonstrated  with  him  for  his  ill- 
advised  utterances.  Adachi  again  countered  with  his  pet  theory 
that  it  was  the  initial  inspiration  which  was  always  the  most 
natural  and  the  best. 

4.  See  above,  p.   199. 

5.  Harada  Diary,  2,  116.  Author's  translation. 


COLLAPSE  OF  THE  WAKATSUKI  CABINET  223 

On  the  Seiyukai  side,  Tokonami  Takejiro,  Kuhara  Fusano- 
suke,  and  even  Hatoyama  Ichiro,  were  said  to  be  in  favor  of 
coalition  government.  Only  Mori  Kaku  and  members  of  the 
Suzuki  clique  were  staunchly  opposed  to  it.  Nevertheless,  to  un- 
dermine the  position  of  the  Minseito,  the  Seiyukai  on  November 
1 1  passed  a  resolution  at  their  party  caucus  favoring  a  ban  on 
the  export  of  gold.  The  resolution  had  an  immediate  effect  on 
the  coalition  movement.6  President  Inukai  was  now  certain  that 
the  two  parties  would  be  unable  to  agree  on  a  working  arrange- 
ment, since  his  party  had  spelled  out  a  financial  policy  at  com- 
plete variance  with  that  of  the  opposition.  Inukai  is  quoted  as 
observing:  "British  political  parties  vie  with  each  other  over  the 
choice  of  policy.  Therefore,  if  several  parties  can  reach  accord 
over  a  matter  of  policy,  parties  can  join  hands.  However,  in  Ja- 
pan, the  prime  object  of  parties  is  to  dominate  the  government, 
so  it  is  not  within  the  nature  of  political  parties  to  coalesce."7 
Furthermore,  Inukai  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  political  situa- 
tion was  not  particularly  suitable  for  a  coalition  cabinet. 

On  the  Minseito  side,  after  the  Seiyukai  resolved  to  ban  gold 
exports,  party  interests  dictated  that  Wakatsuki  assume  an  un- 
compromising attitude  toward  any  proposal  to  form  a  coalition 
government.  Any  abrupt  change  of  cabinet  would  have  affected 
adversely  the  financial  interests  operating  in  line  with  the  free 
and  flexible  exchange  policy  of  Inoue,  the  Minister  of  Finance. 
Furthermore,  Wakatsuki  feared  that  the  rumor  of  an  imminent 
change  in  government  might  spread  panic  in  the  financial  world 
and  induce  a  flight  of  capital. 

Kuhara  Fusanosuke,  Secretary  General  of  the  Seiyukai,  was 
quick  to  see  that  the  breach  between  Wakatsuki  and  Adachi  was 
pregnant  with  possibilities  for  furthering  his  own  political  for- 
tunes. By  astute  manipulation  of  the  coalition  theme  he  could 
not  only  hasten  the  collapse  of  the  Wakatsuki  cabinet  but  steal  a 
march  on  his  political  rivals  by  ushering  in  a  reconstructed  gov- 

6.  See  below,  pp.  227-29. 

7.  Shiraki,  Nihon  Seitoshi,  p.  95.  Author's  translation. 


224  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

ernment  oriented  toward  the  new  political  movement  spearhead- 
ed by  army  men.  It  appeared  that  he  might  be  able  to  kill  two 
birds  with  one  stone. 

However,  Wakatsuki  himself  was  largely  responsible  for 
abetting  the  coalition  movement.  It  was  he  who  had  first  lent  a 
sympathetic  ear  to  Adachi's  proposal.  But  even  more  far-reaching 
in  effect  was  the  prevalent  notion  that  Wakatsuki  was  too  weak 
a  premier  to  face  the  crisis  on  two  fronts — at  home  and  in  Man- 
churia. Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  fact  that  at  the 
time  of  the  Mukden  Incident,  Kido  Koichi  had  criticized  Waka- 
tsuki's  timidity.8  Later,  on  New  Year's  Day  of  1932,  Harada 
reports  having  heard  Saionji  say,  "When  I  learned  that  Wakatsuki 
was  going  around  calling  on  the  Elder  Statesmen,  I  had  a  strong 
premonition  that  he  had  made  a  fatal  move."9 

Because  of  the  official  positions  Kuhara  and  Adachi  held  in 
their  respective  parties,  neither  man  dared  approach  the  other 
openly.10  However,  Kuhara  found  ready  collaborators  in  Tomita 
Kojiro11  and  Nakano  Seigo,12  both  of  whom  were  members  of 
Adachi's  clique.  On  December  10  Tomita  suddenly  confronted 
Wakatsuki  with  a  Tomita-Kuhara  agreement.  In  brief  the  pact 
provided  that,  irrespective  of  the  party  affiliation  of  the  individual 

8.  See  above,  pp.  192-94. 

9.  Harada  Diary,  2,  169.  Author's  translation. 

10.  Kuhara  had  told  Prince  Saionji,  "I  have  not  met  with  Adachi,  but 
have  met  with  Mr.  Tomita  in  regard  to  coalition  government"  {Harada 
Diary,  2,  151).  Despite  Kuhara's  profession  to  Saionji,  it  is  inconceivable 
that  the  two  men  did  not  have  a  tacit  understanding.  Their  names  were 
inseparably  linked  in  the  minds  of  the  public  as  men  who  plotted  the 
downfall  of  the  Wakatsuki  cabinet.  That  Kuhara  had  committed  himself 
to  the  cause  of  a  coalition  cabinet  is  borne  out  by  the  following  incident. 
After  Inukai  became  the  premier,  he  asked  Kuhara  to  become  the  chief 
secretary  of  the  party.  Kuhara  was  greatly  troubled  and  the  story  was  that 
he  consented  only  after  he  had  cleared  himself  with  Adachi.  Tsugumo 
Kunitoshi,  "Kuromaku,  Kuhara  Fusanosuke"  (Kuhara,  The  Wire  Puller), 
Fuun  Jinbutsu  Tokuhon,  p.  187. 

11.  A  member  of  the  Lower  House  of  the  Diet,  a  counselor  of  the 
Minseito. 

12.  A  member  of  the  Lower  House  of  the  Diet  and  the  manager  of  the 
Minseito. 


COLLAPSE  OF  THE  WAKATSUKI  CABINET  225 

who  would  be  asked  to  form  the  next  cabinet  by  imperial  man- 
date, the  heads  of  both  parties  would  meet  and  distribute  the 
portfolios  for  cabinet  officials  and  parliamentary  vice  ministers 
equally  among  the  men  of  both  parties.  Needless  to  say,  the  pact 
had  been  reached  in  private  between  Kuhara  and  Tomita  only  and 
did  not  bear  the  official  stamp  of  approval  of  either  party. 

The  coalition  government  envisaged  by  Adachi,  Kuhara,  or 
Tomita  did  not  represent  a  last  stand  of  the  party  men  to  bury 
the  hatchet  and  unite  in  order  to  stave  off  the  encroachment  of 
army  men  on  party  government.  Quite  the  contrary,  these  men 
saw  in  the  rising  tide  of  military  influence  in  government  an  op- 
portunity by  which  they  might  further  their  own  political  for- 
tunes. Publicly  they  may  have  paid  lip  service  to  the  preservation 
of  a  party  form  of  government,  but  privately  they  curried  the 
favor  of  influential  military  men.13  Adachi  was  doing  exactly  the 
same  thing  Mori  had  done  in  January  of  the  same  year:  he  was 
employing  the  army  as  a  lever  to  dislodge  the  opposition. 

It  has  been  noted  that  among  the  members  of  the  Seiyukai, 
only  Mori  and  those  of  Suzuki's  clique  were  opposed  to  any  kind 
of  coalition  government.  Mori's  long  association  with  the  army 
from  the  days  of  Premier  Tanaka  made  him  an  avowed  foe  of 
Shidehara's  China  policy,  and  he  saw  no  reason  why  party  gov- 
ernment should  be  allowed  to  continue  in  decrepit  form.  It  may 
be  recalled  that  during  the  March  Plot  the  three  generals — 
Ninomiya,  Koiso,  and  Tatekawa — summoned  Lieutenant  Col- 
onel Suzuki  Teiichi  to  the  official  residence  of  the  Minister  of 
War  one  night  and  summarily  ordered  him:  "Go  immediately  to 

13.  Reference  has  been  made  earlier  to  Adachi's  visits  to  General  Araki 
during  the  former's  stay  in  Kumamoto  at  the  time  of  the  grand  maneuvers. 
To  cite  another  instance,  at  a  cabinet  meeting  in  the  latter  part  of  Septem- 
ber when  Shidehara  put  a  difficult  question  to  Minami  regarding  the  un- 
authorized movement  of  the  Kwantung  Army,  Adachi  defended  Minami. 
After  this  minor  incident,  Adachi  is  said  to  have  curried  the  good  will  of 
the  army.  See  Harada  Diary,  2,  85.  With  respect  to  Nakano  Seigo,  Harada 
wrote,  "Take,  for  instance,  Nakano  Seigo.  There  is  even  a  rumor  that  he 
has  been  calling  on  General  Araki  every  day."  Ibid.,  p.  127.  Author's 
translation. 


226  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Mori  of  the  Seiyukai  and  explain  to  him  that  you  come  on  order 
of  the  Minister  of  War,  and  instruct  Mori  to  take  measures  to 
keep  the  Diet  in  a  state  of  confusion."14  Again  during  the  period 
immediately  preceding  the  October  Plot,  it  was  Mori  who  ap- 
parently had  advance  information  on  the  doings  of  the  young 
officers.15  He  is  said  to  have  gone  about  predicting  the  big  coup 
d'etat  which  was  to  come  any  day. 

On  the  same  day  that  Tomita  confronted  Wakatsuki  with  the 
Kuhara-Tomita  agreement,  the  Premier  summoned  all  cabinet 
ministers  who  were  members  of  the  Minseito  party  to  his  resi- 
dence for  a  conference.  Only  Adachi  failed  to  appear.  Those  who 
were  present  decided  to  continue  the  cabinet  as  it  was  then  con- 
stituted. Meanwhile,  Wakatsuki  sent  three  men  to  Adachi  urging 
him  to  join  the  meeting,  but  he  refused  in  each  instance.  The  last 
to  go  was  Tanaka  Ryuzo,  Minister  of  Education.  He  urged 
Adachi  to  submit  a  letter  of  resignation,  but  Adachi  would  not 
do  so,  stating  that  he  would  resign  only  on  condition  that  all  the 
other  members  of  the  cabinet  did  likewise.  Wakatsuki's  time  was 

14.  Ibid.,  pp.  22-23.  Author's  translation. 

15.  Mori's  true  colors  became  increasingly  apparent  with  the  passage  of 
time.  In  the  spring  of  1932,  as  the  army  became  disgruntled  with  Inukai's 
government,  it  sought  to  replace  Inukai  with  a  cabinet  headed  by  Hira- 
numa.  Mori  promptly  parted  company  with  his  former  friends  of  the 
Seiyuki,  such  as  Hatoyama  (see  the  following  for  details),  and  set 
out  to  engineer  the  collapse  of  the  Inukai  cabinet  from  within  with 
the  backing  of  the  Araki-Mazaki  clique — the  K6do-ha.  Inukai  quickly 
saw  Mori's  design  and  allied  himself  with  Kuhara.  But  Inukai's  long  poli- 
tical career  came  to  an  abrupt  end  when  he  fell  at  the  hands  of  the  young 
officers  in  the  May  15  Incident  of  1932.  Hatoyama  said:  "It  was  during 
the  days  of  the  Inukai  cabinet  that  I  got  into  a  heated  argument  with  Mori 
in  the  Chief  Secretary's  Office  [of  the  Seiyukai].  Mori  disapproved  the  path 
I  was  treading,  saying  that  times  had  changed.  He  said  that  if  I  persisted 
in  adhering  to  my  type  of  thinking,  my  life  would  be  in  peril."  Mori  said, 
"I  will  assure  your  position  and  reputation  for  you;  so  let  me  handle  this 
matter  my  way.  Do  not  interfere  with  me.  I  have  no  political  ambition 
except  to  see  that  the  problem  of  China  is  settled.  In  matters  of  domestic 
politics,  I  shall  respect  your  opinion  to  the  bitter  end."  Hatoyama  re- 
torted, "I'll  take  care  of  my  own  life  so  do  not  worry.  However,  your  idea 
is  mistaken."  And  they  parted  company  in  tears.  Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku, 
p.  506.  Author's  translation. 


COLLAPSE  OF  THE  WAKATSUKI  CABINET  227 

up.  The  following  day,  December  11,  all  the  members  of  the 
cabinet,  including  Adachi,  submitted  their  resignations.  There- 
upon, Adachi,  Tomita,  Nakano,  and  six  other  members  of 
Adachi's  clique  seceded  from  the  Minseito. 

Although  no  one  has  succeeded  in  determining  whether  the 
two  events  are  interrelated,  it  is  often  alleged  that  the  heavy  pur- 
chase of  dollar  funds  by  large  business  interests  in  Japan  throttled 
the  coalition  movement  and  thereby  hastened  the  fall  of  the 
Wakatsuki  cabinet. 

When  London  chose  to  go  off  the  gold  standard  on  September 
22,  1931,  it  is  a  fact  that  the  major  banks  in  Japan  had  to  build 
up  their  dollar  funds  in  New  York.  Taking  the  British  action  as 
a  sign  of  the  future,  Japanese  financiers  suspected  that  it  was  but 
a  question  of  time  until  Japan,  too,  would  have  to  suspend  her 
shipments  of  gold.  In  such  an  event  the  value  of  the  yen  on  the 
exchange  market  would  inevitably  decline,  and  those  who  waited 
until  then  to  convert  their  dollar  funds  into  yen  would  receive 
more  yen  for  the  dollar  than  those  who  converted  before  the 
ban  on  gold  shipments.  Initially,  the  purchase  of  dollar  funds 
began  as  a  measure  of  expediency,  but  it  later  turned  into  a 
speculative  venture,  especially  after  the  Seiyukai  at  its  party  cau- 
cus passed  a  resolution  favoring  a  ban  on  gold  shipments.16  From 
then  on,  the  flight  of  capital  from  Japan  shifted  into  high  gear. 

Inoue,  Minister  of  Finance,  countered  the  Seiyukai's  public 
statement  with  an  announcement  that  the  Minseito  government 
would  under  no  circumstance  resort  to  a  ban  on  gold  shipments. 

16.  On  September  12,  1917,  Japan  followed  America  in  placing  a  ban 
on  the  export  of  gold.  In  the  summer  of  1929  the  Minseito  party  returned 
to  office.  Inoue  Junnosuke,  the  Finance  Minister,  was  a  firm  believer  in 
balanced  budgets  and  free  gold  movements — in  short,  in  "orthodox"  finan- 
cial policy.  Inoue  managed  to  convince  his  colleagues  and  the  business 
world  that  exchange  fluctuations  were  in  the  long  run  more  detrimental 
to  Japan's  future  development  than  any  inconveniences  that  would  attend 
a  return  to  the  gold  standard.  The  gold  embargo  was  lifted  on  November 
21,  1929.  Perhaps  the  most  authoritative  account  of  the  "purchase  of  dol- 
lars" is  Ikeda  Seihin's  own  story  in  Yatsugi,  Showa  Jinbutsu  Hiroku, 
pp.  100-18. 


228  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

Nevertheless,  during  the  months  of  October  and  November  1931 
gold  shipments  out  of  Japan  reached  285  million  yen,  heavily 
depleting  the  supply  of  gold  specie  held  by  the  Bank  of  Japan. 
Ikeda  Seihin,  managing  director  of  the  Bank  of  Mitsui,  estimated 
that  the  total  capital  flight  in  this  period  ranged  between  500 
and  600  million  yen.  This  was  a  sizable  part  of  the  funds  held  by 
the  Bank  of  Japan,  for  immediately  prior  to  the  resumption  of 
gold  shipments  in  1929  it  had  amounted  to  over  one  billion  yen. 

Thus,  many  were  able  to  argue  that  the  large  business  interests 
of  Japan,  by  heavy  buying  of  dollars,  had  irrevocably  committed 
themselves  to  a  policy  of  waiting  for  the  expected  depreciation 
in  the  exchange  rate  of  the  yen  that  would  follow  a  gold  embargo. 
They  had  thus  assumed  a  position  from  which  they  could  not 
withdraw.  Either  the  Seiyukai  had  to  replace  the  Minseito  or  big 
business  interests  stood  to  sustain  a  heavy  loss.  Therefore,  the 
suspicion  grew  that  there  may  have  been  collusion  between  the 
Adachi-Kuhara  coalition  cabinet  movement  and  the  big  business 
interests  which  had  invested  heavily  in  dollar  funds. 

As  maintained  previously,  evidence  has  not  been  uncovered  to 
substantiate  the  suspicion  that  the  large  financial  interests  abetted 
Adachi,  Kuhara,  or  Tomita  in  upsetting  the  Wakatsuki  cabinet. 
Moreover,  Ikeda  Seihin,  the  mainstay  of  Mitsui  interests,  has 
stated  that  in  the  capital  transfer  from  yen  to  dollar,  Japanese 
banks  actually  sustained  huge  net  losses,  running  into  the  mil- 
lions: Mitsubishi  Bank,  80  million  yen;  Bank  of  Mitsui,  10  mil- 
lion yen;  and  Sumitomo  Bank,  about  5  million  yen. 

Ikeda  further  has  stated  that  when  he  became  Minister  of 
Finance  in  1938  under  the  first  Konoe  government,  he  ordered 
a  thorough  study  of  the  incident,  and  it  was  substantiated  that 
the  purchase  of  dollar  funds  did  not  result  in  profits. 

Nevertheless,  the  public  could  not  overlook  the  fact  that,  after 
the  ban  on  gold  shipments,  the  exchange  rate  of  the  yen  in  rela- 
tion to  the  dollar  declined  by  20  per  cent.  With  it  there  was 
an  appreciable  rise  in  the  price  of  consumer  goods.  The  night 
the  ban  went  into  force,  two  department  stores  in  Tokyo  had 


COLLAPSE  OF  THE  WAKATSUKI  CABINET  229 

their  clerks  work  all  night  to  retag  their  merchandise  with  higher 
prices.  The  rise  in  wages  lagged  behind,  with  the  result  that  wage 
earners  were  caught  in  a  squeeze. 

When  Baba  Tsunego,  a  well-known  journalist,  wrote  a  scath- 
ing editorial  about  the  alleged  exorbitant  profits — 60  million 
yen — reaped  by  the  zaibatsu  in  a  time  of  acute  depression,  it 
fanned  the  resentment  of  the  public  all  the  more.  The  term 
"purchase  of  dollars"  thus  came  to  be  associated  with  a  change 
of  government,  and  became  a  byword  for  the  corruption  of  the 
political  parties  and  big  business  interests.  And  such  a  trend  in 
public  opinion  gave  the  national  reconstruction  movement  cen- 
tered around  the  military  a  convenient  pretext  for  resorting  to 
direct  action  to  liquidate  these  two  alleged  sources  of  evil  in 
Japan:  big  business  interests  and  party  government. 


8. 

PRELUDE  TO  TRAGEDY 


Despite  the  mounting  crisis  at  home  and  abroad,  it  did  not 
appear  in  the  spring  of  1931  that  Japan  as  a  nation  was  on  the 
verge  of  large-scale  revolution.  Quite  the  contrary,  the  bureau- 
cracy went  about  its  routines  at  a  seemingly  unhurried  pace,  and 
it  may  well  have  been  its  complacency  that  spurred  the  military 
and  the  extremists  to  proceed  with  their  plans  with  so  much  zeal. 

Certain  public  figures,  moreover,  despite  a  belief  that  the  cor- 
rect policy  lay  in  maintaining  the  status  quo  at  home  and  pre- 
serving peace  abroad,  found  it  expedient  for  political  reasons 
to  pay  lip  service  to  expansionist  sentiments.  For  some  this  may 
have  been  the  reaction  of  an  innate  conservatism  to  the  unre- 
strained liberal  tendencies  of  the  twenties.  Tanaka  belonged  to 
this  category;  Premier  and  simultaneously  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  he  was  never  the  architect  of  the  China  policy  that  bore 
his  name. 

While  Tanaka  as  an  old  soldier  decried  Japan's  waning  in- 
fluence in  China  and  blamed  the  conciliatory  policy  of  the  oppo- 
sition party  for  it,  his  confidant  was  furtively  engaged  behind  the 
scenes  in  negotiations  with  the  Chinese  authorities.  This  was 
not  to  the  liking  of  the  expansionists,  who  were  clamoring  for 
more  forceful  means  to  break  the  momentum  of  the  fiery  rights 
recovery  movement  and  thus  restore  Japan  to  her  former  position 
of  influence  in  Manchuria  and  China. 

Behind  Premier  Tanaka  stood  the  true  molder  of  his  China 
policy — Mori  Kaku,  Parliamentary  Vice  Minister  of  Foreign 

230 


PRELUDE  TO  TRAGEDY  231 

Affairs,  who  in  the  early  months  of  Tanaka's  government  con- 
vened the  Eastern  Regions  Conference  in  Tokyo  to  outline  to 
the  diplomats  and  military  officials  summoned  from  China  and 
Manchuria  his  own  version  of  the  "positive  policy."  The  occasion 
was  momentous,  for  Mori  at  this  conference  finally  sanctioned 
the  kind  of  direct  action  which  the  extremists  of  the  Kwantung 
Army  had  for  some  time  been  advocating.  In  short,  by  his  action 
Mori  gave  direct  impetus  to  a  development  that  ended  with  the 
Mukden  Incident. 

Mori  had  no  scruples  about  arousing  the  antagonism  of  the 
Chinese.  Despite  the  misgivings  voiced  by  both  Tanaka  and  the 
army  and  despite  strenuous  opposition  from  the  officials  of  the 
Foreign  Office  stationed  in  China,  in  1927  and  1928  Mori  will- 
fully sent  military  expeditions  to  Shantung.  The  second  expedi- 
tion brought  on  a  direct  clash  between  Chinese  and  Japanese 
troops,  which  required  more  than  two  years  of  painstaking  nego- 
tiations to  settle. 

Mori  planned  to  occupy  Manchuria  in  May  1928,  and  only 
Tanaka's  veto  at  the  final  moment  prevented  a  precipitating 
incident  from  occurring  at  that  time.  Although  Tanaka  momen- 
tarily restrained  the  Kwantung  Army  from  going  on  the  warpath, 
the  irate  officers  gave  vent  to  their  anger  by  assassinating  Chang 
Tso-lin.  Thus  again  a  Sino-Japanese  clash  became  only  a  ques- 
tion of  time,  since  under  Chang  Hsueh-liang,  his  successor,  re- 
lations between  the  two  countries  became  even  more  strained. 

At  home  Mori  advocated  withdrawal  from  the  League,  so  that 
Japan  could  pursue  unimpeded  her  expansionist  goals  in  Man- 
churia. In  order  to  strengthen  Japan's  war  potential,  he  declared 
that  free  enterprise  should  be  restrained,  that  essential  indus- 
tries such  as  insurance,  banking,  navigation,  fishing,  and  silk 
should  be  nationalized.  He  decried  trading  practices  which  per- 
mitted basic  staples  such  as  rice  to  become  objects  of  speculation 
on  the  open  market. 

Mori's  prescription  for  creating  a  highly  centralized  form  of 
government  was  for  politicians  and  the  military  to  join  hands 


232 


CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 


in  forming  a  single  mass  party.  In  practice,  however,  he  drew 
much  more  heavily  on  the  army  than  on  civilians  to  back  his  ex- 
pansionist program  and  to  exert  pressure  upon  the  rival  party 
in  government.  By  utilizing  the  army  as  his  political  tool  Mori, 
more  than  any  other  individual  in  Japan's  recent  history,  pro- 
vided the  military  with  convenient  access  to  Japan's  political 
structure.  This,  indeed,  is  a  grave  accusation,  for  in  the  end  it 
was  the  reckless  behavior  of  the  army  in  China  which  brought 
onto  Japan  her  disastrous  defeat  in  World  War  II. 

Less  obvious  but  highly  important  was  the  all-pervasive  in- 
fluence exerted  by  Mori's  political  philosophy  upon  many  up- 
and-coming  officials  in  the  government.  Most  notable  among  this 
group  was  Prince  Konoe  Fumimaro,  who  thrice  became  premier 
between  1937  and  1941,  a  decisive  period  in  Japan's  modern 
history.  He  described  his  debt  to  Mori  in  1940: 

Because  of  the  stimulus  I  received  from  Mori,  my  face 
was  turned  toward  a  new  political  order.  It  was  through 
him  that  I  was  afforded  the  opportunity  of  meeting 
men  in  military  and  other  walks  of  life  who  were  ad- 
herents of  the  philosophy  underlying  the  new  political 
order.  Again  it  was  through  Mori  that  I  began  to  enter- 
tain deep  concern  for  Manchuria.  Indeed,  Mori  was 
the  predecessor  who  drew  me  into  the  circle  of  the  new 
political  order.1 


Although  Tanaka's  name  has  over  the  years  become  a  byword 
for  Japan's  sinister  designs  on  the  continent,  he  was  neither  a 
chauvinist  nor  an  expansionist.2  He  was  in  large  measure  a  vic- 
tim of  his  subordinates — men  like  Mori  Kaku  and  his  firebrands 
of  the  Kwantung  Army  who  stopped  at  nothing  to  fulfill  their 

1.  Yamaura,  Mori  Kaku,  pp.  iii-iv.  Author's  free  translation. 

2.  See  Ugaki  Memoirs,  pp.  315-17,  for  General  Ugaki's  account  of 
Tanaka's  own  formula  for  the  solution  of  the  international  problems  posed 
by  Manchuria. 


PRELUDE  TO  TRAGEDY  233 

expansionist  ambitions,  and,  in  the  process,  together  with  the 
Seiyukai's  policy  toward  China,  brought  upon  Tanaka  the  un- 
earned opprobrium  of  the  world. 

Mori  was  a  proponent  of  expansionism,  the  direct  actionists 
attempted  to  implement  his  type  of  program  through  a  series 
of  conspiracies,  plots,  and  assassinations.  Notable  among 
this  group  were  Colonel  Komoto  Daisaku,  Okawa  Shumei,  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Hashimoto  Kingoro,  and  Major  Hanaya  Tadashi. 
The  boastful  utterances  and  chauvinistic  actions  of  these  men 
can  hardly  be  considered  as  coming  from  stable  individuals,  and 
in  fact  they  would  have  made  appropriate  subjects  for  psychiatric 
study.3  They  behaved  contemptuously  toward  those  who  sought 
compromise  solutions,  including  even  their  immediate  superiors. 
Many  were  woefully  lacking  in  any  sense  of  responsibility  even 
toward  the  immediate  members  of  their  families,  not  to  speak 
of  the  society  of  which  they  were  a  part. 

It  should  not  occasion  surprise,  therefore,  to  find  that  individ- 
uals whose  dealings  with  their  own  society  were  irresponsible 
behaved  with  criminal  irresponsibility  in  the  international  sphere. 
The  fact  was  that  these  extremists  regarded  the  efforts  of  the  For- 
eign Office  to  abide  by  the  terms  of  international  agreements  as 
sheer  cowardice  and  lack  of  patriotism.  In  seeking  an  explanation 
for  their  excessive  behavior,  we  become  aware  that  we  are  study- 
ing what  might  be  termed  the  anatomy  of  over-reaction. 

In  the  most  general  terms,  when  the  status  or  the  existence  of 

a  nation  or  a  group  with  a  strong  identity  is  threatened  from 

within  or  without,  it  is  not  uncommon  for  an  individual  or  a 

group  of  individuals  to  decide  to  risk  their  personal  welfare  in 

3.  In  this  connection  attention  is  called  to  four  very  penetrating  essays 
by  Professor  Maruyama  Masao:  "Cho^kokka  Shugi  no  Ronri  to  Shinri" 
(The  Rationale  and  Psychology  Underlying  Ultranationalism),  "Nihon 
Fashizumu  no  ShisS  to  Undo"  (Ideology  and  Movements  Pertaining  to 
Japanese  Fascism),  "Gunkoku  Shihaisha  no  Seishin  Keitai"  (The  Gestalt 
of  the  Elites  of  Militarism),  and  "Nihon  ni  Okeru  Nashonarizumu" 
(Nationalism  in  Japan).  These  articles,  together  with  supplementary  foot- 
notes, are  included  in  his  Gendai  Seiji  no  Shiso  to  Kodo  (Thoughts  and 
Actions  Underlying  Contemporary  Politics),  1  (Tokyo,  1958). 


234  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

what  they  feel  to  be  the  best  interests  of  the  nation  or  group.  That 
the  individual  thereby  catapults  himself  into  the  limelight  tends 
to  reinforce  his  sense  of  mission — as  a  hero,  Messiah,  martyr, 
patriot,  or  whatever.  This  tendency,  if  one  may  hazard  a  guess, 
seems  especially  strong  in  an  authoritarian  society  such  as  Japan, 
where  the  ego's  needs  are  often  submerged  in  the  interests 
of  the  group  without  leaving  the  individual  any  socially  accept- 
able means  of  redress.  Thus  rebellion  against  authority,  when  it 
comes,  tends  to  be  more  violent  and  irrational  than  in  a  less 
suppressive  society,  and  it  characteristically  starts  under  the  ban- 
ner of  patriotism  or  national  interest.  Only  by  positing  such  as- 
sumptions can  the  behavior  of  the  direct  actionists  in  Japan  be 
properly  understood.  In  the  early  thirties  certain  self-styled  pa- 
triots felt  that  a  need  existed  to  surmount  the  domestic  and  in- 
ternational crisis.  And  in  view  of  the — to  them — hopelessly 
inadequate  political  means  available  for  a  solution,  they  felt 
driven  to  resort  to  erratic,  irresponsible,  and  desperate  actions 
which  seriously  jeopardized  the  long-term  national  interests  of 
Japan.  The  assassinations  of  Chang  Tso-lin  and  Premier  Hama- 
guchi,  the  abortive  March  and  October  Plots,  and  the  Mukden 
Incident  belong  to  this  category. 

The  welling  crises  in  Manchuria  and  at  home  patently  de- 
manded decisiveness  in  thinking  and  action  by  the  government, 
but  decisiveness  was  sadly  lacking.  While  Saburi  and  Shigemitsu 
as  representatives  of  the  Japanese  government  made  every  effort 
to  keep  channels  of  communication  open  with  the  Chinese,  Shide- 
hara  and  Wakatsuki  dared  not  take  steps  which  even  suggested 
a  conciliatory  attitude,  lest  such  a  move  provoke  the  army  ex- 
tremists to  go  on  a  rampage  and  create  untoward  incidents. 

At  this  point  the  crux  of  the  problem  reveals  itself  as  the  old 
question  of  the  place  of  the  military  in  the  Japanese  government. 
We  may  note  in  passing  that  for  a  variety  of  reasons  Ito  and  his 
legal  advisers  found  it  necessary  to  clothe  the  Meiji  Constitution 
in  the  garb  of  constitutional  monarchy  and  yet  provide  for  the 
independence  of  the  supreme  command.  In  the  late  twenties  and 


PRELUDE  TO  TRAGEDY  235 

early  thirties,  societal  strains  and  inequities  of  every  description 
that  had  been  contained  for  many  years  under  the  governmental 
program  of  forced  modernization  came  to  a  head  in  the  form  of 
a  crucial  question:  Should  not  this  fiction  inherent  in  Japan's 
political  structure  be  resolved  once  and  for  all? 

Wakatsuki  cannot  be  absolved  from  the  charge  that  he  failed 
to  provide  strong  political  leadership  when  Japan  needed  it  most. 
Vigorous  action  was  a  necessity  if  only  to  revive  the  confidence 
of  the  people  in  the  parliamentary  form  of  government,  but 
Wakatsuki,  a  former  bureaucrat,  may  well  have  lacked  confidence 
in  the  future  of  parliamentary  government.  A  revealing  incident 
in  this  regard  is  cited  by  Harada  Kumao. 

Shortly  before  the  Mukden  Incident,  Harada  asked  Premier 
Wakatsuki's  opinion  on  the  Emperor's  role  in  forming  a  cabinet. 
Should  the  Emperor  remind  a  party  president  forming  a  new 
cabinet  to  exercise  care  in  the  selection  of  ministers  so  that  only 
men  of  upright  character  and  reputation  would  be  appointed, 
thereby  restoring  the  confidence  of  the  people  in  political  parties? 

Wakatsuki's  reply  is  interesting  because  it  reveals  his  mental 
reservations  on  parliamentary  government:  "If  it  should  ever 
become  the  practice  for  the  Emperor  to  direct  his  queries  ex- 
clusively toward  the  presidents  of  parties,  this  would  carry  a 
strong  overtone  that  the  Emperor  himself  sanctions  party  rule 
as  being  the  proper  mode  of  His  Imperial  Highness'  government 
in  the  future."4 

If  Wakatsuki  was  powerless  to  restrain  the  unruly  Kwantung 
Army,  was  this  not  the  moment  for  the  Premier  or  Prince  Saionji 
to  advise  the  Emperor  to  invoke  his  prerogative  to  bring  the  army 
into  line?  Prince  Saionji  was  firmly  set  against  it.  Did  he  per- 
form an  effective  role  as  the  last  surviving  Elder  Statesman? 

Prince  Saionji  in  his  youth  had  spent  ten  years  in  France 
absorbing  the  liberal  political  traditions  of  the  West  and  was 
undoubtedly  the  most  enlightened  of  the  Elder  Statesmen  who 
in  their  lifetime  had  often  acted  as  a  balance  wheel  between  the 

4.  Harada  Diary,  2,  59-60.  Author's  free  translation. 


236  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

parliamentary  forces  and  the  military.  Two  factors,  however, 
left  him  relatively  powerless  in  the  herculean  task  of  restraining 
the  military  both  at  home  and  abroad  in  the  critical  thirties:  his 
personality  and  his  age.  As  a  scion  of  the  effete  court  nobility 
of  Kyoto,  he  tended  to  be  overly  gentle  and  lacking  in  the  militant 
spirit  and  iron  resolve  necessary  for  his  role  as  arbiter;  and  his 
advanced  years — he  was  already  in  his  eighties  and  in  failing 
health — further  robbed  him  of  the  energy  required  for  his  exact- 
ing role.5 

The  Emperor,  who  sternly  disapproved  of  the  arbitrary  actions 
of  the  Kwantung  Army  and  indeed  on  a  number  of  occasions  ex- 
pressed his  desire  for  the  restoration  of  friendly  relations  with 
China,  often  volunteered  to  assume  the  arbiter's  role,  perhaps 
to  compensate  for  the  weak  role  Saionji  was  performing.  The 
Emperor  suggested  in  late  October  of  1931  that  he  summon  Pre- 
mier Wakatsuki  and  War  Minister  Minami  to  discuss  the  current 
Manchurian  situation. 

This  meeting  never  took  place,  however,  because  Saionji  firmly 
advised  against  it.  Not  only  did  he  seriously  doubt  that  such 
meetings  could  accomplish  anything  of  consequence,  he  also 
suspected  that  should  a  decision  be  reached  only  to  be  disobeyed 
by  the  army,  the  position  of  the  throne  would  be  compromised. 
Saionji  therefore  insisted  to  the  bitter  end  that  the  Emperor 
should  never  be  made  to  assume  personal  responsibility  for  any 
act  of  state. 

One  wonders  if  Saionji  ever  fully  appreciated  the  crippling 
effect  which  the  passing  of  the  institution  of  the  Elder  Statesmen 
from  the  political  scene  in  Japan  had  on  practical  aspects  of 
government.6  As  the  solitary  surviving  Elder  Statesman,  Saionji 

5.  For  an  excellent  portrayal  of  Prince  Saionji,  see  "Saigo  no  Genro, 
Saionji  Kinmochi"  (Saionji,  The  Last  Elder  Statesman),  in  Oka  Yoshitake, 
Kindai  Nihon  no  Seijika  (Statesmen  of  Recent  Japan)  (Tokyo,  1960), 
esp.  pp.  203-04,  227-28,  235. 

6.  After  the  death  of  two  Elder  Statesmen  from  Satsuma,  Kuroda 
Kiyotaka  in  1900  and  Saigo  Tsugumichi  in  1902,  the  balance  of  power  in 
that  body  shifted  to  the  Choshu  faction  with  Ito  Hirobumi,  Yamagata 


PRELUDE  TO  TRAGEDY  237 

no  longer  enjoyed  the  powerful  influence  previously  wielded  by 
this  extraconstitutional  body  in  directing  the  domestic  and  for- 
eign policies  of  Japan.  While  he  retained  in  his  person  the  im- 
portant function  of  nominating  premiers,  he  no  longer  performed 
the  function  which  the  exigencies  of  the  time  made  even  more 
essential — reconciling  the  differences  between  the  cabinet  and 
the  high  command.  During  the  Meiji  era  joint  sessions  of  the 
Elder  Statesmen  and  the  principal  cabinet  officials,  or  of  these 
two  bodies  with  the  high  command,  had  been  held  to  iron  out 
differences  and  to  facilitate  the  unimpeded  operation  of  these 
governmental  agencies. 

Once  the  powerful  institution  of  Elder  Statesmen  wasted 
away,  who  would  step  in  to  resolve  the  dualism  inherent  in  the 
constitutional  structure  of  Japanese  government?  That  there 
existed  a  genuine  need  for  such  a  body  was  brought  to  a  sharp 
focus  under  the  stresses  of  the  Manchurian  crisis  when  Premier 
Wakatsuki,  out  of  desperation,  made  a  round  of  calls  on  senior 
statesmen  and  opposition  leaders  to  effect  some  sort  of  solution. 

Saionji,  however,  was  deeply  distressed  by  Wakatsuki's  preci- 
pitate action  and  told  Harada,  his  aide,  that  any  action  which 
tended  to  revive  obsolete  bodies  such  as  the  conference  of  Elder 
Statesmen  was  anachronistic  and  ran  contrary  to  the  growth 
of  constitutional  government.  It  is  true  that  Japan  possessed  a 
written  constitution,  but  because  of  its  origin  and  structure  it 
was  not  the  sort  from  which  the  eventual  evolution  of  a  respon- 
sible government  in  the  Western  sense  could  be  expected. 

A  pragmatic  approach  to  one  of  the  gravest  political  crises 
that  beset  Japan  would  have  demanded  that  countervailing 
forces  of  every  description  be  marshaled  to  check,  if  only  momen- 
tarily, the  mounting  strength  of  the  military.  Saionji  prescribed 
no  such  all-out  effort.  Instead  he  resorted  to  a  stop-gap  measure 


Aritomo,  and  Inoue  Kaoru  pitted  against  Matsukata  Masayoshi  and 
Oyama  Iwao  of  Satsuma.  The  subsequent  addition  of  Katsura  Taro  and 
Saionji  Kinmochi  did  not  affect  the  predominance  of  the  Choshu  faction, 
since  the  former  was  also  from  Choshu. 


238  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

by  calling  on  individuals,  such  as  General  Ugaki  and  Admiral 
Saito,  to  man  the  crumbling  defenses  as  best  they  could. 

From  time  to  time  the  assertion  has  been  made  that  the  Muk- 
den Incident  marked  the  beginning  of  the  unfolding  of  Japan's 
master  plan  to  dominate  the  whole  of  the  Far  East.  This  sim- 
plistic and  linear  view  of  history,  already  discredited,  requires 
modification,  since  it  ignores  the  thesis  developed  here  that  the 
crises  with  which  Japan  was  confronted  at  home  and  in  Man- 
churia from  the  late  twenties  were  intrinsically  such  as  to  invite 
radical  solutions;  and  that  self-styled  patriots,  excited  by  the  be- 
lief that  the  solution  lay  in  conquest  and  domination,  internally 
and  externally,  sought  by  direct  extremist  action  to  realize  their 
vision  of  a  perfect  world. 

It  is  known  for  a  fact  that  Japan's  creeping  expansion  in  the 
Far  East  from  Manchuria  in  1931  and  down  through  North 
China  in  1937  and  southward  into  French  Indo-China  and  the 
Dutch  East  Indies  in  1941  hardly  represented  a  well-coordinated 
drive  masterfully  directed  from  Tokyo.  The  true  significance  of 
the  Mukden  Incident  was  that  its  instant  success  not  only  enabled 
the  army  to  regain  stature  and  influence  but  also  permitted  it 
to  make  inroads  into  the  weakened  fabric  of  Japan's  political 
structure,  gradually  supplanting  the  old  order  with  a  political 
system  more  in  consonance  with  its  own  views  and  goals. 

However,  the  army  in  so  doing  accentuated  the  deep-seated 
factional  struggle  which  had  been  going  on  within  the  ranks 
since  the  early  twenties.  The  bitter  feud  raging  between  the  fac- 
tions tended  to  strengthen  the  political  influence  of  the  ultrana- 
tionalists,  whose  backing  certain  army  factions  tried  to  enlist, 
and  conversely  weakened  the  status  of  the  liberal  elements  which 
had  hitherto  exercised  a  moderating,  though  limited,  influence 
inside  the  government  as  well  as  in  Japanese  society  in  general.7 
Therein  lay  the  roots  of  Japan's  prewar  tragedy. 

7.  "The  crisis  may  be  exploited  by  rival  groups  within  the  elite  in  the 
process  of  internal  power  striving.  The  thrusts  implicit  in  the  crisis  situa- 
tion for  the  elite  as  a  whole  provide  a  point  of  leverage  for  the  dominant 


PRELUDE  TO  TRAGEDY  239 

It  is  significant  that,  despite  the  extremely  shaky  position  of 
cabinet  government  following  the  abortive  March  and  October 
Plots,  no  leader  rose  from  the  ranks  of  the  commoners  as  in  Italy 
and  Germany  to  become  the  symbol  of  a  regenerated  Japan.  Al- 
though the  young  officers  of  the  Kodo-ha  may  have  toyed  with 
the  idea  of  replacing  the  Emperor  with  his  younger  brother, 
Prince  Chichibu,  it  was  unthinkable  for  any  loyal  Japanese  sub- 
ject to  defy  the  imperial  tradition,  rooted  in  over  a  thousand 
years  of  history,  and  rule  Japan  as  a  dictator.  Even  a  military 
dictator  after  the  fashion  of  the  Tokugawa  Shogunate  would 
have  been  improbable  in  the  Showa  era;  for  unlike  the  warrior 
class  or  samurai  of  the  Tokugawa  period,  who  owed  their  fealty 
to  local  feudal  lords,  the  rank  and  file  of  the  Japanese  army  and 
navy  were  recruited  from  the  common  people  and  owed  their 
allegiance  to  the  Emperor.  This  explains  why  right-wing  revolu- 
tionaries showed  very  little  interest  in  mass  uprisings  as  a  means 
of  grasping  power  and  resorted  instead  to  assassinations  and 
coups  d'etat. 

Westerners  are  prone  to  look  upon  any  act  of  defiance  by  the 
military  which  undermines  the  authority  of  the  duly  constituted 
government  as  something  grievous  and  monstrous,  since  we  have 
come  to  assume  that  the  rigid  subjection  of  armies  and  navies 
to  the  civil  authorities  is  the  perfectly  normal  state  for  a  civilized 
society.  The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  military  hegemony  in  some 
form  or  other  has  been  the  rule  rather  than  the  exception  in 
human  history.  Events  in  many  parts  of  the  world  today  attest 
to  the  fact  that,  even  in  better-ordered  societies,  a  serious  dislo- 
cation of  the  established  order  quite  often  results  in  reversion  to 
rule  by  a  military  dictator  or  junta. 

In  Japan,  owing  to  the  exceptionally  acute  nature  of  the  crises 
with  which  she  was  confronted  at  home  and  abroad  in  the  early 


faction  to  improve  its  power  position  over  against  the  opposition  factions." 
Lasswell  and  Kaplan,  Power  and  Society  (New  Haven,  Yale  University 
Press,  1950),  p.  245.  In  the  case  of  Japan,  from  about  the  middle  thirties 
the  dominant  faction  was  the  Tosei-ha. 


240  CONSPIRACY  AT  MUKDEN 

thirties  and  to  a  firmly  entrenched  tradition  of  military  dictator- 
ship, this  phenomenon — the  mounting  influence  of  the  military 
in  the  affairs  of  government — developed  more  rapidly  and  with 
less  resistance  after  the  Manchurian  crisis  than  most  Western 
nations  were  prepared  to  believe. 


CHRONOLOGY 


1927 


IN  JAPAN 

ABROAD 

Mar. 

24 

Nanking  Incident 

Apr.   18 

Bank  of  Taiwan  fails 

Apr. 

18 

Chiang    Kai-shek    forms 

20 

Tanaka  forms  a  cabinet 
Tanaka  launches  railroad 
negotiations  with  Chang 
Tso-lin 

gov't  in  Nanking 
Chang  Tso-lin  threatened 
in  North  China 

May 

30 

Japanese  troops  land  at 
Tsingtao 

June  27- July  7  Second  Eastern  Re- 
gions Conf.  convenes  in 
Tokyo 


July  20  Yamamoto  Jotaro  as- 
sumes Presidency  of 
South  Manchuria  Rail- 
way Co. 


Aug.  13      Mukden  Conference 
(Mori  Kaku) 

Aug.  14     Dairen  Conference 
(Mori  Kaku) 

Aug.  1 5     Port  Arthur  Conference 
(Mori  Kaku) 


Aug.  Chiang    Kai-shek    relin- 

quishes command  of  Na- 
tionalist Army 

Sept.    8     Japanese    troops    evacu- 
ated from  Shantung 

16     Coalition  of  Nanking  and 
Wuhan  governments 


241 


242 


CHRONOLOGY 


1927  (Continued) 


IN  JAPAN 


ABROAD 


Sept.  29-Nov.  8  Chiang  Kai-shek  in 
Japan 


Nov.  Yamamoto  Jotaro  visits 

Chang  Tso-lin  in  Peking 

Dec.  Chiang    Kai-shek    allies 

with  Feng  Yu-hsiang 


1928 


Feb. 


First  popular  election 


May  20-25  Eastern  Regions  Conf. 
Emergency  Session,  Ta- 
naka  stops  invasion  of 
Manchuria 


Oct.  Army   grand   maneuvers 

in  Iwate  Prefecture 


Apr.  19     Kumamoto  Division  dis- 
patched to  Shantung 

May     3     Tsinan  Incident 


June  4  Death  of  Chang  Tso-lin 
Komoto's  demand  to  mo- 
bilize Kwantung  Army 
meets  rebuff 

July  7  Nationalists  announce 
abolition  of  extraterritor- 
iality, abrogation  of  un- 
equal treaties 

Aug.  27  Signing  of  Kellogg- 
Briand  Pact 


Oct.      1 


U.S.S.R.      begins 
Five- Year  Plan 


first 


Dec.  29  Chang  Hsueh-liang  raises 
Nationalist  flag  in  Man- 
churia 


1929 


Jan.    10 


June  28     Tanaka's  report  rejected 
by  Emperor 


Assassination    of    Yang 
Yu-ting 


CHRONOLOGY 


243 


1929   (Continued) 


IN  JAPAN 


ABROAD 


July     2     Tanaka   cabinet   resigns,      July  21     Severance  of  Soviet-Chi- 

Hamaguchi    forms    cab-  nese  diplomatic  relations 

inet  over     Chinese      Eastern 

Railway 
Sept.  29     Tanaka  Giichi  dies 

Oct.  23     Crash     of     N.Y.     stock 

Nov.  29     Saburi  Sadao  dies  market 


1930 


Jan.    1 1     Ban  on  gold  export  lifted 

Feb.  19  Kanaya  appointed  Chief 
of  General  Staff 

Apr.  2  Chief  of  Naval  General 
Staff  appeals  directly  to 
Emperor 

June  14  Gen.  Ugaki  signifies  in- 
tention to  resign  as  Min- 
ister of  War 


Jan.    21     London    Naval    Confer- 
ence opens 


Apr.  22     London     Naval     Treaty 
signed 


Sept.  Small  Cherry  Society  or- 

ganized; critical  drop  in 
price  of  rice  and  silk 

Oct.      1     Privy     Council     ratifies 
London  Navy  Treaty 

Nov.    4     Premier    Hamaguchi    at- 
tacked by  assassin 


Mar. 


1931 


March  Plot 


Apr.  14  Second  Wakatsuki  cab- 
inet formed 

June  13  Uchida  appointed  Pres. 
of  South  Manchuria 
Railway 

17     Ugaki  replaces  Saito  as 
Gov.  Gen.  of  Korea 


June 


Nakamura  Incident 


244 


CHRONOLOGY 


IN  JAPAN 


Oct. 


October  Plot 


1931  (Continued) 

July 
Sept.  18 
21 

Oct.     8 
Nov.  19 


Dec.  11     Wakatsuki     cabinet     re- 
signs 

13     Inukai     forms     cabinet, 
ban  on  gold  shipment 


ABROAD 

Wanpaoshan  Incident 

Mukden  Incident 

Korean  Army  crosses 
Yalu  River  and  Man- 
churia 

Bombing  of  Chinchow 

Kwantung  Army  enters 
Tsitsihar 


26     Tientsin  Incident 


1932 


Feb.     9     Inoue  Junnosuke  assassi- 
nated 


Jan.      3 

28 
Feb.     5 

29 


Mar.    5     Dan Takuma  assassinated       Mar.    1 

15 


May  15     May  15  Incident,  Inukai 
assassinated 

26     Saito  cabinet  formed 

Sept.  15     Japan    recognizes    Man- 
chukuo 


Kwantung  Army  enters 
Chinchow 

Shanghai  Incident 

Kwantung  Army  enters 
Harbin 

Arrival  of  Lytton  Com- 
mission 

Manchukuo  established 

America  announces  non- 
recognition  of  Manchu- 
kuo 


Oct.     2     Lytton  Report  released 


Dec.  12     Mori  Kaku  dies 


GLOSSARY 


Aikoku  Kinroto — Patriotic  Workers'  Society. 

Choshu — Geographical  designation  for  most  of  what  is  now 
Yamaguchi  Prefecture.  A  number  of  Genro  and  high-rank- 
ing military  men  from  this  area  formed  a  clique  which 
wielded  powerful  influence  in  government  and  military 
circles. 

Daimyo — Feudal  lord(s). 

Elder  Statesmen  (Genro) — An  extraconstitutional  body  of 
highly  venerable  statesmen  and  military  men  which  met  to 
discuss  matters  of  extreme  importance  and  advise  the 
Emperor. 

Fengtien  Army — The  army  under  Marshal  Chang  Tso-lin  and, 
later,  Chang  Hsueh-liang. 

Ketsumeidan — Blood  Brotherhood  League. 

Kodo-ha — The  Imperial  Way  Faction.  Consisted  primarily  of 
army  officers  of  company  grade  who  rallied  around  Gen- 
erals Araki  Sadao  and  Mazaki  Jinzaburo.  Members  of  this 
clique  were  determined  to  eliminate  zaibatsu  and  political 
parties.  Civilian  counterparts  of  this  group  included  men 
such  as  Kita  Ikki  and  Nishida  Zei. 

Kwantung  Army — Japanese  Army  stationed  in  Kwantung  Ter- 
ritory and  Manchuria  with  headquarters  in  Port  Arthur. 

Manchurian  Crisis  (or  Incident) — The  extended  military  opera- 
tions of  the  Kwantung  Army  which  began  with  the  Mukden 
Incident  and  continued  with  the  occupation  of  strategic 
cities  of  Manchuria  by  November  19  of  the  same  year 
(1931);  and  to  the  efforts  made  at  Geneva  to  reconcile  the 

245 


246  GLOSSARY 

differences  between  China  and  Japan  resulting  in  Japan's 
notification  to  withdraw  from  the  League  of  Nations  on 
March  27,  1933. 

Minseito — One  of  Japan's  large  political  parties  formed  by  the 
union  of  Kenseikai  and  Seiyuhonto  in  June  1927  with 
Hamaguchi  Osayuki  as  president.  It  maintained  close  ties 
with  the  Mitsubishi  interests. 

Mukden  Incident — The  alleged  explosion  of  a  bomb  on  the 
tracks  of  the  South  Manchuria  Railway  a  few  miles  north 
of  Mukden  on  the  night  of  September  18,  1931,  following 
which  the  Kwantung  Army  went  into  action  and  occupied 
Mukden  and  neighboring  cities  before  the  night  was  over. 

Musanto — Proletarian  party. 

Rodo  Nominto — Labor  Farmer  party. 

Sakurakai — The  Cherry  Society. 

Samurai — Warrior (s)  or  warrior  class. 

Satsuma — Geographical  designation  for  what  is  now  a  portion 
of  Kagoshima  Prefecture.  Like  Choshu,  this  area  produced 
a  number  of  able  statesmen  and  military  men  who,  as  a 
clique,  wielded  powerful  influence  in  Japanese  government 
and  military  circles. 

Shakai  Minshuto — Social  Democratic  party. 

Seiyukai — Political  party  founded  in  1900  by  I  to  Hirobumi, 
Saionji  Kinmochi,  and  Hara  Kei.  Worked  closely  with 
Mitsui  interests  and  older  military  men.  In  general,  sup- 
ported the  "positive"  policy  toward  China. 

Teikoku  Nokai — Imperial  Agricultural  Society. 

Tosei-ha — The  Control  Faction.  Major  General  Nagata  Tetsuzan 
and  General  Tojo  Hideki  were  leading  members  of  this 
group.  It  sought  pol'tical  ascendancy  by  means  of  gradual- 
ism and  legitimate  procedures.  After  eliminating  the  Kodo- 
ha  in  1936,  it  was  in  an  unassailable  position. 

Wuhan  government — A  Nationalist  government  with  Soviet  form 
which  existed  in  Hankow,  China,  from  1926  to  1927. 

Young  officers — A  collective  term  denoting  several  factions  of 
army  and  naval  officers,  principally  of  company  grade  but 
including  a  few  army  officers  up  to  the  rank  of  lieutenant 
colonel.  Their  primary  goal  was  internal  reconstruction  of 


GLOSSARY  247 

Japan  along  the  lines  of  national  socialism.  Although  they 
were  involved  in  continental  expansion,  this  was  incidental 
to  the  successful  accomplishment  of  domestic  reform.  As  a 
means  of  initiating  their  program,  the  "young  officers"  relied 
solely  on  individual  assassination  and  coups  d'etat  rather 
than  on  general  strikes  or  mass  uprisings,  tactics  more  fre- 
quently employed  by  revolutionaries  in  the  West. 
Zaibatsu — Japanese  financial-industrial  combines. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


PUBLIC    DOCUMENTS 

In    English 

International   Military   Tribunal   for  the   Far  East,   Exhibits, 

Tokyo,  1948. 
International  Military  Tribunal  for  the  Far  East,  International 

Prosecution  Section  Document,  Tokyo,  1948. 

*  International  Military  Tribunal  for  the  Far  East,  Judgment,  4,  6, 

Tokyo,  1948. 

*  International  Military  Tribunal  for  the  Far  East,  Proceedings, 

Tokyo,  1948. 

*  League  of  Nations,  Appeal  by  the  Chinese  Government — Re- 

port of  the  Commission  of  Enquiry,  Geneva,  1932. 
U.S.  Foreign  Relations,  1931 ,  3,  Washington,  D.C. 
U.S.  Foreign  Relations,  Japan  (1931-41),  1 ,  Washington,  D.C. 

In    Japanese 

Japan,  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs,  Public  Peace  Section,  comp., 
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anese Reform  Movements),  Tokyo,  1938. 

Japan,  Chief  of  Staff,  Manshu  Jihen-shi  (The  History  of  the 
Manchurian  Incident),  compilation  no.  3,  Tokyo,  1932. 

*Asterisks  denote  sources  especially  relevant  to  this  study. 

249 


250  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

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In   English 

Allen,  G.  C,  Japan:  The  Hungry  Guest,  New  York,  Dutton, 

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New  York,  Holt,  1951. 
Borton,  Hugh,  Japan's  Modern  Century,  New  York,  Ronald 

Press,  1950. 
Briggs,  Herbert  W.,  The  Law  of  Nations,  New  York,  Appleton- 

Century-Crofts,  1952. 
Brown,  Delmer  M.,  Nationalism  in  Japan,  Berkeley,  University 

of  California  Press,  1955. 
Burton,  John  W.,  Peace  Theory:  Preconditions  of  Disarmament, 

New  York,  Knopf,  1962. 
Chien,  Tuan-sheng,  The  Government  and  Politics  of  China, 

Cambridge,  Harvard  University  Press,  1950. 
Colegrove,  Kenneth  W.,  Militarism  in  Japan,  Boston,  World 

Peace  Foundation,  1936. 
Craig,  Albert  M.,  Choshu  in  the  Meiji  Restoration,  Cambridge, 

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Grew,  Joseph  C,  Ten  Years  in  Japan,  New  York,  Simon  and 

Schuster,  1944. 
Jones,  F.  C,  Japan's  New  Order  in  East  Asia:  Its  Rise  and  Fall, 

1937-45,  New  York,  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  1954. 
Lasswell,  Harold  D.,  and  Kaplan,  Abraham,  Power  and  Society, 

New  Haven,  Yale  University  Press,  1950. 
Linebarger,  Paul  Myron  Anthony,  Government  in  Republican 

China,  New  York,  McGraw-Hill,  1938. 
MacNair,  H.  F.,  China  in  Revolution,  Chicago,  University  of 

Chicago  Press,  1931. 
MacNair,  H.  F.,  and  Lach,  Donald  G.,  Modern  Far  Eastern 

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BIBLIOGRAPHY  251 

Maxon,  Y.  C,  Control  of  Japanese  Foreign  Policy:  A  Study  of 

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Morley,  J.  W.,  Japanese  Thrust  into  Siberia,  1918,  New  York, 

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Nakano,  Tomio,  The  Ordinance  Power  of  the  Japanese  Em- 
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*Norman,  E.  Herbert,  Japan's  Emergence  as  a  Modern  State, 

New  York,  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations,  1940. 
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Knopf,  1954. 
Reischauer,  Karl  Robert,  Japan  Government — Politics,  New 

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Rowe,  David  Nelson,  China  Among  the  Powers,  New  York, 

Harcourt,  Brace,  1945. 
*Scalapino,  Robert  A.,  Democracy  and  the  Party  Movement  in 

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1953. 
Schumpeter,  E.  B.,  Allen,  G.  C,  Gordon,  M.  S.,  and  Penrose, 

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1930-40,  Toronto,  Macmillan,  1940. 
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in  International  Relations,  New  York,  Oxford  University 

Press,  1948. 
Stimson,  Henry  L.,  The  Far  Eastern  Crisis,  New  York,  Harper, 

1936. 
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New  York,  Doubleday  Doran,  1935. 
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252  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Toynbee,  Arnold  J.,  Survey  of  International  Affairs,  1931 ,  Lon- 
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Tsunoda,  R.,  de  Bary,  W.  T.,  and  Keene,  D.,  Sources  of  the 
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Uyehara,  Cecil  H.,  comp.,  Checklist  of  Archives  in  the  Japa- 
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Vespa,  A.,  Secret  Agent  of  Japan:  A  Handbook  to  Japanese 
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Vinacke,  Harold  M.,  A  History  of  the  Far  East  in  Modern 
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Weale,  Putnam  (Bertram  Lenox  Simpson),  Why  China  Sees 
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In   Japanese 

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BIBLIOGRAPHY  253 

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258  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

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the  Last  Elder  Statesman),  Kindai  Nihon  no  Seijika 
(Statesmen  of  Recent  Japan),  Tokyo,  1960,  pp.  199-252. 
*Shinmy6  Takeo,  "Showa  Seiji  Hisshi — Cho  Sakurin  Bakusatsu" 
(Secret  Political  History  of  the  Showa  Era — The  Bombing 
of  Chang  Tso-lin),  Chud  Koron,  69  (1954),  190-201. 

Suzuki  Teiichi,  "Hokubatsu  to  Sho:  Tanaka  Mitsuyaku"  (The 
Northern  Expedition  and  Chiang  Kai-shek:  Tanaka's  Sec- 
ret Agreement),  Himerareta  Showashi,  Supplement  to 
Chisel,  December  1956,  pp.  20-25 
*Takamiya  Taihei,  "Waribashi  kara  Umareta  Manshu-Jihen" 
(The  Manchurian  Incident  which  Started  from  a  Fall  of  a 
Chopstick  [i.e.  flipping  of  a  coin]),  Showa  Memo,  Supple- 
ment to  Bungei  Shunju,  July  1954,  pp.  22-31. 

Tokyo  Asahi,  1927-1932. 

Toyoshima  Fusataro,  "Chosengun  Ekkyo  Shingeki  su"  (Japan's 
Korean  Army  Crosses  the  Border  and  Advances),  Himera- 
reta Showashi,  Supplement  to  Chisei,  December  1956,  pp. 
52-58. 

Tsugumo  Kunitoshi,  "Kuromaku — Kuhara  Fusanosuke"  (Ku- 
hara,  The  Wire  Puller),  Fuun  Jinbutsu  Tokuhon  (Review 
of  the  Men  of  the  Hour),  Supplement  to  Bungei  Shunju, 
June  1955,  pp.  184-89. 

Usui  Katsumi,  "Cho  Sakurin  Bakushi  no  Shinso"  (The  Truth 
Regarding  the  Assassination  by  Bombing  of  Chang  Tso-lin) , 
Himerareta  Showashi,  Supplement  to  Chisei,  December 
1956,  pp.  26-38. 
*Yamaura  Kanichi,  "Bosho  Mori  Kaku"  (Mori  Kaku,  The  Arch- 
Schemer),  Fuun  Jinbutsu  Tokuhon,  Supplement  to  Bungei 
Shunju,  June  1955,  pp.  60-65. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  259 

MICROFILMS 

Documents  pertaining  to  London  Naval  Conference  preserved 
by  the  Japanese  Embassy  in  London,  DLC*  5039,  Reels 
UD  32,  33,  34. 

Japanese  Editorials  and  Articles  concerning  the  Supreme  Com- 
mand, April-June,  1930,  DLC,  Reel  S612. 

Japanese  Foreign  Ministry,  Correspondence,  Instructions,  Com- 
muniques, etc.,  June  1929  to  May  1931,  DLC,  Reel  SI  12. 

Japanese  Foreign  Ministry,  DLC  5040,  Reels  42,  43.  (Consu- 
lar Reports,  principally  from  China  Proper,  some  from 
Manchuria,  1932-33.) 

Japanese  Naval  Attache  Reports:  Captain  Nakamura  Incident, 
Manchurian  Incident,  DLC,  Reels  R26,  R27. 

Japanese  Navy,  Documents  relevant  to  London  Naval  Con- 
ference, DLC,  UD55-2. 

Kido  (Koichi)  Diary,  July  11,  1931-December  9,  1945,  DLC, 
Reel  WT5. 

Kwantung  Army,  Army  General  Staff:  Intelligence  Reports  on 
Manchurian  Incident,  DLC,  Reel  132. 

Public  Speeches  relevant  to  London  Naval  Conference  and 
Treaty  made  by  Hamaguchi,  Wakatsuki,  Takarabe,  etc., 
August  1929-October  1930,  DLC,  Reel  SI  13. 
*DLC  denotes  microfilm  at  Library  of  Congress. 

OTHER     SOURCES 

In    English 

Kobayashi,  Key  Kiyokazu,  "The  Kwantung  Army  and  the  Man- 
churian Incident,"  submitted  to  the  East  Asian  Institute, 
Columbia  University,  1956. 

Tiedman,  Arthur  E.,  "The  Hamaguchi  Cabinet,  First  Phase, 
July  1929-February  1930:  A  Study  in  Japanese  Parlia- 
mentary Government,"  doctoral  dissertation,  Columbia 
University,  1960. 


260  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Wald,  Royal  J.,  "The  Young  Officers  Movement  in  Japan,  ca. 
1925-37:  Ideology  and  Action,"  doctoral  dissertation,  Uni- 
versity of  California  at  Berkeley,  1949. 

In  English  and  Japanese 

Okawa  Shumei,  Written  Statement  Regarding  the  Manchurian 
Incident  of  September  18,  1931.  Japanese  text  and  English 
translation.  International  Prosecution  Section  SCAP,  no. 
815.  Designated  as  IMT  103  in  Uyehara,  Checklist  of  Ar- 
chives. 


INDEX 


Abe  Nobuyuki,   General,  40,   85 

Abo  Kiyokazu,  Admiral,  80 

Activists,  2  n.,  40,  79,  149,  171, 
233.  See  also  Extremists 

Adachi  Kenzo,  220,  224,  227 

Adachi  Takamori,  46,  50 

Admiralty,  Japanese,  desiderata  at 
London  Naval  Conference,  63 

Adventurers,  in  China,  42,  47 

Agriculture:  households,  status  in 
20s,  107;  relation  of  impoverish- 
ment to  planned  and  actual 
coups,  107;  policy,  Tokugawa, 
111;  products,  index  price,  115. 
See  also  primary  industries  under 
Income,  national 

"Agriculture  First,"  advocates,  116 
f. 

Air  force,  Japanese,  170 

Aizawa  Saburo,  Lieutenant  Colo- 
nel, assassinates  Colonel  Nagata, 
95  n. 

Akamatsu  Katsumaro,  92 

Alarmists,   141  f. 

Allen,  G.  C,  109  f. 

America,  26;  fleet,  79.  See  also 
United  States 

Anglo-American  leadership,  12 

Anti-Chinese  riots,  143  f. 

Anti-Japanese:  activities,  24,  55, 
144;  sentiment,  187 

Anti-Ugaki  faction,  94 

Antung,  capture  of,  4,  6 


Araki  Goro,  Major  General,  43 

Araki-Mazaki  clique,  226  n. 

Araki  Sadao,  General,  20,  38,  82, 
198  f.,  203,  222 

Arita  Hachiro,  35,  40 

Arms  reduction,  1922-31,  102-06 

Army 

opposed  first  expedition  to  Shan- 
tung, 19;  morale  impaired  by 
retrenchment  program,  102  f.; 
Reorganization  Committee  op- 
poses armament  reductions, 
103;  attempts  to  freeze  arma- 
ments, 104;  outlines  position 
in  Manchurian  crisis,  174-75; 
and  October  Plot,  203;  deteri- 
oration in  morale  and  disci- 
pline, 206;  annual  maneuvers 
in  Kumamoto,  208;  estab- 
lishment of  Manchurian  pup- 
pet regime,  209;  as  tool  in 
political  struggle,  232;  and 
impact  of  Mukden  Incident  on 
factional  struggle,  238  f. 
"Big  Three,"  9,  104;  formulate 
terms  of  settlement  for  Man- 
churian crisis,  191;  agree  on 
responsibility  in  October  Plot, 
203 
leaders,  150;  consensus  of,  105; 

in  Manchurian  crisis,   174 
maneuvers,  1,  3,  154 
officers:    conspiracy,   83,   87-88, 


261 


262 


INDEX 


Army  (Continued) 

172   n.,   200;   involuntary  re- 
tirement, 103 
Special  Service  Agency,  Mukden, 
161 
Assassination,  78  f.,  239;  of  Chang, 

41-51;  of  Inukai,  117 
Authoritarian  society,  234 
Authority,    political,    11,    106;    re- 
bellion against,  234 

Baba  Tsunego,  229 

Ballantine,    J.    W.,     and    Tanaka 

Memorial,  26  n. 
Bank:  crisis,  and  collapse  of  Wakat- 

suki  cabinet,  11  f.;  of  Japan,  12; 

of  Taiwan,  12 
Body  politic,  82 
Borodin,  Michael,  18  n. 
Boycott,  of  Japanese  goods,  24,  27- 

28 
Business    interests,    117,    228.    See 

also  Zaibatsu 

Cabinet:    in    military    affairs,    72; 
superiority,    78;    coalition,    220. 
See    also    Hamaguchi;    Tanaka; 
Wakatsuki 
Capital,  flight  of,  227 
Censorship,  March  Plot,  83 
Chang  Hai-peng,  General,  206,  212 
Chang  Hseuh-liang,  1  n.,  125,  127, 
137  f.,  145  f.;  learns  identity  of 
father's  assassins,  50;  returns  to 
Mukden,  51;  and  raising  Nation- 
alist flag  in  Manchuria,   52  ff.; 
political    bargain    with    Chiang 
Kai-shek,      53 ;     rapprochement 
with  Nanking,  56;  underrated  by 
Japanese,    56   f.;    and    Japanese 
demands,  126 
Chang  Tso-hsiang,  51  f. 
Chang  Tso-lin,  14  n.,  27  f.,  48  n.;  re- 
treats toward  Peking,  18;  protests 
Japanese  expedition  to  Shantung, 


19;  refuses  to  relinquish  Peking, 
21;  and  arms  agreement  with  Leo 
Karakhan,  32;  struggle  with  Wu 
Pei-fu,  32;  sanctions  construction 
of  Taonanfu-Tsitsihar  Railway, 
33;  orders  arrest  of  M.  Ivanov- 
Rinov,  33;  pressed  by  Japanese 
to  withdraw  to  Manchuria,  37 
conspiracy  to  assassinate,  41-51 
confronts  Nationalist  drive,  44 
admits  defeat,  45;  death  of,  50  f. 
succession  problems,  51  ff. 
granted  railroad  concessions  to 
Japanese  under  duress,  125 

Chang  Tsung-chang,  49 

Changchun,  169 

Changchun-Harbin  Railway,  16 

Chao  Chin-po,  8  n. 

Chauvinism,  233 

Chen,  Eugene,  18  n. 

Cherry  Society,  84  n.,  95  f.,  195  ff.; 
extremists  of,  84;  three  cliques 
within,  96  f.;  dissident  elements, 
98;  not  linked  with  Mukden  In- 
cident, 99;  purpose  of,  99 

Chiang  Kai-shek,  53,  120;  home- 
ward bound  from  Japan,  32;  ac- 
cepts voluntary  exile,  33  n.; 
meets  Tanaka  at  Hakone,  34 

Chiang  Tso-pin,   187 

Chichibu,  Prince,  239 

Chientao,  147;  Korean  farmers  in, 
128 

China:  hard  policy  toward,  14,  17; 
unification,  17  f.;  resentment 
toward  Japanese,  35;  tariff  auto- 
nomy, 119;  authorities  in  Man- 
churia, 127  f.;  moderate  policy 
toward,  176;  troops  in  Manchu- 
ria, 183 

Chinchow,  216  f.,  191 

Chinese  Eastern  Railway,  32  f.,  127, 
145,  213 

Chinhai  Line,  125  n. 


INDEX 


263 


Cho  Isamu,  Captain,  98  n.,  132  f., 

141,  194,  196,  198  f.;  and  Cherry 

Society,    99;    and   October   Plot, 

201;    reprimanded    by    Ishihara, 

202 
Choshu,  236  n.,  245 
Chumatien,  18,  32 
Civil     government.     See    Civilian, 

government 
Civil  war,  25 
Civilian,  control,  viii;  government, 

vii  f.,  83;  groups,  91 
Coalition  cabinet,  220;  government, 

222 
Coercive    measures    recommended 

by  Dairen  Conferences,  30 
Communism,  21,  22,  33  n.;  Chinese, 

17  f.;  leaders,  92  n.;  primitive, 

116  f. 
Conspirators:   March  Plot,  172  n.; 

relationship    among    groups    of, 

200 
Constitution,   Articles   11   and   12, 

55,  70;  controversy  over,  72 
Consul  General,  Mukden,  151;  foils 

mobilization  of  Kwantung  Army, 

51;  fails  to  reassert  rights,  127  f.; 

urges   conference   with   Chinese 

authorities,   129  f. 
Coup  d'etat,  83,  239;  of  May  15, 

1932,    107   n.;   of  February   26, 

1936,    107  n. 
Crises  of  early  thirties,  vii  f.;  eco- 
nomic, 82;  financial  (1927),  103; 

resulting  from  factional  struggle, 

238  n. 
Crop   failures,    Northeast   Honshu 

and  Hokkaido,  110 

Dairen:  Conferences,  26  ff.  and  n.; 

port  outflanked,  126 
Debuchi  Katsuji,  30 
Depression,  vii,  61 
Dictatorship,  239 


Diet,  106;  58th  Session,  71;  59th 
Session,  80 

Disarmament  Conference,  Geneva 
(1932),   army's  reaction  to,    102 

Disorder,  deliberate  creation  of,  36 

Doihara  Kenji,  Colonel,  14  n.,  208; 
visits  Tokyo  before  Mukden  In- 
cident, 149;  and  scheme  to  in- 
augurate puppet  regime,  210 

Domestic  problems,  86;  impact  on 
Manchurian  plans,  99 

Dual  economy,  115 

East  Barracks,  capture  of,  4 

Eastern  Regions  Conference,  22  f., 
231;  objectives,  23  ff.;  role  of 
South  Manchuria  Railway  re- 
duced, 23;  proposals,  24  f.;  ex- 
change between  Tanaka  and 
Muto,  25  f.;  emergency  sessions, 
38  ff. 

Elder  Statesmen,  235  ff. 

Election,  general  (1930),  77 

Elites,  army,  105.  See  also  Army 
leaders 

Emperor,  68,  75,  104,  135,  155, 
180,  235;  halts  Kwantung  Army's 
advance  to  Chinchow,  41;  re- 
action to  Army  assassination  of 
Marshal  Chang,  59  f.;  Hama- 
guchi  threatens  to  invoke  prero- 
gative of,  62;  prerogative  over 
navy,  70;  prerogative  over  mili- 
tary command,  72  f.;  and  London 
Naval  Conference,  76;  orders 
restoration  of  order  in  army, 
154;  decrees  nonaggravation 
policy  in  Manchuria,  181;  inter- 
poses civil  government  between 
throne  and  army,  182;  repri- 
mands Kanaya,  183;  volunteers 
to  assume  arbiter's  role,  236 

England,  26,  44  n.  See  also  Great 
Britain 

Expansionism,  vii,  11,  12  f.,  44  n., 
79,  148  n.,  229,  233 


264 


INDEX 


Extremists,  82,  96  ff.,  100,  197,  233; 
and  hard  China  policy,  14;  hands 
forced  by  London  Naval  Agree- 
ment, 79;  mentality  of,  233  ff.;  of 
Army,  viii,  36,  117,  132;  of 
Cherry  Society,  84;  of  civilians, 
11  ff.;  of  Kwantung  Army,  7;  in 
Manchurian  crisis,  10;  of  Seiyu- 
kai,  80.  See  also  Activists 

Farmers'  income:   decline  in,   110; 

in  relation  to  urban  wages,  113 

f.,   114 
February   26   Incident   (Ni-ni-roku 

liken)  (1936),   95  n. 
Feng  Yu-hsiang,  18,  33,  37 
Fengtien  Armies,  18,  245.  See  also 

Northern  Army 
Fighter  planes,  134,  136 
Flag,  Nationalist,  1  n. 
Fleet:     clique,    62;    auxiliary,    70; 

faction,  74  f. 
Foreign    Office,    67,     189;    favors 

draft  proposal  for  London  Naval 

Treaty,  65 
Formosa,  94 
France,   constitution   compared   to 

Japanese,  73 
Free  enterprise,  231 
Fujimura  Toshifusa,  advocates  par- 
tial occupation  of  Mukden,  152 

n. 
Fushun,  3,  125  n.,  153 

General  Staff,  73,  100;  intelligence 
sections,  101;  concern  for  na- 
tional reconstruction,  101;  key 
officers  of,  194 

Geneva,  193 

Germany,  97 

Giga  Nobuya,  Major,  14  n.,  49 

Gondo  Seikyo,  and  young  officers, 
116  f. 

Government:  civilian,  vii  f.,  83; 
opposed  to  first  expedition  to 
Shantung,  19;  schism  within,  62; 


constitutional  controversy  with 
Naval  General  Staff,  72;  antago- 
nism toward  army,  104  f.;  fore- 
stalls Kanaya  from  receiving 
Imperial  sanction,  172;  dualism 
inherent  in  structure  of,  237 

Gradualism,  advocated  by  Tosei- 
ha,  95 

Great  Britain,  political  parties  in, 
223.  See  also  England 

Hakone  conversation,  33  n.,  34 

Hamaguchi  Osayuki,  Premier,  in- 
tention to  accept  draft  proposal 
of  London  Naval  Treaty,  66;  re- 
ports acceptance  to  Emperor,  68; 
pleads  with  Yabuki  and  Suetsugu, 
69;  resists  opposition  from  Privy 
Council,  75;  attacked,  78 

Hanaya  Tadashi,  Major,  135,  138, 
158;  receives  secret  telegram 
from  Hashimoto,  156  n.;  asserts 
prerogative  of  military  to  Consul 
Morishima,   165 

Hara  Kei,  Premier,  21 

Harada  Kumao,  Baron,  104,  173; 
notes  Foreign  Office  rapproche- 
ment with  army,  204 

Harbin,  178 

Hasebe  Brigade,   163,   168 

Hashimoto  Kingoro,  Colonel,  87, 
96,  98  n.,  101,  132  f.,  194,  196, 
198  ff.;  as  liaison  between  two 
army  cliques,  84;  seeks  army  sup- 
port for  March  Plot,  92  n.;  well- 
spring  of  his  ideas,  97;  denies 
communication  with  officers  of 
Kwantung  Army,  99;  urges  in- 
ternal reconstruction,  100;  pleads 
for  postponement  of  Manchurian 
military  action,  149;  sends  secret 
telegrams  to  Itagaki  and  Hanaya, 
156 

Hashimoto  clique,  favors  direct 
action,  98 


INDEX 


265 


Hayashi  Hisajiro,  Consul  General 
at  Mukden,  7,  53,  55,  145,  151, 
154,  168  f.,  189;  warns  against 
raising  of  Nationalist  flag,  54; 
reaches  impasse  on  railroad  nego- 
tiations,   125   ff. 

Hayashi  Senjuro,  General,  170, 
171,  178,  182,  184 

Heilungkiang,  42;  alignment  of,  53 

Hiranuma  Kiichiro,  Baron,  in- 
fluence over  Suetsugu,  72  n. 

Hirata  Yukihiro,  Colonel,  4;  testi- 
mony at  Tokyo  Trials,  161  ff. 

Hitler,  Adolf,  97 

Honan,  plains  of,  18 

Honjo  Shigeru,  Lieutenant  General, 
9,  157,  161,  170,  179,  213;  given 
Kwantung  Army  command,  95; 
concerned  over  farmers'  im- 
poverishment, 117  n.;  held  cap- 
tive by  subordinates,  135;  and 
initiation  of  Mukden  attack,  166 
ff. 

Howitzers,  133  f.,  136 

Hozumi  Yutaka,  Professor,  inter- 
prets "responsible  ministers,"  72 
f. 

Hsi  Chia,  179  f. 

Huangkutun,  45,  48  f. 

Hulutao,  port  of,  126 

Ideologists,  civilian,  viii 

Ideology,  unified,  202 

Ikeda  Seihin,  228 

Imada  Shintaro,  Captain,  138,  156; 
directs  blasting  of  rail,  165 

Imperial  Agricultural  Society  (Tei- 
koku  Nokai),  108 

Imperial  Flag  Revolution  (Kinki 
Kakumei),   198  n. 

Income,  national:  rise  in,  109;  per 
capita  share  by  primary,  second- 
ary and  tertiary  industries,  113  f. 

Industrial  development,  109;  role  of 
external  pressures,   112 

Inner  Mongolia,  natural  resources 


of,  23;  and  Japan's  security,  25 

Inoue  Junnosuke,  106,  227  n.;  re- 
trenchment policy,  103;  reduces 
military  expenditures,   106 

Inoue  Nissho,  195 

Insurrection,  91 

Internal  difficulties,  11.  See  also 
Domestic  problems 

Internal  reconstruction,  95,  107  n., 
150;  momentarily  abandoned, 
132.  See  also  National  recon- 
struction 

Inukai  Tsuyoshi,  Premier,  192,  223; 
suffers  loss  of  face,  77  f.;  restores 
relations  with  Minseito,  82;  as- 
sassination of,    117 

Ishihara  Kanji,  Lieutenant  Colonel, 
14  n.,  22,  43  n.,  135,  137  ff.,  163, 
167,  170,  178;  fears  Soviet  thrust 
into  Manchuria,  142  f.;  advocates 
surrender  of  Japanese  rights  in 
Manchuria,  149;  discusses  plans 
with  Itagaki,  158;  reprimands 
Cho,  202;  strategy  in  northern 
Manchuria,  212 

Ishii  Kikujiro,  Viscount,  75 

Isobe  Asaichi,  197 

Itagaki  Seishiro,  Colonel,  7  f.,  14 
n.,  43  n.,  134  f.,  138,  159,  160  n., 
161,  164,  179,  199,  209,  214;  tes- 
timony at  Tokyo  Trials,  35  f.; 
advocates  discarding  party  gov- 
ernment, 135;  receives  secret 
telegram  from  Hashimoto,  156; 
order  to  Shimamoto,  162;  mobi- 
lization order,  166 

Italy,  97 

Ito  Hirobumi,  Prince,  commentary 
on  Article  12,  72 

Ito  Miyoji,  Count,  123;  helps  un- 
seat Wakatsuki's  first  cabinet, 
12;  attempts  to  block  London 
Naval  Treaty,  75 

Japan,  transition  from  feudal  to 
modern  state,   112 


266 


INDEX 


Japanese  residents  in  China,  13,  19, 
23,  27,  33,  34,  42,  127  ff.;  pro- 
tection of  rights  and  interests, 
25,   124 

Jehol,  53 

Kaifeng,  19 

Kanaya  Hanzo,  General,  9,  154, 
172,  174  n.,  180  f.,  191,  198, 
214,  217,  218;  forbidden  to  cross 
Yalu,  172;  recalls  troops  en 
route  to  Chinchow,  217;  and 
inept  handling  of  Manchurian 
crisis,  218  n. 

Kanda  Masatane,  Lieutenant  Col- 
onel, 150,  170 

Kanda  Yasunosuke,  First  Lieuten- 
ant, 45 

Karakhan,  Leo,  Ambassador,  32 

Karakhan-Koo  Agreement  (1924), 
32 

Katakura  Tadashi,  Captain,  164, 
166;  testimony  at  Tokyo  Trials, 
167;  reproves  Hayashi,  169 

Kato  Kanji,  Admiral,  66;  declines 
to  represent  Japan  at  London 
Naval  Conference,  63;  opposes 
Naval  Treaty  draft  proposal,  65; 
makes  direct  appeal  to  throne, 
68  f.;  critical  of  London  Naval 
Agreement,  70;  resigns,  74 

Kawakami  Seiichi,  Captain,  163; 
ambiguous  action  at  Fushun, 
153  n. 

Kawamoto  Suemori,  First  Lieu- 
tenant, 2 

Kawashima  Tadashi,  Captain,  3 

Kellogg-Briand  Pact,  127  f. 

Kemal  Atatiirk,  97 

Kido  Koichi,  Marquis,  173;  critical 
of  Wakatsuki's  irresolution,   192 

Kimura  Eiichi,  30,  148  n.,  153 

Kinryu-tei,  102 

Kirin,  6,  169,  179 

Kirin  Province,  alignment  of,  53 


Kita  Ikki,  viii,  89;  cleavage  with 
Okawa,  89 

Kita-Nishida  faction,  195 

Kiyose  Ichiro,  in  defense  of  Naval 
General  Staff,  73  f. 

Kiyoura  Keigo,  Count,  192 

Kodo,  137 

Kodo-ha,  82,  245;  uprising  of  Feb- 
ruary 26  (1936)  by,  95  n. 

Koiso  Kuniaki,  Lieutenant  General, 
84  n.,  93,  106,  155,  177  n.,  201; 
approached  by  Okawa  for  sup- 
port, 90;  rebuffs  Minami's  budg- 
etary agreement,  106 

Koizumi  Sakutaro,  views  on  Tana- 
ka's  accomplishments,  60  n. 

Kokutai  Genri-ha,  196 

Komoto  Daisaku,  Colonel,  14  n., 
22;  resents  Japanese  advisors  to 
Chang  Tso-lin,  42  n.;  sides  with 
Mori  at  Eastern  Regions  Confer- 
ence, 43  n.;  sounds  out  Muto  on 
Kwantung  Army  autonomy,  44 
n.;  encounters  Takeshita,  45;  en- 
counter with  Tomiya,  46;  orders 
Ozaki  to  demand  mobilization, 
50;  punished,  59;  sent  to  dissuade 
Okawa,  93;  contacts  Itagaki  and 
Ishihara,  148 

Konoe  Fumimaro,  Prince,  192, 
205,  232 

Korean  Army,   168,   178  ff. 

Korean  farmers,  in  Manchuria, 
143  f. 

Koreans,  status  and  treatment  in 
Manchuria,  129 

Kozu,  85  f. 

Kuan  Yu-hing,  145  f. 

Kuhara  Fusanosuke,  223  f. 

Kuhara-Tomita  Agreement,  226 

Kuo  Sung-lin,  48  n. 

Kwantung  Army,  8  f.,  42,  98,  127, 
134,  136,  178,  185,  191,  207, 
220,  231;  aloof  to  Yoshida's 
plan,  31;  shifts  headquarters  to 


INDEX 


267 


Kwantung  Army  (Continued) 
Mukden,  37;  harasses  Tokyo 
with  queries,  38;  plots  to  block 
Chang  Tso-lin's  retreating  troops, 
40  f.;  Chinchow  attack  halted, 
41;  staff  of,  99;  plans  occupation 
of  Manchuria  and  Inner  Mon- 
golia, 139  ff.;  radicals  of,  175; 
attains  autonomy,  199;  resists 
interference  from  Foreign  Office, 
210;  demands  resignation  of  Ma 
Chan-shan,  212 

Kwantung  Leased  Territory,  1  n.; 
Japan's  judicial  power  within, 
130 

Labor,  unemployed,  116  n.;  wage 
indices,    114 

Labor  Farmer  Party  (Rodo 
Nominto),  rapprochement  with 
Cherry  Society,  92 

Land  tax,  111  n.;  Meiji  period, 
112  n. 

Land  tenure,  107 

Landlords,  Chinese,  127  f. 

Leadership,  political,  weakness  of, 
11 

League  of  Nations,  12,  187  f.,  219; 
Article  11,  13,  15  of  Covenant, 
188  n. 

Left  wing  organizations,  84,  92 

Lese  majesty,  127 

Liao  River,  216 

Liaoyang,  capture  of,  6 

Little  Cherry  Society,  102 

Liu  Tsai-ming,  48 

Liutiaohu,  6 

London  Naval  Conference,  61-79; 
purpose,  61;  impact  on  public 
opinion,  62;  Japan's  "three  fun- 
damental claims,"  63;  Matsu- 
daira-Reed  compromise,  64; 
Navy  proposal,  66;  naval  leaders 
resigned  to  futility  of  opposition, 
67  f.;  Kato  appeals  to  throne,  68 


f.;  Kato  protests  to  Yamanashi, 
69;  "violation  of  supreme  com- 
mand," 71;  legal  battle  over  Ar- 
ticles 11  and  12,  72  ff.;  Privy 
Council  backs  down,  77 

London  Naval  Treaty,  draft  pro- 
posal, 64;  attempt  to  block,  72  n.; 
forces  hands  of  extremists,  79; 
attacked  by  Mori,  80 

Lytton  Report,  6,  163,   165  f. 

Ma  Chan-shan,  General,  206 

Machino  Takema,  Colonel,  16,  49, 
51;  and  railroad  negotiation,  14; 
assures  Chang  Tso-lin  safe  re- 
turn to  Mukden,  48  n.;  ignorant 
of  Komoto's  plot,  49 

"Major  Tanaka's  Notes,"  84,  87, 
195 

Makino  Nobuaki,  Count,  conveys 
Emperor's  wishes  to  Okada,  76 

Malcontents,  83 

Manchuria,  24,  123;  occupation  of, 
9;  dismembered  from  China 
proper,  22;  natural  resources,  23; 
and  Japan's  security,  25;  abor- 
tive occupation  of,  37  ff.;  lacking 
in  petroleum  resources,  133; 
master  plans  for  occupation  of, 
139  ff.;  local  war  lords  in,  175 
n.;  occupation  of,  231 

Manchurian  crisis,  245 

Manchurian  Incident,  44  n.  See  also 
Mukden  Incident 

Manchurian  problems,  14,  99;  set- 
tlement of,  95;  immediate  action 
advocated  in  solution  of,  101; 
manifesto  concerning,  132 

March  Plot,  83-95,  99,  195;  plans 
for,  88  f.;  mock  bombs  for,  92; 
causes  for  collapse  of,  93  ff.,  99; 
defectors  within  Ugaki  faction, 
95;  participants,  98  n.;  no  link 
with  Mukden  Incident,  99 

Maruyama  Masao,  116  n.,  233  n. 


268 


INDEX 


Matsudaira-Reed  compromise,  64 
ff. 

Matsui  Iwane,  Lieutenant  General, 
34  n.,  220  n. 

Matsui  Nanao,  Lieutenant  General, 
14  n.,  51 

Matsuoka  Yosuke,  13  n.,  51,  57  n. 

May  15  Incident  (Go-ichi-go  Jiken) 
(1932),  73,  74  n. 

Mazaki  Jinzaburo,  General,  in- 
censed by  March  Plot,  94  ff.;  and 
Ugaki  clique,  95  n. 

Meiji  government,  policy  goal,  112 
f. 

Militarists,  106 

Military,  22,  92  n.,  144;  leadership, 
viii;  expeditions,  26  f.,  27  n.,  35 
f.,  231;  retired  officers,  65;  rise 
of,  86;  government,  140  f.;  spies, 
145;  operations  in  Northern 
Manchuria,  206  ff.;  objections  to 
operations,  212;  hegemony,  239 

Minami  Jiro,  General,  17,  106,  177, 
190,  198  f.,  210  f.,  217,  220; 
cross-examined  by  Wakatsuki,  7; 
advocates  reinforcements,  8;  de- 
nounces weak-kneed  diplomacy, 
104  f.;  budgetary  agreement  re- 
buffed, 106;  summoned  to  palace, 
154;  sets  forth  army's  views,  174; 
promises  no  independent  action, 
182  f.;  unsuccessfully  attempts  to 
remain  in  post,  203 

Minobe  Tatsukichi,  Professor,  in- 
terprets relevancy  of  Constitution 
Articles  11  and  12  to  London 
Naval   agreement,  72 

Minseito,  18,  80,  221,  227,  246; 
reaction  to  Minami's  speech,  105 

MinseitS  government,  relief  mea- 
sures by,  110 

Mitsubishi,  135 

Mitsui,  135 

Mitsui  Seikichi,  Colonel,  102 

Miyake  Mitsuharu,  Major  General, 


9,  135;  briefed  in  Tokyo,  137 

Miyazaki  Report,  141  f. 

Mobilization  order,  issued  by 
Itagaki,    166 

Moderates,  97.  See  also  Gradualism 

Modernization,  235 

Mongolia,  24 

Mori  Kaku,  viii,  19  n.,  57  n.,  59,  82, 
89,  123  ff.,  205,  220  n.,  223,  225 
f.,  226  n.,  229;  and  Suzuki  Teii- 
chi,  13  n.;  Tanaka  tells  Debuchi 
to  disregard  Mori,  17  n.;  visits 
Wuhan  government,  18  n.;  dis- 
patches first  expedition  to  Shan- 
tung, 19  f.;  sponsors  Second 
Eastern  Regions  Conference, 
22  ff.;  and  South  Manchuria 
Railway,  23;  proposals  at  Dairen 
Conferences,  28  f.;  sends  second 
expedition  to  Shantung,  34  f.;  at- 
titude toward  China,  35  f.;  forces 
decision  to  occupy  Manchuria, 
39;  suspends  session  investigating 
death  of  Chang  Tso-lin,  59; 
questions  Harada,  69  n.;  attempt 
to  discredit  government  in  Diet, 
81;  plan  for  putsch,  82;  and 
March  Plot,  88;  as  political  op- 
portunist, 89;  tours  Manchuria 
amidst  crisis,  147  ff.;  decorated 
posthumously  for  pushing  Jap- 
an's cause  in  Manchuria,  149;  ad- 
vocates withdrawal  from  League 
of  Nations,  231 

Morishima  Goro,  189 

Morishima  Morito,  140,  151,  154, 
164    f. 

Mukden,  41;  Hirata  leads  attack 
on  walled  city,  4 

Mukden  Incident,  1-6,  99,  151-70, 
246;  principal  actors,  132—43; 
portents  of  military  action,  152; 
question  of  premeditated  date, 
152 

Muranaka  Koji,   197 


INDEX 


269 


Muraoka  Chotaro,  Lieutenant  Gen- 
eral, 39,  42,  44  f.,  51;  punished 
by  administrative  action,  59 

Musanto  (proletarian  party),  92 

Mussolini,  Benito,  97 

Muto  Akira,  Colonel,  98 

Muto  Nobuyoshi,   General,   9 

Nagamine  Yasuo,  Lieutenant,  160, 
166 

Nagata  Tetsuzan,  Colonel,  84  n., 
94,  101,  172;  plans  phase  two  of 
March  Plot,  89;  confides  March 
Plot  to  fellow  officers,  94;  assas- 
sinated, 95  n. 

Nakamura  Shintaro,  Captain,  inci- 
dent of,  144^17,  150  f. 

Nakano  Seigo,  224,  227 

Nanking  government,  2  n.,  33  n., 
53.  125.  See  also  Nationalist  gov- 
ernment 

Nanking  Incident  (1927),  12  f. 

National  defense,  80,  133,  141 

National  reconstruction,  viii,  97,  98, 
139.  148  n.,  and  Manchurian 
problem.  100  f.,  made  focal  point 
in  1930  Report  on  the  State  of 
the  Nation,   101 

National  socialism,  as  result  of  coup 
d'etat,  135 

Nationalist-Communist  expedition, 
against  northern  war  lords,  17- 
18 

Nationalist  government,  189; 
launches  three-pronged  drive 
against  Northern  armies,  44; 
abrogates  Sino-Japanese  com- 
mercial treaty,  54;  rapproche- 
ment with  Mukden  regime,  56; 
refers  Captain  Nakamura  case  to 
League  of  Nations,  146.  See  also 
Nanking  government 

Naval  General  Staff,  62,  70,  73,  78, 
102;  opposition  to  government 
over  draft  proposal,  65;  and  Ar- 


ticles 11  and  12,  70;  procedural 
precedence,  71  n.;  controversy 
with  government  over  armament, 
72 

Navy,  187  n.;  and  "violation  of  su- 
preme command,"  71  f.;  opera- 
tions in  Far  Eastern  waters,  79 

Nemoto  Hiroshi,  Lieutenant  Colo- 
nel, 87,  98  n.,   198  f. 

Nine  Power  Pact,  41  n. 

Ninomiya  Harushige,  Lieutenant 
General,  84 

Nishida  Zei,   194 

Noda  Sukuo,  Lieutenant,  4 

Nonni  River,  208;  bridges  over,  211 

Norman,  E.  Herbert,   112 

North  Barracks,  3  f.,  134 

North  China,   141 

Northeast   Political   Council,    125 

Northern  Army,  44.  See  also  Feng- 
tien  Armies 

Northern  Expedition,  17  ff.,  27  n., 
33  n. 

Obata  Torikichi,  Ambassador,  189: 
Nanking  refuses  as  Minister,  121 

October  Plot,  194-204;  causes  of 
collapse,  196-99,  202  f.;  effect 
on  Foreign  Office,  203  ff. 

Ohashi  Chuji,  215 

Okada  Keisuke,  Admiral,  40,  66; 
dissuades  Kato  from  resigning, 
69  f.;  informed  of  Emperor's 
wishes,  76;  uses  personal  tie  to 
prevail  over  Kato,  77 

Okawa  Shumei,  viii,  84,  88,  99,  132 
f.,  139,  142,  195;  role  in  March 
Plot,  conversation  with  Ugaki, 
89  f.;  approaches  rightist  and 
leftist  groups,  91  f.;  abandons 
coup,  93;  reconciled  to  priority 
for  internal  reconstruction,  100  f. 

Okura  interest,   14  n.,  51 

Old  China  hands,  and  staff  officers 
of  Kwantung  Army,  14  n. 


270 


INDEX 


Onodera  Chojiro,  Accountant  Gen- 
eral, 177  n. 

Over-reaction,  as  explanation  for 
extremist   actions,   233   f. 

Ozaki  Yoshiharu,  Captain,  and 
plot  against  Chang  Tso-lin,  48 
n.;  ordered  to  demand  mobiliza- 
tion, 50 

Parliamentary  government,  78,  90; 
distrust  of,  117  f. 

Party  government,    135,  229 

Patriots,  self-styled,  vii,  234 

Peasants,  exploited,  11  n.;  upris- 
ings, 1 1 1  n. 

Peking  Declaration,  annex  to  Sino- 
Japanese  Treaty  (1905),   125  n. 

Peking  Tariff  Conference  (1928), 
120 

Penhsihu,  158 

Polarization,  of  society,  106 

Police  power,  130;  used  in  Man- 
churia, 126  ff. 

Popular  movements,  90 

Population,  115  f.;  growth,  109; 
problems,  115  f.;  surplus,  116 

Port  Arthur,  168  f. 

Portsmouth  Treaty  (1905),  130 

"Positive"  policy,  12,  27 

Primary  industries.  See  Income, 
national 

Privy  Council,  12,  62;  considers 
London  Naval  Agreement,  75; 
reverses  stand,  77;  succumbs  to 
ultranationalistic  appeals,   123 

Proletarian  party  (Musanto),  92 

Purchase  of  dollar  funds,  227  ff. 

Putsch,  89 

Pu-yi,  Henry,  208 

Railroad:  negotiations,  16,  31  ff., 
36  f.,  54,  124-27;  rates,  126 

"Railroad  town"  sections  of  Man- 
churian  cities,  1  n.,  130 

"Railway  guards,"  1,  130 


Rengo  News,  discloses  Wang's  in- 
tentions regarding  Manchuria, 
122-23 

Report  on  the  State  of  the  Nation 
(1930),  101 

Rice,  causes  of  depressed  price,  107 
ff. 

Right  wing:  civilians,  65;  organiza- 
tions, 91;  revolutionists,  102,  239. 
See  also  Extremists;  Ultrana- 
tionalists 

Rights,  in  Manchuria,  54,  128,  136, 
144 

"Rights  recovery"  movement,  vii, 
29  f.,  57 

Russell,  Bertrand,  113 

Russia,  212;  Five  Year  Plan,  97 

Russo-Chinese  Agreement  (1896), 
130 

Saburi  Sadao,  Minister,  suicide  of, 
119  ff. 

Sagoya  Tomeo,  78  f. 

Saionji  Kinmochi,  Prince,  173,  184, 
224,  235  ff.;  urges  report  to  Em- 
peror on  circumstances  of 
Chang's  death,  58  f.;  and  Lon- 
don Naval  Conference,  63;  sup- 
ports Wakatsuki,  76;  urges  Ugaki 
not  to  resign,  85  f.;  cautions  Em- 
peror against  commitment  to 
Army's  scheme,  104;  blocks 
Korean  Army  from  crossing 
Yalu,  173 

Saito  Hiroshi,  Ambassador,  23 

Saito  Makoto,  Governor  General, 
and  London  Conference,  76 

Saito  Tsune,  Major  General,  14  n., 
42;  eager  to  occupy  Manchuria, 
38  f.;  rejects  Komoto's  proposal, 
50 

Sakata  Yoshiro,  Lieutenant  Colo- 
nel, 87,  96,  98  n. 

Satsuma,  236  n.,  246 


INDEX 


271 


Second  Eastern  Regions  Confer- 
ence, 21-26;  and  Suzuki,  21  ff.; 
Tanaka  lukewarm  toward,  21 
ff.;  under  Mori's  sponsorship,  22 
ff.;  true  object  of,  23,  25  f. 

Second  Overseas  Fleet,   168 

"Secret  Records  of  Japanese  Re- 
form Movements,"  84,  85  n. 

Seiyiikai,  21,  60,  81,  221,  246;  views 
Northern  Expedition  with  alarm, 
17  f.;  opposes  punishing  Chang's 
assassins,  58;  fracas  with  Min- 
seito,  81;  swayed  by  ultrana- 
tionalistic  appeals,  123 

Seventeen-Member  Peace  Preser- 
vation Committee,  53,  55 

Shanhaikwan,  Army  plot  to  block 
Chang  at,  40 

Shantung,  20,  33;  first  expedition 
to,  19  f.;  second  expedition  re- 
sults in  Tsinan  Incident,  34  f. 

Shibayama  Kaneshiro,  Major,  149; 
sent  by  Chang  Hsueh-liang  to 
Tokyo,  150  f. 

Shidehara  Kijuro,  Baron,  7,  8  n., 
68,  80  ff.,  120,  176,  185,  188, 
190,  217  f.;  conciliatory  policy 
toward  China,  12  f.,  137;  and 
Nanking  Incident,  18;  critical  of 
Tanaka's  China  policy,  54  n.; 
"slip  of  tongue"  incident,  80;  rep- 
rimands Minami,  105  f.;  notes 
disquieting  situation  in  Manchu- 
ria, 154;  expresses  misgivings 
about  Wakatsuki,  173;  negotia- 
tions with  Chiang  Tso-pin,  188; 
abandons  previous  stand  on 
Manchuria,  204 

Shigemitsu  Mamoru,  120,  185;  dif- 
ficulties with  Mori,  35  f.;  negotia- 
tions with  Wang,  121;  proposals 
rebuffed  in  Tokyo,  123 

Shigeto  Chiaki,  Colonel,  87,  98  n.; 
conduct  at  Kinryu-tei,  101 


Shimamoto  Masaichi,  Lieutenant 
Colonel,  3;  receives  order  from 
Itagaki,  161  ff. 

Shimizu  Gyonosuke,  obtains  fund 
from  Tokugawa,  91 

Shimizu  Momokazu,  214 

Shingishu,  171  f.,  178 

Ships,  capital,  62  f. 

Shirakawa  Yoshinori,  General,  19, 
40  n.;  reports  on  Chang's  death  to 
Tanaka,  57  f. 

Shiratori  Toshio,  and  national  re- 
construction, 204;  advocates 
withdrawing  from  League  of  Na- 
tions, 205 

"Shore  duty"  faction,  74  f. 

Silk,  raw,  decline  in  export  price, 
109 

Sino-Japanese  Treaty  (1915),  127 
ff. 

Sino-Japanese  Treaty  of  Peking 
(1905),  loopholes  in,  130  f. 

Sino-Soviet  Agreement  (1924),  131 

Sino-Soviet  clash  (1929),  127 

Social  Democratic  party  (Shakai 
Minshuto),  92 

Societal   strains,   sources,   83 

Sogo  Shinji,  184;  accommodates 
Kwantung  Army,  148  n. 

Solun,  145  f. 

Soong,  T.  V.,  185 

South  Manchuria  Railway  Com- 
pany, 28,  184;  Research  Section, 
139 

Southern  Army,  49.  See  also  Na- 
tionalist Army 

Soviet  Union,  122;  influence  in 
Manchuria,  32  f.;  threat  from, 
141  f.  See  also  Russia 

Standard  of  living,  of  peasants,  109; 
in  villages,  1 15  f. 

Statesmen,  senior,  192 

Stimson,  Henry  L.,  204,  218 

Suetsugu  Nobumasa,  Vice  Admiral, 
67;  opposes  draft  proposal,  65; 


272 


INDEX 


Suetsuga  Nobumasa  (Continued) 
adamant     against     Hamaguchi's 
plea,     69;    under    influence     of 
Hiranuma,  72  n. 

Sugaha  Saburo,  Lieutenant,   102 

Sugiyama  Hajime,  Major  General, 
84  n.,  92  f.,  198;  pleads  with 
Wakatsuki,   181 

Supreme  command,  9,  165,  181 

Supreme  War  Council,  74 

Suzuki  Company,  12 

Suzuki  Kantaro,  Baron,  41,  60; 
dissuades  Prince  Fushimi,  77 

Suzuki  Teiichi,  Lieutenant  Colonel, 
20,  84  n.,  101;  and  Mori,  13  n., 
18  n.;  and  Eastern  Regions  Con- 
ference, 21  ff.;  and  national  re- 
construction, 204;  bears  instruc- 
tions to  keep  Diet  in  turmoil, 
225  f. 

Tachibana  Kosaburo,  116 

Takahashi    Korekiyo,    192 

Takarabe  Takeshi,  Admiral,  64;  re- 
jects Kato's  memorial,  71;  delays 
return  to  Tokyo,  74 

Takeshita  Yoshiharu,  Lieutenant 
Colonel,  48;  encounter  with 
Komoto,  45 

Tamon  Jiro,  Lieutenant  General, 
180,  213 

Tanaka  Giichi,  Baron,  19  n.,  20  n., 
58,  124,  126,  229;  China  policy, 
13,  30;  misgivings  about  first 
expedition  to  Shantung,  19  f.; 
and  Chang  Tso-lin,  20  f.,  37,  50 
f.;  exchange  with  Muto,  25;  and 
Dairen  Conferences,  28;  cabinet, 
33;  second  expedition  to  Shan- 
tung, 34;  vetoes  Mori's  plan  to 
occupy  Manchuria,  40;  views  on 
Nationalist  flag-raising  in  Man- 
churia, 54;  learns  identity  of  as- 
sassin, 55;  retreats  to  less  positive 
policy,  55  f.;  resigns  premiership, 
57  ff.;  death  of,  60 


Tanaka  Kiyoshi,  Major,  87,  97,  98 
n.,  194,  197,  199 

Tanaka  Memorial,  authenticity  of, 
26  n. 

Tanaka  Ryukichi,  Captain,  48,  196; 
testimonies  on  Cho,  Cherry  So- 
ciety, corroborates  Hashimoto's 
statement,  99;  testimony  on  Cho, 
202 

Tani  Masayuki,  36,  219 

Taonan-Anganchi  Railway,  206 

Taonan-Solun  Line,  145 

Taonanfu-Tsitsihar   Railway,   33 

Tariff  autonomy,  Chinese,  119 

Tatekawa  Yoshitsugu,  Major  Gen- 
eral, 84  n.,  133  ff.,  158  f.,  178, 
196,  201;  stands  by  Okawa,  93; 
plans  for  Manchuria,  133;  ques- 
tioned by  Minami,  155;  sides 
with  Honjo,  169;  tiff  with  Umezu, 
213   f. 

Tatung  Line,  125  n. 

Tenancy  disputes,  110  f. 

Thirty-Ninth  Mixed  Brigade,  171, 
178 

Three  Eastern  Provinces,  24,  53, 
79;  status  of  in  1931,  1  n. 

Tientsin,  215  f.;  riots  in,  208 

Tojo  Hideki,  84  n. 

Tokugawa  feudalism,  12 

Tokugawa  Iesato,  192 

Tokugawa  Yoshichika,  role  in 
March  Plot,  9;  pleads  with 
Okawa,  93 

Tomita  Kojiro,  224,  226 

Tomita-Kuhara  Agreement,  224 

Tomiya  Tetsuo,  Major,  encounter 
with  Komoto,  46 

T6sei-ha,  107  n.,  239  n.,  246;  ad- 
vocates gradualism,  95 

Toyama  Mitsuru,  93 

Treaty  of  Peking  (1905),  130;  in- 
equalities of,  30,   122 

Tsang  Shih-yi,  145;  conceals 
Chang's  death,  50 

Tsinan  Incident,  33  ff.,  124 


INDEX 


273 


Tsingtao,    mob    demonstration    in, 

147 
Tsitsihar,    occupied    by    Kwantung 

Army,  213 
Twenty-One  Demands,  2  n.,  29  f., 

121 

Uchida  Yasuya,  148,  184  f. 

Uesugi  Shinkichi,  interpretation  of 
"responsible  ministers,"  73 

Ugaki  clique,  revenge  on  Mazaki, 
95  n. 

Ugaki  Kazunari,  General,  85,  99, 
184,  216  n.;  sends  Suzuki  to  Han- 
kow, 18  n.;  and  Chang's  death, 
50;  and  Minseito  platform,  82; 
and  March  Plot,  85  ff.;  expresses 
concern  to  Shidehara,  87;  con- 
versation with  Okawa,  89  f.;  or- 
ders coup  d'etat  abandoned,  93; 
blocked  from  forming  cabinet  in 
1937,  95  n.;  army  retrenchment 
program  (1925),  102  f. 

Ultranationalism,  92  n.  See  also 
Right  wing 

Ultranationalists,  12  f.,  84,  144;  and 
Minseito  government,  62;  civil- 
ian, 132.  See  also  Activists;  Ex- 
pansionism; Extremists 

Umezu  Yoshijiro,  Lieutenant  Gen- 
eral, exchange  with  Tatekawa, 
214 

Undersea  craft,  tonnage,  65 

United  Nations  Charter,  Article  33, 
188  n. 

United  States,  29,  44  n.,  79,  184; 
cautions  Japan,  37  ff.;  Japan  risks 
war  with,  40.  See  also  America 

Urban-rural  imbalance,  116 

Views  Regarding  Housecleaning  in 
the  Army  (Shukugun  ni  kan- 
suru  Ikensho),  197 

Wachi  Takaji,  Lieutenant  General, 
testimony  of,  99,  200 


Wages,  farm  in  relation  to  urban, 
113  f. 

Wakatsuki  Reijiro,  Baron,  18,  181, 
191,  210  f.,  219;  cross-questions 
Minami,  7;  cabinet,  9,  11,  221; 
prepared  to  resign,  67;  complains 
to  Harada,  173,  193;  calls  on 
senior  statesmen,  192;  resigns, 
226;  reservations  on  parliamen- 
tary government,  235 

Wang,  C.  T.,  120,  122;  cautions 
Japanese  government,  37  f.;  an- 
nounces five  stages  to  recovery  of 
rights,  122 

Wanpaoshan  Incident,  143  f. 

War,  211;  Tanaka  wishes  to  avoid, 
14;  as  solution  to  Manchurian 
problem,  22;  civil,  25;  with 
United  States  and  Great  Britain, 
41 

Washington  Naval  Conference 
(1921-22),  12,  61  f.;  tonnage  re- 
strictions imposed  by,  64 

Wholesale  index,  115 

Wu  Chun-sheng,  General,  42 

Wu  Pei-fu,  32 

Wuhan  government,  18  n.,  246; 
rapprochement  with  Nanking, 
33  n. 

Yalu,  unauthorized  crossing  of  by 
Korean  Army,  170-83 

Yamamoto  Gonbei,  Admiral,  13, 
192 

Yamamoto  J5taro,  proffered  presi- 
dency of  South  Manchuria  Rail- 
way Company,  16;  against  fol- 
lowing decisions  of  Dairen  Con- 
ferences, 30 

Yamamoto  Tatsuo,  Baron,  192 

Yamanashi  Hanzo,  General,  20  f. 

Yamanashi  Katsunoshin,  67  f. 

Yamaoka  Shigeatsu,  Colonel,  up- 
braids Nagata,  93 

Yamaura  Kanichi,  82,  147 


274 


INDEX 


Yang  Yu-ting,  5,  27;  as  possible  suc- 
cessor to  Chang,  5 1  f . 

Yen  Hsi-shan,  18  f.,  33 

Yingkow,  168;  capture  of,  4,  6;  as 
port  of  exit,  125  f. 

Yonai  Mitsumasa,  Rear  Admiral, 
opposes  plan  to  occupy  Man- 
churia, 40  f. 

Yoshida  Shigeru,  23,  28,  30,  35; 
rebuffed  by  Kwantung  Army, 
30  f. 

Yoshimura's  brigade,  172  f. 

Yoshizawa  Kenkichi,  Ambassador, 


27  f.,  189;  and  railroad  negotia- 
tions, 27  f.;  serves  Chang  with 
ultimatum,  37 

Young  officers,  22,  107  n.,  1 17,  197, 
206,  218,  226,  246;  of  Navy,  65; 
of  Kita  faction,  102;  and  de- 
pressed peasantry,  117  f.,  and 
reckless  conduct,  158;  of  Foreign 
Office,  204;  of  K6do-ha.  239 

Yung  Chen,  General,  145,  151 

Zaibatsu,  106,  117,  229,  247.  See 
also  Business  interests 


YALE  STUDIES  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


1.  Robert  E.  Lane,  The  Regulation  of  Businessmen 

2.  Charles    Blitzer,    An    Immortal    Commonwealth:    The    Political 
Thought  of  James  Harrington 

3.  Aaron  Wildavsky,  Dixon-Yates:  A  Study  in  Power  Politics 

4.  Robert  A.  Dahl,   Who  Governs?  Democracy  and  Power  in  an 
American  City 

5.  Herbert  Jacob,  German  Administration  Since  Bismarck:  Central 
Authority  versus  Local  Autonomy 

6.  Robert  C.  Fried,  The  Italian  Prefects:  A  Study  in  Administrative 
Politics 

7.  Nelson  W.  Polsby,  Community  Power  and  Political  Theory 

8.  Joseph  Hamburger,  James  Mill  and  the  Art  of  Revolution 

9.  Takehiko  Yoshihashi,  Conspiracy  at  Mukden:  The  Rise  of  the 
Japanese  Military 


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